ORDER 1. The petitioners in the present application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India are aggrieved by an order dated 21.11.2006 passed by learned Special Land Acquisition Judge, III, Patna, whereby he has rejected an application filed by the petitioners under Sections 114, 151 and 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure for amendment of the judgment dated 04.04.1990, in view of the amendment in the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (Hereinafter referred to as the Act) introduced by Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984. 2. I have heard Mr. Satyendra Narayan Singh, learned counsel for the petitioners and Mr. Sanjay Pandey, learned Government Pleader No. 21 appearing on behalf of the State-Respondents. On a request made by this Court, Mr. Pushkar Narayan Shahi, learned Additional Advocate General No. 14 has given valuable assistance to this Court for proper adjudication of the case. This court places on record deep appreciation for his assistance extended by Mr. Shahi. 3. Facts are short and are not much in dispute. The petitioners land at Mauza Murarpur and Abdul Rahmanpur was acquired by the Respondent State of Bihar for construction of a marketing yard. A notification to that effect under Section 4 (1) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) was issued and accordingly award was passed, without adding interest and solatium thereon. Being aggrieved by the award of Special Land Acquisition Collector, Marketing Board, Patna, the petitioners along with other land holders filed an application for reference to the Court under Section 18 of the Act, objecting to the amount of compensation granted to these petitioners. The case was accordingly referred to and registered as L.A. Case No. 317 of 1979, in the Court of learned Special Land Acquisition Judge, III, Patna. 4. Learned Special Land Acquisition Judge, III, Patna, decided the reference vide his judgment dated 04.04.1990 allowing solatium at the rate of 15% on the amount of compensation determined and interest at the rate of 6% per annum and award was drawn up on such terms. 5. This is apt be noted here that as per Section 26 (2) of the Act, such award is deemed to be a decree and the statement of the grounds of every such award, a judgment; within the meaning of Section 2, Clause (2) and Section 2 Clause (9) respectively, of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. 5. This is apt be noted here that as per Section 26 (2) of the Act, such award is deemed to be a decree and the statement of the grounds of every such award, a judgment; within the meaning of Section 2, Clause (2) and Section 2 Clause (9) respectively, of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Sixteen years after the said date of judgment (04.04.1990), the petitioners filed an application in the Court of learned Special Land Acquisition Judge, III, Patna under Sections 114, 151 and 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 with a plea that provision as contained in Section 23(2) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 came to be amended by the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 and for the words “fifteen per centum” occurring in the said provision, the words “thirty per centum” were substituted. Similarly, Section 34 of the Act was amended and in place of “six per centum”, “nine per centum” came to be fixed as the rate per annum payable on amount of compensation, from the time of taking possession until it was paid or it was deposited. It is the case of the petitioners that there was accidental omission / clerical error in judgment and decree (award) passed by learned Special Land Acquisition Judge, III, Patna and in place of “thirty per centum”, only “fifteen per centum” was mentioned as the solatium amount and interest at the rate of 6% was granted on the amount of compensation, which rate should have been 15% as per the amended provision. 6. Mr. Satyendra Narayan Singh, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners submitted that this mistake occurred in the judgment of learned Special Land Acquisition Judge, III, Patna due to accidental slip and oversight inasmuch as the rate of solatium and interest was fixed, overlooking the amendments made in the land Acquisition Act which had become operative from 24.09.1984. He submits that so as to get the judgment (award) corrected, the petitioners preferred application under Section 151 and 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure for correcting the clerical / arithmetical mistakes in the judgment / decree which apparently arose out of an accidental slip and omission by the Court below to take note of the amended provisions of the Land Acquisition Act. He submits that the court below, without appreciating the true scope and spirit of Section 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure refused to entertain the application filed by the petitioners by the impugned order dated 21.11.2006. He has accordingly submitted that in the interest of justice, necessary correction ought to have been introduced by the Court below in the judgment / decree as prayed for by these petitioners in terms of the amended provision. He has placed reliance upon a judgment of this Court reported in 1991(1) P.L.J.R. 468 (Sheo Shankar Singh Vs. State of Bihar) in support of his submission. 7. The prayer of the petitioner has been opposed by learned State Counsel on the plea that it cannot be said to be a case of clerical or arithmetical mistake for the purpose of invoking Section 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The petitioners could have preferred appeal against said award in terms of Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 but they elected not to do so and thus award attained finality. It is submitted that the Court below rightly rejected the petitioners application by the impugned order on consideration that what was being sought by the petitioners was not mere correction of any arithmetical error. It also took into account the fact that such application was filed more than sixteen years after passing of the award. 8. Mr. Pushkar Narayan Shahi, learned Additional Advocate General has submitted that Section 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 could be applied for correcting only clerical or arithmetical mistakes in the judgments, decrees, orders or errors arising out of any accidental slip or omission. He would submit that the said provision is not attracted in the facts and circumstances of the case. He would also submit, relying upon the Supreme Court judgments that the judgment relied upon by learned counsel for the petitioner passed by this Court reported in Sheo Shankar Singh (supra) does not lay down the correct law and is not a binding precedent, in view of the said judgments of Supreme Court. 9. Mr. Shahi has placed reliance upon a judgment reported in (2011) 11 SCC 198 , Sarup Singh and another Vs. 9. Mr. Shahi has placed reliance upon a judgment reported in (2011) 11 SCC 198 , Sarup Singh and another Vs. Union of India and Another and would submit that a decree once passed and which has become final and binding could not be sought to be amended by filing petition under Sections 151 and 152 of the C.P.C. He has also placed reliance upon a Constitution Bench judgment reported in (2001) 7 SCC 211 (Sundar Vs. Union of India) of the Supreme Court to contend that the parties to the proceeding before the Court below are bound by the award / judgment of the Court below and such award cannot be altered taking shelter of Section 152 of the C.P.C. Reliance has also been placed upon another Supreme Court judgment reported in (2012) 5 SCC 432 (Mehrawal Khewaji Trust (Regd.) Faridkot & Ors. v. State of Punjab & Ors.) to contend that the petitioners could claim interest and solatium and additional market value in terms of the amended provision, only if the award of the reference court did not specifically refer to the question of interest or solatium at additional market value or by award, the claim would not have been rejected either expressly or impliedly. 10. He submits that the petitioners cannot, in the facts and circumstances of the case, taking recourse to Section 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure, seek amendment in the decree which attained finality in 1990 itself. 11. As has been noted above, the facts are not in dispute. Section 23 (2) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 before amendment by the Land Acquisition (Amendment) Act, 1984 read thus:- “In addition to the market-value of the land as above provided the Court shall in every case award a sum of [fifteen per centum] on such market value, in consideration of the compulsory nature of the acquisition.” 12. The provision was amended by the said Amendment Act in 1984 and in place of “fifteen per centum”, the words “thirty per centum” were substituted. The provision was amended by the said Amendment Act in 1984 and in place of “fifteen per centum”, the words “thirty per centum” were substituted. Similarly, Section 34 of the Act as it existed prior to amendment in 1984 read thus:- “When the amount of such compensation is not paid or deposited on or before taking possession of the land the Collector shall pay the amount awarded with interest thereon at the rate of six per centum per annum from the time of so taking possession until it shall have been so paid or deposited.” 13. By amendment introduced in the year 1984, the word six per centum occurring in Section 34 have been substituted by nine per centum and a proviso has been introduced which reads thus:- “Provided that if such compensation or any part thereof is not paid or deposited within a period of one year from the date on which possession is taken, interest at the rate of fifteen per centum per annum shall be payable from the date of expiry of the said period of one year on the amount of compensation or part thereof which has not been paid or deposited before the date of such expiry.” 14. As has been noted above, since the petitioners were not allowed solatium and interest by the District Land Acquisition Officer, a reference was made under Section 18 of the Act and accordingly award was passed in the year 1990, allowing the petitioners, solatium of “fifteen per centum” on the market value of the land and interest at the rate of “six per centum” from the date of taking possession of the land till realization of the compensation award. In my opinion, if aggrieved, the petitioners could have taken recourse to appeal provided under the Act. Having not done so, the award attained finality and it was implemented also. I am further of the opinion, that after more than sixteen years of passing of the award, it was not open for the petitioners to take recourse to Section 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure for seeking amendment of the award for the purpose of enhancement of solatium and rate of interest. Section 152 of the C.P.C. cannot be pressed into service for such purpose. Section 152 of the C.P.C. cannot be pressed into service for such purpose. Section 152 is applicable only in case of clerical and arithmetical mistakes occurring in the judgment or when there is an accidental slip or omission. 15. Mr. Shahi is right in his submission while placing reliance upon the Supreme Court judgment in case of Sarup Singh and another Vs. Union of India (supra), paragraph 25 of which reads thus:- “25. In the present cases the judgment and order passed by the High Court before Amendment Act 68 of 1984 became final and binding as no appeal was brought to this Court thereafter. However, consequent to the amendment in the Land Acquisition Act, the appellants had filed civil miscellaneous applications for the grant of 30% solatium and 9% interest for the first year and 15% interest thereafter. This Court has also held in a catena of decisions that a decree once passed and which has become final and binding cannot be sought to be amended by filing petition under Sections 151 and 152 CPC.” 16. Scope of Section 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure has been considered in several judgments which have been taken note of by their lordships of Supreme Court in case of Sarup Singh V. Union of India (supra), relevant paragraphs of the said judgment are being quoted hereinbelow:- “26. In Union of India v. Swaran Singh this Court held thus: (SCC p. 503, para 8) “8. The question then is whether the High Court has the power to entertain independent applications under Sections 151 and 152 and enhance solatium and interest as amended under Act 68 of 1984. This controversy is no longer res integra. In State of Punjab v. Jagir Singh and also in a catena of decisions following thereafter in Union of India v. Pratap Kaur; State of Maharashtra v. Maharau Srawan Hatkar; State of Punjab v. Babu Singh; Union of India v. Raghubir Singh and K.S. Paripoornan v. State of Kerala, this Court has held that the Reference Court or the High Court has no power or jurisdiction to entertain any applications under Sections 151 and 152 to correct any decree which has become final or to independently pass an award enhancing the solatium and interest as amended by Act 68 of 1984. Consequently, the award by the High Court granting enhanced solatium at 30% under Section 23(2) and interest at the rate of 9% for one year from the date of taking possession and thereafter at the rate of 15% till date of deposit under Section 28 as amended under Act 68 of 1984 is clearly without jurisdiction and, therefore, a nullity. The order being a nullity, it can be challenged at any stage. Rightly the question was raised in execution. The executing court allowed the petition and dismissed the execution petition. The High Court, therefore, was clearly in error in allowing the revision and setting aside the order of the executing court.” 27. In Union of India v. Rangila Ram this Court held as follows: (SCC p. 586, para 4) “4. The point is no longer res integra. This Court has considered the scope of the power of the High Court under Sections 151 and 152 CPC and also under Section 13-A of the Act. This Court has held that once the civil court made an award as per law then in force which became final and that there is no error of law as on that date. Subsequent amendment does not give power to the court to amend the decree under Sections 151 and 152 CPC. This was held in State of Maharashtra v. Maharau Srawan Hatkar and Union of India v. Pratap Kaur. In Maharau Srawan Hatkar case this Court held that the civil court lacked inherent jurisdiction and was devoid of the power to entertain an application to award additional benefits under Amendment Act 68 of 1984. The facts therein were that the award had become final and Amendment Act 68 of 1984 had come into force on 24-9-1984. The respondents made an application under Sections 151 and 152 CPC to award enhanced solatium and additional benefits, etc. and the civil court allowed and granted the same. In that context, considering the civil court’s power under Sections 151 and 152 CPC, this Court laid the above law.” 28. In Dwaraka Das v. State of M.P. this Court described the scope of Section 152 CPC thus: (SCC p. 504, para 6) “6. Section 152 CPC provides for correction of clerical or arithmetical mistakes in judgments, decrees or orders of errors arising therein from any accidental slip or omission. In Dwaraka Das v. State of M.P. this Court described the scope of Section 152 CPC thus: (SCC p. 504, para 6) “6. Section 152 CPC provides for correction of clerical or arithmetical mistakes in judgments, decrees or orders of errors arising therein from any accidental slip or omission. The exercise of this power contemplates the correction of mistakes by the court of its ministerial actions and does not contemplate of passing effective judicial orders after the judgment, decree or order. The settled position of law is that after the passing of the judgment, decree or order, the court or the tribunal becomes functus officio and thus being not entitled to vary the terms of the judgments, decrees and orders earlier passed. The corrections contemplated are of correcting only accidental omissions or mistakes and not all omissions and mistakes which might have been committed by the court while passing the judgment, decree or order. The omission sought to be corrected which goes to the merits of the case is beyond the scope of Section 152 for which the proper remedy for the aggrieved party is to file an appeal or review application. It implies that the section cannot be pressed into service to correct an omission which is intentional, however erroneous that may be. It has been noticed that the courts below have been liberally construing and applying the provisions of Sections 151 and 152 CPC even after passing of effective orders in the lis pending before them. No court can, under the cover of the aforesaid sections, modify, alter or add to the terms of its original judgment, decree or order.” 17. Considering the rival submissions of the parties and taking note of Supreme Court judgment in case of Sarup Singh (supra) which covers the present matter, I do not find any illegality in the impugned order. Relying upon the said judgment, I am of the considered view that Section 152 of the Code of Civil Procedure cannot be pressed into service in the facts and circumstances of the present case as the errors which are being pointed out by the petitioners in judgment and decree cannot be said to be clerical or mathematical or because of accidental slip or omission. 18. I do not find any merit in this application and it is accordingly dismissed.