N. Chaudhury, J. -- By filing this application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the petitioner which is a registered society engaged in cultural activities has challenged validity of order dated 16.10.2012 passed by the learned Civil Judge No.3, Kamrup in Misc.(J) Case No. 55 of 2010 arising out of Money Suit No. 138 of 2008. By this order, the learned Trial Court dismissed application of the defendant/ petitioner for condoning delay of 224 days in filing an application under Order IX Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure in respect of an ex-parte decree dated 15.03.2010 in this aforesaid suit. 2. The opposite party, as plaintiff, instituted Money Suit No. 138 of 2008 in the Court of learned Civil Judge No.3, Guwahati, praying for a decree of Rs. 12,50,479/- with pendente lite and final interest @ 18% per annum. It is the case of the plaintiff that pursuant to a tender process, defendant engaged the plaintiff to supply various food items as breakfast, lunch, dinner, tea, snacks, sweets etc. Although some payments were made from time to time but all entitlements of the plaintiff was not cleared which along with interests, damage and compensation became as high as Rs.12,50,476/- and the same amount was claimed by a money decree. The learned Trial Court passed an ex parte decree on 04.09.2009 of the aforesaid amount with interest @ 6% per annum holding that in spite of service of summons, the defendant failed to appear and assure the claim of the plaintiff. 3. After the decree was put in execution in Money Execution No.2 of 2010 of the Court of leaned Civil Judge No.3,Kamrup, at Guwahati, the sole judgment debtor (petitioner herein) filed an application on 28.04.2010 under Order IX Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure praying for setting aside of the ex parte decree before the learned Court who has passed the decree stating that only after service of notice on 15.03.2010 of the Execution case, the defendant came to know about the decree and the suit wherein the decree was passed, that summon was not duly served on the defendant and thus it is a fit case for setting aside of the ex parte decree. This application was accompanied by another application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 wherein the petitioner claimed to have come to know about the suit and the ex parte decree passed therein only after receipt of notice on 15.03.2010 of the Money Execution Case No.2 of 2010. The petitioner specifically denied to have received any summon in the main suit. It was claimed, therefore, that the delay of 7 months 14 days in filing the application under IX Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure be condoned and the application be entertained by extending the period of limitation under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The application for condonation of delay was registered as Misc.(J) Case No. 55 of 2010 and notice was issued. The plaintiff filed objection and denied the pleadings of the petitioner/ defendant. 4. The petitioner examined one Dipti Bora, an employee of the defendant and denied service of summons of the main suit on the defendant. She was cross-examined by the plaintiff's side. The summon on defendant was confronted before her as Exhibit-A. She could not identify the signature of the person affixed thereon acknowledging service of summon. However, she admitted that there was seal and signature of the defendant officer therein. The plaintiff/ opposite party, on the other hand, examined the process server (Ratul Das) who stated that he served notice on an Employee of the defendant who put his signature and seal of the office. In course of cross-examination he admitted that the notice was addressed to the defendant through Goutam Sarmah and that he did not know the name of the person who had received the summon. Of course, he denied the suggestion that he had handed over notice to security staff. What is conspicuous from his evidence is that he did not specifically claim to have served the summon on Goutam Sarmah through whom defendant was supposed to have been served. However, learned Trial Court in his judgment and order dated 16.10.2012 held that the plea of non service and of knowledge of the decree on 15.03.2010 was apparently not based on fact. The learned Court further held that even if the date of knowledge is accepted to be 15.03.2010, the application was filed on 28.04.2010 which is beyond 30 days and that, the petitioner could not explain delay caused after 15.03.2010. The learned Court further held that even if the date of knowledge is accepted to be 15.03.2010, the application was filed on 28.04.2010 which is beyond 30 days and that, the petitioner could not explain delay caused after 15.03.2010. With these observations and relying on two judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court as to nature and scope of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the learned Trial Court refused to extend limitation and consequently rejected the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. It is this order dated 16.10.2012 which has been challenged in the present revision petition. 5. I have heard Mr. B.D. Deka, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. P.K. Deka, learned counsel for the opposite party. I have perused the materials available on records including the deposition of the witnesses examined by both the sides. 6. Learned counsel for the petitioner has drawn my attention to the provisions of Rule 3 of the Order XXX of the Code of Civil Procedure and Rule 64 of the Civil Rules and Order. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, the summon ought to have been served under Order XXX Rule 3 (b) of the Code of Civil Procedure on the person having control of management of the business. Here, the defendant being a society and notice having been admittedly routed through one Goutam Sarmah in the body of summon itself indicating that Goutom Sarmah is the person in control or management of the defendant, it was incumbent on the plaintiff to prove that notice was served on him. But evidence of the opposite party is deficient in this. Moreover, under Rule 64 of the Civil Rules and Order, the Process Server is duty bound to identify the person on whom the summon is served. The Process Server in the present case has failed to discharge such burden and consequently notice was not duly served. Regarding delay after knowledge of the ex parte decree the learned counsel Mr. B.D. Deka would argue that there was barely a delay of 14 days or so and such delay in regard to an organization over which the instrumentalities of the State Government has all pervasive control is inevitable. Because, file has to be moved across number of tables to obtain a nod in affirmation of the proposed move to file application. B.D. Deka would argue that there was barely a delay of 14 days or so and such delay in regard to an organization over which the instrumentalities of the State Government has all pervasive control is inevitable. Because, file has to be moved across number of tables to obtain a nod in affirmation of the proposed move to file application. The learned counsel would further indicate that the plaint being silent in regard to the nature of the defendant and as to maintainability of the suit vis-à-vis a probable objection under Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the prayer for condonation of delay has an enhanced magnitude of importance. According to the learned counsel there is explanation for the delay as a whole although day to day explanation after 15.03.2010 is not on record which according to the learned counsel is not required in view of the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case. 7. Per contra, Mr. P.K. Deka, learned counsel for the opposite party/ plaintiff would argue that an application under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is not maintainable under the facts and circumstances of this case. The learned counsel has relied on the judgment of the Hon'ble Court in the case of Radheshyam and Another vs. Chhabi Nath & Others reported in (2009) 5 SCC 616 to show essential distinction between Article 226 & Article 227 of the Constitution of India and would argue that the law in the case of Surya Dev Rai vs. Ram Chander Rai reported in (2003) 6 SCC 675 was laid down for an extreme exigency and not for the type of cases as in the present case. 8. This revision petition has two basic points to deal with. One is in regard to service of notice on the defendant in the main Money Suit and the other is in regard to explanation given by the petitioner for the delay after date of knowledge of the ex parte decree i.e. 15.03.2010. Coming to the first point, there is no dispute at the bar that the sole defendant being a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860, is governed by the provision of Order XXX of the Code of Civil Procedure. This chapter deals with suits by or against firms and persons carrying on business in names other than their own. Coming to the first point, there is no dispute at the bar that the sole defendant being a society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860, is governed by the provision of Order XXX of the Code of Civil Procedure. This chapter deals with suits by or against firms and persons carrying on business in names other than their own. The word 'firm' appearing in this Order is wide enough to include even a fictitious name under which any person carries on business. Rule 10 of this Order shows that when a person carries on business in a name or style other than his own name or a Hindu Undivided family carrying business in any name, it should be construed to be a firm and the provision of Order XXX of the Code of Civil Procedure would apply thereto in so far as the nature of such case permits. The defendant herein is a society, constituted by various persons and they are running its activities in the name of society. So, provisions of Order XXX of the Code of Civil Procedure would apply here. Once Order XXX of the Code of Civil Procedure applies, mode of service of notice on such deemed firm has to be as per Rule 3 thereof. It needs no mention that if a statute prescribes something to be done in a particular manner, it has to be done in that particular manner and not otherwise. Service of summons on a defendant is a vital milestone in the course of trial. The soul of this step is nothing but principles of natural justice as to the doctrine of audi alteram partem. It, thus, goes to the root of the matter. So, any violation thereof would vitiate the whole trial. Under the facts of this case, the server did not perform his duty of assuring himself of the identity of the person on whom he served the notice. He admitted in course of cross-examination that as per the recital of the summon, it was to be routed through Goutam Sarmah and he was not sure on whom did he serve the notice. He admitted in course of cross-examination that as per the recital of the summon, it was to be routed through Goutam Sarmah and he was not sure on whom did he serve the notice. So, on joint reading of Order XXX Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure with Rule 64 of the Civil Rules and Order, it is clear that service of notice on the sole defendant in Money Suit No. 138 of 2008 may not be proper. 9. Now, except this summon, there is no other mention as to making the defendant aware of the suit. The defendant has claimed that it became aware on 15.03.2010 as to the ex parte decree and the suit wherein it was passed after receipt of notice in Money Execution Case No. 2 of 2010. There is no cross-examination of the sole witness to discredit her on this point. So, the finding of the learned trial Court that the story of subsequent knowledge of decree on 15.03.2010 was not based on fact, is perverse. These findings are accordingly quashed. 10. This takes us to the next question as to whether the defendant has furnished proper explanation for delay over 30 days after it got knowledge of the decree on 15.03.2010. The Second subparagraph of Paragraph-5 of the application under Section 5 furnishes some explanations. The statements are no doubt vague and casual. It does not contain explanation for day to day delay. Of course, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Collector Land Acquisition vs. Mst. Katiji ( AIR 1987 SC 1353 ) has done away with the requirement of everyday's explanation. In Paragraph-3 of this judgment, the Hon'ble Apex Court called for a liberal approach citing as many as 6 grounds for the same which includes a proposition that there is no presumption that delay was caused deliberately and that a litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. Hon'ble Supreme Court sounded a note of caution in 6th ground of the Paragraph-3 of this case reminding that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalise injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so. Hon'ble Supreme Court sounded a note of caution in 6th ground of the Paragraph-3 of this case reminding that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalise injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so. Having reminded myself of such notices of caution, I feel persuaded to hold that the defendant in this case was prevented by sufficient cause for not filing the application within time and accordingly, this revision petition is allowed. Impugned order dated 16.10.2012 is set aside. The learned Trial Court, Kamrup, shall consider and decide the application of the defendant filed under Order IX Rule 13 of the Code of Civil Procedure on merit. 11. No order as to cost.