JUDGMENT Hon’ble Ran Vijai Singh, J.—Heard Sri Yashwant Varma, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Sri Rohan Gupta, learned counsel for the petitioner, learned Standing Counsel appearing for the State-respondents and learned counsel for the Gaon Sabha. 2. The amendment application is allowed. Learned counsel for the petitioner is permitted to amend the writ petition during the course of the day. 3. In substance, the petitioner appears to be aggrieved by the order dated 31.1.2014 passed by the Chief Revenue Officer in revision No. 16/27 of 2013-14 (Hindustan Coca-Cola Beverages Pvt. Ltd. v. State and others) by which the petitioner’s application, seeking stay of the operation of the order dated 16.12.2013 passed by the Tehsildar/Assistant Collector in case Nos. 186/410 of 2013, 411 of 2013, 433 of 2013 and 256 of 2013 (Report Lekhpal v. Hindustan Coca-Cola Beverages Pvt. Ltd.), has been rejected. vide order dated 16.12.2013, the proceeding initiated against the petitioner under Section 122-B of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 (in short ‘the Act’) has been allowed ex parte without there being any version of the petitioner. Challenging this order, the petitioner has filed revision which has been numbered as revision No. 16/27 of 2013-14 (Hindustan Coca-Cola Beverages Pvt. Ltd. v. State and others). In the aforesaid revision, the petitioner has filed an application praying the stay of the operation of the order dated 16.12.2013 by which the eviction order has been passed against the petitioner and a damages to the tune of Rs. 1,24,590/- has been imposed. The stay application has been rejected holding it to be not maintainable as there is no provision under the Act to pass an interim protection. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner states that the view taken by the Assistant Collector is unsustainable in the eye of law as even if it is assumed that under the Act, there is no provision for moving a stay application, the provisions of Section 341 of the Civil Procedure Code are applicable in the proceedings initiated under the Act. Otherwise also, if the statutory remedy against an order of eviction and imposition of damages has been provided under the Act, in that eventuality, the Court has inherent power to stay the execution of the order against which revision or appeal has been filed. Otherwise, filing of revision/appeal would be futile exercise. Otherwise also, if the statutory remedy against an order of eviction and imposition of damages has been provided under the Act, in that eventuality, the Court has inherent power to stay the execution of the order against which revision or appeal has been filed. Otherwise, filing of revision/appeal would be futile exercise. In support of his submissions, learned counsel for the petitioner has placed reliance upon the judgments of the Apex Court in the case of Mool Chand Yadav and another v. Raza Buland Sugar Company Ltd., ( 1982 (3) SCC 484 ) as well as of this Court in Ramdhani Jaiswal v. State of U.P. and others (AIR 2008 Allahabad 142) and Smt. Lalti and others v. Chief Controlling Revenue Authority (AWC 1992 (3) 1480 All.). 5. Learned Standing Counsel as well as learned counsel for the gaon sabha have contended that the petitioner has made encroachment over the land in dispute which is recorded in the revenue record as Chak Marg, Nali and Bhita, which is of the property of gaon sabha and in spite of service of notice, the petitioner did not appear and file its objection, therefore, no infirmity can be attached with the impugned order dated 16.12.2013. So far as the order dated 31.1.2014 is concerned, in this regard, it has been contended by the learned counsel for the respondents that there is no provision under the Act under which an application seeking interim protection can be filed in such cases, therefore, the view taken by the Chief Revenue Officer, rejecting the petitioner’s stay application, cannot be faulted with. So far as quashing of recovery citation is concerned, in this regard, it has been submitted by the learned counsel for the respondent that this Court has no jurisdiction to quash the recovery citation and for that, there is a different Bench, which can interfere with such matters. 6. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record of the writ petition. With the consent of the learned counsel for the parties, the writ petition is taken up for final disposal. 7. 6. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record of the writ petition. With the consent of the learned counsel for the parties, the writ petition is taken up for final disposal. 7. It is not in dispute that four cases were instituted by the gaon sabha against the petitioner-Company before the Assistant Collector (First Class)/Tehsildar, Sadar, Varanasi under Section 122-B of the Act on the allegations that the petitioner has made encroachment over the Chak Marg, Nali and Bhita, which is belonging to the gaon sabha and meant for public use. It is observed in the order that in spite of service of notice, since the petitioner has not filed any objection, therefore, the case is decided on its own merit on the basis of the record available before the Court and the Court found that as the land in dispute is recorded in the revenue record as Chak Marg, Nali and Bhita, therefore, it belongs to the gaon sabha and the petitioner’s possession thereon is unauthorized. Holding this, the Tehsildar has allowed the application with the direction to dispossess the petitioner from the land in dispute and thereafter, hand over the possession of the land in dispute to the gaon sabha. While doing so, damages to the tune of Rs. 1,24,590/- alongwith Rs. 5/- execution cost, has also been imposed upon the petitioner. 8. Aggrieved petitioner has filed revision before the Chief Revenue Officer, which was numbered as revision No. 16/27 of 2013-14 (Hindustan Coca-Cola Beverages Pvt. Ltd. v. State and others). Alongwith the revision, the petitioner has also filed an application for stay of operation and implementation of the order dated 16.12.2013 passed by the Tehsildar. The Chief Revenue Officer has rejected the application for following reasons: (i) there is no provision under the Act to grant an interim protection; and (ii) the petitioner has not mentioned any section under which the application has been filed. 9. So far as passing of order dated 16.12.2013 is concerned, learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the said order is ex parte as against the petitioner as no notice was ever served upon the petitioner and the finding with regard to the service of notice is false. 10. 9. So far as passing of order dated 16.12.2013 is concerned, learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the said order is ex parte as against the petitioner as no notice was ever served upon the petitioner and the finding with regard to the service of notice is false. 10. Be that as it may, I am not inclined to address myself on this point for the simple reason that this order is sub judice before the revisional Court and there, its validity has to be looked into by the Chief Revenue Officer. 11. So far as rejection of the petitioner’s stay application is concerned, the first reason, on which the impugned order has been passed, is that there is no provision under the Act to grant an interim protection. Learned counsel for the petitioner has invited attention of this Court towards Section 341 of the Act, which reads as under: “341. Application of certain Acts to the proceeding of this Act.—Unless otherwise expressly provided by or under this Act, the provisions of the Indian Court Fees Act, 1870 (VII of 1870), the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (V of 1908), and the Limitation Act, 1963 (XXXVI of 1963), including Section 5 thereof shall apply to the proceedings under this Act.” 12. The purpose of insertion of this section under the statute is to make applicable the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (in short, ‘CPC’) to the proceedings under the Act, unless otherwise expressly provided by or under this Act, if different procedure contemplated under the Act and the Rules (U.P. Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Rules, 1952). The procedure under the CPC would not be applicable. The Chief Revenue Officer has rejected the petitioner’s application on the ground that there is no provision under the Act which permits the filing of an stay application and requiring the Court to consider the same. In these situations, it appears, the Chief Revenue Officer has neither looked into the provisions of Section 341 of the Act, nor his attention was attracted thereon. 13. In these situations, it appears, the Chief Revenue Officer has neither looked into the provisions of Section 341 of the Act, nor his attention was attracted thereon. 13. It is not the case of the respondents that there is prohibition under the Act for granting an interim protection, therefore, in my considered opinion, in view of Section 341 of the Act, the provisions contained under the CPC will come to the rescue of the petitioner and Section 151 of the CPC, which reads as under: “151. Saving of inherent powers of Court.—Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the inherent power of the Court to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the Court.” and provides that nothing in the CPC shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the inherent power of the Court to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of the process of the Court. 14. Here in this case, the order under challenge in the revision is the order of dispossession and imposition of damages and the result of non-grant of an interim protection would lead serious civil consequences, i.e., the dispossession of the petitioner from the land in dispute and also realization of the damages, and in absence of payment pursuant to the citation, auction of the other property belonging to the petitioner, which may result in manifest miscarriage of justice in case the revision is allowed afterward. The purpose of the establishment of Courts is to impart substantial justice to the parties and not to scuttle the process of justice on technicalities, therefore, even if there is no provision under the Act, it is the inherent/ancillary power of the Court, upon which power of revision/appeal has been conferred and in such situation, the Court should not hesitate in considering the application for interim protection, where such type of miscarriage of justice is apprehended. 15. In Income Tax Officer, Cannanore v. M.K. Mohd. Kunhi and others ( AIR 1969 SC 430 ), the Apex Court has held that the power to stay was a necessary corollary to the power entertained an appeal or revision. 15. In Income Tax Officer, Cannanore v. M.K. Mohd. Kunhi and others ( AIR 1969 SC 430 ), the Apex Court has held that the power to stay was a necessary corollary to the power entertained an appeal or revision. The Apex Court in the case of Mool Chand Yadav and another v. Raza Buland Sugar Company Ltd., ( 1982 (3) SCC 484 ) has observed as under: “But the judicial approach requires that during the pendency of the appeal, the operation of an order having serious civil consequences must be suspended. More so, when appeal is admitted. Previous history of litigation cannot be over looked.” 16. This Court in the case of Smt. Lalti and others v. Chief Controlling Revenue Authority, Board of Revenue and another, 1992 (3) AWC 1480 (All), has also taken the same view by observing as under: “In the present case, therefore, taking into consideration the serious civil consequences which were likely to result in the event of the continuance of the proceedings for recovering the amount in question as arrears of land revenue there could be absolutely on justification for not staying the above proceedings in order to prevent the manifest miscarriage of justice which have resulted in the event of the revision being allowed as even after having succeeded in revision, in case in the meantime either the property in dispute had been sold to third persons in a public auction or the petitioners were arrested or detained or their other property sold, it would not have been possible to reverse the process and to undo the wrong done to the petitioners. In such matters judicial discretion has to be exercised in a manner so that the rights of the parties may remain protected during the pendency of the lis. The balance of convenience, therefore, clearly lay in favour of the petitioners and the interests of justice required that the realization of the amount in dispute as arrears of land revenue ought to have been stayed during the pendency of the revision of course, protecting the interest of the State. I find support for this view from a decision of a learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of Ajay Tandon v. Chief Controlling Revenue Authority (Board of Revenue) U.P. at Alld, 1992 U.P. 160” 17. I find support for this view from a decision of a learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of Ajay Tandon v. Chief Controlling Revenue Authority (Board of Revenue) U.P. at Alld, 1992 U.P. 160” 17. A Division Bench of this Court in the case of Ramdhani Jaiswal v. State of U.P. and others, AIR 2008 142 (All), has also taken the same view by observing as under: “7. On a consideration of the provisions of Rule 77 and of the decisions referred to above, it appears to us that the Divisional Commissioner also has the power in an appeal to grant stay in a proper case. The scope of the appellate power of the Commissioner is not circumscribed by any words imposing restriction. An order of the District Officer or of the Committee under the Rules is appealable. The rule does not restrict the filing of an appeal to a particular category of orders. All orders of the District Officer can be challenged in appeal. Some of the orders have serious consequence. Thus appeal may lie against order granting or refusing lease; cancelling a lease, demanding or royalty, forfeiture of security; imposition of penalty etc. In some cases, the demand may be arbitrary and exorbitant and it is difficult to conceive that the legislature did not intend to confer the power of stay in an appeal under Rule 77. In our opinion, the power of stay is available as an ancillary power for the effective exercise of the appellate jurisdiction.” 18. Here in this case, as has been noticed in the earlier part of the judgment that the reason for rejecting the stay application is absence of power under the Act, the application has not been rejected on merit, holding that there is no case for granting any interim protection, which, in my opinion, is arbitrary exercise of power and in fact, failure to exercise the power vested in the revisional Court. 19. The matter may be examined from another angle also. 19. The matter may be examined from another angle also. In case the statute is silent and it neither prohibits nor provides to meet out such contingency, as has arisen in this case with regard to consideration of application for interim protection, in a statutory appeal or revision, in that eventuality, for achieving the aim and objects of the statute, if there are other pari materia statutes, then with a view to make the statute workable, help of other statutes may be taken. Such type of extension of the rule is always permissible, as stated by Lord Mansfield “where there are different statutes in pari materia though made at different times, or even expired, and not referring to each other, they shall be taken and construed together as one system and as explanatory of each other.” A.G. v. HRH Prince Ernest Augustus of Hanover, (1957) 1 All ER 49, p. 53 : 1957 AC 436 (HL). This view has been followed by the Apex Court in the case of Shah & Co. Bombay v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1967 SC 1877 , Sirsilk Ltd. v. Textiles Committee, AIR 1989 SC 317 , Jugul Kishore v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1989 SC 159 Page 162 and Kusum Ingots and Alloys Ltd. v. Union of India, (2004) 6 SCC 254 Page 259 and in many other cases. In these judgments the Apex Court has taken the view that statute on the same point, pari materia have to be read in a complementary manner so that they do not create contradictions while operating in the same field. 20. So far as non-mentioning of the section, while filing the application for interim protection, is concerned, it is settled that wrong mentioning or non-mentioning of section will not affect the exercise of power conferred upon the Court for considering the application. 21. In view of the foregoing discussions, I am of the considered opinion that the Chief Revenue Officer has erred in rejecting the application for interim relief holding it to be not maintainable as the revisional Court has every power either to stay the order of eviction or to impose damages, without imposing any condition or after imposing condition, therefore, this order cannot be sustained in the eye of law. 22. The writ petition succeeds and is allowed. 22. The writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The order dated 31.1.2014 passed by the Chief Revenue Officer, Varanasi in revision No. 16/27 of 2013-14 (Hindustan Coca-Cola Beverages Pvt. Ltd. v. State and others) is hereby quashed. The revisional Court is directed to decide the stay applications filed by the petitioners afresh in accordance with law. 23. Till the petitioner’s stay application is considered in view of the observations made in this order, on deposit of Rs. 50,000/- by the petitioner before the revisional Court, the eviction of the petitioner and further realization of the damages shall be kept in abeyance. 24. It is further provided that the Chief Revenue Officer shall make all endeavor to decide the revision itself expeditiously in accordance with law after hearing all concerned without granting any unnecessary adjournments to the learned counsel for the parties. 25. It may be clarified that I have not addressed myself on the merit of the stay application and the revisional Court is free to pass an independent order on its own merit in accordance with law.