JUDGMENT Hon'ble Anjani Kumar Mishra,J. Heard Sri A.A. Khan, learned counsel for the petitioners and Sri O.P. Pandey, learned counsel for the respondents. The writ petition arises out of an objection under section 9A-2 of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act filed by the contesting respondents seeking co-tenancy to the extent of 1/3 in the land in question, which in the basic year record, was recorded in the names of petitioner no. 1, Chhotu and the father of petitioners 2 to 4, namely, Jhagaru, sons of Gajadhar. The claim of the objector was that he was also the son of Gajadhar and hence the claim of co-tenancy to the extent of 1/3rd. The petitioners contested the objection on the ground that Dukhran, the objector, was not son of Gajadhar but the son of Autar and that a suit no. 370 of 1951 was filed by the petitioners under section 59/61 of the Tenancy Act. The said suit was decreed vide judgment and decree dated 28.6.1952, which is final and therefore the same would operate as res judicata between the parties, and the objection was therefore liable to be dismissed. The Consolidation Officer by his judgment and order dated 3.1.1991 allowed the objection. The judgment of the Consolidation Officer was set aside in appeal by the Settlement Officer, Consolidation vide order dated 29.4.2002. The consequential revision filed by the contesting respondents was allowed by the Deputy Director of Consolidation, Maharajganj on 29.4.2002, whereby the judgment of the Consolidation Officer was affirmed and that passed by the Settlement Officer, Consolidation was set aside. Hence this writ petition. In paragraph 13 of the writ petition, the following pedigree has been set up:- Anganoo | _________________________|______________ | | | Autar Gajadhar Harkhu | | Dukharan ______|_________ | | | ____________ Jhagaru Chhotu | | ____________ Molahu Puranmasi | | | Sukai Kishore Jawahar It has been contended by Sri Khan, learned counsel for the petitioners that the pedigree, set up by the contesting respondents, was not admitted by the petitioners, yet the Consolidation Officer recorded a finding that the same was undisputed. He has secondly contended that the judgment of the revenue court in the suit under section 59/61 of the Tenancy Act was final between the parties, as an appeal was filed against the same but the same was subsequently withdrawn and, therefore, the same would operate as res judicata between the parties, and the courts below have committed manifest illegality in holding to the contrary. He has contended that a large number of documents were filed on behalf of the petitioners before the Consolidation Officer but the same were not taken into consideration while deciding the objection. It has lastly been contended that the contesting respondents did not adduce any evidence in support of their claim and, therefore, the impugned judgments are based upon no evidence. Sri O.P. Pandey, learned counsel for the respondents has submitted that the reliance upon the judgment of the suit under section 59/61 of the Tenancy Act, is entirely misconceived. This judgment is said to have been passed on 28.6.1952 by the A.S.D.O., Maharajganj. He has submitted that in 1952, there was no post of A.S.D.O. and that the said post was created for the first time in 1961 when section 18 of the Land Revenue Act was amended. It is therefore the contention of learned counsel for the respondents that the alleged judgment and decree is a forged and fabricated document. The second submission of learned counsel for the respondents is that on the date, the suit was instituted, namely 2.7.1951, the Tenancy Act stood repealed and, therefore, the judgment and decree in the said suit was, is in any case, without jurisdiction apart from being a forged and fabricated document. He has next submitted that in any case the said judgment and decree was never implemented in the revenue record, the maximum limitation for such implementation being three years. He has further submitted that a categorical finding has been returned by the Consolidation Officer that the land in question was acquisition of Gajadhar and that the objector Dukharan is the son of Gajadhar. Upon consideration of the rival submissions, the primary point which arises for consideration, is as to whether the alleged judgment in suit no. 370 of 1951 is a genuine document or not. There is no dispute that this judgment is said to have been passed by the A.S.D.O., Maharajganj on 28.6.1952. Upon consideration of the rival submissions, the primary point which arises for consideration, is as to whether the alleged judgment in suit no. 370 of 1951 is a genuine document or not. There is no dispute that this judgment is said to have been passed by the A.S.D.O., Maharajganj on 28.6.1952. Learned counsel for the respondents has placed The Uttar Pradesh Land Laws Amendment Act 1961 (U.P. Act No. 10 of 1961). Section 2 of this Amendment Act amends section 18 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act 1901 and the amended section 18 reads as follows:- "18. Sub-Divisional Officers and Additional Sub-Divisional Officers-(1) The State Government may place any Assistant Collector of the first class in charge of one or more sub-divisions of a district, and may remove him therefrom. (2) Such Assistant Collector shall be called an Assistant Collector in-charge of a sub-division of a district or a Sub-Divisional Officer and shall exercise all the powers and discharge all the duties conferred and imposed upon him by this Act or by any other law for the time being in force, subject to the control of the Collector. (3) The State Government may designate any Assistant Collector of the first class appointed to a district to be Additional Sub-Divisional Officer in one or more sub-divisions of the district. (4) The Additional Sub-Divisional Officer shall exercise such powers and perform such duties of an Assistant Collector in-charge of a sub-division of a district in such cases or classes of cases as the State Government may direct. (5) The provisions of this Act and of every other law for the time being applicable to a Sub-Divisional Officer shall apply to every Additional Sub-Divisional Officer when exercising any powers of discharging any duties under sub-section (4) as if he were a Sub-Divisional Officer. (6) The State Government may delegate its powers under this section to the Collector of the district and may revoke such delegation." Section 18 prior to its amendment read as follows:- 18. (1) The Local Government may place any Assistant Collector of the first class in charge of one or more sub-divisions of a district and may remove him therefrom. (6) The State Government may delegate its powers under this section to the Collector of the district and may revoke such delegation." Section 18 prior to its amendment read as follows:- 18. (1) The Local Government may place any Assistant Collector of the first class in charge of one or more sub-divisions of a district and may remove him therefrom. (2) Such Assistant Collector shall be called an Assistant Collector in charge of a sub-division of a district, and shall exercise all the powers and discharge all the duties conferred and imposed upon him by this Act, or by any other law for the time being in force, subject to the control of the Collector. (3) The Local Government may delegate its powers under this section to the Collector of the district, and may revoke such delegation." From a perusal of the provisions of section 18 as it stood prior to the amendment in 1961 and post such amendment clearly reveals that there was no post of A.S.D.O. in existence in the year 1952, when the suit filed by the petitioners is alleged to have been decreed and, therefore, the said judgment, which is alleged to have been passed by the A.S.D.O., is prima facie a got up document. No reliance therefore can be placed upon the same. For the same reason, this alleged judgment shall not operate as res judicata between the parties and, therefore, the submission made by learned counsel for the petitioners in this regard cannot be accepted, and the same is repelled. The respondent no. 1 as also the Consolidation Officer have recorded categorical findings in favour of the contesting respondents granting them co-tenancy rights to the extent of 1/3 in the property in question, and learned counsel for the petitioners has not been able to point any illegality or perversity in the same. The writ petition therefore is devoid of merits and is liable to be dismissed and is accordingly dismissed. ——————