JUDGMENT B.R. SARANGI, J. 1. The Managing Committee of the Jata High School, Jata in the district of Keonjhar has filed the writ application bearing OJC No. 6496 of 2002 challenging the order dated 7.5.2002 passed by the Director, Secondary Education, Orissa in Appeal Case No. 35 of 2000, Annexure-5, setting aside the order of termination of services of opposite party No. 4 holding the same having been passed without following due procedure of law. The very same order has also been challenged by opposite party No. 5, who is the petitioner in OJC No. 6466 of 2002 stating that the Director has not applied his mind properly while passing the impugned order under Annexure-5, therefore he seeks quashing of the same. Both the writ applications having arisen out of same cause of action assailing the same appellate order were heard together and are disposed of by this common judgment. 2. The short facts of the case, in hand, are that Jata High School is a private education institution within the meaning of Section 3(b) of the Orissa Education Act and the rules framed thereunder. The petitioner in OJC No. 6496 of 2002 being the Managing Committee of the institution selected/appointed opposite party No. 4 as an Assistant Teacher on 12.7.1990. While continuing as such, opposite party No. 4 was deputed to Arabind High School, Saruali Centre along with some students of the school to facilitate them to appear in the Annual HSC Examination, 1996 which was to commence from 10.4.1996 to 18.4.1996. In the examination centre, opposite party No. 4 being the guardian of all the students presented them to appear in the said examination, but he advanced an immoral act to outrage the modesty of a girl student and for that the father of the victim girl submitted an application before the petitioner to take appropriate disciplinary action against opposite party No. 4. Apprehending some action, opposite party No. 4 left the school w.e.f. 4.5.1996 without submitting any leave application. 3. Since the school in question was running without teacher and the education of the students hampered, in greater public interest, the Managing Committee of the school issued show cause notice to opposite party No. 4 on 7.5.1996, 13.5.1996, 20.5.1996, 24.8.1996 and 29.9.1996. Apprehending some action, opposite party No. 4 left the school w.e.f. 4.5.1996 without submitting any leave application. 3. Since the school in question was running without teacher and the education of the students hampered, in greater public interest, the Managing Committee of the school issued show cause notice to opposite party No. 4 on 7.5.1996, 13.5.1996, 20.5.1996, 24.8.1996 and 29.9.1996. In addition to that opposite party No. 4 was also allegedly involved in immoral activities which spoiled the reputation of the school and to substantiate the same, several documents were appended to the show cause notice, but without referring to the same, opposite party No. 4 filed a representation before the Director, Secondary Education, Orissa and also approached this Court by filing OJC No. 11141 of 1996. 4. This Court while entertaining the writ application, issued notice to the petitioner and others, who were opposite parties in the said writ application, but without entering into the merits of the case disposed of the said writ application vide order dated 7.2.2000 directing the Director to consider the representation of the petitioner and dispose of the same within a period of six months from the date of its filing. The said representation was registered as Appeal No. 35 of 2000 but no application for condonation of delay had been filed as per the provisions contained in the Act. As per the Act, the appeal had to be filed within a period of one month from the date of termination. Since the petitioner had left the institution on 4.5.1996 and according to him, he was not allowed to join the school, such non-joining in service amounted to termination. Therefore, calculating one month from 4.5.1996, the limitation period for preferring appeal expired w.e.f. 3.6.1996 i.e. from the date the petitioner left the school. Otherwise also, if it was to be counted w.e.f. 25.10.1996, i.e. from the date the Governing Body passed the resolution to remove the opposite party No. 4 from service and confirmed the order of dismissal, the limitation was to expire on 25.11.1996. But no appeal was filed within the time stipulated and much after the order dated 7.2.2000 passed by this Court, the appeal was filed. Therefore, the Director could have rejected the so-called appeal on the ground of limitation, but without doing so, the Director passed the impugned order, vide Annexure-5, hence this writ application. 5. Mr. But no appeal was filed within the time stipulated and much after the order dated 7.2.2000 passed by this Court, the appeal was filed. Therefore, the Director could have rejected the so-called appeal on the ground of limitation, but without doing so, the Director passed the impugned order, vide Annexure-5, hence this writ application. 5. Mr. S.K. Rath, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner Managing Committee strenuously urged that on the basis of the misconduct of opposite party No. 4 and on allegation of the father of the victim girl, whose modesty was allegedly outraged by opposite party No. 4, action was taken by the Management to uphold the reputation of the institution. As such, opposite party No. 4 having left the service w.e.f. 4.5.1996 without filing any application for leave, show cause notices were issued to him on several occasions, but opposite party No. 4 instead of giving any reply to the show cause notices, approached this Court by filing aforesaid OJC No. 11141 of 1996 wherein this Court directed opposite party No. 4 vide order dated 7.2.2000 to file an appeal/representation and his appeal was registered as Appeal No. 35 of 2000. It is stated that due to abandonment of service, opposite party No. 4 is not entitled to the relief granted by the Director, Secondary Education. More so, the misconduct of opposite party No. 4 was so serious, that affected the reputation of the institution. For such reason, the action taken by the Management against opposite party No. 4 was wholly and fully justified. It is also stated that when there was allegation of immoral act against a teacher, the question of compliance with principle of natural justice did not arise. To substantiate his contention, he relies upon the judgments of the apex Court in Sahoodul Haque vs. Registrar, Co-operative Societies, Bihar and Another, AIR 1974 SC 1985 , Viveka Nand Sethi vs. Chairman, J & K Bank Limited and Others, (2005) 5 SCC 347 and Avinash Nagra vs. Navodaya Vidyalaya Samiti, 1997 (2) SLJ 42. 6. Mr. A.K. Pandey, learned Standing Counsel for the School and Mass Education Department supported the stand taken by the Director and stated that the impugned order passed by the authority may not be interfered with and opposite party No. 4 deserves to be reinstated in service. 7. Mr. 6. Mr. A.K. Pandey, learned Standing Counsel for the School and Mass Education Department supported the stand taken by the Director and stated that the impugned order passed by the authority may not be interfered with and opposite party No. 4 deserves to be reinstated in service. 7. Mr. A. Routray, learned counsel for opposite party No. 4, strenuously urged that the action taken by the Managing Committee cannot be sustained as no disciplinary proceeding had been initiated against opposite party No. 4 to find him guilty of the allegations and the so-called allegation made by the girl as well as her father with regard to outraging her modesty could not be taken into consideration as such, the same being false. 8. With regard to limitation period to entertain the appeal it is stated that question of limitation did not arise as the action taken pursuant to confessional statement made on 24.6.1996 could not be sustained as the same was false one. More so, the Managing Committee was not competent to take a decision in the matter as some of its members had resigned, and therefore the action taken by the Managing Committee was in gross violation of principles of natural justice. Consequently, the order passed by the Director setting aside the termination of the opposite party No. 4 by the Managing Committee is well justified. 9. Mr. R.C. Behera, learned counsel for opposite party No. 5 submits that due to mis-behaviour of opposite party No. 4 with a minor girl student while he was deputed to Arabind High School, Saruali as students guardian, he was dismissed from service. Since there was shortage of staff to manage the institution, the Managing Committee selected and appointed opposite party No. 5 on 25.12.1996, pursuant to which, he joined and discharged his duty from that date. Taking into account his experience in the said post, he was selected to undergo B. Ed. Training and after completion of such training having been placed in 1st Division, he is continuing in the school. It is stated that by virtue of the order passed by the Director, Secondary Education, in the event opposite party No. 4 is allowed to continue in the school, it will ultimately affect opposite party No. 5 who has rendered service for so many years and has also become trained in the meantime. It is stated that by virtue of the order passed by the Director, Secondary Education, in the event opposite party No. 4 is allowed to continue in the school, it will ultimately affect opposite party No. 5 who has rendered service for so many years and has also become trained in the meantime. As such, the appeal which was filed by opposite party No. 4 beyond the limitation period, could not have been entertained by the Director and would have been rejected outright on the ground of limitation. 10. Even on merit also, it is stated that on the allegation of misconduct with a girl student in the examination centre, opposite party No. 4 remained absent from the institution w.e.f. 4.5.1996 and he never requested to join his duty and with regard to the of allegation when opportunity was given to him to show cause, he having not availed the same and did not participate in the proceeding, the Managing Committee was justified in dismissing him from service and opposite party No. 5 was selected and appointed in his vacancy. Therefore, the order passed by the Director being not in conformity with the provision of law is liable to be struck down. 11. In the above backdrop, it is to be considered as to whether opposite party No. 4 had virtually abandoned the service and as a consequence thereof he is not entitled to get the benefit as per the direction given by the Director and whether there is non-compliance with the principles of natural justice while dismissing him from service. 12. Considering the above contentions raised by learned counsel for the parties, it appears that admittedly opposite party No. 4 had been appointed as an Assistant Teacher and he was discharging his duty under the petitioner. He had been deputed to Arabind High School, Saruapali as a guardian of the students, who were being presented to appear in the Annual HSC Examination, 1996 where he allegedly committed gross misconduct by outraging the modesty of a girl student and on the basis of the complaint in that regard lodged by the victim girl and her father when the Managing Committee was in seisin over the matter, opposite party No. 4, of his own left the school on 4.5.1996 without any leave application and remained absent unauthorisedly for a pretty long time. On the basis of the allegation made by the father of the concerned girl student the petitioner being the Managing Committee of the institution in order to keep the dignity of the institution, terminated the services of opposite party No. 4. 13. As it appears, opposite party No. 4 did not assail the order of termination of his service passed by the Managing Committee on 25.10.1996, rather he approached this Court by filing OJC No. 11141 of 1996, where he sought direction that his representation might be ordered to be considered by the Director, Secondary Education and this Court disposed of the said writ application directing the Director vide order dated 7.2.2000 to consider the grievance of the petitioner and dispose of the same in accordance with law. 14. The very conduct of opposite party No. 4 clearly indicates that he himself abandoned the service without giving any leave application and now turns round and says that the action taken by the Managing Committee was not justified. He cannot take a plea that apprehending termination, he made a representation which was considered by the Director. Fact remains, the Managing Committee had already passed a resolution on 25.10.1996 taking into consideration on abandonment of service of opposite party No. 4 for which his services was terminated. More so, in spite of opposite party No. 4 being afforded opportunity of hearing by show-cause notices various occasions, he did not respond to the same. Whether such action of the opposite party No. 4 can be construed to be Abandonment of service, the same should be examined on the basis of materials available before this Court for consideration. 15. In G.T. Lad vs. Chemical and Fibres of India Limited, 1979 SC 582, the apex Court considered the Abandonment of Service and states as follows:- "Abandonment of Service" According to the Dictionary of English Law by Earl Jowitt (1959 Edition) abandonment means relinquishment of an interest of claim. According to Black's Law Dictionary abandonment when used in relation to an office means voluntary relinquishment. It must be total and under such circumstances as clearly to indicate an absolute relinquishment. The failure to perform the duties pertaining to office must be with actual or imputed intention on the part of the officer to abandon and relinquish the office. According to Black's Law Dictionary abandonment when used in relation to an office means voluntary relinquishment. It must be total and under such circumstances as clearly to indicate an absolute relinquishment. The failure to perform the duties pertaining to office must be with actual or imputed intention on the part of the officer to abandon and relinquish the office. The intention may be inferred from the acts and conduct of the party and is a question of fact Temporary absence is not ordinarily sufficient to constitute an abandonment of office. Hence it clearly follows that to constitute abandonment, there must be total or complete giving up of duties so as to indicate an intention not to resume the same. Abandonment or relinquishment of service is always a question of intention, and normally, such an intention cannot be attributed to a employee without adequate evidence in that behalf. Thus, whether there has been a voluntary abandonment of service or not is a question of fact which has to be determined in the light of the surrounding circumstances of each case. 16. Similarly, in Buckingham & Carnatic Co. Ltd. vs. Venkatiah, AIR 1964 SC 1272 , the apex Court has stated as follows:- "Abandonment of Service" It is true that under common law an inference of relinquishment of service is not easily drawn unless from the length of absence and other surrounding circumstances an inference to that effect can be legitimately drawn and it can be assumed that an employee intended to abandon service. This normally requires adequate evidence in support of his contention. But where the circumstances in which such an inference should be drawn are agreed and laid down in certified standing orders, the doctrine of common law or considerations of equity would not apply and in such cases where the conditions mentioned in the standing orders are fulfilled, the employee will be deemed to have terminated his contract of employment and thus relinquished or abandoned his employment. 17. Keeping in view the judgments of the apex Court an inference can be drawn from the length of absence arid other surrounding circumstances, but it requires adequate evidence in support of the contention. 18. 17. Keeping in view the judgments of the apex Court an inference can be drawn from the length of absence arid other surrounding circumstances, but it requires adequate evidence in support of the contention. 18. As it appears from the materials available on record, due to mis-behaviour and misconduct when the opposite party No. 4 remained absent without leave application w.e.f. 4.5.1996 and did not turn up to duty after his deputation was over which had saddled the responsibility to represent the students to appear in Annual HSC Examination, 1996 and the misconduct and mis-behaviour were so serious which had been taken into consideration on the basis of the complaint lodged by the victim girl student as well as her father and ultimately opposite party No. 4 did confess his guilt and chose not to join the school, that itself is sufficient to show that opposite party No. 4 had abandoned the service. More so, keeping in view the judgment of the apex Court in Sahoodul Haque case (supra) no useful purpose will be served to afford an opportunity to opposite party No. 4 to explain his absence when the facts were known and his conduct was unbecoming of a teacher. In that case, the long absence from duty amounted to abandonment of service. In addition to that the Managing Committee has given sufficient opportunity by calling upon opposite party No. 4 to show cause, but he having not been responded to the same, it cannot be construed that there was non-compliance with the principles of natural justice. 19. In Viveka Nand Sethi (supra), the apex Court took into consideration that when a person had been long absent, it could be treated as abandonment of service but categorically held that when facts are admitted, an inquiry would be an empty formality. Applying the same, principles of natural justice are required to be complied with having regard to the fact situation obtaining therein. It cannot be put in a straitjacket formula. It cannot be applied in a vacuum without reference to the relevant facts and circumstances of the case. The principle of natural justice, it is true, is no unruly horse. When facts are admitted, an inquiry would be an empty formality. It cannot be put in a straitjacket formula. It cannot be applied in a vacuum without reference to the relevant facts and circumstances of the case. The principle of natural justice, it is true, is no unruly horse. When facts are admitted, an inquiry would be an empty formality. Applying the same to the present case, it appears that when the facts were known and opposite party No. 4 had confessed his guilt and had abandoned the service, there was no need of compliance with principles of natural justice, rather the petitioner was justifying in its action to safe the institution from such unscrupulous teachers. 20. The apex Court in Avinash Nagra (supra) has categorically held that teaching is a noble profession and teachers must prove worthy of trust reposed in them. It is further held that inquiry may be dispensed with in a school where giving the evidence will harass girl students in cases as of sexual harassment by a teacher. 21. Applying the same to the present context, it appears that opposite party No. 4 was given opportunity but he did not choose to avail of the same. On the other hand, he confessed the allegation made by the victim girl as well as her father to be true. In view of that, the question of inquiry or compliance with the principles of natural justice does not arise. Therefore, on the basis of availability of materials on record, if any action was taken by the Managing Committee, the same should not have been interfered with by the Director while exercising his appellate jurisdiction under the Education Act Apart from the same, the Director had acted contrary to the provisions of law. The appeal having not been filed within the limitation period prescribed under the Act, he could have rejected the same on the ground of limitation. By entertaining the appeal filed beyond the limitation period and setting aside the order of termination passed by the Managing Committee, the Director has committed gross error of law. 22. Accordingly, the order dated 7.5.2002, vide Annexure-5 in OJC No. 6496 of 2002 and Annexure-8 in OJC No. 6644 of 2002 is hereby quashed and both the writ petitions are allowed. No order as to cost Petition allowed.