ORDER PRASHANT KUMAR MISHRA, J. 1. Challenge in this writ petition is to the order dated 19.5.1998 (Annexure-P/22) passed by the Chairman of erstwhile Bilaspur Development Authority (for short 'BDA'), the predecessor in interest of Municipal Corporation, Bilaspur, dismissing the petitioner from service as also directing recovery of the defalcated amount. 2. The petitioner was initially appointed as daily wager 'LDC' on 19.9.1984 by an order passed by the CEO (BDA). In due course, the petitioner was regularly appointed by order dated 4.3.1989 in the cadre of Class-III employee of the BDA. On 1.7.1995, the petitioner was transferred to the recovery cell of BDA. On 4.10.1995, an FIR was lodged by the cashier of BDA to the effect that when he opened the office at 10.30 am, he found that smoke was emanating from Almirah No.11. On opening the Almirah, it was found that some receipt books were burning, which were doused with the help of other employees. A charge sheet was issued against the petitioner on 22.11.1995 by the Chairman of BDA. Prior to issuance of charge sheet, the petitioner was suspended on 19.10.1995. After issuance of charge sheet, one Shri DS Thakur was appointed as Enquiry Officer. On the allegation that the enquiry was constituted by an incompetent authority and the same was continued in violation of principles of natural justice, without supplying the documents to the petitioner, he challenged the said enquiry by preferring a civil suit with a prayer for grant of temporary injunction. On 23.12.1995, 6th Civil Judge, Class-2, Bilaspur granted an order of status quo and thereafter the petitioner was allowed to inspect the documents/records on 4.1.1996. The BDA moved an application under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC, which was allowed and the suit was eventually dismissed on 9.1.1997. In the meanwhile, charge sheet was filed against the petitioner for offence under Sections 409 and 436 of the IPC on 11.3.1996. By a judgment dated 14.6.2005 in ST No.371/99, the 9th ASJ (FTC) Bilaspur acquitted the petitioner. 3. According to the petitioner, the BDA continued the departmental equiry during pendency of criminal trial; concluded the same without giving proper and adequate opportunity of hearing and without serving copy of the enquiry report and eventually, the petitioner was dismissed from service by order dated 19.5.1998. 4. 3. According to the petitioner, the BDA continued the departmental equiry during pendency of criminal trial; concluded the same without giving proper and adequate opportunity of hearing and without serving copy of the enquiry report and eventually, the petitioner was dismissed from service by order dated 19.5.1998. 4. Learned counsel for the petitioner has argued that the petitioner having been appointed by the CEO of the authority pursuant to the decision of the Board of Directors of the BDA, the Chairman had no authority or competence to issue charge sheet and impose penalty of dismissal from service. He would also submit that the petitioner was not supplied copies of the documents/records relied by the enquiry officer, therefore, the petitioner has been prejudiced in his defence. He has further argued that initiation and completion of DE during the pendency of criminal case is illegal and even otherwise, once the petitioner has been acquitted of the criminal charges, imposition of penalty of dismissal from service on the same set of charges has to fall. According to learned counsel for the petitioner, even in course of enquiry, the petitioner was not granted proper opportunity of hearing to defend himself because dates of hearing of the enquiry were never informed to the petitioner by issuing or serving proper notice. 5. Per contra, learned counsel for the Municipal Corporation, Bilaspur, who is now successor in interest of the erstwhile BDA, has argued that the Chairman of the BDA was competent to impose penalty of dismissal from service in view of the provisions contained under Rule 8 of the CG Development Authority Services (Officers & Servants) Recruitment Rules, 1987 (for short 'the Rules, 1987') and that the petitioner was allowed to inspect the entire record; granted full opportunity to defend himself and was issued repeated notices by the enquiry officer to appear in the enquiry, yet the petitioner did not cooperate for which he has to blame himself. It is thus argued that full, proper and adequate opportunity of hearing has been afforded to the petitioner and the charges having been proved against the petitioner, there is no illegality or arbitrariness in the impugned order. 6. Learned counsel for the respondents has raised a preliminary objection that the petitioner has challenged the order of dismissal without taking recourse to the appellate remedy, therefore, the writ petition deserves to be dismissed on this count alone. 7. 6. Learned counsel for the respondents has raised a preliminary objection that the petitioner has challenged the order of dismissal without taking recourse to the appellate remedy, therefore, the writ petition deserves to be dismissed on this count alone. 7. True it is that the appellate remedy is available under the provisions of the Act and the Rules, however, since the writ petition remained pending for the last 15 years, this Court does not deem it proper at this stage to relegate the petitioner to the appellate authority and instead I proceed to decide the writ petition on merits. 8. From the arguments raised above, it would appear that the legality and validity of the order of dismissal from service has been assailed on the following grounds:- (A) the Chairman of the BDA not being the appointing authority of the petitioner, was neither competent to constitute DE; issue charge sheet or pass order of dismissal from service. (B) the enquiry was conducted in blatant violation of principles of natural justice inasmuch as neither the documents were supplied nor inspection of record was allowed to the petitioner and he was not informed about the dates of hearing. (C) Conduct of DE during the pendency of the criminal case was illegal, arbitrary and unjustified. 9. Before proceeding to deal with each of the ground raised by the petitioner to call in question the order of dismissal, it would be apt to briefly refer to the nature of charges and the finding of the enquiry officer. “Charge No.(1):-This charge concerns the allegation of embezzlement of Rs.81,790/-. On the basis of statements of the persons, who deposited the amount as well as the statements of the Accounts Officer, Accountant and Cashier of the BDA, the enquiry officer found that there is difference in the amount mentioned in the original receipt with the amount mentioned in carbon copy issued to the person concerned who deposited the amount with the BDA. As against the charge of embezzlement of Rs.81,790/-, the enquiry officer found that from the evidence produced in course of enquiry, the actual amount of defalcation is Rs.1, 23,238/-. The report specifically noted the receipt issued to 19 persons which included some of the employees and the figures entered in the original receipt and that mentioned in the carbon copy has been shown against each of the names. The report specifically noted the receipt issued to 19 persons which included some of the employees and the figures entered in the original receipt and that mentioned in the carbon copy has been shown against each of the names. For example, while receiving the lease rent from shop keeper Choudhary Ram, the receipt issued to the said lessee mentions Rs.5,400/-whereas in the carbon copy available with the BDA, the amount was shown as Rs.400/-. Similarly, in relation to Devidas Wadhwani, the amount shown in the receipt is Rs.6,655/-whereas the carbon copy carries the figure Rs.655/-. This interpolation was made to defalcate the amount and while doing so, the petitioner issued receipt of the amount deposited by the person concerned, but in the carbon copy, he used to mention lesser amount. Thus the BDA suffered financial loss and the amount was retained by the petitioner. Charge No.(2):-This charge was about committing mischief by putting the documents/receipt on fire. The enquiry officer has found that it is highly probable that the petitioner has committed mischief by fire because it was he who committed defalcation and the receipt books and collection registers were evidence, which would have nailed him. Charge No.(3):-In this charge, it is mentioned that because of acts and omissions committed by the petitioner, the credibility and reputation of the BDA has suffered jolt. The enquiry officer found that since the petitioner has committed defalcation and tried to extinguish the evidence by committing mischief with fire, the same has definitely dented the credibility of the development authority. Charge No.(4):-This charge was about commission of serious misconduct on account of his involvement in charge Nos.(1) to (3). This charge has also been found to be proved. 10. The findings on the charges are based on evidence recorded in course of enquiry. This Court has seen the record of the DE proceeding. The record contains statements of witnesses, audit reports pointing out the difference in the amount and the embezzlement, statements of lessee/shop keepers etc. The finding recorded by the enquiry officer is in the nature of finding of fact. 11. In the matter of Union of India and others Vs. Manab Kumar Guha, (2011) 11 SCC 535 , it has been held that the High Court, while exercising power of judicial review in respect of order of disciplinary authority does not act as a Court of appeal and appraise evidence. 11. In the matter of Union of India and others Vs. Manab Kumar Guha, (2011) 11 SCC 535 , it has been held that the High Court, while exercising power of judicial review in respect of order of disciplinary authority does not act as a Court of appeal and appraise evidence. It has further been held that the High Court can interfere with the finding of the enquiry officer only when the same is perverse. 12. On perusal of the record, it does not appear that the findings on charge Nos.(1), (3) & (4) are without any evidence. As a matter of fact, there is abundance of evidence proving the embezzlement. The enquiry officer appears to have based his finding on charge No.(2) by assuming that the petitioner might have duplicate keys of the almirah for opening the same and putting on fire. The finding on this charge appears to be without any reliable evidence, however, at-least 4 charges were levelled against the petitioner, therefore, even if the finding on charge No.(2) is perverse, charge No. (1) concerning defalcation of amount has been fully proved and the same does not suffer from any infirmity. Competence of Chairman, BDA to constitute DE and impose punishment of dismissal from service 13. Indisputably, the petitioner's services are governed under the Rules, 1987 framed by the State Government in exercise of powers under Section 76B(2) read with Section 85 of the CG Nagar Tatha Gram Nivesh Adhiniyam, 1973. Rule 51 thereof speaks about the penalties which may be imposed on the employee. Under Rule 53, the appointing authority is the disciplinary authority to impose any of the penalties provided under Rule 51. Under Rule 8(2), the appointing authority for Class-III and Class-IV employees of the development authority is the Chairman. Thus, the appointing authority of the petitioner is the Chairman of the BDA. 14. Thus, the first ground raised by the petitioner is without any substance and it is rejected. Violation of principles of natural justice 15. The record of the departmental enquiry contains notices issued to the petitioner on 9.2.98 for his appearance before the enquiry officer on 23.2.98. There is another notice dated 27.2.98 informing the petitioner that statements of witnesses shall be recorded on 7.3.98. Violation of principles of natural justice 15. The record of the departmental enquiry contains notices issued to the petitioner on 9.2.98 for his appearance before the enquiry officer on 23.2.98. There is another notice dated 27.2.98 informing the petitioner that statements of witnesses shall be recorded on 7.3.98. When the enquiry was fixed for 9.2.98, the petitioner moved an application on the date of hearing i.e. 9.2.98 stating that since he is suffering from Jaundice, he is unable to appear till 20.2.98. It is on receipt of this application, the hearing was fixed on 23.2.98. On 26.2.98, the petitioner moved another application stating that he has not yet recovered from ailment, therefore, hearing be fixed after 7.3.98. Along with his earlier application, he submitted certificate of one Dr. Rajnikant Verma whereas with his second application, he submitted medical certificate issued by Dr. RK Mishra. He moved another application on 7.3.98 for adjourning the hearing. On all the occasions, the hearing was adjourned. However, by letter dated 13.4.98, the petitioner was informed that he should get himself examined by the Medical Board and produce the certificate. He was also informed that the next date of hearing is fixed on 24.4.98 and in the event, he fails to present himself, the enquiry would proceed ex-parte. After receiving this notice, the petitioner moved another application on 23.4.98 mentioning that his aunt ¼aekeh½ has died at Indore, therefore, hearing be adjourned. Significantly, the petitioner did not produce the certificate issued by the Medical Board regarding his illness. It appears, despite being granted repeated opportunities, the petitioner did not present himself to cross-examine the witnesses nor presented himself as a witness to defend himself against the charges. In none of the applications submitted before the enquiry officer the petitioner raised any ground that he is unable to cross-examine the witnesses or defend himself for non-supply of the documents. He has neither stated as to what prejudice he has suffered, if any particular document has not been supplied. Contrary to this, charge sheet issued and served on the petitioner on 22.11.95 contains the article of charges, statement of imputation, list of documents and the list of witnesses. 16. In Nagar Palika, Nataur Vs. He has neither stated as to what prejudice he has suffered, if any particular document has not been supplied. Contrary to this, charge sheet issued and served on the petitioner on 22.11.95 contains the article of charges, statement of imputation, list of documents and the list of witnesses. 16. In Nagar Palika, Nataur Vs. U.P. Public Services Tribunal, Lucknow and others, (1998) 2 SCC 400 , it has been held that principle of natural justice is not violated where the delinquent was afforded opportunity of hearing but the same was not utilized. 17. In the present case also, this Court has found that the petitioner was issued notices seeking his appearance before the enquiry officer at the time of recording statements of witnesses, however, the petitioner kept on moving applications for adjournments and chose to remain absent. Therefore, it is not a case where the petitioner was not afforded any opportunity of hearing or that principle of natural justice has been violated. Thus, this ground of challenge also fails. Acquittal in criminal case and conduct of DE during the pendency of criminal case on the same set of evidence 18. The charge sheet issued to the petitioner contains 4 charges. The charge of defalcation/embezzlement has been found on the basis of oral statements of witnesses. The record of enquiry also contains various audit objections. It is settled law that proof of guilt in criminal case is on the principle of proof beyond reasonable doubt whereas in departmental enquiry, the principle of preponderance of probability is pressed into service. 19. It is held by the Supreme Court that acquittal in criminal case would not ipso facto entitle the delinquent for exoneration in the departmental enquiry as decision in the departmental enquiry is based on evidence adduced before the enquiry officer. 20. In Divisional Controller, Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation Vs. M.G. Vittal Rao, (2012) 1 SCC 442 , it has been held by the Supreme Court that question of considering reinstatement after decision of acquittal or discharge by a competent criminal court arises only if dismissal from services was based on conviction by criminal court in view of provisions of Article 311 (2) second proviso (a) of Constitution. M.G. Vittal Rao, (2012) 1 SCC 442 , it has been held by the Supreme Court that question of considering reinstatement after decision of acquittal or discharge by a competent criminal court arises only if dismissal from services was based on conviction by criminal court in view of provisions of Article 311 (2) second proviso (a) of Constitution. In case where enquiry is independent of criminal proceedings, acquittal in a criminal court is of no help and that even if a person stands acquitted by a criminal court, domestic enquiry can be held, since standard of proof required in a domestic enquiry and that in a criminal case are different. 21. In Noida Entrepreneurs' Assn. v. NOIDA, (2007) 10 SCC 385 and Divisional Controller, Gujarat SRTC Vs. Kadarbhai J. Suthar, (2007) 10 SCC 561, the Supreme Court has held that mere acquittal in a criminal case does not have the effect of nullifying the decision taken in the departmental proceedings. They operate in different areas of considerations. 22. In Avinash Sadashiv Bhosale (dead) through LRs. Vs. Union of India and others, (2012) 13 SCC 142, the Supreme Court has observed thus:- “54. This Court recently reiterated the legal principle that departmental proceedings can be conducted simultaneously to the criminal trial in Karnataka SRTC Vs. M.G. Vittal Rao { (2012) 1 SCC 442 }. In this case, making reference to almost all the previous precedents, this Court has reiterated the legal position as follows: 54.1 There is no legal bar for both proceedings to go on simultaneously. 54.2 The only valid ground for claiming that the disciplinary proceedings may be stayed would be to ensure that the defence of the employee in the criminal case may not be prejudiced. But even such grounds would be available only in cases involving complex questions of facts and law. 54.3 Such defence ought not to be permitted to unnecessarily delay the departmental proceedings. The interest of the delinquent officer as well as the employer clearly lies in a prompt conclusion of the disciplinary proceedings. 54.4 Departmental proceedings can go on simultaneously to the criminal trial, except where both the proceedings are based on the same set of facts and the evidence in both the proceedings is common. 54.5 In our opinion, the principles culled out by this Court would be a complete answer to all the submissions made by Mr. Jain. 55. 54.4 Departmental proceedings can go on simultaneously to the criminal trial, except where both the proceedings are based on the same set of facts and the evidence in both the proceedings is common. 54.5 In our opinion, the principles culled out by this Court would be a complete answer to all the submissions made by Mr. Jain. 55. In view of the aforesaid legal principles enunciated and reiterated by this Court, we cannot accept that because the appellant had been prosecuted, the departmental proceedings could not have been continued simultaneously. As pointed out by Mr. Dwivedi, the charges against the appellant in the criminal trial related to the commission of criminal offences under Sections 120-B, 420, 467, 468, 471 and 201 of the Penal Code. The proof of criminal charges depended upon prosecution producing proof beyond reasonable doubt relating to the culpability of the appellant along with other persons. In the departmental proceedings, the basic charge was that the appellant whilst posted as a Branch Manager of Washi Turbhe Branch, failed to discharge his duties with utmost integrity, honesty, devotion and diligence to ensure and protect the interest of the Bank and acted in a manner unbecoming of a bank officer. The aforesaid charge clearly related to the manner in which the appellant performed the duties as the Manager of the branch of the Bank. It had nothing to do with any criminal liability attaching to such conduct.” 23. For the foregoing, I am of the considered opinion that the enquiry officer has not committed any illegality by proceeding with the departmental enquiry during the pendency of the criminal case. 24. In the result, the writ petition being bereft of any substance deserves to be and is hereby dismissed.