JUDGMENT Paresh Upadhyay, J. This Civil Revision Application under Section 29(2) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 [‘the Bombay Rent Act, 1947", for short] is filed by the original plaintiff - landlord and is directed against the judgment and decree passed by the Appellate Bench of the Small Causes Court at Ahmedabad in Civil Appeal No.15 of 1987 dated 02.05.1996, by which, the Appellate Court below, while allowing the Appeal filed by the tenant, reversed the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court i.e. Small Causes Court, Ahmedabad in H.R.P. Suit No.350 of 1981 dated 30.12.1986. The Trial Court had decreed the suit for recovery of possession filed by the landlord, principally on the ground that the suit premises, which is a residential premises, and which was specifically given for residential purpose, was being used for non-residential purpose by an entity other than the tenant. Based on these findings, the Trial Court had decreed the suit and had directed the tenant to handover the vacant and peaceful possession of the suit premises to the landlord, on or before 01.06.1987. It is this finding and decree of the Trial Court, which was interfered with by the Appellate Court below, which is the subject matter of this Revision Application. 2. The Trial Court had, on the basis of the pleadings, framed many issues, the relevant of which are quoted here below, and on the basis of evidence led before it, answered them as under : "2. Whether the defendants have unlawfully sublet the whole or part of the suit premises or assigned or transferred the same in any other manner his interest therein as alleged ? (In affirmative) 6. Whether the defendant is not using the suit premises without reasonable cause for the purpose for which it was let out for a continuous period of six months immediately, preceding the date of the suit ? (In affirmative) 6A. Whether the plaintiff proves that the defendant has changed the use of the suit premises from residential to non-residential purpose as alleged ? (In affirmative) 9. Whether the plaintiff is not entitled to file a suit for possession for the part of the entire property let out to the defendant ? (In negative) 10. What relief is the plaintiff entitled to get ? (Possession of the suit premises)" 3. (In affirmative) 9. Whether the plaintiff is not entitled to file a suit for possession for the part of the entire property let out to the defendant ? (In negative) 10. What relief is the plaintiff entitled to get ? (Possession of the suit premises)" 3. On the basis of the above findings, the Trial Court decreed the suit and directed the defendants - tenant to handover the vacant and peaceful possession of the suit premises to the landlord on or before 01.06.1987. 4. Being aggrieved by the said judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court, the defendant- tenant preferred Civil Appeal No.15 of 1987 before the Appellate Bench of the Small Causes Court at Ahmedabad. 5. The Appellate Court below, on the basis of the pleadings before it, framed the following issues and answered them as under :- 1. Whether the learned Trial Judge has erred in holding that the suit premises were let for the purpose of residence to only the defendant Nos. 1 and 7 ? (In affirmative) 2. Whether the learned Trial Judge has erred in holding that the suit premises were unlawfully transferred, sublet or assigned by the defendant Nos. 1 & 7 to the defendant Nos. 6 and others ? (In affirmative) 3. Whether the learned Trial Judge has erred in holding that the defendant Nos. 1 and 7 had changed the user of the suit premises from residential to non-residential and they were not using the suit premises continuously for a period of six months or more immediately preceding the filing of the suit ? (In affirmative) 4. Whether the learned Trial Judge has erred in passing a decree of ejectment against the defendants ? (In affirmative) 6. On the basis of above findings, the Appellate Court below allowed the appeal filed by the tenant and reversed the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court. It is this judgment and decree passed by the Appellate Court below, the legality of which is questioned in this Revision Application, by the landlord. 7.1 Mr. Mehul Shah, learned advocate for the applicant - landlord has submitted that, the Appellate Court below has committed gross illegality by misreading the evidence on record and which has ultimately resulted in perversity and thereby miscarriage of justice. 7.1 Mr. Mehul Shah, learned advocate for the applicant - landlord has submitted that, the Appellate Court below has committed gross illegality by misreading the evidence on record and which has ultimately resulted in perversity and thereby miscarriage of justice. Learned advocate for the applicant has specifically drawn the attention of this Court to the material evidence, more particularly that of Mr.Pravinkumar, Exh.48, who is son of the landlord - original plaintiff, and evidence of original defendant No.7 - Mr.Chandubhai Parsottamdas Amin, Exh.70. Attention of the Court is invited to the reasoning recorded by the Trial Court in Para 15 of its judgment, and the reasoning recorded by the Appellate Court below in Para 14 of its judgment. On this, it is submitted that, the Appellate Court below, while deciding the appeal, fell in error to the extent of illegality and the same be interfered with. 7.2 Learned advocate for the landlord has further stated that the suit premises is Bungalow No.5, Dipawali Society, Paldi, Ahmedabad. The construction on the said plot is on the ground floor and the first floor. It is submitted that the suit was filed to get back the possession of the first floor and therefore, the suit premises, for the purpose of this Revision Application, would mean first floor only. It is submitted that even the contention on behalf of the tenant was taken before the Trial Court that, the landlord could not have instituted the suit for eviction for part of the suit premises i.e. the first floor only and an issue No.6A was also framed by the Trial Court in that regard. It is submitted that, the landlord wants possession of the ground floor as well on various grounds, but that not being the subject matter of this Revision Application, submission is not made in that regard. 7.3 It is further submitted that, the suit premises (the first floor) was given for residential purpose only and the tenant claims that it was given to run a school. The said school is already closed by this time and therefore, be it ground floor or first floor, the tenant can not have any right to continue in the suit premises, and in any case, can not be permitted to continue to claim the possession of the first floor, which even otherwise was not for running a school. The said school is already closed by this time and therefore, be it ground floor or first floor, the tenant can not have any right to continue in the suit premises, and in any case, can not be permitted to continue to claim the possession of the first floor, which even otherwise was not for running a school. It is submitted that, the closure of the school is an undisputed fact and the same can be and need to be taken into consideration by this Court. Attention of the Court is invited to the additional affidavit filed on behalf of respondents No.1 and 3 dated 13.02.2014. 7.4 On behalf of the applicant landlord, reliance is placed on the following decisions. (i) Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu v. The Motor and General Traders, AIR 1975 SC 1409 (ii) Hari Shankar v. Rao Girdhari Lal Chowdhury reported in AIR 1963 SC 698 . (iii) Niruben wd/o Jyotindrabhai Yagnik v. Kiritkumar Ramanlal reported in 1991(1) GLR 390 . (iv) Adil Jamshed Frenchman (deceased) by L.Rs. v. Sardar Dastur School Trust & ors. Reported in AIR 2005 SC 996 . (v) Satyawati Sharma (dead) v. Union of India, (2008) 5 SCC 287 . (vi) Maria Margarida Sequeria Fernandes v. Erasmo Jack De Sequeria reported in AIR 2012 SC 1727 . 7.5 It is submitted on behalf of the applicant - landlord that, the judgment and decree passed by the Appellate Court below be quashed and set aside and that of the Trial Court be restored and the tenant be directed to handover the vacant and peaceful possession of the suit premises to the applicant landlord. 8. On the other hand, Ms.Mamta Vyas, learned advocate for the contesting opponents - tenant has submitted that, the Appellate Court below has not committed any error and even otherwise the scope of the judicial review in Revision Application is very limited and even if two views are possible, this Court may not interfere. Learned advocate for the tenant has taken this Court through the reasoning recorded by both the Courts below to contend that no error is committed by the Appellate Court below in interfering with the judgment and decree of the Trial Court and it is submitted that this Revision Application be dismissed. 9. Learned advocate for the tenant has taken this Court through the reasoning recorded by both the Courts below to contend that no error is committed by the Appellate Court below in interfering with the judgment and decree of the Trial Court and it is submitted that this Revision Application be dismissed. 9. Before the findings are recorded, at the outset it is recorded that, this Court is conscious of the legal proposition that, the powers under Section 29 (2) of the Bombay Rent Act are revisional powers with which this Court is clothed, it empowers the High Court to correct only such errors which may make the decision contrary to law and which go to the root of the decision but it does not vest the High Court with the power to rehear the matter and reappreciate the evidence, and that mere fact that a different view is possible on reappreciation of the evidence, can not be a ground for exercise of the revisional jurisdiction. Further, this Court is also conscious of the settled position of law that, the scope of this Revision Application under Section 29(2) of the Act is only to the extent that, the High Court may, for the purpose of satisfying itself, that any decision in appeal was according to law, call for the case in which such decision was taken and pass such order with respect thereto, as it thinks fit. Keeping these principles in view, this Court has to examine as to whether, any interference is required in the decision arrived at by the Appellate Court below. 10. Having heard learned advocates for the respective parties and having gone through the material on record to the extent necessary, and while doing so, also keeping above principles of law in view, this Court finds that the judgment and decree passed by the Appellate Court below is unsustainable and needs to be interfered with. This Court further finds that, the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court needs to be restored for more than one reasons. The factors which have weighed with this Court to arrive at this conclusion are as under. 11.1 It is recorded that, this Court has minutely gone through the evidence on record, more particularly that of Mr. This Court further finds that, the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court needs to be restored for more than one reasons. The factors which have weighed with this Court to arrive at this conclusion are as under. 11.1 It is recorded that, this Court has minutely gone through the evidence on record, more particularly that of Mr. Pravinkumar Exh.48, who is son of the landlord - original plaintiff, and evidence of original defendant No.7 - Mr.Chandubhai Parsottamdas Amin, Exh.70, and on harmonious reading thereof, this Court finds that, the reasoning recorded by the Trial Court in Para:15 of its judgment was just and proper, and there was no occasion for the Appellate Court below to interfere in it. This Court further finds that, the reasoning recorded by the Appellate Court below in Para: 14 of its judgment, is not only illegal, but is perverse, since no man with ordinary prudence would arrive at the conclusion on the basis of material which was on record, at which the Appellate Court below has arrived at, and further that, the said illegality goes to the root of the matter. To elaborate this, the following further details are necessary to be recorded. 11.2 In the suit, original defendant No.1 is Arvindbhai Parsottambhai Patel, original defendant No.7 is Chandubhai Parsottamdas Amin and original defendant No.6 is Pallavi Vidyalaya (School). The witness - the son of the original landlord Mr.Pravinkumar in his evidence Exh.48 deposed that, it is the Chandubhai to whom the suit premises was rented for residential purpose. He further deposed that the said Chandubhai, to whom the suit premises was given does not stay there. The evidence further goes to show that the said premises is illegally occupied by defendant No.6 Pallavi Vidyalaya (school) for non-residential purpose. At one place, in his evidence, the said witness referred, said Chandubhai as defendant No.6, instead of defendant No.7. The Trial Court is not unmindful of this inadvertent and inconsequential error of the witness to refer to serial number of a defendant, because in substance, reference is made to Chandubhai by name and not Pallavi Vidyalaya (the school). It is this inadvertent and inconsequential error of the said witness, which is not only taken cognizance of, but properly dealt with also by the Trial Court, and thereafter eviction decree was passed. It is this inadvertent and inconsequential error of the said witness, which is not only taken cognizance of, but properly dealt with also by the Trial Court, and thereafter eviction decree was passed. Curiously, it is this inadvertent and inconsequential error of the said witness, which in substance has turned out to be the sole basis for the Appellate Court below to reverse the judgment and decree of the Trial Court. This Court has read the relevant evidence, not for the purpose of reappreciation thereof, but just to verify from this angle and it is found that, by doing so the Appellate Court below has not arrived at a different finding of fact, in which case this Court would not have interfered, but it is absolute misreading of evidence and perversity on the part of the Appellate Court below, which has resulted in setting aside of the eviction decree passed by the Trial Court and thereby this has gone to the root of the matter. On conjoint reading of the material evidence, and reasons contained in Para 15 of the judgment of the Trial Court, and that of the Appellate Court below in Para 14 of its judgment, an unmistakable picture has emerged before this Court, wherein the Appellate Court below is found to have arrived at a conclusion, which is not even possible one, and the said illegality goes to the root of the matter. This is how the judgment and decree of the Appellate Court is unsustainable and the same needs to be interfered with and quashed and set aside. The result thereof would be that, the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court shall stand restored. 12. Additionally, it is an undisputed fact that, the school which was working as a sub-tenant, in the suit premises, is even otherwise closed by this time, under the orders of the competent Authority of the Government. Reference in this regard can be made to the affidavit dated 13.02.2014 filed by the original defendant No.1, who is contesting respondent in this matter. The question may arise as to whether this subsequent development can be taken into consideration by this Court. Reference in this regard can be made to the affidavit dated 13.02.2014 filed by the original defendant No.1, who is contesting respondent in this matter. The question may arise as to whether this subsequent development can be taken into consideration by this Court. On this point we are not on virgin field, and reference can be made to the decisions of Hon'ble the Supreme Court of India in the cases of Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu (supra) and Adil Jamshed Frenchman (supra), wherein it is held that, it is not only open but duty of the Court to take subsequent development into consideration, provided it is an undisputed fact. This is more so, when litigation spreads over not years but decades and generations. The present one is also no exception, since eviction decree passed by the Trial Court is of the year 1986 and further that, the legal heir of the landlord has already come on record. On this additional factor also, which is an undisputed fact, the judgment and decree of the Trial Court, ordering eviction of the tenant from the first floor of the Bunglow, which is suit premises in this litigation, needs to be restored and given effect to. 13.1 There is one more dimension of the matter. The assertion of the contesting respondent is that one P.J.Amin Kelavani Trust, which is a Public Charitable Trust, and which runs schools in different areas of the city of Ahmedabad, was running Pallavi Vidhyalay (school) in the suit premises. A Public Charitable Trust may undertake any activity, which is permissible in accordance with law from its own resources, but the said Trust can not be heard to content that its Charity may be continued at somebody else's cost. At this juncture reference needs to be made to the decision of Hon'ble the Supreme Court of India in the case of State of Maharashtra v. M/s. Super Max International Pvt. Ltd., reported in AIR 2010 SC 722 . Relevant paras of the said decision read as under. "39. The way this Court has been looking at the relationship between the Landlord and the Tenant in the past and the shift in the Court's approach in recent times have been examined in some detail in the decision in Satyawati Sharma v. Union of India & Anr., (2008) 5 SCC 287 . "39. The way this Court has been looking at the relationship between the Landlord and the Tenant in the past and the shift in the Court's approach in recent times have been examined in some detail in the decision in Satyawati Sharma v. Union of India & Anr., (2008) 5 SCC 287 . In that decision one of us (Singhvi, J.) speaking for the Court referred to a number of earlier decisions of the Court and (in paragraph 12 of the judgment) observed as follows: "Before proceeding further we consider it necessary to observe that there has been definite shift in the Court's approach while interpreting the rent control legislations. An analysis of the judgments of 1950s to early 1990s would indicate that in majority of cases the courts heavily leaned in favour of an interpretation which would benefit the tenant- Mohinder Kumar v. State of Haryana, (1985) 4 SCC 221 , Prabhakaran Nair v. State of T.N., (1987) 4 SCC 238 , D.C. Bhatia v. Union of India - (1995) 1 SCC 104 and C.N. Rudramurthy v. K. Barkathulla Khan, (1998) 8 SCC 275 . In these and other cases, the Court consistently held that the paramount object of every rent control legislation is to provide safeguards for tenants against exploitation by landlords who seek to take undue advantage of the pressing need for accommodation of a large number of people looking for a house on rent for residence or business in the background of acute scarcity thereof. However, a different trend is clearly discernible in the later judgments." 40. He then referred to some later decisions and (in paragraph 14 of the judgment) quoted a passage from the decision in Joginder Pal v. Naval Kishore Behal, (2002) 5 SCC 397 , to the following effect: "... The courts have to adopt a reasonable and balanced approach while interpreting rent control legislations starting with an assumption that an equal treatment has been meted out to both the sections of the society. In spite of the overall balance tilting in favour of the tenants, while interpreting such of the provisions as take care of the interest of the landlord the court should not hesitate in leaning in favour of the landlords. Such provisions are engrafted in rent control legislations to take care of those situations where the landlords too are weak and feeble and feel humble." (emphasis in original) 42. Such provisions are engrafted in rent control legislations to take care of those situations where the landlords too are weak and feeble and feel humble." (emphasis in original) 42. The decision in Satyawati Sharma then referred to the doctrine of temporal reasonableness and in paragraph 32 observed as follows: "It is trite to say that legislation which may be quite reasonable and rational at the time of its enactment may with the lapse of time and/or due to change of circumstances become arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of the doctrine of equality and even if the validity of such legislation may have been upheld at a given point of time, the Court may, in subsequent litigation, strike down the same if it is found that the rationale of classification has become non-existent." 43. We reaffirm the views expressed in Satyawati Sharma and emphasise the need for a more balanced and objective approach to the relationship between the landlord and tenant. This is not to say that the Court should lean in favour of the landlord but merely that there is no longer any room for the assumption that all tenants, as a class, are in dire circumstances and in desperate need of the Court's protection under all circumstances. (The case of the present appellant who is in occupation of an area of 9000 sq. ft. in a building, situate at Fort, Mumbai on a rental of Rs.5236.58/-, plus water charges at the rate of Rs.515.35/- per month more than amply highlights the point) " 13.2 The above observations and mandate of the Supreme Court of India need to be given effect to, with full force in this case. 14.1 There is still one more factor, which tilts the balance against the tenant in this case. It has come on record that during the pendency of this Revision Application before this Court, parties tried to settle the issue out of Court, which has not materialised. What this settlement could be. Giving some money by the landlord to the tenant, to handover the possession of the suit property or is it selling the property in question to the tenant himself, at a throw away price ? Let the tenant be disillussioned of this myth now. What this settlement could be. Giving some money by the landlord to the tenant, to handover the possession of the suit property or is it selling the property in question to the tenant himself, at a throw away price ? Let the tenant be disillussioned of this myth now. In this regard reference can be made to the decision of Hon"ble the Supreme Court of India in the case of Maria Margarida Sequeria Fernandes v. Erasmo Jack De Sequeria, AIR 2012 SC 1727 . Paras-84, 85 and 90 thereof read as under. "84. False claims and defences are really serious problems with real estate litigation, pre-dominantly because of ever escalating prices of the real estate. Litigation pertaining to valuable real estate properties is dragged on by unscrupulous litigants in the hope that the other party will tire out and ultimately would settle with them by paying a huge amount. This happens because of the enormous delay in adjudication of cases in our Courts. If pragmatic approach is adopted, then this problem can be minimised to a large extent. 85. This Court in a recent judgment in Ramrameshwari Devi and others (AIR 2011 SC (Civ) 1776) (supra) aptly observed at page 266 that unless wrongdoers are denied profit from frivolous litigation, it would be difficult to prevent it. In order to curb uncalled for and frivolous litigation, the Courts have to ensure that there is no incentive or motive for uncalled for litigation. It is a matter of common experience that Court's otherwise scarce time is consumed or more appropriately, wasted in a large number of uncalled for cases. In this very judgment, the Court provided that this problem can be solved or at least be minimised if exemplary cost is imposed for instituting frivolous litigation. The Court observed at pages 267-268 that imposition of actual, realistic or proper costs and/or ordering prosecution in appropriate cases would go a long way in controlling the tendency of introducing false pleadings and forged and fabricated documents by the litigants. Imposition of heavy costs would also control unnecessary adjournments by the parties. In appropriate cases, the Courts may consider ordering prosecution otherwise it may not be possible to maintain purity and sanctity of judicial proceedings. 90. Imposition of heavy costs would also control unnecessary adjournments by the parties. In appropriate cases, the Courts may consider ordering prosecution otherwise it may not be possible to maintain purity and sanctity of judicial proceedings. 90. Experience has shown that all kinds of pleadings are introduced and even false and fabricated documents are filed in civil cases because there is an inherent profit in continuation of possession. In a large number of cases, honest litigants suffer and dishonest litigants get undue benefit by grant or refusal of an injunction because the Courts do not critically examine pleadings and documents on record. In case while granting or refusing injunction, the Court properly considers pleadings and documents and takes the pragmatic view and grants appropriate mesne profit, then the inherent interest to continue frivolous litigation by unscrupulous litigants would be reduced to a large extent." 14.2 The above observations of Hon'ble the Supreme Court of India would apply with full force in the facts of this case, since the property in question is in Paldi area of Ahmedabad City which is one of the costliest area so far the prices of real estate are concerned. The Trial Court had already passed the eviction decree in the year 1986 and by this time about three decades have passed. The legal heir of the landlord has already come on record. The claim of the tenant that the first floor was given not for residence but to run a school is not found to be legal, even otherwise, the said school is shut down under the orders of the Competent Authority of the Government and still the handing over of possession is resisted under the pretext of a Public Charitable Trust needing it for Charity at the cost of the landlord. Further, the talks of settlement also are indicated to have failed. The talks of what, arm twisting of the landlord in above circumstances. This is the same situation, which the Supreme Court has warned against in the above quoted judgment. 15. There is still one more factor, which though may not tilt the balance against the tenant, but still would continue the landlord to be in a helpless position, which can not be helped, in this case. It is this. The suit premises is Bungalow No.5, Dipawali Society, Paldi, Ahmedabad. 15. There is still one more factor, which though may not tilt the balance against the tenant, but still would continue the landlord to be in a helpless position, which can not be helped, in this case. It is this. The suit premises is Bungalow No.5, Dipawali Society, Paldi, Ahmedabad. The construction on the said plot is on the ground floor and the first floor. The suit was filed to get back the possession of the first floor and therefore, the suit premises, for the purpose of this Revision Application would mean the first floor only. Even a contention was also taken on behalf of the tenant before the Trial Court that, the landlord could not have instituted the suit for eviction for part of the suit premises i.e. the first floor only and an issue No.6A was also framed by the Trial Court in that regard. The landlord wants possession of the ground floor also on various grounds, and prima facie he may be entitled also to it for the reasons which are recorded above, but that (ground floor) not being the subject matter of the present suit, even after succeeding in this Revision Application, the landlord still has to go for one more round of litigation for the ground floor and the said round may be spread over few decades, and I am afraid next generation as well. But the ground floor not being the subject matter of this litigation, no further observation needs be made in that regard. 16. Considering the totality, this Court finds that this Civil Revision Application needs to be allowed, and the judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court needs to be restored. 17. In the result, the following order is passed. 17.1 This Civil Revision Application is allowed. The judgment and decree passed by the Appellate Bench of the Small Causes Court at Ahmedabad in Civil Appeal No.15 of 1987 dated 02.05.1996, is quashed and set aside. The judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court i.e. Small Causes Court, Ahmedabad in H.R.P. Suit No.350 of 1981 dated 30.12.1986 is restored. 17.2 The opponents - tenant, more particularly the original defendant No.1 - the present opponent No.1 - Shri Arvindbhai Parsottamdas Patel is directed to handover the vacant and peaceful possession of the suit premises to the landlord on or before 30.04.2014. 17.2 The opponents - tenant, more particularly the original defendant No.1 - the present opponent No.1 - Shri Arvindbhai Parsottamdas Patel is directed to handover the vacant and peaceful possession of the suit premises to the landlord on or before 30.04.2014. 17.3 In the event, the opponent - tenant does not handover the possession of the suit premises to the landlord by 30.04.2014, the opponent - tenant shall pay Rs.25,000/- per month to the landlord, for the period during which the possession of the suit premises is retained by him after 30.04.2014. While ordering so, this Court has kept in view the observations of Hon'ble the Supreme Court of India in the case of Maria Fernandes (supra). It is clarified that, this stipulation of paying Rs.25,000/- per month to the landlord from 01.05.2014, is in no way a permission to the opponent tenant, to retain the possession of the suit premises and it would be open to the landlord to resort to any coercive proceedings, in accordance with law, to get back the possession of the suit premises. 17.4 The landlord needs to be compensated by awarding cost, however, as held above, it is the perversity of the Appellate Court below which has resulted in depriving the landlord of his property for about three decades after the eviction decree was passed by the Trial Court. Let the tenant be not penalised for it. Therefore, no order as to costs. 18. After this judgment is pronounced, request is made on behalf of the tenant to stay this judgment for some time. Considering the totality, this Court finds that, the decree of eviction, which is restored now, was passed by the Trial Court in the year 1986 and the tenant has already retained the possession of the suit premises, for about three decades thereafter. Let it be used by the legal heirs of the landlord now. Further, the time to handover the possession of the suit premises is already granted till 30.04.2014. Under these circumstances, this request is rejected.