Judgment T. Mathivanan, J. 1. In so far this case is concerned, we have virtually pronounced the judgment on 25.8.2014, confirming the conviction and sentence under Section 302 read with Section 34 of IPC imposed on the appellant/A-1 by the Trial Court. While confirming the conviction and sentence under Section 302 read with Section 34 of IPC, we have also found the appellant guilty under Section 449 of IPC, but with reference to this charge, the Trial Court had found the appellant/A-1 not guilty and therefore he was acquitted on the said charge. 2. After pronouncement of the judgment, we have noticed that the appellant/A-1 was not heard on question of sentence as he is found guilty under Section 449 of IPC. Non-hearing of the appellant will not vitiate the conviction as the defect is curable in nature. 3. As afore-stated, the appellant/A-1 along with other accused was tried for the charges under Sections 449 and 302 read with Section 34 of IPC. The Trial Court while finding the appellant/A-1 guilty under Section 302 read with Section 34 of IPC has acquitted him of the charge under Section 449 IPC, despite adequate evidences are available as against him, to find him guilty under Section 449 IPC also. However, this Court, being an Appellate Court, has got every power to analyse the evidences of prosecution and render fair criminal justice to both parties. 4. Since the appellant/A-1 shall not be punished without hearing him on question of sentence under Section 235(2) Cr.P.C., about the sentence which may be imposed on him under Section 449 of IPC, we, in fact, have directed the Registry to issue notice to the appellant/A-1, directing him to appear for hearing him on question of sentence. Only under this circumstance, Mr. P.H. Pandian, learned Senior Counsel, has come forward with this petition in Criminal M.P.No.1 of 2014 to recall the order dated 25.8.2014. 5. Since the Miscellaneous Petition was in S.R., stage being M.P.SR No.43912 of 2014, we have directed the Registry to number the recall petition filed by the appellant/A-1 after numbering the same to list before this Court on 7.10.2014 at about 2.00 P.M. Thereafter, the petition came up for hearing on 8.10.2014 and subsequently at the request made by Mr. 5. Since the Miscellaneous Petition was in S.R., stage being M.P.SR No.43912 of 2014, we have directed the Registry to number the recall petition filed by the appellant/A-1 after numbering the same to list before this Court on 7.10.2014 at about 2.00 P.M. Thereafter, the petition came up for hearing on 8.10.2014 and subsequently at the request made by Mr. R. Anand, learned counsel appearing for the second respondent herein in the miscellaneous petition who is none other than the mother of the deceased, we directed the Registry to list this petition on 9.10.2014. On the abovesaid date, we have heard both sides. 6. Mr. P.H. Pandian, learned Senior Counsel, has argued that the appellant/A-1 had filed the present appeal in Criminal Appeal No.374 of 2008 on 27.6.2008, challenging the judgment of conviction and sentence in S.C.No.65 of 2007 recorded by the learned II Additional Sessions Judge, Tirunelveli. He has also argued that though the appellant/A-1 was tried for the charges under Sections 449 and 302 read with Section 34 of IPC, the learned Trial Judge had not found him guilty under Section 449 of IPC, but found him guilty under Section 302 read with Section 34 of IPC and as such, he was convicted and sentenced to suffer life imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs.10,000, in default, to suffer a further period of 2 years of simple imprisonment. 7. The learned Senior Counsel has also submitted that there was no appeal preferred by the State as against the acquittal of the appellant/A-1 under Section 449 of IPC and hence the judgment passed by this Court on 25.8.2014 is a nullity and not a mere irregularity. He has also submitted that in the absence of a State appeal against acquittal or appeal, if any, notice is very much essential to be served on the appellant/A-1. 8. While advancing his argument, the learned Senior Counsel has also maintained that if a judgment has been pronounced without jurisdiction or in violation of the principles of natural justice or when the order had been pronounced without giving an opportunity of being heard to a party affected, the Court in exercise of its inherent powers can recall such order for the reason that in such an eventuality the order becomes a nullity. He has also added that Section 362 Cr.P.C., cannot be considered in a rigid and hyper technical manner to defeat the ends of justice. 9. On the other hand, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor appearing for the State (R-1) has vehemently objected to recall the judgment dated 25.8.2014 as no such provision is available in the Criminal Procedure Code. Mr. Ashok Kumar, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of Mr. R. Anand, who is on record for the second respondent, while advancing his argument has drawn our attention to the provisions of Section 362 of Cr.P.C., and submitted that recalling of judgment pronounced by the Court of competency is unknown to the Code of Criminal Procedure and therefore, he has strenuously objected to recall the judgment, as has been urged by Mr. P.H. Pandian. The second respondent, being the interested person and the complainant to the police, has also filed her counter statement. 10. Mr. P.H. Pandian, learned Senior Counsel, in support of his arguments, has placed reliance upon the following decisions:- (i) State of Punjab vs. Davinder Pal Singh Bhullar and Others with Criminal Appeal Nos.2258-64 of 2011 Sumedh Singh Saini vs. Davinder Pal Singh Bhullar and others { (2011) 14 SCC 770 }. (ii) Lakshmi Singh and others vs. State of Bihar { AIR 1976 SC 2263 (1)}. (iii) (1) Criminal Appeal No.222 of 1959The State of A.P., vs. Thadi Narayana (2) Criminal Appeal No.112 of 1961 Thadi Narayana vs. The State of A.P. { AIR 1962 SC 240 (1)} (iv) Sheo Swarup and others vs. King Emperor {AIR 1934 Privy Council 227 (2)} (v) Mohammed Dastagir vs. The State of Madras { AIR 1960 SC 756 (V.47 C 125}. (vi) Vishnu Agarwal vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another { (2011) 14 SCC 813 }. (vii) Asit Kumar Kar vs. State of West Bengal and Others { 2009 (2) SCC 703 }. 11. In State of Punjab vs. Davinder Pal Singh Bhullar and Others { (2011) 14 SCC 770 }, cited first supra, with reference to the provisions of Sections 362 and 482 Cr.P.C., a Division Bench of the Apex Court headed by His Lordship Dr. B.S. Chauhan, in paragraphs 44, 45 and 49 has held as under:- “III. Bar to review/alter judgment: 44. There is no power of review with the Criminal Court after the judgment has been rendered. B.S. Chauhan, in paragraphs 44, 45 and 49 has held as under:- “III. Bar to review/alter judgment: 44. There is no power of review with the Criminal Court after the judgment has been rendered. The High Court can alter or review its judgment before it is signed. When an order is passed, it cannot be reviewed. Section 362 Cr.P.C., is based on an acknowledged principle of law that once a matter is finally disposed of by a Court, the said Court in the absence of a specific statutory provision becomes functus officio and is disentitled to entertain a fresh prayer for any relief unless the former order of final disposal is set aside by a Court of competent jurisdiction in a manner prescribed by law. The Court becomes a functus officio the moment the order for disposing of a case is signed. Such an order cannot be altered except to the extent of correcting a clerical or arithmetical error. There is also no provision for modification of the judgment (see Hari Singh Mann vs. Harbhajan Singh Bajwa { (2001) 1 SCC 169 : 2001 SCC (Cri.) 113} and Chhanni vs. State of U.P. {(2006) 5 SCC 396 : (2006) 2 SCC (Cri.) 466}. 45. Moreover, the prohibition contained in Section 362 Cr.P.C., is absolute; after the judgment is signed, even the High Court in exercise of its inherent power under Section 482 Cr.P.C., has no authority or jurisdiction to alter/review the same (see Moti Lal vs. State of M.P. {(2012) 11 SCC 427 : AIR 1994 SC 1544 } and State of Kerala vs. M.M.Manikantan Nair { (2001) 4 SCC 752 : 2001 SCC (Cri.) 808}. 49. Thus, the law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that the criminal Justice Delivery System does not clothe the Court to add or delete any words, except to correct the clerical or arithmetical error as specifically been provided under the statute itself after pronouncement of the judgment as the Judge becomes functus officio. Any mistake or glaring omission is left to be corrected only by the appropriate Forum in accordance with law.” 12. Any mistake or glaring omission is left to be corrected only by the appropriate Forum in accordance with law.” 12. In (1) Criminal Appeal No.222 of 1959The State of A.P., vs. Thadi Narayana (2) Criminal Appeal No.112 of 1961 Thadi Narayana vs. The State of A.P. { AIR 1962 SC 240 (1)}, cited third supra, the Three Judges Bench of the Apex Court, has observed that “in a case where several offences are charged against an accused person the trial is no doubt one; but where the accused person is acquitted of some offences and convicted of others the character of the appellate proceedings and their scope and extent is necessarily determined by the nature of the appeal preferred before the Appellate Court. If an order of conviction is challenged by the convicted person but the order of acquittal is not challenged by the State then it is only the order of conviction that falls to be considered by the Appellate Court and not the order of acquittal. Therefore, the assumption that the whole case is before the High Court when it entertain an appeal against conviction is not well founded and as such it cannot be pressed into service on construing the expression “alter the finding” in Section 423(1)(b)(2). The expression “alter the finding” has only one meaning, and that is “alter the finding of conviction and not the finding of acquittal”. In exercising the powers conferred on it by Section 423(1)(b), the High Court cannot convert acquittal into conviction; that can be done only by adopting the procedure prescribed in Section 439. Hence, the High Court acts without jurisdiction in altering the finding and order of acquittal passed in favour of the accused in respect of the offences under Sections 302 and 392, Penal Code, when it is dealing with the appeal preferred by the accused against her conviction under Section 411”. 13. In Vishnu Agarwal vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and Another { (2011) 14 SCC 813 }, cited sixth supra, the Apex Court has observed with reference to Section 362 of Cr.P.C., saying that “Section 362 cannot be considered in a rigid and overtechnical manner to defeat the ends of justice. In this case, an application was filed by the respondent for recalling of the order and not for review”. In this case, an application was filed by the respondent for recalling of the order and not for review”. In this connection, the Apex Court has observed that “in a recall petition, Court does not go into the merits but simply recalls an order which was passed without giving an opportunity of hearing”. 14. The ratio applied in the above cited decision, would not made applicable to the instant case on hand because in the above cited decision, the criminal revision was listed before the High Court on 2.9.2003. When the matter was taken up for hearing, no one had appeared on behalf of the revisionist, though the counsel for the respondents appeared. In these circumstances, the judgment was passed. Subsequently, an application was moved for recalling the order dated 2.9.2003 alleging that the case was shown in the computer list and not in the main list of the High Court and hence the learned counsel for the revisionist had not noted the case and hence he did not appear. 15. When the Division Bench of the Apex Court headed by Hon'ble Mr. Justice Markandey Katju happened to hear the criminal appeals, they have observed that “in a recall petition, the Court does not go into the merits but simply recalls an order which was passed without giving an opportunity of hearing to an affected party and that Section 362 cannot be considered in a rigid and overtechnical manner to defeat the ends of justice. Therefore, the petitioner, who is the appellant/A-1, cannot take umbrage under the above cited decision”. 16. In Asit Kumar Kar vs. State of West Bengal { (2009) 2 SCC 703 }, with reference to Article 32 of the Constitution of India in exercising of power to recall of judgment, a Division Bench of the Apex Court has observed that “it is a basic principle of justice that no adverse orders should be passed against a party without hearing him. This is the fundamental principle of natural justice and it is a basic canon of jurisprudence. In the Seven Judges Constitution Bench of this Court in A.R. Antulay vs. R.S. Nayak { (1988) 2 SCC 602 : 1988 SCC (Cri.) 372}, it has been observed in paragraph 55 thereof at page 660: “55. ..... So also the violation of the principles of natural justice renders the act a nullity.” 17. In the Seven Judges Constitution Bench of this Court in A.R. Antulay vs. R.S. Nayak { (1988) 2 SCC 602 : 1988 SCC (Cri.) 372}, it has been observed in paragraph 55 thereof at page 660: “55. ..... So also the violation of the principles of natural justice renders the act a nullity.” 17. On the other hand, the learned Senior Counsel Mr. Ashok Kumar, after inviting our attention to the provisions of Sections 362 and 482 of the Code of Criminal procedure has adverted to that once a matter is finally disposed of, the Court in the absence of a specific statutory provision, becomes functus officio in respect of that matter. 18. In support of his submission, he has placed reliance upon the decision of the Apex Court in Hari Singh Mann vs. Harbhajan Singh Bajwa { (2001) 1 SCC 169 : 2001 SCC (Cri.) 113}. In this case, while speaking on behalf of a Division Bench of the Apex Court, Hon'ble Mr. Justice R.P. Sethi has observed as under:- “The impugned orders were passed completely ignoring the basic principles of criminal law. The petition filed under Section 482 of the Code had been finally disposed of by the High Court on 7.1.1999. Thereafter, there was no lis pending in the High Court wherein the respondents could have filed any miscellaneous petition. Directions in the case filed by the respondents were issued apparently without notice to any of the respondents in the petition. Merely because the first respondent was an Advocate did not justify the issuance of directions at his request without notice of the other side. The impugned orders dated 30.4.1999 and 21.7.1999 could not have been passed by the High Court under its inherent power under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The impugned orders of the High Court dated 30.4.1999 and 21.7.1999 which are not referable to any statutory provisions, having been passed apparently in a review petition in a criminal case are without jurisdiction and liable to be quashed. His Lordship has also highlighted and made stress on the point that “the practice of filing miscellaneous petitions after the disposal of the main case and issuance of fresh directions in such miscellaneous petitions by the High Court are unwarranted, not referable to any statutory provisions and in substance an abuse of the process of the Court”. His Lordship has also highlighted and made stress on the point that “the practice of filing miscellaneous petitions after the disposal of the main case and issuance of fresh directions in such miscellaneous petitions by the High Court are unwarranted, not referable to any statutory provisions and in substance an abuse of the process of the Court”. Besides this, his Lordship has also observed that “there is no provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure authorising the High Court to review its judgment passed either in exercise of its Appellate or Revisional or Original Criminal Jurisdiction. Such a power cannot be exercised with the aid or under the cloak of Section 482 of the Code. Section 362 Cr.P.C., has extended the bar of review not only to the judgment but also to the final orders other than the judgment. Section 362 is based on an acknowledged principle of law that once a matter is finally disposed of by a Court, the said Court in the absence of a specific statutory provision becomes functus officio and disentitled to entertain a fresh prayer for the same relief unless the former order of final disposal is set aside by a Court of competent jurisdiction in a manner prescribed by law. The Court becomes functus officio the moment the official order disposing of a case is signed. Such an order cannot be altered except to the extent of correcting a clerical or an arithmetical error”. 19. We, with a very great respect, are in agreement with the observation made by their Lordships in the abovesaid decision. On coming to the instant case on hand, we have pronounced the judgment on 25.8.2014. As aforestated, the appellant/A-1 was tried along with other accused (A2) for the charges under Sections 449 and 302 read with Section 34 of IPC. Though adequate, sufficient, unassailable and clinching evidences are available, to find the appellant/A-1 guilty under Section 449 of IPC, the learned Trial Judge had simply closed his eyes and without non-application of his judicial mind, had mechanically found the appellant not guilt under Section 449 of IPC, while confirming him under Section 302 read with Section 34 of IPC, because according to the prosecution, both the appellant/A-1 and A-2 armed with aruval has trespassed into the house of deceased and assaulted with aruval and caused total injuries and committed murder of the deceased. Based on the construction of the prosecution case, if the charge under Section 449 goes out, the entire edifice of prosecution case would be collapsed and the offence under Section 302 read with Section 34 of IPC, would not be made out which has been elaborately discussed by us in the judgment. 20. Since this Court, being an Appellate Court, we have made an analytical approach on the testimonies of prosecution witnesses and found the serious error, committed by the learned Trial Judge for having failed to found the appellant guilty under Section 449 of IPC also and therefore, we found him guilty under Section 449 of IPC, while confirming the conviction recorded by the Trial Judge under Sections 302 read with Section 34 of IPC. This is not illegal or against the settled principle of law. However, our conclusion has been fully supported by the decision of the Apex Court as has been stated in the later paragraph. 21. Section 362 of Cr.P.C., enacts as under:- “Section 362. Court not to alter judgment.--Save as otherwise provided by this Code or by any other law for the time being in force, no Court, when it has signed its judgment or final order disposing of a case, shall alter or review the same except to correct a clerical or arithmetical error. As observed in Surendra vs. State { AIR 1954 SC 194 : 1954 SCR 330 : 1954 Crl.L.J. 475}, a judgment delivered in the open Court can, however, be freely altered or amended or even changed completely without further formality provided it has not been signed and notice has been served to parties. 22. To exercise the power of inherent jurisdiction conferred on this Court by Section 482 Cr.P.C., the following three ingredients are very much essential:- (i) the injustice which comes to light should be of a grave, and not of a trivial, character; (ii) it should be palpable and clear and not doubtful; and (iii) there exists no other provision of law by which the party aggrieved could have sought relief. 23. It is also obvious that the inherent power can be exercised only for either of the three purposes specifically mentioned in the Section. 23. It is also obvious that the inherent power can be exercised only for either of the three purposes specifically mentioned in the Section. It is only where the High Court is satisfied either - (a) that an order passed under the Code would be rendered ineffective, or (b) that the process or any Court would be abused, or (c) that the ends of justice would not be secured, that the High Court can and must exercise its inherent power under Section 482. 24. In Sher Singh and others vs. State of Uttar Pradesh { AIR 1967 SC 1412 : 1967 SCR (2) 727} the appellants were charged for murder under Section 302/34 IPC and were acquitted by the Sessions Judge. On appeal, the High Court reversed the acquittal and convicted the appellants under Section 302/34 IPC. In appeal to this Court (Supreme Court), the appellants contended that (i) since an acquittal “reinforces” the presumption of innocence, it was not a fit case for reversal of an acquittal and (ii) the testimony of the eye witnesses in the case was found by the Sessions Judge to be satisfactory. Under these circumstances, the Apex Court has held as under: “The High Court rightly convicted the appellants. (i) The powers of the High Court in an appeal from an acquittal are in no way different from those in an appeal from a conviction. The High Court can consider the evidence and weigh the probabilities. It can accept evidence rejected by the Sessions Judge and reject evidence accepted by him, unless the Sessions Judge relied upon his observation of the demeanour of a particular witness. In departing from the conclusions of the Sessions Judge, the High Court may pay due attention to the grounds on which the acquittal is based on repeal those grounds satisfaction torily, bearing in mind always that an accuse starts with a presumption of innocence in his favour and this presumption cannot certainly be less strong after the acquittal. If these matters are properly kept in view and the acquittal is reversed, there can no objection because the High Court is empowered to reverse an acquittal [729 E-G] Sanwat Singh vs. State of Rajasthan { 1961 (3) SCR 120 } referred to. 25. If these matters are properly kept in view and the acquittal is reversed, there can no objection because the High Court is empowered to reverse an acquittal [729 E-G] Sanwat Singh vs. State of Rajasthan { 1961 (3) SCR 120 } referred to. 25. The provisions of Section 386 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is also very much essential to be extracted with regard to the powers of the Appellate Court. Section 386 (c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure reads as under:- “Section 386. Powers of the Appellate Court.--After perusing such record and hearing the appellant or his pleader, if he appears, and the Public Prosecutor, if he appears, and in case of an appeal under Section 377 or Section 378, the accused, if he appears, the Appellate Court may, if it considers that there is no sufficient ground for interfering, dismiss the appeal, or may-- (a) ... .. .. .. (b) ... .. .. .. (c) in an appeal for enhancement of sentence-- (i) reverse the finding and sentence and acquit or discharge the accused or order him to be retried by a Court competent to try the offence, or (ii) alter the finding maintaining the sentence, or (iii) with or without altering the finding, alter the nature or the extent, or, the nature and extent, of the sentence, so as to enhance or reduce the same”. 26. From the language interwoven in the provisions of Section 386 of the Code, it is explicit that it is the duty of an Appellate Court to look into the evidence adduced in the case and arrive at an independent conclusion as to whether the said evidence can be relied upon or not and even if it can be relied upon, then whether the prosecution can be said to have been proved beyond reasonable doubt on the said evidence the credibility of a witness has to be adjudged by the Appellate Court in drawing inference from proved and admitted facts. {Padam Singh vs. State of U.P., AIR 2000 SC 361 : 2000 Crl.L.J. 489 : (2000) 1 SCC 621 : 2000 (1) Crimes 41 (SC)}. 27. {Padam Singh vs. State of U.P., AIR 2000 SC 361 : 2000 Crl.L.J. 489 : (2000) 1 SCC 621 : 2000 (1) Crimes 41 (SC)}. 27. In these circumstances, we find that it may be better to have the guidance of the judgment of the Apex Court in Criminal Appeal No.1584 of 2012 (@Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No.3583 of 2012) Iqbal Abdul Samiya Malek vs. State of Gujaratwith Criminal Appeal No.1585 of 2012 (@ Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No.6260 of 2012) Henno @ Anwarali Amir Maleq and Others vs. State of Gujarat In this case, the Apex Court has held that “elaborate procedures have been prescribed under Section 386 of Crl.P.C., for disposal of the appeal by the Appellate Court. It is the duty of an Appellate Court to look into the evidence adduced in the case arrive at an independent conclusion as to whether the said evidence can be relied upon or not and even it can be relied upon then whether the prosecution can be said to have proved beyond reasonable doubt on the said evidence. The credibility of a witness has to be adjudged by Appellate Court in drawing inference from proved and admitted facts. Further appeal cannot be disposed of without examining records/merits (vide Padam Singh vs. State of U.P., AIR 2000 SC 361 and Bani Singh and Others vs. State of U.P., 1996 (4) SCC 720 }. 28. In an another decision in Y. Dass and Another vs. State {1990 Cri.L.J. 234}, the Karnataka High Court has observed as under:- “When a person is convicted in appeal, it follows that the Appellate Court has exercised its power in the place of the original Court and the guilt, conviction and sentence must be substituted for and shall have retroactive effect from the date of the judgment of the Trial Court. The appellate convictions substitute the verdict of the trial Court. An appeal is a continuation of an Appellate Court judgment as a replacement of the original judgment”. 29. The appellate convictions substitute the verdict of the trial Court. An appeal is a continuation of an Appellate Court judgment as a replacement of the original judgment”. 29. With reference to the powers of Criminal Appellate Court conferred under Section 386 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Calcutta High Court in Radheshyam Soni and Another vs. State and Another {1991 Cri.L.J. 2926} has observed as under:- “Thus, while a High Court may dismiss a criminal appeal for default of appearance and may also restore the same to file on sufficient grounds, the Criminal Appellate Courts subordinate to the High Court, exclusively governed by Section 386 and having no inherent powers cannot in view of the mandate in that section do so, but must dispose of the appeal on the merits on perusal of the record, even when the appellant or his counsel does not appear to press or prosecute the appeal. Therefore, the order dismissing the criminal appeal for default could not be sustained and the case would be sent back to the Court of Appeal for disposal on merits on perusal of records and in accordance with the provisions of Section 386”. 30. It is trite law that the Court of Appeal has full power to go into the entire evidence and all relevant circumstance, a case, if any, to its own conclusion about the guilt of the accused bearing in mind and the prosecution of the accused person and the fact that he was acquitted by the Trial Court. 31. Apart from this, it is well settled proposition of law that the Appellate Court is untrammelled in its power to re-evaluate the evidence bearing in mind the seriousness of overthrowing an acquittal once recorded. This principle is laid down in Khem Karan and Others vs. The State of U.P. And Another { AIR 1974 SC 1567 (V 61 C 287)} reads as under:- “Merely because a different view of evidence is possible the Court cannot cancel a finding against guilt. But the Appellate Court is untrammelled in its power to re-evaluate the evidence bearing in mind the seriousness of overthrowing an acquittal once recorded.” 32. But the Appellate Court is untrammelled in its power to re-evaluate the evidence bearing in mind the seriousness of overthrowing an acquittal once recorded.” 32. With reference to the powers of this Court conferred under Section 386 of the Code, a Division Bench of the Supreme Court in Sham Sundar vs. Puran and Another { AIR 1991 SC 8 }, wherein the Supreme Court has observed as follows:- “The High Court, exercising power under Section 386, Cr.P.C., in appeal from a conviction may reverse the finding and sentence and acquit the accused or alter the finding maintaining the sentence or with or without altering the finding alter the nature or the extent or the nature and extent of the sentence but not so as to enhance the same. The powers of the High Court in dealing with the evidence are as wide as that of the Trial Court. As the final Court of facts, the High Court has also duty to examine the evidence and arrive at its own conclusion on the entire material on record as to the guilt or otherwise of the appellants before it.” 33. In addition to the observation made above, we also like to place it on record that the Appellate Court, while setting aside the acquittal must look at the reasonings given by the Trial Judge and we are not satisfied with the reasonings of the Trial Judge. The power of the High Court, while sitting in appeal against an order of acquittal is the same, as the power, while sitting in appeal against the conviction and the High Court, therefore, would be fully entitled to re-appreciate the materials on record and to its own conclusion. The only concession on the part of the Appellate Court is that the reasonings defined by the Sessions Judge, while acquitting the accused and indicate as to why those reasonings cannot be accepted. If the order of acquittal is based upon the grounds not sustainable, the Appellate Court would be defined in interfering with the said order of acquittal. 34. We have, with great caution, have considered the submissions made by Mr. P.H. Pandian, learned Senior Counsel as well as Mr. Ashok Kumar, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the second respondent along with the submissions made by Mr. P. Govindarajan, learned Additional Public Prosecutor. 35. 34. We have, with great caution, have considered the submissions made by Mr. P.H. Pandian, learned Senior Counsel as well as Mr. Ashok Kumar, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the second respondent along with the submissions made by Mr. P. Govindarajan, learned Additional Public Prosecutor. 35. As already discussed in the foregoing paragraphs, the judgment was pronounced on 25.8.2014, confirming the conviction and sentence recorded by the Trial Court as against the appellant/A-1 under Section 302 read with Section 34 of IPC. While confirming the judgment, we have also found the appellant/A-1 guilty under Section 449 of IPC, which was omitted to be considered by the learned Trial Judge despite sufficient evidence is available. Therefore, under Section 386 of the Cr.P.C., our conclusion is fully protected and supported and therefore, we find that this Crl.M.P.No.1 of 2014 filed by the appellant/A-1 to recall the order dated 25.8.2014 in Crl.A.No.374 of 2008 does not have merit therefore deemed to be dismissed. Accordingly, the Criminal Miscellaneous Petition is dismissed. 36. The Registry is directed to issue notice to the appellant/A-1, directing him to appear on 28.10.2014 before this Court so as to enable this Court to hear him on question of sentence which may be imposed on him as he is found guilty under Section 449 of IPC also.