Hon'ble GUPTA, J.—This second appeal under Section 100 CPC has been filed against the judgment and decree dated 14.1.1981 passed by District Judge, Sikar whereby the appellate court has affirmed the judgment and decree of the trial court dated 11.4.1977 passed by Munsiff, Sikar by which suit of plaintiff appellant for possession, injunction and redemption of mortgage has been dismissed. 2. The short facts of the case leading to this appeal are that plaintiff appellant Bhure Khan filed a suit inter alia pleading that he is adopted son of Dule Khan and in possession of the property belonging to Dule Khan and in Sikar District and Sikar City for adoption and marriage ceremonies like Hindus are being performed by custom. The further contention in the suit was that disputed property is in permissive possession of the defendant and inspite of reminders, he has not vacated the suit property hence the suit has been lodged. Per contra, the contention of the defendant was that he is in possession of the property since 1984 as the property has been mortgaged to him for a sum of Rs. 1886/-. Present appellant is not the adopted son of Dule Khan and there is no custom of adoption in Muslims at Sikar. Plaintiff is the son of Kamruddin Khan. The court below has dismissed the suit mainly on the ground that present appellant is not the adopted son of Dule Khan and there is no such customs in Muslims at Sikar District to have adoption like Hindus. The appellate court has also affirmed the findings of court below as regards to adoption and confirmed the view that appellant is not the adopted son of Dule Khan but appellate court has held that in Muslims, in District Sikar there are customs for adoption like Hindus and now it is the admitted case between the parties that suit property is in possession of the respondents by virtue of mortgage for a sum of Rs. 1886/-. The contention of the present appellant is that adoption is about 50 years old and it cannot be possible for a party to adduce strict evidence for the same. The present appellant is treated as son of Dule Khan in the society and on the basis of probabilities, the court must hold that he is adopted son of Dule Khan. The contention of the present appellant is that adoption is about 50 years old and it cannot be possible for a party to adduce strict evidence for the same. The present appellant is treated as son of Dule Khan in the society and on the basis of probabilities, the court must hold that he is adopted son of Dule Khan. All the witnesses of the plaintiff are of same community have stated that present appellant Bhure Khan has been treated in the society as the adopted son of Dule Khan and the court below has not considered this aspect of the matter. Specific evidence as regards to adoption has been produced. PW.3 Samshed Hussain and PW.8 Ibrahim are the eye witnesses of the adoption. PW.8 Ibrahim is Dule Khan's daughter's son inspite of this, he has stated against his right. The court below has not considered the documents Ex. 1 and Ex. 2 Ex. 2 document is of the year 1944, genuineness of which cannot be disputed. The property of Dule Khan situated in Fatehpur has been transferred in his name. He is in possession of other property of Dule Khan. His sisters, daughter of Dule Khan has not objected as regards to this status and further the contention of the appellant is that before the appellate court he has moved an application under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC which has been wrongly rejected by the court below. He has placed three documents vide the application. One is his service book, patta of property at Fatehpur in his favour and Khasra Abadi of Sikar which are relevant and significant documents to prove his status but court below has not admitted the documents and findings are perverse. Further his contention is that court also he has moved three applications under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC. In the earlier application, certified copies of the documents have been produced, thereafter he could get the original documents from the concerned court and original documents have been produced by way of another application. Alongwith the application dated 9.9.1999, seven letters have been produced which are written by various persons to the appellant treating him son of Dule Khan. In the earlier application, certified copies of the documents have been produced, thereafter he could get the original documents from the concerned court and original documents have been produced by way of another application. Alongwith the application dated 9.9.1999, seven letters have been produced which are written by various persons to the appellant treating him son of Dule Khan. Original writing of wife of Dule Khan dated 13.11.1946 has also been produced which shows the fact of adoption and agreement dated 11.10.1051 by his natural father which states that Bure Khan had been given in adoption to Dule Khan and by another application dated 7.9.1999 under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC, he has produced his Nikhanama in which his father's name has been entered as Dule Khan be taken on record. Per contra the contention of the respondent is that both the courts had concurrently held that appellant is not the adopted son of Dule Khan and relevant issue No. 1 has been decided against the appellant by concurrent finding of both the courts below and there is no perversity in the impugned judgment and as regards applications under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC, his contention is that admittedly all documents which the present appellant wants to produce are within the knowledge of the appellant from the inception but they have not been produced before the courts below appeal has been filed in the year 1981 whereas the impugned applications have been filed after a considerable delay and nothing has been shown that why these documents had not been produced before the court below. His further contention is that all the documents are forged one. In suit and in the statement of the PW.1 Bure Khan there is no mention of any of the documents. The appellant has applied for patta of the disputed property before the authorities which was objected by respondent vide Ex. A/2 on 11.3.1947 and reply to the objections has been filed by the appellant as Ex. A/4 in which there is no mention that Dule Khan has taken the appellant in adoption. The appellant has applied for patta of the disputed property before the authorities which was objected by respondent vide Ex. A/2 on 11.3.1947 and reply to the objections has been filed by the appellant as Ex. A/4 in which there is no mention that Dule Khan has taken the appellant in adoption. Per contra, the contention was that he resided with Dule Khanand after his death Naseeban wife of Dule Khan has adopted him vide document dated 15.11.96 and in spite of opportunities and adjournments Naseeban wife of Dule Khan and alleged documents of 15.11.1956 has not been produced before the authorities and proceedings were disposed of with the direction to approach the civil court and no patta was issued to the appellant. PW.1 Bure Khan has not stated a word as regards to adoption in his examination-in-chief, even in suit nothing has been pleaded as regards to fact of adoption. It was duty of plaintiff to plead material facts as regards to adoption which has not been done. Objections were raised by the respondents in March, 1947 and present suit has been filed after about 18 years in 1968. Documents could not be taken on record to force the respondents to play a new inning. There is no perversity in the impugned judgment and appeal is liable to be dismissed. 3. Heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the judgments and decree under appeals as well as the original record of the case. 4. The present appeal has been admitted on 17.11.1982 on the following substantial questions of law:- "(i) Whether the finding of the Lower appellate court to the effect that the plaintiff-appellant has failed to prove the factum of adoption by the Dhula Khan is perverse and is vitiated by an erroneous approach to this problem? (ii) Whether a customary adoption amongst the Muslims of the area to which the parties belong does not require any particular form or ceremony for its validity?" 5. The star question in the matter is as regards to issue No. 1 because as regards substantial question No. 2, the evidence speaks that there is no particular form or ceremony prescribed for adoption by way of customs in Muslims some has said that it is the custom that sweets will be distributed. The star question in the matter is as regards to issue No. 1 because as regards substantial question No. 2, the evidence speaks that there is no particular form or ceremony prescribed for adoption by way of customs in Muslims some has said that it is the custom that sweets will be distributed. Some has said that after the death of adoptive father society accepts the adoptive son as his/her by giving him turban and some has stated that turban was to be offered by concerned Thikana, maternal and paternal sides of the person. Thus, witnesses are consistent on the point that no specific ceremony is provided for customary adoption amongst the Muslims and both the counsel for the parties has also agreed to it hence no further consideration on this point is necessary and question No.2 is answered accordingly that no cere-mony or form is prescribed amongst the Muslims for the customary adoption. 6. Both the counsel for the parties are also consented to the fact that it is a admitted fact between the parties that disputed property is in possession of respondents by virtue of mortgage. Before coming to question No. 1 consideration of applications under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC is essential. 7. The first application which was presented before the appellate court below was for three documents. First is copy of service book of the appellant, patta which has been issued in favour of the present appellant as regards the other properties and Khasra Abadi. The court below has considered that all the three documents were in the knowledge of the appellant but nothing has been said that why all the three documents have not been produced before the court below and apart from this, the other pertinent reason has been given by the appellate court that all the three documents are of later than 1947 when respondent has challenged the factum of adoption, duplicate service book which has been placed on record contains verification in 1956 when name of father of the appellant has been written Dule Khan which has no significance in the matter as it is the documents prepared after the objections raised by the respondent. The patta in reference to Fatehpur property is also of 1948 and same is the situation with Kahsra Abadi hence the court below has rightly declined to accept the documents when nothing has been shown by the appellant that why documents has not been produced before the court below. It was the duty of the appellant to establish that inspite of due diligence, he could not produce the documents, all three documents are with the power and possession of the appellant but they have not been produced. 8. Here in the present case Nikhanama and other documents has been placed by way of applications under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC, but nothing has been shown that why these documents which are in possession and knowledge of the appellant have not been produced earlier, not a single world has been said for non production of the documents earlier. Apart from this, in suit nothing has been mentioned as regards to these documents. The plaintiff himself or any other witness has stated nothing as regards to these documents in their statements before the court. The existence of the documents have not been pleaded. The respondent has very categorically objected as regards to Nikhanama that it is a forged documents as Nikhanama is alleged to be of February, 1946 and Hijary Samvat 1365 whereas the form of Nikhanama has been printed in Samvat 14. His further contention is that in objection raised at Ex. A/4 the documents written by Naseeban is stated to be of 15.11.1946 whereas by the application under Order 41 Rule 27 the document which sought to be produced is of 13.11.1946 and interestingly the contention of the appellant is that by virtue of the document the mother of Dule Khan has taken him in adoption on 13.11.1946 whereas Kamruddin gave him in adoption vide document dated 11.10.1951. Both these documents could not go hand in hand. One cannot take the child in adoption unless it has been given by the natural father when the case of the appellant is that natural father has given him in adoption in 1951 how can he be taken in adoption in 1946. 9. Both these documents could not go hand in hand. One cannot take the child in adoption unless it has been given by the natural father when the case of the appellant is that natural father has given him in adoption in 1951 how can he be taken in adoption in 1946. 9. Apart from it, in Ex.A/4 it has been alleged by the appellant that Naseeban has taken him in adoption whereas in suit the case of the appellant is that Dule Khan has taken him in adoption and that too when he was seven years old. Hence, there are number of contradictions in the case pleaded and proved. 10. The contention of the appellant is that documents he wanted to place before this court under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC are significant to decide the controversy and to do complete justice the documents should be taken on record so the judgment can be pronounced more satisfactorily. Reliance has been placed on H.P. Vedavyasachar vs. Shivashankara & Anr., (2009) 8 SCC 231 where scope of Order 41 Rule 27 has been explained that without setting aside the findings, the additional evidence could be taken on record. There is no dispute about this legal proposition. Further reliance has been placed on North Eastern Railway Admn. Gorakhpur vs. Bhagwan Das (dead) by LRs. (2008) 8 SCC 511 wherein it has been held as under:- "The High Court was bound to consider the application under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC before taking up the appeal on merits. The question whether looking into the documents, sought to be filed as additional evidence, would be necessary to pronounce judgment in a more satisfactory manner, has to be considered by the Court at the time of hearing of the appeal on merits. Though the general rule is that ordinarily the appellate court should not travel outside the record of the lower court and additional evidence, whether oral or documentary is not admitted but Section 107 C.P.C., which carves out an exception to the general rule, enables an appellate court to take additional evidence or to require such evidence to be taken subject to such conditions and limitations as may be prescribed. These conditions are prescribed under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC." 11. Further reliance has been placed on State of Raj. These conditions are prescribed under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC." 11. Further reliance has been placed on State of Raj. vs. T.N. Sahani & Ors., (2001) 10 SCC 619 and A.P. State Wakf Board Hyderabad vs. All India Shia Conference (Branch), A.P. & Ors., AIR 2000 SC 1751 and contention of the appellant is that looking to the provision of Order 41 Rule 27 CPC documents should be admitted. Per contra the contention of the respondent is that the power under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC cannot be invoked to patch up the weakness of evidence of unsuccessful party and reliance has been placed on K.R. Mohan Reddy vs. Net Work Inc. represented through MD, (2007) 14 SCC 257 . Further reliance has been placed on Sadhu Ram vs. Ghasi Ram, 2001 DNJ (Raj.) 535 where it has been held that documents were in the knowledge of the applicant during trial and they have been mentioned and discussed but same has not been produced before the High Court then there is no justification to accept the documents. Further reliance has been placed on K.R. Mohan Reddy vs. M/s. Net Work Inc. Rep. Tr. M.D., 2007 DNJ (SC) 1070 wherein it has been held that a good reason must be shown as to why the evidence was not produced in the trial Court and held as under:- "In the circumstances, the learned counsel for the appellant, reiterated the claim made before the High Court that they should be permitted to adduce further evidence before the court to substantiate their claim but when the matters were pending before the Trial Court and the High Court they had ample opportunity to do so. If they had to produce appropriate documents, they could have done so and also it is not clear as to the nature of the documents which they seek to produce which will tilt the matter one way or the other. The scope of Order XLI, Rule 27, CPC is very clear to the effect that the parties to an appeal shall not be entitled to produce additional evidence, whether oral or documentary, unless they have shown that in spite of due diligence, they could not produce such documents and such documents are required to enable the court to pronounce proper judgment." 12. Here in the present case, no reason much less good reason has been shown by the appellant. Here in the present case, no reason much less good reason has been shown by the appellant. Admittedly, all the documents were in his knowledge as regards some documents, objections have been raised by the respondent before the municipality way back in 1947 but the present appellant has not chosen to produce the documents. Further reliance has been placed on Karnataka Board of Wakf vs. Government of India & Ors., 2004 DNJ (SC) 920 wherein it has been held that during appeal, additional evidence is not permissible unless required by the Court to pronounce the proper judgment, hence the ceritria is that whether impugned documents are necessary for pronouncement of proper judgment or pronounced the judgment in a more satisfactorily manner, it has been explained by the Apex Court in State of Gujarat vs. Mahendrakumar Parshottambhai Desai, (2006) 9 SCC 772 as under: "....though the appellate Court has the power to allow a document to be produced and a witness to be examined under Order XLI Rule 27 CPC, the requirement of the said Court must be limited to those cases where it found it necessary to obtain such evidence for enabling it to pronounce judgment. This provision did not entitle the appellate court to let in fresh evidence at the appellate stage where even without such evidence it can pronounce judgment in the case. It does not entitle the appellate court to let in fresh evidence only for purposes of pronouncement of judgment in a particular way." 13. In view of the above, the applications under O.41 R. 27 CPC deserve to be dismissed as the appellant has not stated anything that why the evidence was not produced in the trial court and evidence is not necessary for the pronouncement of judgments, it is not the duty of this Court to call fresh evidence to pronounce a judgment in a particular way. The documents are not needed for proper pronouncement of judgment and court will not patch up the weakness of the evidence of the appellant in view of above the applications presented by the appellant under O. 41 R. 27 CPC are dismissed. 14. As regards merits of the case, the contention of the appellant is that finding on Issue No. 1 suffers from perversity. 14. As regards merits of the case, the contention of the appellant is that finding on Issue No. 1 suffers from perversity. His contention is that from the statement of PW.1 Bheru Khan and other witnesses of the plaintiff it is amply proved that he is the adoptive son of Dule Khanand all the witnesses has stated that they are treating the appellant as his adoptive son and his contention is that when the adoption is old one, the concrete evidence could not be procured and reliance has been placed on L.Debi Prasad vs. Smt. Tribeni Devi & Ors., 1970 (1) SCC 677 wherein it has been held that when adoption has taken place and questioned years after, the slightest evidence would be sufficient in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, that adoption is valid. There cannot be any dispute about the legal proposition but here in the present case, adoption has not been questioned year back. The facts of the case speak itself that in 1947, the status of the present appellant has been objected and at that time, the alleged mother, wife of Dule Khan was also alive but she has not been produced before the authorities. 15. Further reliance has been placed on Moti Lal & Ors. vs. Sardar Mal & Ors., AIR 1976 Raj. 40 wherein it has been held that when an adoptive son has been recognized in the family for a number of years, the presumption can be drawn in favour of adoption. Here in the present case, nothing has been proved that the present appellant is recognised in the family as adoptive son. Admittedly, he never resided with Dule Khan as PW.8 Ibrahim, the star witness of the appellant has stated that Dule Khan died in Sikar and he brou-ght Bhure Khan with him to Sikar. He has also stated that Dule Khan remained ill but at that time, the present appellant was with him has not been stated. Thus, the very fact negative the factum of adoption that inspite of assertion of the appellant that in age of 7 years, he has been adopted, still he was not living with Dule Khan which negatives the fact of adoption. Further reliance has been placed on Nandkishore vs. Brij Behari AIR 1955 Raj. 65 where the facts were quite different. Thus, the very fact negative the factum of adoption that inspite of assertion of the appellant that in age of 7 years, he has been adopted, still he was not living with Dule Khan which negatives the fact of adoption. Further reliance has been placed on Nandkishore vs. Brij Behari AIR 1955 Raj. 65 where the facts were quite different. During the life time of adoptive father, documents have been framed entirely upon the basis of adoption. Here in the present case, no such documents has been produced which shows that in the life time of Dule Khan, the present appellant was recognized as his adoptive son. Further reliance has been placed on Kailash Candra Nag & Ors. vs. Bejoy Chandra Nag & Ors., AIR 1923 Cal. 18 wherein it has been held that slight evidence is sufficient to prove adoption where the adoptive son has been treated as such for long years. Here plaintiff has examined witnesses essentially on the point that he has been treated as adoptive son in the society, but plaintiff himself has not stated that he has resided with his adoptive father or Dule Khan has ever taken him in adoption in his life time. PW/3 Samshad Hussain has been improved himself as eye witness to the adoption ceremony in his cross-examination, but none other has confirmed the statement of PW.3 Samshad Hussain. PW.8 Ibrahim who is the real elder brother of the appellant, has stated that he brought sweets from Fatehgarh but even the plaintiff has not stated that Ibrahim, PW.8 or Samshad Hussain, PW.3 were there at the time of adoption or whether any ceremony of adoption has taken place in the life time of Dule Khan. The other contention of the appellant is that documents Ex. 1 and 2 has not been relied upon by the courts below. Ex. 1 is a notice of Executive Officer given to present appellant in 1952. Admittedly, the objections were pending before the Municipal Board, Sikar at that time, hence these documents has no significance as regards the factum of adoption, the other document is Ex. 2 which is bona fide resident certificate which could only certifies the residence of a particular person. This cannot be taken as certificate as regards the pater-nity of a person, hence both these documents have no bearing on the issue. 2 which is bona fide resident certificate which could only certifies the residence of a particular person. This cannot be taken as certificate as regards the pater-nity of a person, hence both these documents have no bearing on the issue. The further contention of the appellant is that facts narrated by PW.8 Ibrahim as regards adoption have not been cross-examined and hence they should be taken as true and reliance has been placed on Mishri Bai vs. Krishna Lal Chaddha, RLW 1997(2) Raj. 884 and Traders Syndicate vs. Union of India, AIR 1983 Cal. 337 . But looking to the overall consideration of the courts below, contention is not acceptable, no perversity has been shown in the concurrent findings of fact recorded by both the courts below. 16. Further reliance has been placed by the appellant on Boodireddy Chandraiah & Ors. vs. Arigela Laxmi & Anr., AIR 2008 SC 380 wherein it has been held as under:- "It will, therefore, depend on the facts and circumstances of each case whether a question of law is a substantial one and involved in the case, or not; the paramount overall consideration being the need for striking a judicious balance between the indispensable obligation to do justice at all stages and impelling necessity of avoiding prolongation in the life of any lis." 17. Here in the present case the overall consideration of the evidence reveals that findings of courts below are based on proper appreciation of evidence and no perversity has been shown. 18. Respondent has relied upon Ramchandra Pandurang Sonar (deceased by LRs) & Ors. vs. Murlidhar Ramchandra Sonar & Ors., AIR 1990 SC 1973 , Madhavan Nair vs. Bhaskar Pillai (dead) by LRs (2005) 10 SCC 553; H.P. Parejan vs. Dasappa (dead) by LRs & Ors., (2006) 2 SCC 496 ; Parsini (dead) through LRs.vs. Atma Ram & Ors., AIR 1996 SC 1558 = RLW 1996(2) SC 82; Dr. Ranbir Singh vs. Asharfi Lal, 1995(3) CCC 482 = RLW 1995(2) SC 139; and Ramaswamy Kalingaryar vs. Mathayan Pandayachi, AIR 1992 SC 115 where the scope of second appeal has been explained that even erroneous findings of fact based on appreciation of evidence should not be interfered with. Ranbir Singh vs. Asharfi Lal, 1995(3) CCC 482 = RLW 1995(2) SC 139; and Ramaswamy Kalingaryar vs. Mathayan Pandayachi, AIR 1992 SC 115 where the scope of second appeal has been explained that even erroneous findings of fact based on appreciation of evidence should not be interfered with. The court is not justified in re appreciating the evidence and substitute its own conclusion, nothing has been shown by the appellant that courts below have ignored any material evidence or any inadmissible evidence has been considered. Much has been said as regards to non consideration of Ex.1 and 2 but as considered earlier, these two documents are not at all relevant as they do not establish the fact of adoption and both the courts below have referred the documents in the judgments which shows that documents have been referred as they are not material, they have not been considered. 19. In the result, there is no merit in the appeal and looking to the concurrent findings of fact of both the courts below, the appeal is liable to be dismissed. The appeal is accordingly dismissed.