ORDER 1. This is plaintiffs' Second Appeal against the judgment and decree dated 23.3.1999 passed by 1st Additional District Judge, Bastar in Civil Appeal No. 3-A/98, affirming the judgment and decree dated 3.8.1998 passed by Civil Judge, Class II, Narayanpur, in Civil Suit No. 6-A/1997, dismissing the plaintiffs' suit. [For sake of convenience, the parties would be referred hereinafter as per their status before the trial Court] 2. That the plaintiffs filed suit for declaration of their title pleading inter alia that they are title holder of the scheduled suit land situated at village Narayanpur and that they have purchased the suit property from Radho Bai, widow of Shri Bhotka by registered sale deed dated 7.4.1981 and the order passed by the revenue authorities declaring that the said transaction under Section 170-B of the CG Land Revenue Code (for short 'the Code') is null and void as such the transaction entered into between the plaintiffs and Radho Bai, both belonging to aboriginal tribe, the provisions of 170-B of Code is not attracted. 3. The trial Court, by its judgment & decree dated 3.8.1988 while deciding the issue of the jurisdiction as preliminary issue held that civil court has no jurisdiction to entertain the suit in view bar created Section 257(L-1) of the Code, holding that Revenue Authorities, has exclusive jurisdiction over matter covered under Section 170-B of the Code. 4. On first appeal filed by the plaintiffs, the first appellate Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the judgment and decree of the trial Court. 5. Mr. Bhaskar Pyashi, learned counsel appearing for the plaintiffs would submit that both the courts below have committed a legal error in holding that the civil suit is not maintainable in law in view of bar created under Section 257(L-0) of the Chhattisgarh Land Revenue Code, 1959. He would further submit it ought to have seen that in the instant case the transaction is between two aboriginal tribes, that is Radho Bai and the plaintiffs, therefore the provisions of Section 170-B of the Code is not attracted and thus, the Civil Court has jurisdiction to deal with the matter as such bar u/s 257 (L-o) would not make the suit non maintainable in law. 6. I have heard learned counsel appearing for the plaintiffs and carefully perused the records of both the courts below including judgment and decree impugned. 7. 6. I have heard learned counsel appearing for the plaintiffs and carefully perused the records of both the courts below including judgment and decree impugned. 7. The provision of section 257 (1 - 1) of Code reads thus : "257. Exclusive jurisdiction of revenue authorities-Except as otherwise provided in this Code, or in any other enactment for the time being in force, no civil Court shall entertain any suit instituted or application made to obtain a decision or order on any matter which the State Government, the Board, or any Revenue Officer is by this Code, empowered to determine, decide or dispose of and in particular and without prejudice to the generality of this provision, no Civil Court shall exercise jurisdiction over any of the following matters : xxx xxx xxx (1-1) any matter covered under section 170-B." It entails special bar on the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to entertain a dispute which requires to be decided by the Sub Divisional Officer under Section 170-B of the Code. 8. The short question that arises for consideration as to what extent in a provision of exclusive jurisdiction any interference can be made by the civil court. The Supreme Court in the case of Dhulabhai Vs. State of M.P., (1968) 3 SCR 662 : AIR 1969 SC 78 has laid down several test with regard to interference by civil court in provision relating to exclusive jurisdiction by the Special Tribunal/Revenue Authorities and held as under: "(i) Where the statute gives a finality to the orders of the special Tribunals the civil courts' jurisdiction must be held to be excluded if there is adequate remedy to do what the civil courts would normally do in a suit. Such provision, however, does not exclude those cases where the provisions of the particular Act have not been complied with or the statutory Tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure. (ii) Where there is an express bar of the jurisdiction of the court, an examination of the scheme of the particular Act to find the adequacy or the sufficiency of the remedies provided may be relevant but is not decisive to sustain the jurisdiction of the civil court. (ii) Where there is an express bar of the jurisdiction of the court, an examination of the scheme of the particular Act to find the adequacy or the sufficiency of the remedies provided may be relevant but is not decisive to sustain the jurisdiction of the civil court. Where there is no express exclusion the examination of the remedies and the scheme of the particular Act to find out the intendment becomes necessary and the result of the inquiry may be decisive. In the latter case it is necessary to see if the statute creates a special right or a liability and provides for the determination of the right or liability and further lays down that all questions about the said right and liability shall be detem1ined by the Tribunals so constituted, and whether remedies normally associated with actions in civil courts are prescribed by the said statute or not. (iii) Challenge to the provisions of the particular Act as ultra vires cannot be brought before Tribunals constituted under that Act. Even the High Court cannot go into that question on a revision or reference from the decision of the Tribunals. (iv) When a provision is already declared unconstitutional or the constitutionality of any provision is to be challenged, a suit is open. A writ of certiorari may include a direction for refund if the claim is clearly within the time prescribed by the Limitation Act but it is not a compulsory remedy to replace a suit. (v) Where the particular Act contains no machinery for refund of tax collected in excess of constitutional limits or illegality collected a suit lies. (vi) Questions of the correctness of the assessment apart from its constitutionality are for the decision of the authorities and a civil suit does not lie if the orders of the authorities are declared to be final or there is an express prohibition in the particular Act. In either case the scheme of the particular Act must be examined because it is a relevant enquiry. (vii) An exclusion of the jurisdiction of the civil court is not readily to be inferred unless the conditions above set down apply." 9. The same principles are again enunciated by the Supreme Court in the case of State of Andhra Pradesh Vs. Manjeti Laxmi Kantha Rao (Dead.) by LRs. (vii) An exclusion of the jurisdiction of the civil court is not readily to be inferred unless the conditions above set down apply." 9. The same principles are again enunciated by the Supreme Court in the case of State of Andhra Pradesh Vs. Manjeti Laxmi Kantha Rao (Dead.) by LRs. and others, wherein the decision of Dhulabhai, (1968) 3 SCR 662 : AIR 1969 SC 78 , (supra) has been noticed. Para 5 of the said report, which is relevant, succinctly states as under :- "5. The normal rule of law is that civil courts have jurisdiction to try all suits of civil nature except those of which cognisance by them is either expressly or impliedly excluded as provided under Section 9 of the Code of Civil Procedure but such exclusion is not readily inferred and the presumption to be drawn must be in favour of the existence rather than exclusion of jurisdiction of the civil courts to try a civil suit. The test adopted in examining such a question is (i) whether the legislative intent to exclude arises explicitly or by necessary implication, and (ii) whether the statute in question provides for adequate and satisfactory alternative remedy to a party aggrieved by an order made under it. In Dhulabhai v. State of MP., it was noticed that where a statute gives finality to the orders of the Special Tribunals, jurisdiction of the civil courts must be held to be .excluded if there is adequate remedy to do what the civil courts would normally do in a suit and such provision, however, does not exclude those cases where the provisions of the particular Act have not been complied with or the statutory tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure." 10. Thus, in such cases civil court has to see only to the extent whether basic fundamental principles of the judicial process have been followed or not by the competent authority while passing the order impugned and the jurisdiction of the civil Court is limited as laid down in the case of Dhulabhai, (1968) 3 SCR 662 : AIR 1969 SC 78 , (supra) and case must fall within the parameter of the tests mentioned in case of Dhulabhai, (1968) 3 SCR 662 : AIR 1969 SC 78 , (supra) and State of Andhra Pradesh, (2000) 3 SCC 689 , (supra). 11. 11. While considering this question in the matter of 170-B of the Code Madhya Pradesh High Court in Dhumaniya Vs. Harisingh and others, 2001 RN 85 reported in Revenue Niryana, held as under: "22. The civil Court has gone into the questions which were required to be decided by the SDO and as a matter of fact, decided by the SDO. The matters which are required to be decided by the SDO are not final as against the order of the SDO there is further appeal and revision provided under the Code. The orders thus passed are final and the jurisdiction of civil Court is barred u/s 257(1-1) of the Code. Thus, the Courts below could have seen only to the extent whether basic fundamental principles of the judicial process have been followed or not by the competent authority passing the order and the jurisdiction of the civil court is limited as laid down in the case of Dhulabhai (supra) and case must fall within the parameter of the tests mentioned in para 19 of this order. The Courts below have not considered the material such as the voters list which was referred to by the SDO and also the lease deed filed by the respondent, granted to Luraiya Sahariya." 12. In view of the aforesaid legal position inspite the bar created under section 257(1)(L-1) of the Code against orders passed by the Revenue Authorities under section 170-A and 170-B of the Code in their exclusive jurisdiction even then the civil Court had jurisdiction to entertain and consider the matter up to the extent whether the authority concerned has complied with the prescribed procedure or not while holding the enquiry and passing the order. But such jurisdiction is limited as laid down in the case of Dhulabhai, (1968) 3 SCR 662 : AIR 1969 SC 78 , (supra). The civil Court cannot consider the questions decided by such revenue authorities on merits under their exclusive jurisdiction. Thus, it is held that the civil Court has jurisdiction to entertain such suit upto the aforestated extent. 13. Thus in view of the aforesaid legal position, the contention of the plaintiff is to be examined as to whether the inter se transfer of land between Radhobai (member of aboriginal tribe) and plaintiffs who are also the members of aboriginal tribe - provisions 170-B of the Code would be attracted. 14. 13. Thus in view of the aforesaid legal position, the contention of the plaintiff is to be examined as to whether the inter se transfer of land between Radhobai (member of aboriginal tribe) and plaintiffs who are also the members of aboriginal tribe - provisions 170-B of the Code would be attracted. 14. Section 170-B reads as under :- "170-B. (1) Reversion of land of members of aboriginal tribe which was transferred by fraud - Every person who on the date of commencement of Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code (Amendment) Act, 1980 (hereinafter referred to as the Amendment Act of 1980) is in possession of agricultural land which belonged to a member of a tribe which has been declared to be an aboriginal tribe under sub-section (6) of Section 165 between the period commencing on the 2nd October, 1959 and ending on the date of the Commencement of Amendment Act, 1980 shall, within (two years) of such Commencement notify to the Sub-Divisional Officer in such form and in such manner as may be prescribed, all the information as to how he has come in possession of such land. (2) If any person fails to notify the information as required by subsection (1) within the period specified therein it shall be presumed that such person has been in possession of the agricultural land without any lawful authority and the agricultural land shall, on the expiration of the period aforesaid revert to the person to whom it originally belonged and if that person be dead, to his legal heirs. (2-A) If a Gram Sabha in the scheduled area referred to in clause (1) of Article 211 of the Constitution finds that any person, other than a member of an aboriginal tribe, is in possession of any land of a Bhumiswami belonging to an aboriginal tribe, without any lawful authority, it shall restore the possession of such land to that person to whom it originally belonged and if that person is dead to his legal heirs. Provided that if the Gram Sabha fails to restore the possession of such land, it shall refer the matter to the Sub-Divisional Officer, who shall restore the possession to such land within three months from the date of receipt of the reference. Provided that if the Gram Sabha fails to restore the possession of such land, it shall refer the matter to the Sub-Divisional Officer, who shall restore the possession to such land within three months from the date of receipt of the reference. (3) On receipt of the information under sub-section (1) the Sub-Divisional Officer shall make such enquiry as may be necessary about all such transactions of transfer and if he finds that the member of aboriginal tribe has been defrauded of his legitimate right he shall declare the transaction null and void and – (a) Where no building or structure has been erected on the agricultural land prior to such finding pass an order revesting the agricultural land in the transferer and if he be dead, in his legal heirs; (b) Where any building or structure has been erected on the agricultural land prior to such finding, he shall fix the price of such land in accordance with the principles laid down for fixation of price of land in the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (No.1 of 1894) and order the person referred to in sub-section (1) to pay to the transferer the difference, if any, between the price so fixed and the price actually paid to the transferer : Provided that where the building or structure has been erected after the 1st day of January, 1984 the provisions of clause (b) above shall not apply: Provided further that fixation of price under clause (b) shall be with reference to the price on the date of registration of the case before the Sub-Divisional Officer." 15. A bare perusal of the aforestated provision it becomes luminously clear that a person who is in possession of the agricultural land which belong to a Tribe who has teen declared to be and Aboriginal Tribe under sub-section (6) of Section 165 within period of 2.10.1959 and ending on the date of commencement of the Amendment Act, 1980 viz. 21.10.1980 within 2 years should supply all the infol1nation as to how he has come in possession of such land and Section 170-B of the Code would be attracted even if transaction of transfer of land is between two aboriginal tribes. 16. The Supreme Court in case of Bhaiji Vs. 21.10.1980 within 2 years should supply all the infol1nation as to how he has come in possession of such land and Section 170-B of the Code would be attracted even if transaction of transfer of land is between two aboriginal tribes. 16. The Supreme Court in case of Bhaiji Vs. Sub-Divisional Officer, Thandla and others, (2003) 1 SCC 692 has held that no where in the entire scheme of subsections (1), (2) and (3) of section 170-B of the Code as enacted in 1980, there is the least indication of confining the applicability of the provision to such transaction of transfer as where entered into by a member of an aboriginal tribe in favour of a member not belonging to a aboriginal tribe. Their Lordships have further held that there is no exception in the enactment so as to exclude from the purview of section 170-B of the Code that the inter se transfer between aboriginal tribe is not hit by section 170-B of the Code. Had it been so the legislature had specifically said so. In this context it would be profitable to rely para 8 of the case of Bhaiji, (2003) 1 SCC 692 , (supra) which reads thus : "8. It is well known that some of the aboriginal tries are nomadic and some indulge in Climes traditionally and historically. The purpose of settling land with the tribals mostly which is done at very concessional rates and at times even without involving an obligation to pay the land revenue, is so done with a view to see that the aboriginals settle at one place abandoning nomadism and picking up tilling the soil as their vocation by settling at one place and earning livelihood by labour and toil. It is also well known that creamy layers have developed and even as amongst socially unprivileged some have acquired affluence. An affluent shrewd tribal may indulge in exploiting his fellow beings. Possibility cannot be ruled out where a non-tribal, may manager to have land transferred apparently but not in reality in the name of a tribal and taking advantage of his status, affluence or any other means, conferring him with capacity to exploit, may till the land to his own advantage depriving the aboriginal tribal from the benefits of the land settled by the State with him. All such cases are taken care of by Section 170-B. The purpose of enacting Section 170-B of the Code is very wide. The object sought to be achieved, as its drafting indicates, is to gather and make available all statistics with the State officials so as to find out how much land belonging to aboriginal tribals is in possession of anyone to whom it docs not belong as on the cut-off date. The information having been collected, the enquiry under sub-section (3) shall be directed towards finding out the nature of transaction resulting in transfer of land-whether such transaction of transfer has resulted in the aboriginal tribal having been defrauded of his legitimate right in the land. Sub-sections (1), (2) and (3), as enacted in 1980, have to be read as part of one whole scheme. If the submission of Shri Gambhir is correct then the object of enquiry under sub-section (3) would have been to find out if such transaction of transfer has resulted in an aboriginal tribal having been defrauded of his legitimate right by a person not belonging to an aboriginal tribe. But that is not so. Nowhere in the entire scheme of subsections (1), (2) and (3) of Section 170-B, as enacted in 1980, there is the least indication of confining the applicability of the provision to such transactions of transfer as were entered into by a member of an aboriginal tribe in favour of a member not belonging to an aboriginal tribe. No exception has been enacted by the legislature so as to exclude from the purview of Section 170-B transactions of transfer between two persons both of whom are members of aboriginal tribes. Had it been so, the legislature would have specifically said so. The language of the section as drafted in 1980 is clear and unambiguous and, does not admit of any doubt so far as this aspect is concerned." 17. Thus, it has authoritatively been laid down by the Supreme Court, that transaction of transfer between two members of aboriginal tribe would came within the purview of Section 170-B of Code and its applicability to aboriginal tribes have not been excluded by the legislature. 18. Thus, it has authoritatively been laid down by the Supreme Court, that transaction of transfer between two members of aboriginal tribe would came within the purview of Section 170-B of Code and its applicability to aboriginal tribes have not been excluded by the legislature. 18. In light of afore-stated decision of the Supreme Court, the submission raised by the counsel for plaintiff, that Section 170-B of Code is not attracted as transaction of transfer between two aboriginal tribes is not legally acceptable submission, it deserves to and accordingly rejected. 19. The findings recorded by both the courts below are finding of fact based on material available on record and I do not find it either perverse or contrary to record and no question of law much less substantial question of law is involved in this appeal. 20. Recently, the Supreme Court in the case of Vishwanath Agrawal, s/o Sitaram Agrawal Vs. Sarla Vishwanath Agrawal, (2012) 7 SCC 288 has held that High Court should not disturb the concurrent finding of fact, unless finding recorded are perverse being based on no evidence. Para-36, 37 of report as under :- "36. In Major Singh Vs. Rattan Singh, (1997) 3 SCC 546 : AIR 1997 SC 1906 it has been observed that when the courts below had rejected and disbelieved the evidence on unacceptable grounds, it is the duty of the High Court to consider whether the reasons given by the courts below are sustainable in law while hearing an appeal under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 37. In Vidhyadhan Vs. Manikrao, (1999)3 SCC 573 it has been ruled that the High Court in a second appeal should not disturb the concurrent findings of fact unless it is shown that the findings recorded by the Courts below arc perverse being based on no evidence or that on the evidence on record no reasonable person could have come to that conclusion. We may note here that solely because another view is possible on the basis of the evidence, the High Court would not be entitled to exercise the jurisdiction under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. This view of ours has been fortified by the decisions of this Court in Abdul Raheem Vs. Karnataka Electricity Board, (2007) 14 SCC 138 : AIR 2008 SC 956 ." 21. This view of ours has been fortified by the decisions of this Court in Abdul Raheem Vs. Karnataka Electricity Board, (2007) 14 SCC 138 : AIR 2008 SC 956 ." 21. Keeping in view, the ratio of law laid down by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid case, the concurrent finding of fact recorded by both the courts below is based on evidence, no substantial question of law is involved in this appeal, thus appeal deserves to and accordingly dismissed at admission stage itself. No order as to cost. Appeal Dismissed.