Judgment 1. The second appeal has been preferred under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure against the Judgment and Decree, dated 31.01.2003 passed in A.S.No.68 of 2002 on the file of the Additional District Judge/Fast Track Court No.IV, Erode at Bhavani, reversing the Judgment and Decree, dated 24.07.2001 made in O.S.No.69 of 1998 on the file of the Second Additional District Munsif, Bhavani. 2. The suit in O.S.No.69 of 1998 was filed by the first respondent herein, seeking partition and allotment of half share in the suit schedule property to the first respondent/plaintiff. The suit was originally filed against the second respondent herein and late Marasamy, father of both the respondents. Subsequently, the appellant herein was impleaded as the third defendant in the suit. In fact, only the appellant/D3 contested the suit against the first respondent/plaintiff and the defendants 1 and 2 have not contested the suit. 3. As per the Judgment and Decree, dated 24.07.2001, passed in O.S.No.69 of 1998 by the trial court, the suit was dismissed, hence, first appeal was preferred by the plaintiff of the suit in A.S.No.68 of 2002 and by Judgment and Decree, dated 31.01.2003, the appeal was allowed by the first appellate court, reversing the Judgment and Decree rendered by the trial court and preliminary decree for partition was granted with costs by the appellate court. Aggrieved by which, this second appeal has been preferred by the Tamil Nadu Industrial Investment Corporation Ltd., the third defendant in the suit. 4. The following substantial questions of law have been framed by this Court in this second appeal, in view of Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, for consideration: "1. Whether the Judgment and Decree passed by the first appellate court is sustainable in law, on account of non-consideration of the documents filed in support of the claim of the appellant/D3 and considering Ex.A.5 in passing preliminary decree for partition, allotting 1/2 share to the first respondent/plaintiff? 2. Whether the first appellate court is right in reversing the Judgment of the trial court, pertaining to the suit, as stated by the appellant, in view of Order XXXXI Rule 31 of the Code of Civil Procedure?" 5. 2. Whether the first appellate court is right in reversing the Judgment of the trial court, pertaining to the suit, as stated by the appellant, in view of Order XXXXI Rule 31 of the Code of Civil Procedure?" 5. Substantial Question of Law No.1: It is an admitted fact that the first respondent herein had filed the suit originally against the second respondent and Late Marasamy, father of the respondents 1 and 2, seeking partition and separate possession of 1/3rd share in the suit schedule property. After the death of Marasamy, the prayer was amended, as per order passed in I.A.No.91 of 2002, dated 18.11.2002, whereby the first respondent/plaintiff claimed half share in the property as one of the legal heirs of the deceased Marasamy. The real contestant in the suit was the appellant/third defendant, Tamil Nadu Industrial Investment Corporation Ltd., represented by its Managing Director, Erode. 6. The case of the appellant/third defendant is that the second respondent/D1 had obtained loan from the appellant/third defendant for running a power-loom unit, for which late. Marasamy, father of the respondents, was the guarantor and he created equitable mortgage/hypothecation in favour of the appellant/third defendant for the said loan. On the application given by the first respondent, a sum of Rs.4,50,000/- had been sanctioned by the appellant/D3 on 09.09.1991 in favour of the second respondent/D1. A Registered mortgage deed was executed by the first respondent/D1 on 27.02.1992 in respect of the property gifted in his favour by his father late Marasamy and the value of the same was stated at Rs.50,000/-. It is not in dispute that the second respondent/D1 availed only Rs.4,36,000/-, out of the sanctioned loan of Rs.4,50,000/-from and out of the said amount, construction of power-loom factory building was made and machineries were also purchased by the second respondent/D1 and started running the power-loom unit. However, according to the appellant/D3, the second respondent/D1 sold the hypothicated machineries against the loan agreement with the appellant/D3 and the second respondent has also not settled the amount due and payable to the Tamil Nadu Industrial Investment Corporation Ltd., the appellant/D3 herein. 7. It is submitted on the side of the appellant that the suit was filed by the first respondent/plaintiff, in order to deceive the amount due and payable to the appellant/D3. 7. It is submitted on the side of the appellant that the suit was filed by the first respondent/plaintiff, in order to deceive the amount due and payable to the appellant/D3. It was also argued by the learned counsel for the applicant that the loan was obtained by the second respondent/D1 along with his father late Marasamy, as Kartha of the family, hence, their joint family properties are liable for discharging the debt. It is not in dispute that 25 cents of land had been gifted by late Marasamy under the original of Ex.B.2, dated 19.11.1990 in favour of the second respondent/D1, where the power-loom factory was constructed and running the power-loom unit. 8. Mr. V. Bhiman, learned counsel appearing for the appellant argued that only for the purpose of getting loan, the property had been settled in favour of the second respondent by late Marasamy, father of the respondents herein. According to him, the supporting documents and evidence available on record would clearly show that the loan obtained for starting a power-loom unit was only the joint family of late Marasamy, in the name of his elder son, Palanisamy, the second respondent herein. Therefore, the first respondent/plaintiff cannot raise a defence that the joint family property given as security by his father, late Marasamy, by way of creating equitable mortgage/hypothecation in favour of the appellant/D3 is not binding on his share in the joint family property. It was argued on the side of the appellant that on the facts and circumstances, the first respondent/plaintiff is not entitled to seek partition of half share in the property, after the death of Marasamy, without discharging the amount due and payable to the appellant/D3 and that the first respondent/plaintiff is not entitled to raise a plea that he should be given his share in the assets of the joint family, but not in the liability of the family. 9. It is further argued on behalf of the appellant that though the trial Court had properly considered both the plea and also the oral and documentary evidence and dismissed the suit, the first appellate Court, contrary to law, has reversed the finding of the trial court, contrary to law and granted preliminary decree for partition, as prayed for by the first respondent/plaintiff with costs, hence, the second appeal has been preferred. 10. Per contra, Mr. 10. Per contra, Mr. N. Manokaran, learned counsel appearing for the first respondent/plaintiff submitted that the loan obtained by the second respondent/D1 was only for running his power-loom unit, which would not bind the claim of the first respondent/plaintiff, seeking partition. Learned counsel for the first respondent/plaintiff drew the attention of this Court to the deposition of the first respondent/plaintiff as P.W.1 and argued that the second respondent/D1 was a spendthrift and he was not attached to the family and therefore, the first respondent/plaintiff and late Marasamy were living separately. According to him, the first respondent/plaintiff was not aware of the loan obtained by the second respondent from the appellant/third defendant and also running of the power-loom unit by the second respondent herein, hence, the appellate Court, reversed the finding of the trial court and passed preliminary decree for partition, whereby granted half share in the joint family property in favour of the first respondent/plaintiff, in view of the death of Marasamy father of the respondents. 11. In support of his contention, Mr. N. Manokaran, learned counsel appearing for the first respondent relied on the following decisions: 1. Gajraj Jain v. State of Bihar, (2004) 7 SCC 151 2. S.J.S Business Enterprises (P) Ltd., v. State of Bihar, (2004) 7 SCC 166 12. In Gajraj Jain v. State of Bihar, reported in (2004) 7 SCC 151 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the provisions of sub-sections (1) and (4) of Section 29 of the State Financial Corporations Act, is similar to that of Section 69 of the Transfer of Property Act. Section 29(1) contemplates a sale for distribution of sale proceeds and not a sale for distribution of property charged with the debt. It was also made clear that the first charge-holder must act in a manner to protect not only the first charge-holder's own interest but also the interest of the subsequent charge-holder(s) and also the mortgagor of the property. The words "realisation of the property pledged, mortgaged, hypothecated" presuppose realisation of sale proceeds and application/appropriation thereof to liquidate the dues of the paramount charge-holder and from the surplus payment to person(s) entitled thereto. This implies that the first charge-holder is bound to obtain the best possible price for the mortgaged assets and the best possible price must, in the context, means the fair market value. This implies that the first charge-holder is bound to obtain the best possible price for the mortgaged assets and the best possible price must, in the context, means the fair market value. The financial corporation, in the matter of sale under Section 29, must act in accordance with the statute and must not act unreasonably. It was also held that reasonableness is to be tested against the dominant consideration to secure the best price. 13. Having gone through the decision cited by the counsel for the first respondent, it is clear that the afore cited decision is not applicable to the facts and circumstances of the case at this stage. If the property is brought for sale, for the amount due and payable to the appellant/D3 by the authority or creditor, it should secure the best possible price for the mortgaged/hypothecated property, which cannot be disputed. In this second appeal, the pertinent question before this Court is whether a member of the joint family is entitled to seek partition by raising a plea that the hypothecation or equal mortgage created on the joint family properties by the Kartha of the family is not binding on the share of the first respondent/plaintiff. 14. It is seen from the recorded evidence that the first respondent/plaintiff, as P.W.1 has deposed that his paternal grand father, Avinashi Gounder had owned the properties. Subsequently, Marasamy, father of the respondents and his brother, Nachimuthu partitioned the property, for which a xerox copy of the registered partition deed, dated 08.02.1981 has been produced and marked as Ex.B.1. In this second appeal and suit, there is no dispute with regard to the fact that the property was originally owned by Avinashi Gounder, his sons, Marasamy, father of the respondents herein and Nachimuthu, another son of Avinashi Gounder partitioned the property, under the original of Ex.B.1, whereby the suit property was allotted to the share of the Marasamy, father of the respondents. The first respondent/plaintiff filed the suit, seeking partition, hence, it has been admitted by the first respondent/plaintiff that the suit property is the joint family property of Marasamy and his two sons, who are respondents 1 and 2 herein. It is also made clear that only for the purpose of starting a power-loom unit and getting loan for the said purpose from the appellant/D3, settlement deed, original of Ex.B.2 was executed by late. It is also made clear that only for the purpose of starting a power-loom unit and getting loan for the said purpose from the appellant/D3, settlement deed, original of Ex.B.2 was executed by late. Marasamy in favour of his elder son, the second respondent herein. 15. It is also relevant to note that the first respondent, who was examined as P.W.1 has given a self-contrary version in his deposition stating that he does not know anything about his brother, the second respondent, starting power-loom unit and also the loan obtained from the appellant/D3. However, in his cross-examination, he has admitted that he had knowledge about the power-loom unit, which was run by his brother, the second respondent. In the cross-examination, the first respondent/plaintiff has further admitted that in the land in S.No.990, building was constructed for power-loom unit and power-loom unit was also functioning in the said property. However, he disputes by saying that he did not know whether his father had executed any settlement deed in respect of the land, an extent of 25 cents in favour of his brother, second respondent herein, for the purpose of constructing building for the power-loom unit. 16. Mr. N. Manokaran, learned counsel appearing for the first respondent/plaintiff drew the attention of this Court to the decision in S.J.S. Business Enterprises (P) Ltd., v. State of Bihar, reported in (2004) 7 SCC 166 , which reads in paragraph No.17 thus : "17. We are of the view that the sale effected in favour of Respondent 6 cannot be sustained. It is axiomatic that the statutory powers vested in State Financial Corporation under the State Financial Corporations Act, must be exercised bonafide. The presumption that public officials will discharge their duties honestly and in accordance with the law may be rebutted by establishing circumstances which reasonably probablise the abuse of that power. In such event, it is for the officer concerned to explain the circumstances which are set up against him. If there is no credible explanation forthcoming the court can assume that the impugned action was improper. (See Pannalal Binjraj v. Union of India, ( AIR 1957 SC 397 ), AIR at p.409). In such event, it is for the officer concerned to explain the circumstances which are set up against him. If there is no credible explanation forthcoming the court can assume that the impugned action was improper. (See Pannalal Binjraj v. Union of India, ( AIR 1957 SC 397 ), AIR at p.409). Doubtless some of the restrictions placed on State financial corporations exercising the powers under Section 29 of the State Financial Corporations Act, as prescribed in Mahesh Chandra v. Regional Manager, U.P.Financial Corpn, [ (1993) 2 SCC 279 ] are no longer in place in view of the subsequent decision in Haryana Financial Corpn. v. Jagdamba Oil Millls, [ (2002) 3 SCC 496 ]. However, in overruling the decision in Mahesh Chandra, this Court has affirmed the view taken in Chairman and Managing Director, SIPCOT v. Contromix (P) Ltd, [ (1995) 4 SCC 595 ] and said that in the matter of sale under Section 29, State financial corporations must act in accordance with the statute and must not act unfairly, i.e., unreasonably. If they do, their action can be called into question under Article 226. Reasonableness is to be tested against the dominant consideration to secure the best price for the property to be sold." 17. In the decision referred to by Mr. N. Manokaran, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that when a property is brought under sale, to realise the amount due and payable under Section 29(1) & (4) of the State Financial Corporations Act, the authority must secure best price for the property to be sold and there should be no abuse of power. Hence, said decisions cited by the learned counsel for the first respondent are not relevant to the facts and circumstances of the present case, since at this stage, the Court has to consider whether the first respondent/plaintiff is entitled to seek partition of half share in the property, saying that his share is not binding for the loan amount due and payable to the appellant/D3. 18. The evidence available on record would clearly show that the loan was obtained from the appellant/D3 in the name of the second respondent/D1 for running power-loom unit, however, late Marasamy, father of both the respondents and also the Kartha of their joint family stood as guarantor for the said loan, by creating equitable mortgage/hypothecation of the joint family property in favour of the appellant/D3. 19. 19. Mr. V. Bhiman, learned counsel appearing for the appellant/D3 drew the attention of this Court to the evidence available on record and the judgments rendered by the trial court and submitted that the loan obtained from the appellant/D3 is only to develop the joint family property, hence, the first respondent/plaintiff cannot raise a bald allegation against his brother, stating that the second respondent/D1 was a spendthrift and the loan was obtained by him only for running his own power-loom unit and the loan is not binding on his share in the joint family properties. Late Marasamy, father of the respondents had admittedly given the joint family properties as security by way of creating equitable mortgage/hypothecation in favour of the appellant/D3. There was no partition of the said properties by the respondents 1 and 2 and their father late Marasamy, even as per the case of the first respondent/plaintiff. 20. In this regard, Hon'ble Apex Court in Sushil Kumar & Anr. v. Ram Prakash & Ors, reported in 1988 AIR 576, has held as follows : "In a Hindu family, the Karta or manager occupies a unique position. He has greater rights and duties. He must look after the family interests. He is entitled to possession of the entire joint estate. He is also entitled to manage the family properties. In other words, the actual possession and management of the joint family property must vest in him. The managing member of Karta has not only the power to manage but also the power to alienate joint family property. The alienation may be either for family necessity or for the benefit of the estate. Such alienation would bind the interests of all the undivided members of the family, adults or minors." 21. In Bhagwan Dayal v. Mst.Reoti Devi, reported in (1962) 3 SCR 440 , p.477, the Hon'ble Apex Court has held that in a Hindu family, the karta or manager occupies a unique position and it is not as if anybody could become manager of a joint Hindu family. "As a general rule, the father of a family, if alive, and in his absence the senior member of the family alone is entitled to manage the joint family property." In fact the manager occupies a position superior to other members and he has greater rights and duties. He must look after the family interests. "As a general rule, the father of a family, if alive, and in his absence the senior member of the family alone is entitled to manage the joint family property." In fact the manager occupies a position superior to other members and he has greater rights and duties. He must look after the family interests. He is entitled to possession of the entire joint family estate and also to manage the family properties. In other words, the actual possession and management of the joint family property must vest in him. He may consult the members of the family and if necessary take their consent to his action but he is not answerable to every one of them. The decision referred to above reads as follows : "22. In Mayne's Hindu Law (12th Ed. para 318) thus: 318. Manager's Legal position-"The position of a karta or manager is sui generis; the relation between him and the other members of the family is not that of principal and agent, or of partners. It is more like that of a trustee and cestui que trust. But the fiduciary relationship does not involve all the duties which are imposed upon trustees." 22. In the aforesaid decision reported in 1988 AIR 576, the Hon'ble Apex Court has also ruled that the decision of the Punjab & Haryana High Court in Jujhar Singh v. Giani Talok Singh, 1986 P.L.J. 346, the High Court of Punjab & Haryana has correctly laid down the law. It has been observed at p. 348 of the said decision thus : "If it is held that such a suit would be competent the result would be that each time the manager or the karta wants to sell property, the coparcener would file a suit which may take number of years for its disposal. The legal necessity or the purpose of the proposed sale which may be of pressing and urgent nature, would in most cases be frustrated by the time the suit is disposed of. Legally speaking unless the alienation in fact is completed there would be no cause of action for any coparcener to maintain a suit because the right is only to challenge the alienation made and there is no right recognised in law to maintain a suit to prevent the proposed sale. Legally speaking unless the alienation in fact is completed there would be no cause of action for any coparcener to maintain a suit because the right is only to challenge the alienation made and there is no right recognised in law to maintain a suit to prevent the proposed sale. The principle that an injunction can be granted for preventing waste by a manager or karta obviously would not be applicable to such a suit because the proposed alienation for an alleged need or the benefit of the estate cannot be said to be an act of waste by any stretch of reasoning. We are, therefore, of the considered view that a coparcener has no right to maintain a suit for permanent injunction restraining the manager or the karta from alienating the coparcenary property and his right is only to challenge the same and to recover the property after it has come into being." 23. In the light of various decisions referred to above, it is well settled that Kartha of the family or the Hindu joint family manager occupies unique position and has greater rights and duties, than the other member(s) of the family and his acts are normally binding on the other members of the joint family. 24. In the instant case, it is not in dispute that late Marasamy, father of the respondents was the Kartha of the joint family. The first respondent/plaintiff has not disputed that the suit schedule property was the joint family property of the respondents herein and their father, late Marasamy. As a member of the said joint family, the second respondent had obtained loan from the appellant/D3 for running a power-loom unit, for which, late Marasamy, Kartha of the family furnished security of the joint family property and also executed a Gift settlement deed in favour of the second respondent. The documents marked as Exs.B.1 to B.3 would clearly show that the second respondent had obtained loan from the appellant/D3 and also started power-loom unit in his name, for which, late Marasamy, Kartha of the family had created equitable mortgage/hypothecation, by entrusting the documents relating to his joint family properties. 25. The documents marked as Exs.B.1 to B.3 would clearly show that the second respondent had obtained loan from the appellant/D3 and also started power-loom unit in his name, for which, late Marasamy, Kartha of the family had created equitable mortgage/hypothecation, by entrusting the documents relating to his joint family properties. 25. It is also relevant to note that the second respondent and late Marasamy, father of the respondents had not contested the case properly, by filing written statement and adducing any evidence, which would show that there was no legal defence against the appellant Corporation. In fact, they have admitted the loan obtained in the name of the second respondent, for which, the joint family property of the respondents were given as security by late Marasamy, Kartha of their family. 26. As per the decisions rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court referred to above, it is clear that late Marasamy, Kartha and manager of the family had made the joint family properties answerable to the loan obtained by his elder son, the second respondent herein. In the aforesaid circumstances, the first respondent/plaintiff is not legally entitled to raise a plea that his share in the joint family property is not answerable to the debts obtained from the appellant/D3. It is a clear case that the loan for running power-loom unit was obtained in the name of the second respondent only by the joint family of the respondents herein, hence, Marasamy, father of the respondents had given the joint family property as security for the loan, being the Kartha and manager of the joint family, which is binding on the joint family properties, including the half share claimed by the first respondent/plaintiff in the suit. 27. Though the trial court has rightly dismissed the suit, the first appellate court, without properly considering the oral and documentary evidence relating to the suit, has reversed the judgment and decree of the trial court, whereby granted preliminary decree for partition to divide and allot half share of the property in favour of the first respondent/plaintiff, which is contrary to law. In the appellate stage, Ex.A.5 was marked on the side of the first respondent/plaintiff, wherein it is seen that sale deed, dated 11.07.1996 was executed by late Marasamy and his sons, who are the respondents 1 and 2 herein in favour of one Duraisamy. In the appellate stage, Ex.A.5 was marked on the side of the first respondent/plaintiff, wherein it is seen that sale deed, dated 11.07.1996 was executed by late Marasamy and his sons, who are the respondents 1 and 2 herein in favour of one Duraisamy. The said document would show that the respondents and their father late Marasamy had treated the property only as their joint family properties, otherwise, late Marasamy need not execute the sale deed, original of Ex.A.5, along with his sons, the respondents herein. Hence, the said document, Ex.A.5 would not improve anything in favour of the first respondent/plaintiff's claim. Therefore, this Court is of the view that the first appellate court has not properly considered the documents filed in support of the claim of the appellant/D3 and also Ex.A.5 and other evidence, both oral and documentary, while passing preliminary decree for partition in favour of the first respondent/plaintiff. Accordingly, the first substantial question of law is answered in favour of the appellant/D3 and against the respondents 1 and 2. 28. Substantial Question of Law No.2 : The second substantial question of law raised by the appellant is whether the appellate court is right in reversing the judgment of the trial court, pertaining the suit as stated by the appellant, in view of Order XXXXI Rule 31 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 29. Having gone through the Substantial Question of Law No.2, it is relevant to refer Order XXXXI Rule 31 CPC, which reads as follows: "31. Contents, date and signature of judgment -The judgment of the Appellate Court shall be in writing and shall state - (a) the points for determination; (b) the decision thereon; (c) the reasons for the decision; and (d) where the decree appealed from is reversed or varied, the relief to which the appellant is entitled; and shall at the time that it is pronounced be signed and dated by the Judge or by the Judges concurring therein. HIGH COURT AMENDMENT (MADRAS) : Substitute the following for R.31 : 31. HIGH COURT AMENDMENT (MADRAS) : Substitute the following for R.31 : 31. The judgment of the of the Appellate Court shall be in writing and shall state - (a) the points for determination; (b) the decision thereon; (c) the reasons for the decision; and (d) where the decree appealed from is reversed or varied, the relief to which the appellant is entitled; and shall bear the date on which it is pronounced and shall be signed by the Judge or the Judges concurring therein: Provided that, where the Presiding Judge is specially empowered by the High Court to pronounce his judgment by dictation to a shorthand-write in open Court the transcript of the judgment so pronounced shall, after such revision as may be deemed necessary be signed by the Judge." As per Order XXXXI Rule 31(c), the Judgment of the appellate court shall state the reasons for the decision. The High Court Amendment (Madras) substituted, it makes clear that the appellate court shall state the reasons for the decision." 30. It is not in dispute that the suit was dismissed by the trial court without costs, however, the first appellate court allowed the appeal, setting aside the judgment and decree passed by the trial court and passed preliminary decree for partition and allotted half share in the properties in favour of the first respondent/plaintiff and also granted injunction restraining the appellant/D3 from bringing the property in public auction till final decree for partition being passed in respect of the half share allotted in favour of first respondent/plaintiff. 31. The Judgment and Decree rendered by the first appellate court clearly shows that the first appellate court has not given any cogent reasons for its decision to reverse the judgment and decree passed by the trial court. It is seen that the first appellate court has observed in paragraph no.17 thus : "Thus, this Court finds that there are strong grounds for holding that the appeal is to be allowed, since it is meritorious. There are strong grounds to interfere with the Judgment and Decree of the trial court. Therefore, this appeal is to be allowed, thereby setting aside the Judgment and Decree of the trial court." 32. There is no valid reason available in the Judgment of the first appellate court for reversing the judgment and decree passed by the trial court. There are strong grounds to interfere with the Judgment and Decree of the trial court. Therefore, this appeal is to be allowed, thereby setting aside the Judgment and Decree of the trial court." 32. There is no valid reason available in the Judgment of the first appellate court for reversing the judgment and decree passed by the trial court. In the light of the decisions rendered by the Hon'ble Apex Court, applying to the facts of this case, it is crystal clear that though the loan was obtained in the name of the second respondent, for running power-loom unit, the properties given as security by late Marasamy, kartha and manager of the joint family, would clearly show that the joint family properties are answerable for discharging the loan obtained from the appellant/D3, a State owned corporation. A perusal of the pleadings and the evidence available on record shows that there is no real and legally sustainable cause of action for filing the suit, without discharging the loan obtained from the appellant/D3. The findings of appellate court is against the evidence available on record, which is not based on any admitted facts or the evidence available on record. On the said circumstances, this Court is of the view that the Judgment and Decree passed by the appellate Court, not supported by any evidence, has to be construed only as perverse finding, for reversing the Judgment and Decree of the trial Court. Hence, as contended by the learned counsel appearing for the appellant, it is clear that as contemplated under Order XXXXI Rule 31(c) of the Code of Civil Procedure and the High Court Amendments (Madras) thereon, there is no legally acceptable reason given by the first appellate court, to reverse the judgment and decree of the trial court and therefore, the substantial question of Law No.2 is also answered in favour of the appellant and against the respondents. 33. In the result, the Second Appeal is allowed and the Judgment and Decree passed by the first appellate Court, dated 31.01.2003 made in A.S.No.68 of 2002 on the file of the Fast Track Court No. IV, Bhavani is set aside, confirming the Judgment and Decree of the trial court, dated 24.07.2001 made in O.S.No.69 of 1998 on the file of the II Additional District Munsif, Bhavani, Erode District. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed. The first respondent/plaintiff is also directed to return the cost imposed by the first appellate court to the appellant/D3. However, there shall be no order as to costs in this second appeal.