JUDGMENT L. Narasimha Reddy, J. 1. The appellant herein was tried by the Court of the II Additional Sessions Judge, Nalgonda at Suryapet, in S.C. No. 423 of 2008 for the offences punishable under Sections 302 and 304-B IPC. 2. The case pleaded by the prosecution against the accused was as under: The accused married Vijaya, the daughter of PW-1, five years prior to the incident. On 14.11.2007, PW-1 received information about 12.00 noon that his daughter died by hanging to a log in the hut of the accused. Soon after that, himself, his wife - PW-2, his father - PW-3 and some others proceeded to the village of the accused. On noticing that the dead body of the deceased was hanging with a saree, tied to the log of the hut, they detached her from that and thereafter, he submitted a complaint - Ex.P-1 to the Station House Officer, Athmakur Police Station, at 22.00 hours. Police registered Crime No.88 of 2007 by invoking Section 304-B IPC and investigation was taken up. Scene of offence panchanama was prepared, inquest was conducted and postmortem was arranged in accordance with law. The confessional statement of the accused was said to have been recorded. After completion of the investigation, PW-20 – the Sub Divisional Police Officer, Suryapet, filed the charge sheet. The trial Court framed necessary charges and on denial of the same by the accused, trial was conducted. PWs.1 to 20 were examined and Exs.P-1 to P-19 were filed. No material objects were taken on record. 3. Through its judgment, dated 14.10.2009, the trial Court held the accused guilty of the offences punishable under Sections 304-B and 302 IPC. Separate sentences of imprisonment for life were imposed for both the offences and they were directed to run concurrently. Hence, this appeal by the accused. 4. Sri K. Chaitanya, learned counsel for the appellant, submits that every material witness, examined by the prosecution, was declared hostile and still the trial Court held the accused guilty of the charges. He submits that non-application of mind on the part of the trial Court, is evident from the fact that the accused was convicted of the offences punishable under Sections 304-B as well as 302 IPC though both of them were mutually exclusive. He submits that non-application of mind on the part of the trial Court, is evident from the fact that the accused was convicted of the offences punishable under Sections 304-B as well as 302 IPC though both of them were mutually exclusive. He further submits that the necessity for the accused to lead any independent evidence to discharge the burden under Section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act (for short Act), would have arisen if only any prima facie case is made out by the prosecution and that in the instant case, not only the parents and the grand father of the deceased but also all the other witnesses that were cited by the prosecution to speak about the incident, were declared hostile, and that, the conviction and sentence, ordered by the trial Court, cannot be sustained in law. 5. Learned Additional Public Prosecutor, on the other hand, submits that all the ingredients of Section 304-B IPC are present in the instant case and once the accused did not make any effort to rebut the statutory presumption, the trial Court was left with no alternative except to convict him. She contends that the mere fact that some of the witnesses turned hostile would not alter the presumption that is provided for under law, and that the trial Court has taken the correct view of the matter. 6. Taking into account, the contents of Ex.P-1, the FIR was issued by invoking Section 304-B IPC. Thereafter, the investigation was taken up in accordance with the procedure that applies to cases in which, that provision is invoked. The charge sheet reflected both the provisions i.e. Section 302 and 304-B IPC. Even if the Court was of the view that the case basically, attracts Section 304-B IPC or in the alternative Section 302 IPC, the charges ought to have been framed as alternatives. However, two independent charges under Sections 304-B IPC on one hand, and 302 IPC on the other hand were framed. Basic fallacy has crept in this regard. However, it is not so material nor does it has any adverse impact upon the trial. 7. To prove its case, the prosecution examined PWs.1 to 20. Out of them PWs.1 and 2 are the parents and PW.3 is the grand father of the deceased. Basic fallacy has crept in this regard. However, it is not so material nor does it has any adverse impact upon the trial. 7. To prove its case, the prosecution examined PWs.1 to 20. Out of them PWs.1 and 2 are the parents and PW.3 is the grand father of the deceased. PW.4 is the Sarpanch of the Village, PWs.5 and 6 are persons, who are said to have acted as elders, to settle the disputes between the accused and the deceased. PWs-7 and 8 are neighbours. Rest of the witnesses are the photographer or panch witnesses, as the case may be. The record discloses that except the photographer - PW-9 all other witnesses, up to PW-16, are declared hostile, obviously because they did not support the case of the prosecution. PW-17 is the Medical Officer, PW-18 is the Executive Magistrate, PW19 is the Station House Officer and PW-20 is the Investigating Officer. 8. If a woman dies within few years after the marriage, the immediate concern would be of the parents and their bereavement would be fathomless. For their own reasons, however, the parents of the deceased PWs-1 and 2 did not support the case of the prosecution and they were declared hostile. Once, PWs-1 and 2 turned hostile and have gone to the extent of stating that their daughter was living happily with the accused till her death. That being the case, the fact that rest of the witnesses, associated with the case turned hostile, does not surprise the Court. 9. The trial Court was mostly impressed by the fact that a charge under Section 304-B IPC is framed and the burden is upon the accused to prove his innocence. That would be the case if only the prosecution established the occurrence and stated the fact, which, if unrebutted would lead to proof of guilt of the accused. 10. It is, no doubt, true that Section 113-B of the Act mandates that whenever a person is accused of causing dowry death, the Court shall presume that the person so accused has caused it. That presumption in turn, would place burden upon the accused to prove his innocence. However, the mere registration of a case against the accused does not require him to commence his evidence in the process of proving his innocence. That presumption in turn, would place burden upon the accused to prove his innocence. However, the mere registration of a case against the accused does not require him to commence his evidence in the process of proving his innocence. The situation would not be similar to the one in which the defendant in a suit for recovery of money, based upon a promissory note, admits the execution and disputes on other aspects; resulting in the commencement of the evidence on behalf of the defendant. In a criminal case, in addition to making an accusation, the prosecution is required to place some material before the Court, which, if taken as true would lead to the finding of guilty of the accused. Such material, naturally would be in the form of evidence atleast on certain basic aspects. 11. In Baljit Singh vs. State of Haryana, AIR 2004 SC 1714 the Supreme Court held that the following conditions precedent, must exist, before the trial Court, before it requires the accused to discharge the burden: (a) That a married woman had died otherwise that under normal circumstances. (b) Such death was within seven years of her marriage. (c) The prosecution has established that there was cruelty and harassment in connection with demand for dowry soon before her death. In the instant case, however, the first two aspects are present, the prosecution failed on the third one. 12. Once, all the witnesses ranging from the parents and grand father of the deceased to the persons, who are said to have acted as panch witnesses, have retracted from their earlier stands, reflected in the statements recorded from them under Section 161 Cr. P.C., the basic ingredients, referred to above, cannot be said to have been proved. 13. There is another way looking at the matter. The rebuttal of a presumption need not be through any positive evidence. It can be through the cross-examination of the witnesses of the opposite party also. If the plea raised by the prosecution in a criminal case or the plaintiff in a civil suit, is shown to be non-existent in the process of cross-examination of the witnesses, then the necessity to lead independent evidence by the person on whom the burden is placed, does not arise. If the plea raised by the prosecution in a criminal case or the plaintiff in a civil suit, is shown to be non-existent in the process of cross-examination of the witnesses, then the necessity to lead independent evidence by the person on whom the burden is placed, does not arise. This accords with the proposition of law that howsoever strong a plea may be, it cannot be accepted by a Court, unless it is supported by evidence. Once, the evidence is lacking, the plea, virtually gets diluted, if not obliterated. Therefore, the accused herein did not face any necessity to lead any independent evidence, to discharge the burden that is placed upon him under Section 113-B of the Act. In a way, it stood discharged with the absence of proof of existence of ingredients, referred to above. Therefore, the view taken by the trial Court in this case, cannot be accepted. 14. Another anomaly we noticed in this case is that the trial Court held the accused guilty of offences punishable under Section 304-B IPC as well as 302 IPC. It only shows non-application of mind or a casual approach adopted by the learned Presiding Officer. If a person is held guilty of offence punishable under Section 304-B IPC, the question of that very person being guilty of offence punishable under Section 302 IPC, or vice-versa, does not arise. Curiously enough, the accused was held guilty of both the offences and independent punishments of imprisonment for life were imposed though they were directed to run concurrently. 15. We, therefore, allow appeal and set aside the conviction and sentence ordered against the appellant. 16. In the result, the Criminal Appeal is allowed. The conviction and sentence ordered in S.C. No. 423 of 2008 on the file of the II Additional Sessions Judge, Nalgonda at Suryapet, dated 14.10.2009, against the appellant-accused, are set aside. The appellant-accused shall be set at liberty forthwith, unless his detention is needed in any other case.