JUDGMENT Hon’ble Rajan Roy, J.—Heard Sri Manish Goel and Sri Punit Kumar Gupta, learned for the petitioner, Sri Ashok Khare, learned senior counsel assisted by Sri V.D. Shukla, learned counsel for respondent No. 3 and learned standing counsel for the respondent Nos. 1 and 2. 2. By means of this writ petition, the petitioner-committee of management has challenged an order of the D.I.O.S. dated 18.10.2014, whereby, the said officer has directed the petitioner to reinstate the respondent No. 3 in service as he has been released on bail on 14.8.2014 and the suspension order dated 12.8.2014 not having been approved during the statutory period of 60 days had automatically come to an end in view of Section 16-G(7) of the U.P. Intermediate Education Act, 1921. 3. As there was not much of a factual dispute, therefore, the case was heard at the admission stage and judgment was reserved on 31.10.2014 and the same is being pronounced today. 4. A criminal case was lodged against the respondent No. 3 by his wife under Section 498-A, I.P.C., 3/4 Dowry Prohibition Act, i.e. Crime Case No. 410 of 2005. Charges were framed against him by the Court concerned on 2.9.2008. Advertisement No. 1/2009 was issued for selection of assistant teachers and the respondent No. 3 also applied in pursuance thereof. He was convicted by the trial Court under the aforesaid provisions vide judgment and order dated 12.8.2010. A sentence of two years imprisonment for the offence under Section 498-A, I.P.C., six months’ imprisonment under Section 3/4, Dowry Prohibition Act alongwith Rs. 1000/- as fine was imposed upon him. After the conviction, the respondent No. 3 filed Appeal No. 22 of 2010 before the appellate Court challenging his conviction and sentence imposed by the trial Court, whereupon, he was released on bail in pursuance to the order of the Court dated 16.8.2010. The respondent No. 3 was selected. An intimation of his selection for the petitioner college was sent by the D.I.O.S. on 9.11.2010, in pursuance to which, the appointment letter was issued by the petitioner on 18.11.2010 and on the same date, the respondent No. 3 joined in the institution. The factum of his conviction in the criminal case and pendency of appeal was not disclosed by the respondent No. 3 at any stage. The appeal of the respondent No. 3 came to be dismissed on 15.7.2014. The factum of his conviction in the criminal case and pendency of appeal was not disclosed by the respondent No. 3 at any stage. The appeal of the respondent No. 3 came to be dismissed on 15.7.2014. On 21.7.2014, he applied for sanction of medical leave annexing therewith a discharge slip issued from the District Hospital Banda advising him 20 days bed rest. On 22.7.2014, the respondent No. 3 surrendered on account of dismissal of his appeal and was taken into custody. He remained in jail till 14.8.2014, when he was released in pursuance of an order dated 11.8.2014 passed by the High Court in Criminal Revision No. 2131 of 2014 for enlarging him on bail. Thereafter, a complaint was received by the petitioner from the father in law of the respondent No. 3 informing about his conviction in the criminal case and the proceedings thereafter. The matter being serious, the committee of management resolved to suspend the petitioner. Accordingly, the order dated 12.8.2014 was issued mentioning the respondent No. 3’s conviction in the criminal case as also his incarceration w.e.f. 22.7.2014. Accordingly, he was placed under suspension w.e.f. 22.7.2014. The requisite papers were sent by the petitioner to the D.I.O.S. for his approval on 9.9.2014. In the meantime, it appears that applications dated 19.8.2014, 20.8.2014, 21.8.2014, 26.9.2014 and 13.10.2014 were sent by the respondent No. 3 to the D.I.O.S. for his reinstatement after being released on bail. In pursuance to the decision of the managing committee, disciplinary proceedings were also initiated against the petitioner and a charge-sheet was issued to him on 24.9.2014 containing nine charges, four of which related to the criminal case against him, including the concealment of the said case by the respondent No. 3. On 18.10.2014, a reminder was sent by the petitioner to the D.I.O.S. for taking a decision under Section 16-G(7) of the Act, 1921. On 18.10.2014, a reminder was sent by the petitioner to the D.I.O.S. for taking a decision under Section 16-G(7) of the Act, 1921. On the same date, i.e. 18.10.2014 the impugned order was passed wherein the D.I.O.S. after taking note of the order dated 11.8.2014 passed in Criminal Revision No. 2131 of 2014 ordering release of the respondent No. 3 on bail, his consequent release on 14.8.2014 and also that no approval was granted by the D.I.O.S. within the statutory period of 60 days, has concluded, that the in view of Section 16-G(7) the suspension order had automatically come to an end and further ordered the petitioner to reinstate the respondent No. 3 immediately after cancelling the suspension order. 5. The contention of Sri Manish Goel, learned counsel for the petitioner is that the charges against the respondent No. 3 were very grave and involved moral turpitude, therefore, suspension was justified and as per law. The D.I.O.S. ought to have approved the same, but, he sat over the matter and has ultimately passed the impugned order for reinstatement of the respondent No. 3, which is impermissible and unsustainable in law. As per law, even after expiry of the statutory period of 60 days, the D.I.O.S. can pass an order of approval, which he should have done. In this regard, he relied upon the full bench decision of this Court in the case of Chandra Bhushan Misra v. D.I.O.S., Deoria and others, 1995 (1) UPLBEC 460 . He submitted that the provisions of Section 498A and 3/4, Dowry Prohibition Act involved moral turpitude as is clear from the pronouncements of this Court in the case of Rajendra Prasad Pandey v. High Court of Judicature at Allahabad and another, 1998 (3) UPLBEC 2088 and Udai Shanker Tiwari v. D.I.O.S., Kanpur Nagar and others, 1999 (1) AWC 489 . The respondent No. 3 being a teacher could not be allowed to function. He submitted that the D.I.O.S. could have only approved or disapproved the suspension order, but, he did not have any authority to order reinstatement. In any case, such a direction was not sustainable in the facts of the case. The respondent No. 3 had concealed the factum of his conviction, therefore, for this reasons also, he was not entitled to function as teacher. 6. In any case, such a direction was not sustainable in the facts of the case. The respondent No. 3 had concealed the factum of his conviction, therefore, for this reasons also, he was not entitled to function as teacher. 6. On the other hand, Sri Ashok Khare, learned senior counsel assisted by Sri V.D. Shukla appearing for the respondent No. 3 submitted that even after the conviction, the petitioner continued to work and it is only on 12.8.2014 that he was put under suspension, therefore, there was no reason to interfere with the impugned order of D.I.O.S., which, according to him, did not suffer from any error. As the respondent No. 3 had been released on bail, therefore, he was entitled to reinstatement. He invited the attention of the Court to the provisions of Section 16-G(5) to submit that the case of the respondent No. 3 was not covered by any of the eventualities mentioned in clause a, b and c thereof, therefore, the suspension itself was impermissible and void. The allegations did not relate to the discharge of his official duties as such for this reason also, the suspension was not justified. 7. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 8. The provision relating to suspension of a teacher of an education institution is contained in Section 16-G(5) of the Act of 1921. Sub-section 5 reads as under: “(5) No head of institution or teacher shall be suspended by the Management, unless in the opinion of the Management,- (a) the charges against him are serious enough to merit his dismissal, removal or reduction in rank ; or (b) his continuance in office is likely to hamper or prejudice the conduct of disciplinary proceedings against him ; or (c) any criminal case for an offence involving moral turpitude against him is under investigation, inquiry or trial." 9. Under sub-section 6 of Section 16-G, the committee of management of the institution is required to report the suspension to the D.I.O.S. within seven days from the date of order of suspension after coming into force of the U.P. Secondary Eduction Laws (Amendment) Act, 1975. Under sub-section (7), no such order of suspension shall, unless approved in writing by the Inspector, remain in force more than sixty days from the date of such order. Under sub-section (7), no such order of suspension shall, unless approved in writing by the Inspector, remain in force more than sixty days from the date of such order. Under sub-section (8), if, at any time, the Inspector is satisfied that disciplinary proceedings against the Head of Institution or teacher are being delayed, for no fault of theirs, he may, after affording opportunity to the Management to make representation revoke an order of suspension passed under this section. 10. The order of suspension of the respondent No. 3 dated 12.8.2014 is not referable to clause (a) and (b) of sub-section (5) of Section 16-G as it is not in the context of disciplinary proceedings. The question is; is it referable to clause (c) thereof? As per sub-section 5(c) no head of institution or teacher shall be suspended by the Management, unless in the opinion of the management any criminal case for an offence involving moral turpitude against him is under investigation, inquiry or trial. If a teacher can be suspended during investigation, inquiry or trial as referred therein, then a fortiori, he can also be suspended on conviction for a criminal offence involving moral turpitude, even if, after affirmation of such conviction in appeal, the revision is pending before the High Court, wherein, he has been granted bail. The contention of Sri Khare, to the contrary, is not acceptable. The object of clause (c) is not to allow a teacher charged with an offence involving moral turpitude to come in contact with students, who are of impressionable minds and also to avoid any embarrassment to the teacher himself in the discharge of his duties, therefore, there is no reason as to why the said provision should not be made applicable in a case, where after conclusion of the trial, the teacher has been convicted, even though the provision refers to pendency of investigation, inquiry or trial. Any other view of the matter will lead to an absurdity. The provision has to be read, understood and construed reasonably keeping in mind the object, which it seeks to achieve. Thus, clause (c) applies not only during pendency of investigation, inquiry or trial but also on conviction, conclusion of trial resulting in conviction, as also during pendency of any appeal or revision against such conviction, unless conviction itself has been stayed. Thus, clause (c) applies not only during pendency of investigation, inquiry or trial but also on conviction, conclusion of trial resulting in conviction, as also during pendency of any appeal or revision against such conviction, unless conviction itself has been stayed. A pedantic or narrow view in the matter would be inappropriate, thus, the order of suspension dated 12.8.2014 is referable to sub-section 5(c) of Section 16-G of the Act of 1921. 11. The next question which arises, is whether the offences under Section 498A, I.P.C. and Section 3/4, Dowry Prohibition Act involve moral turpitude? This question is not difficult to answer in view of pronouncements of this Court in the cases in Udai Shanker Tiwari v. District Inspector of Schools, Kanpur Nagar and others, 1999 (1) AWC 489 and Rajendra Prasad Pandey v. High Court of Judicature at Allahabad and another, 1998 (3) UPLBEC 2088 , wherein, the offence under Section 498-A has been held to involve moral turpitude. On the same reasoning, the offence under Section 3/4, Dowry Prohibition Act also involves moral turpitude. Paragraph-15 of the judgment in Udai Shanker Tiwari’s case reads as under: “15. In the instant case, admittedly the petitioner-teacher has been made accused in a case under Sections 304B and 498-A, I.P.C, in connection with which he was also arrested on 22.9.1997, but later on was released on bail by the Sessions Judge. The criminal charge against the petitioner-teacher, though not connected with the position as a teacher of the College, but, if it is such as is likely to embarrass him in the discharge of his duties as teacher, or involves moral turpitude, the Management is well within its power under sub-section (5) to suspend him. The expression ‘moral turpitude’ though has not been defined in the Act. But. In my view, subjecting a woman to cruelty or killing her for or in connection with demand of dowry comes within the purview of the expression ‘moral turpitude’. The order suspending the teacher-petitioner was reported to the District Inspector of Schools within 30 days as required and the District Inspector of Schools having been satisfied, approved his suspension on 26.4.1997. Thus, it cannot be held to be illegal or without jurisdiction.” 12. Paragraphs 5 and 6 of Rajendra Prasad Pandey’s are being quoted below: “5. The expression ‘moral turpitude’ has not been nailed down to the rules. Thus, it cannot be held to be illegal or without jurisdiction.” 12. Paragraphs 5 and 6 of Rajendra Prasad Pandey’s are being quoted below: “5. The expression ‘moral turpitude’ has not been nailed down to the rules. “Moral turpitude”, as held by the Supreme Court in Pawan Kumar v. State of Haryana and others, JT 1996 (5) SC 155, is an expression which is used in legal as also societal parlance to describe conduct which is inherently base, vile, depraved, or having any connection showing depravity. “Killing a person perse may not come within the periphery of ‘moral turpitude’ but subjecting a woman to cruelty and/or killing her for or in connection with demand of dowry, would certainly be an offence involving ‘Moral turpitude’. The expression ‘moral turpitude’ is not a term of a rigid connotation to be defined in any strait-jacket formula, but regard being had to Socio-ethical ethos, and mores of a people, at a given time and their cultural heritage, it would not be difficult for the Courts to conclude if a particular offence involves moral wickedness. According to American Encyclopaedia of Law, anything done contrary to justice, honesty, principle or good morals, an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social duties which a man owes to his fellowmen or society in general ; any thing contrary to accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and man. Involves moral turpitude. In Baleshwar Singh v. District Magistrate and Collector, AIR 1959 All 71 , it was held : “The expression ‘moral turpitude’ is not defined anywhere. But it means anything done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good morals. It implies depravity and wickedness charged with the particular conduct. Every false statement made by a person may not be moral turpitude, but it would be so if it disclose vileness or depravity in the doing of any private and social duty which a person owes to his fellowmen or to the society in general. If therefore the individual charged with a certain conduct owes a duty, either to another Individual or to the society in general to act in a specific manner or not to so act and he still acts contrary to it and does so knowingly, his conduct must be held to be due to vileness and depravity. If therefore the individual charged with a certain conduct owes a duty, either to another Individual or to the society in general to act in a specific manner or not to so act and he still acts contrary to it and does so knowingly, his conduct must be held to be due to vileness and depravity. It will be contrary to accepted customary rule and duty between man and man.” 6. In Mangali v. Chhakki Lal, AIR 1963 All 527 , the term ‘moral turpitude’ was explained as under : “From consideration of the dictionary meaning of the words ‘moral’ and ‘turpitude’ as well as the real ratio decidendi of the cases the principle which emerges appear to be that the question whether a certain offence involves moral turpitude or not will necessarily depend on the circumstances in which the offence is committed. It is not every punishable act that can be considered to be an offence involving moral turpitude. Had that been so, the qualification “involving moral turpitude” would not have been used by the Legislature and it would have disqualified every person who had been convicted of any offence. The tests which should ordinarily be applied for judging whether a certain offence does or does not involve moral turpitude appear to be : (1) whether the act leading to a conviction was such as could shock the moral conscience of society in general. (2) whether the motive which led to the act was a base one and (3) whether on account of the having been committed the perpetrator could be considered to be of a depraved character or a person who was to be looked down upon by the society.” 13. In the cases cited hereinabove, the criminal trial was pending before the Court. In the instant case, the respondent No. 3 has already been convicted and the said conviction has been upheld in appeal against which a criminal revision is pending before the High Court, wherein, he has been ordered to be enlarged on bail, therefore, the aforesaid decisions apply with all the more force in the present case. Mere release of the respondent No. 3 on bail does not entitle him to reinstatement as his conviction has not been stayed. 14. Moreover, the petitioner is a teacher. Mere release of the respondent No. 3 on bail does not entitle him to reinstatement as his conviction has not been stayed. 14. Moreover, the petitioner is a teacher. He is required to maintain the highest level of integrity not only in discharge of his duties but his general reputation, conduct and behaviour is required to be of a level so as to command respect from students. Obligated with the duty to teach tender minds, the antecedents and character of the teacher are relevant factor as the same have a bearing over tender minds, i.e. the students, which is bound to have an impact on the development of their personality. The respondent No. 3 herein did not disclose the factum of his conviction. Even after his conviction was upheld in appeal, he moved an application seeking sanction of medical leave knowing very well that he was going to surrender as he was bound to do. These facts are also indicative of the mindset of the respondent No. 3. His conviction for the offence under Section 498-A, I.P.C. and Section 3/4 Dowry Prohibition Act are also likely to embarrass him in the discharge of his duties as they involve moral turpitude on his part and as the said conviction has not been stayed nor set aside, therefore, the respondent No. 3 could be suspended under sub-section 5(c) of Section 16-G. The order of suspension dated 12.8.2014 refers to his conviction and imprisonment, therefore, being referable to sub-section (5)(c), the same cannot be said to be unjustified or illegal. That though the suspension order refers to the suspension of the respondent No. 3 w.e.f. 22.7.2014 but the fact that it refers to his conviction also leaves no doubt that it is a suspension not only on account of his incarceration but also on account of his conviction in the criminal case as referred above. After the requisite papers were sent to the D.I.O.S., he should have taken a decision thereon within 60 days as is required under sub-section (7), instead, he sat over the matter and, thereafter, passed the impugned order dated 18.10.2014, as already referred hereinabove. In my view, the D.I.O.S. cannot take advantage of his own wrong. After the requisite papers were sent to the D.I.O.S., he should have taken a decision thereon within 60 days as is required under sub-section (7), instead, he sat over the matter and, thereafter, passed the impugned order dated 18.10.2014, as already referred hereinabove. In my view, the D.I.O.S. cannot take advantage of his own wrong. As per the full bench decision in Chandra Bhushan Sharma’s case, if the approval of the D.I.O.S. in writing is not given within 60 days from the date of the order of suspension, it does not cease to exist but only becomes ineffective or inoperative. Even after expiry of 60 days, the D.I.O.S. can grant approval, whereupon, it again becomes effective and operative immediately on such approval. The D.I.O.S. instead of considering the approval or otherwise even after expiry of 60 days has passed the impugned order ordering the reinstatement of the respondent No. 3 on the ground that the suspension has automatically come to an end in view of Section 16-G(7), ignoring the pronouncement of the full bench which permits the grant of such approval even after expiry of 60 days. In my view, the D.I.O.S. has acted illegally, further he had no authority to order reinstatement of the respondent No. 3 without taking any decision as aforesaid, that too, without even affording opportunity to the petitioner and hearing to it. The conviction of the respondent No. 3 under Section 498-A, I.P.C. and 3/4, Dowry Prohibition Act is a serious matter, which could not have been dealt with in such a casual manner by the D.I.O.S. 15. Considering the extraordinary circumstances and the peculiar facts of the case, the impugned order cannot be sustained nor can it be allowed to operate. The same is accordingly quashed. I am of the view that the D.I.O.S. should take a fresh decision in the matter keeping in mind the observations/recitals contained hereinabove within a period of 15 days from the date a certified copy of this order is received by him. For a period of 15 days as aforesaid, the status quo as regards the functioning of the respondent No. 3 shall be maintained. If the disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner have not been concluded as yet, the same shall be concluded within a period of six months. 16. With the aforesaid observations, the writ petition is allowed. ——————