Judgment 1. Respondents 1, 2 and 3 are husband and parents in-law of the petitioner respectively and respondents 4 to 8 are relatives of first respondent. Respondents herein allegedly demanded dowry from the petitioner as also cruelly treated her. The petitioner preferred a complaint before the ninth respondent. A case was registered in Crime No.3 of 2008. Upon completion of investigation, a charge sheet was filed informing commission of offences u/s.498-A IPC and Section 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act. The case was tried in C.C.No.72 of 2008 on the file of learned Judicial Magistrate I, Tirupattur, Vellore District. Respondents 1 to 3/A1 to A3 were charged for offences u/s.498-A IPC and 3 and 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act and respondents 4 to 8/A4 to A8 were charged for offence u/s.498-A IPC. 2. Before the trial Court, the prosecution examined six witnesses and marked four exhibits. One witness was examined on behalf of the defence and four exhibits were marked. On appreciation of materials before it, the trial Court rendered a finding of acquittal. Against such finding, the petitioner has filed the present revision. 3. M.P.No.1 of 2013 has been filed seeking condonation of delay of 22 days in filing a revision against the judgment of acquittal passed by learned Judicial Magistrate I, Tirupattur, Vellore District, in case tried in C.C.No.72 of 2008 on 16.07.2013. 4. Learned counsel for respondents 1 to 8 submitted that the petitioner wife/de facto complainant's allegations of commission of offences u/s.498-A IPC and Section 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act, have not found acceptance at the hands of the trial Court. Learned counsel for respondents 1 to 8 submits that the very revision would not be maintainable in the light of the amended provision to Section 372 Cr.P.C. 5. Section 372 Cr.P.C. as amended reads thus: “372. No appeal to lie unless otherwise provided.- No appeal shall lie from any judgment or order of a Criminal Court except as provided for by this Code or by any other law for the time being in force: Provided that the victim shall have a right to prefer an appeal against any order passed by the Court acquitting the accused or convicting for a lesser offence or imposing inadequate compensation, and such appeal shall lie to the Court to which an appeal ordinarily lies against the order of conviction of such Court.” 6. As a remedy of moving an appeal before the Sessions Court, learned counsel for petitioner relied on the following observations in the judgment of the Apex Court in National Commission for Women v. State of Delhi and another [ 2010 (12) SCC 599 ]: “8. Chapter XXIX of the Code of Criminal Procedure deals with “Appeal(s)”. Section 372 specifically provides that no appeal shall lie from a judgment or order of a criminal court except as provided by the Code or by any other law which authorises an appeal. The proviso inserted by Section 372 (Act 5 of 2009) with effect from 31.12.2009, gives a limited right to the victim to file an appeal in the High Court against any order of a criminal court acquitting the accused or convicting him for a lesser offence or the imposition of inadequate compensation. The proviso may not thus be applicable as it came in the year 2009 (long after the present incident) and, in any case, would confer a right only on a victim and also does not envisage an appeal against an inadequate sentence. An appeal would thus be maintainable only under Section 377 to the High Court as it is effectively challenging the quantum of sentence.” 7. Learned counsel for petitioner submits that a Division Bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court in the decision in D.Sudhakar v. Panapu Sreenivasulu and others [2013 Crl.L.J.2764] inter alia observed as follows: “10. .....The second issue that falls for our consideration is that the incident has taken place on 07.12.2007 and the amendment to Section 372 Cr.P.C. has come into force w.e.f.31.12.2009, where the victim can prefer an appeal against acquittal. This issue will not hold us for long, in view of the fact that the Apex court in National Commission for Women v. State of Delhi, has already held that the amendment is not applicable to cases where the incident has taken place prior to amendment. Therefore, even on this count, the appellant fails, and as such, the appeal is liable to be dismissed as not maintainable.” 8. Relying on the above observations, learned counsel for petitioner submits that the allegations of cruelty and harassment for dowry were long before the coming into force of the amended provision in Section 372 Cr.P.C. and as such, a revision would be maintainable. Relying on the above observations, learned counsel for petitioner submits that the allegations of cruelty and harassment for dowry were long before the coming into force of the amended provision in Section 372 Cr.P.C. and as such, a revision would be maintainable. The further submission of learned counsel for petitioner is that Section 401(5) Cr.P.C made provision for treating a revision preferred under an erroneous belief as an appeal. This Court would entertain the matter as an appeal, even if not as a revision. 9. This Court finds the contention of learned counsel for petitioner regards applicability or otherwise of proviso to Section 372 Cr.P.C., well explained in the decision of the Apex Court in Parmeshwar Mandal and others v. The State of Bihar and others [2013 SCC Online Pat 602] placed before this Court by learned counsel for respondent. The same lucidly explains the reading to be placed on the observations of the Apex Court herein above reproduced. Paragraph Nos.16, 17 and 18 of such judgment read thus: 16. From the reading of the judgment, it would be clear that the entire discussion by the Apex Court revolved around propriety of granting permission to the appellant Commission to file Special Leave Petition and it held that, as an appeal is a creature of statute, it could not lie under inherent power and, to allow anybody or organization 'probono publico' to file appeal, was a dangerous proposition. The observations of the Court in paragraph 5, as reproduced above, were only for the purpose of noticing the limitation imposed by Section 372 for filing appeal against judgment of a criminal court and the proviso was noticed only for the purpose of change having been introduced in Section 372 of the Code. It was in that context the observations were made that in the case proviso was not applicable as it came in the year 2009 and in any case it conferred a right only on a victim and did not envisage an appeal in the case of inadequate sentence. Thereafter, the Court noticed the only provision available in Chapter XXIX of the Code for preferring an appeal against inadequate sentence, i.e. Section 377 of the Code. Entire discussion in the judgment thereafter proceeded on the provisions of Section 377 of the Code and scope and limitation of Article 136 of the Constitution of India. Thereafter, the Court noticed the only provision available in Chapter XXIX of the Code for preferring an appeal against inadequate sentence, i.e. Section 377 of the Code. Entire discussion in the judgment thereafter proceeded on the provisions of Section 377 of the Code and scope and limitation of Article 136 of the Constitution of India. However, in paragraph 5, after observing that "the proviso may not itself be applicable as it came in 2009" a casual comment in brackets - (long after the present incident) - was made by the Apex Court. Question is whether by using the words in brackets "long after the present incident" did the Apex Court lay down any law ? It has to be noticed that the judgments of the Trial Court, and of the High Court in appeal, were all of a date much prior to the insertion of the said proviso in Section 372. Even the petition by the appellant Commission had been filed in the Apex Court much earlier and the permission to file Special Leave Petition was also granted much earlier. From the arguments advanced by learned counsel on behalf of the appellant before the Apex Court, as noticed in the judgment, it is clear that no claim was made on behalf of the appellant Commission before the Apex Court to treat the Special Leave Petition as one under the said proviso to Section 372. Entire argument of learned counsel revolved around maintainability of Special Leave Petition and for it to be considered on merits on the ground that permission had already been granted. The Apex Court found that the permission was wrongly granted as Special Leave Petition on behalf of the Commission, filed under Article 136 of the Constitution of India, was not maintainable. Thus, it is clear that by inserting the words 'long after the present incident' in brackets in paragraph 5, the Apex Court did not give any finding on any issue, to be treated as law in terms of Article 141 of the Constitution of India. The scope and import of the said proviso to Section 372 was not at all under consideration before the Apex Court in the case nor was considered, examined and decided. The scope and import of the said proviso to Section 372 was not at all under consideration before the Apex Court in the case nor was considered, examined and decided. In the circumstances, in our opinion, use of expression 'long after the present incident' in brackets in paragraph 5 of the judgment, can, at best, be treated as only an obiter dictum of the Apex Court and not a law laid down under Article 141 of the Constitution of India. The following observations by a Full Bench of this Court in the case of Rita Mishra v. Director, Primary Education, Bihar ( 1987 PLJR 1090 ) is an authoritative enunciation of law in the matter:- "......... One has to remind himself of the hallowed rule enunciated by Halsbury in Quin v. Leathem (1901 Appeal Cases 495) that what is of essence in a decision is the logic, reasoning and ratio and not every observation found therein nor all that may logically flow from the observations made therein. This has been expressly approved in State of Orissa v. Sudhansu Sekhar Misra (A.I.R.1968 S.C. 647) with the added warning that it is not a profitable task to extract a sentence here and there from a judgment and to build upon it......" 17. This doctrine has also been explained in Halsbury’s Laws of England (Fourth Edition) (Volume 26), thus:- "574. Dicta. Statements which are not necessary to the decision, which go beyond the occasion and lay down a rule that it is unnecessary for the purpose in hand are generally termed 'dicta'. They have no binding authority on another court, although they may have some persuasive efficacy. Mere passing remarks of a judge are known as 'obiter dicta', whilst considered enunciations of the judge’s opinion on a point not arising for decision, and so not part of the ratio decidendi, have been termed 'judicial dicta'. A third type of dictum may consist in a statement by a judge as to what has been done in other cases which have not been reported." 18. In Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary of Words and Phrases (Seventh Edition) (Volume 2 : F-O), this doctrine has been explained thus:- "OBITER DICTA. Obiter dicta are what the words literally signify, namely, statements by the way. In Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary of Words and Phrases (Seventh Edition) (Volume 2 : F-O), this doctrine has been explained thus:- "OBITER DICTA. Obiter dicta are what the words literally signify, namely, statements by the way. If a judge thinks it desirable to give his opinion on some point which is not necessary for the decision of the case, that of course has not the binding weight of the decision of the case, and the reasons for the decision (Flower v Ebbw Vale Steel, Iron & Coal Co [1934] 2 K.B. 132, 154)." 10. Given the position informed, this Court holds that the revision is not maintainable. As regards the further contention of learned counsel for petitioner on Section 401(5) Cr.P.C., this Court would inform that the same is a remedial provision towards avoiding denial of justice in an appropriate case. The same cannot be a foundation for violation of that which specifically stands provided for in the Code. In a case of present nature, where matters are at the nascent stage and where this Court finds that the very revision is not maintainable, the appropriate course to adopt would be to dismiss the same granting liberty to the petitioner to prefer an appeal along with an application for condonation of delay in moving the same informing the reasons therefor. Any such application for condonation of delay would be considered on merits. This miscellaneous petition is dismissed. Consequently, Crl. R.C. No. SR.53763 of 2013 is also dismissed.