JUDGMENT Mr. Paramjeet Singh, J.: - This regular second appeal is directed against the judgment and decree dated 17.03.1986 passed by learned Sub Judge IInd Class, Panipat whereby suit for possession filed by respondent-plaintiff has been decreed and against the judgment and decree dated 07.02.1987 passed by learned District Judge, Karnal whereby appeal preferred by appellants-defendants has been dismissed. 2. For convenience sake, reference to parties is being made as per their status in the suit. 3. The detailed facts are already recapitulated in the judgments of the courts below and are not required to be reproduced. However, the brief facts for disposal of this second appeal are to the effect that the plaintiff was a ‘dohlidar’ of land measuring 16 kanals 8 marlas, situated in village Matlauda, Tehsil Panipat, fully described in para 1 of plaint. The plaintiff executed two sale deeds with regard to said land in favour of the defendants on 11.05.1973 for a consideration of Rs.3,000/-. The plaintiff challenged the sale deeds on ground of fraud. It was pleaded that in fact, the plaintiff had given the land on lease for five years to the defendants, but they had fraudulently got executed the sale deeds in their faovur. The plaintiff was only a ‘dohlidar’ of the said land and he had no right to alienate the same. It was further pleaded that the sale deeds are void, ab initio, therefore, the plaintiff filed suit for possession of the suit land. 4. Upon notice, the defendants resisted the suit and filed written statement. It was pleaded that the defendants had not played any fraud upon the plaintiff. The plaintiff had executed the sale deeds in favour of the defendants after knowing its contents and without any pressure. Otherwise also, the plaintiff has no locus standi to file the suit; the plaintiff is estopped by his own act and conduct from filing the suit; suit is bad for mis-joinder of the parties and cause of action and also barred by limitation. 5. On the pleadings of the parties, the Court of first instance framed following issues: “1. Whether the plaintiff is a dohlidar of the said village and the impugned alienation regarding the land in question is void, ab initio? If so, to what effect?OPP 2 Whether the plaintiff has no locus standi to bring the present suit?OPD 3. 5. On the pleadings of the parties, the Court of first instance framed following issues: “1. Whether the plaintiff is a dohlidar of the said village and the impugned alienation regarding the land in question is void, ab initio? If so, to what effect?OPP 2 Whether the plaintiff has no locus standi to bring the present suit?OPD 3. Whether the plaintiff is estopped from filing the present suit by his own acts and conduct?OPD 4. Whether the suit is bad for mis-joinder of parties?OPD 5. Whether the suit has not been signed and verified in accordance with the law? If so, to what effect?OPD 6. Whether the suit has been wrongly valued for the purpose of court fee and jurisdiction?OPD 7. Whether the suit is time barred?OPD 8. Whether the jurisdiction of this Court is barred?OPD 9. Whether the defendants are entitled to special costs u/s 35-A CPC?OPD 10. Relief.” 6. After appreciating the evidence led by parties, the Court of first instance decreed the suit directing the defendants to hand over possession of the suit property to the plaintiff within sixty days from the date of judgment. Feeling aggrieved, the defendants preferred an appeal which has been dismissed by the lower Appellate Court. Hence, this regular second appeal. 7. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 8. When the appeal was admitted, no substantial question of law was framed. However, during the pendency of appeal, following substantial questions of law have been placed on record by learned counsel for the appellants: (i) Whether the plaintiff-respondent sold the suit land vide registered sale deed dated 11.05.1973 and delivered the possession in pursuance thereof to the defendants-appellants? (ii) Whether the plaintiff after having sold the suit land is estopped from claiming possession of the suit land? (iii) Whether the plaintiff-respondent filed the present suit for a decree of possession by alleging that the defendants played a fraud by getting sale deeds executed instead of a lease deed for five years and the plaintiff has miserably failed to prove that any fraud was played on him by the defendants by getting sale deeds in their faovur? (iv) Whether the suit for possession by the plaintiff is/was maintainable and whether any decree could be passed decreeing such suit? (iv) Whether the suit for possession by the plaintiff is/was maintainable and whether any decree could be passed decreeing such suit? (v) Whether the plaintiff is estopped from claiming possession of the suit land after having voluntarily executed the sale deeds and delivering the possession after receipt of sale consideration? (vi) Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case, the judgment and decree of the courts below decreeing the suit of the plaintiff-respondent are sustainable in law as also on facts? 9. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 10. Learned counsel for the appellants has vehemently contended that impugned judgments and decrees passed by both the courts below are against law and evidence on record. The sale deeds are legal and valid. The plaintiff was competent to execute the sale deeds. Otherwise also, since the defendants had been put into possession pursuant to sale deed, suit for possession is not maintainable. Possession of the defendants is legal and valid on account of sale deeds. Learned counsel has further contended that during the pendency of instant appeal which is a continuation of the suit, new Act i.e. Haryana Dohlidar, Butimar, Bhondedar and Muqararidar (Vesting of Proprietary Rights) Act, 2010 (hereinafter to be referred as “the Act”) has come into force. As per the said Act, since ‘dohlidar’ has become owner of the property, the sale deeds should be treated as legal and valid. 11. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent has vehemently opposed the contentions of learned counsel for the appellants and contended that suit property was a ‘dohli’ which could not be sold. A limited right is given to ‘dohlidar’ and reference has been made to revenue records. The Act has come into operation subsequently which cannot be taken into account. Otherwise also, the Act is prospective in nature and does not operate retrospectively. Learned counsel has further contended that the defendants are not ‘dohlidars’ under the original owner, therefore, they cannot claim right on the basis of the Act. The original owner is not a party in the present suit. 12. I have considered the rival contentions of learned counsel for the parties. 13. Learned counsel has further contended that the defendants are not ‘dohlidars’ under the original owner, therefore, they cannot claim right on the basis of the Act. The original owner is not a party in the present suit. 12. I have considered the rival contentions of learned counsel for the parties. 13. From the perusal of record and arguments advanced by learned counsel for the parties, I find that following substantial questions of law arise for consideration by this Court: (i) Whether a ‘dohlidar’ can alienate the property by way of sale deed? (ii) What is the effect of Haryana Dohlidar, Butimar, Bhondedar and Muqararidar (Vesting of Proprietary Rights) Act, 2010 and whether it operates prospectively or retrospectively? (iii) Whether ‘the Act’ is applicable to the pending appeals? 14. Before I deal with the contentions, it would be appropriate to refer to the decisions of this Court with regard to the same subject matter which have bearing on aforesaid questions. 15. It may be noticed here that word ‘dohli’ or ‘dohlidar’ has not been statutorily defined prior to the enforcement of the Act, however, word ‘dohli’ or ‘dohlidar’ has been in use in the revenue records since times immemorial and has been dealt within various judicial decisions. 16. A Division Bench of Hon’ble Lahore High Court in Sewa Ram vs. Udegir, AIR 1922 Lahore, 126 held as under: “The dohli tenure is a peculiar kind of tenure to be found in the south- eastern districts of Punjab. It is a rent-free grant of a small plot of land by the village community for the benefit of a temple, mosque or shrine, or to a person for a religious purpose. In the revenue records the proprietary body are recorded as the owners of the property, and the grantee is recorded as a tenant in the column of cultivation. So long as the purpose, for which the grant is made, is carried out, it cannot be resumed, but should the holder fail to carry out the duties of his office, the proprietors can eject him and put in some one else under a like tenure.” 17. So long as the purpose, for which the grant is made, is carried out, it cannot be resumed, but should the holder fail to carry out the duties of his office, the proprietors can eject him and put in some one else under a like tenure.” 17. The said observations continued to be followed in Khema Nand and others v. Kundan and another, AIR 1937 Lahore 805; Tirkha and others v. Dwarka Parshad, 1972 Punjab Law Journal 614; Baba Nand Ram v. Gram Panchayat of Village Malkos, 1976 Punjab Law Journal 586; Dharma v. Smt. Harbai, 1976 PLJ 617; Dalip Singh and others v. Puran Dass and another, 1977 Punjab Law Journal 178; Dhani Ram and another v. Gram Sabha and Gram Panchayat of Village Jatmalpur and others, 1984 Punjab Law Journal 234; Sittal Dass and another v. Financial Commissioner Haryana and others, 1989 Punjab Law Journal 148; Bhim Singh v. Dalip Singh, 1993(1) Recent Revenue Reports 606; Lakshmi Chand v. Basanti alias Kailash, 2003(1) Recent Civil Reports 298; Ghisa Ram v. Surat Singh & Co., 2003(4) RCR(Civil) 23 (P&H); Dharam Singh and others v. Smt. Phullan Devi and others, [2005(3) Law Herald (P&H) 726] : 2005(3) RCR(Civil) 832 (P&H) and Dev Dutt and others v. Gram Panchayat Ranila, 1993(3) RRR 54 (P&H). These decisions represent one view, which may be referred to as the first view, while a different view appears to have been taken in a set of judgments of this court out of which leading judgment is a Division Bench judgment in Baba Badri Dass v. Dharma and others, 1981 Punjab Law Journal 447, which can be referred to as the second view, which has been followed in Mandir Darbari Lal Ji v. Financial Commissioner, Haryana and others, 1997(2) RCR(Civil) 84 (P&H). 18. The Division Bench in Baba Badri Dass (supra) has held as under: “9. In none of these cases, the provisions of the Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887 or the Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887 were noticed to come to these conclusions. Sewa Ram’s case (supra) gave at the same time two sets of reasonings, in our view mutually exclusive, namely that a dohlidar is a trustee and his alienations of the dohli property/rights are void ab initio and the other that the dohlidar is a perpetual tenant. Now this kind of reasoning with due respect does not appeal to us. Sewa Ram’s case (supra) gave at the same time two sets of reasonings, in our view mutually exclusive, namely that a dohlidar is a trustee and his alienations of the dohli property/rights are void ab initio and the other that the dohlidar is a perpetual tenant. Now this kind of reasoning with due respect does not appeal to us. It is well understood in legal annals that a trustee is the legal owner of the property, the actual owner thereof having lost title thereto by the creation of a trust. The equitable ownership in the trust property vests in the beneficiaries. The trust is thus an incidence of dual ownership in which the creator of the trust no longer figures. A perpetual tenant, on the other hand, partakes the character of an occupancy tenant and in this relationship his landowner is not divested of the title to the property demised. See in this connection section 8 of the Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887 read in the light of sections 5, 6 and 7 thereof. These two warring concepts which trace their birth to Sewa Ram’s case surfaced in the two cases referred to by the Financial Commissioner in his impugned order with which we will presently deal with in detail. xxxxxx 15. The concept of perpetual tenancy as conceived of in section 8 of the Punjab Tenancy Act in the light of sections 5, 6 and 7 has also become non- existent on account of the Punjab Occupancy Tenants (Vesting of Proprietary Rights) Act, 1952. Occupancy or perpetual tenants have been made owners of the land. This Act came about to carry out agrarian reforms and to remove the intermediaries. And if the dohlidar is a perpetual tenant as conceived of in the Sewa Ram’s and Khema Nand’s cases (supra) of the Lahore High Court followed in the cases of Bharat Dass and Baba Nand Ram by this Court, then there is no reason why such like tenure should be allowed to exist in the face of the afore mentioned statute. The reason is obvious. The succession to occupancy tenancy was governed by section 59 of the Punjab Tenancy Act whereas succession to the dohli tenure is either natural or traditional. The occupancy tenure is capable of sale carrying with it a pre-emptory obligation to offer it in the first instance to the landowner. The reason is obvious. The succession to occupancy tenancy was governed by section 59 of the Punjab Tenancy Act whereas succession to the dohli tenure is either natural or traditional. The occupancy tenure is capable of sale carrying with it a pre-emptory obligation to offer it in the first instance to the landowner. There is no such obligation in the dohli tenure treating it for the movement, though not holding that it is transferable. The occupancy rights are capable of being sold in execution of a decree against the occupancy tenant, but the rights of dohlidar are not subject to such permissible process of Court under the law as understood. Alienations made by occupancy tenants are voidable at the instance of the landowner. For these reasons, which are only some of them, we differ from the view that the dohli tenure is of a perpetual tenancy or is ever covered by the concept of tenancy at all. The view to the contrary taken by above referred to two decisions of the Lahore High Court does not appear to us to be correct. We do not expressly follow the decisions of the Lahore High Court in Sewa Ram’s case and Khema Nand’s case and overrule the Single Bench decisions afore- quoted taking the view based thereon on this aspect. 16. Now when the dohlidar is not a perpetual tenant as held by us, application of the dohli tenure in Douie’s Settlement Manual as an instance of malik kabza and hence that of a landowner for the purposes of the Land Revenue Act and derivately for the purposes of the Act, appears to us crystal clear. He is a landowner because he is in possession of the land. We take the view as taken by H.R.Sodlhi, J. in Mahant Sirya Nath’s case (supra) and hold that a dohli tenure is an instance of malik kabza and a dohlidar, a landowner for the purposes of the Act.” 19. Both the above referred views were considered exhaustively by a Division Bench of this Court in Dharam Vir vs. Bahadur Singh and another [2007(1) Law Herald (P&H) 167 (DB)] : 2007 (2) R.C.R. (Civil) 217; “Second view : 21-29. Relevant observations in Baba Badri Dass’s case (supra), are as under :- “4. Both the above referred views were considered exhaustively by a Division Bench of this Court in Dharam Vir vs. Bahadur Singh and another [2007(1) Law Herald (P&H) 167 (DB)] : 2007 (2) R.C.R. (Civil) 217; “Second view : 21-29. Relevant observations in Baba Badri Dass’s case (supra), are as under :- “4. On the annexation of Punjab to British India the land tenures and rights of landowners came to be governed by two important pieces of legislation. The first was the Punjab Tenancy Act (XXVIII of 1868) which later came to be substituted by the Punjab Tenancy Act, 1887 (XVI of 1887), which held the field till after the independence of the country and still holds the field in a truncated way. The other one was the Punjab Land Revenue Act (XXXIII of 1871) which later came to be substituted by the Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887 (XVI of 1887), which holds the field till date. These twin legislations i.e. Act XVI and XVII of 1887, have supplemented each other in a variety of ways. Behind each legislation prevails the experience gathered by the British Settlement Officers who had become acquainted with the complex traditions and behaviourisms of the various communities in the State of Punjab. Their experiences, the necessities of proceeding in particular directions in effecting settlements, in regulating land revenue etc. came to be complied in the Punjab Settlement Manual by Sir James M. Douie, K.C.S.I.I.C.S., the first edition of which was published on 6th October, 1899. There have been subsequent editions as well improving the previous ones. We find the expression ‘Dohli’ or ‘Dohlidar’ significantly missing from both the Punjab Tenancy Act and the Punjab Land Revenue Act but alluded to only in the Manual in the following manner :- Glossary of Vernacular Words Dohli. - Death-bed gift of a small plot of land to a Brahman. Book II - The Records Rights Chapter VIII - Of tenures and the rights of landowners. Paragraph 142 Malik Kabza. - “Owners are sometimes found in village communities who do not belong to the brotherhood and are not sharers in the joint rights, profits and responsibilities of its members. Their proprietary title is a complete or undivided one, but it is confined to certain fields and does not include any share in the village waste. Paragraph 142 Malik Kabza. - “Owners are sometimes found in village communities who do not belong to the brotherhood and are not sharers in the joint rights, profits and responsibilities of its members. Their proprietary title is a complete or undivided one, but it is confined to certain fields and does not include any share in the village waste. The name by which this tenure is officially known in the Punjab is malkiyat makbuza, and the holder of it is called malik kabza. These terms indicate that the interest of the proprietor is limited to the land actually in his own possession. This land he can let, mortgage, or sell as he pleases, and he is responsible for the payment of its revenue. A familiar instance of this form of landholding is the right acquired by a Brahman, who receives a dohli or death-bed gift of a small plot of land from a landowner. The tenure is also created whenever a landowner sells a part of his holding without the appurtenant share of the village common land. The malik kabza tenure is common in the districts of Gujarat, Rawalpindi, Jhelum, Attock and Hazara, where it was introduced at the first regular settlement under circumstances which will be described in a later paragraph. In some cases, the status of malik kabza is combined with that of an inferior proprietor.. ... ... ...” “175. Forms of ownership recognised. - Our officers had in fact to seek for a fair compromise of conflicting claims. In Gujarat, which was the first of the districts to be settled, and where the Sikh mill had ground exceeding small, the old owners, known as warisan do not seem to have pressed their claims very hotly. But in Jhelum and Rawalpindi, which then included tahsils now in Attock, the former lords of the soil vehemently contested the proprietary right with the cultivating communities. The original villages of the leading clans often covered very large areas, and cultivators had been located in outlaying dhoks, or hamlets, whose occupants now claimed to be treated as entirely independent communities. Tenants in the parent villages alleged that they also possessed full rights as owners on the ground that the old landholders had received from them no sort of recognition of proprietorship. A similar state of things existed in Hazara, where the settlement did not begin till 1868. Tenants in the parent villages alleged that they also possessed full rights as owners on the ground that the old landholders had received from them no sort of recognition of proprietorship. A similar state of things existed in Hazara, where the settlement did not begin till 1868. Four classes of owners emerged :- (a) talukdars or ala malikan, (b) malikan or warisan, (c) adna malikan, and (d) malikan kabza. The nature of the tenure of ownership of the last class has been described in paragraph 142. It was introduced into the settlement of the North-West districts of the Punjab under the orders of Mr. Thornton, the Commissioner of Rawalpindi. It has been remarked that he invented the name, but not the thing. At any rate the solution of the ownership problem which he proposed was not unfair, and where it was adopted, the form of landholding produced was not unlike that which had grown up spontaneously in some of the South-Western districts. Of course, new tenures of malikan kabza are created whenever land is sold without its appurtenant share in the common waste”. Mr. Douie’s views in the Settlement Manual are treated with great respect but these cannot take place of statutory provisions. See Sardara Singh and others v. Sardara Singh and others, 1976 PLJ 199 (DB). Still he had feared while prefacing his first edition in 1899 in this manner:- “..... But it must be remembered that the generation familiar with the early revenue history of the Punjab is rapidly passed away, and that experience shows that it is hard to say of any administrative controversy in India that it is really dead, or of any policy that it has been finally abandoned. Some questions which seemed at one time to have been settled are sure to be revived, and it is well that those who may have to take part in the discussion should know, at least in broad outline, what in the past has been urged and decided in regard to them.” From the Settlement Manual it becomes clear that the dohli tenure was a holding the right of which had been acquired by a Brahman, who received it as such as a death-bed gift from a landowner, and that as a dohlidar, he was in the status of a malik kabza. It is also clearly recognised vide para 175 ibid that these tenures had spontaneously grown in the South Western districts of Punjab, but had to be given a name when they were being enforced or made applicable in the Northern districts vide para 142 ibid. Being termed as malik kabza, the dohlidar was held under para 142 ibid to be responsible for the payment of land revenue and otherwise entitled to let, mortgage or sell it as he pleased. 5. Judicial precedents, however, oblivious perhaps of the material available in the Punjab Settlement Manual, appear to have taken a course of their own. In Sewa Ram v. Udegir, AIR 1922 Lahore 126, a Division Bench consisting of Shadi Lal, C.J. and Harrison, J. spelled out the term dohli tenure in these terms :- “the dohli tenure is a peculiar kind of tenure to be found in the south- eastern districts of Punjab. It is a rent-free grant of a small plot of land by the village community for the benefit of a temple, mosque or shrine, or to a person for a religious purpose. In the revenue records the proprietary body are recorded as the owners of the property, and the grantee is recorded as a tenant in the column of cultivation. So long as the purpose, for which the grant is made, is carried out, it cannot be resumed, but should the holder fail to carry out the duties of his office, the proprietors can eject him and put in some one else under a like tenure. It is beyond dispute that tenure of this kind cannot be alienated by sale or mortgage, and there can be little doubt that any alienation of that character, if made by the dohlidar would be absolutely void. This being the case, we are not prepared to accept the contention that the present dohlidar who is the son of the alienor, is precluded by any rule of law from impeaching the alienation made by his father. As the transaction was altogether void, we consider that even the alienor could have successfully pleaded in answer to the plaintiff’s suit that the latter could not enforce it in a Court of law. As the transaction was altogether void, we consider that even the alienor could have successfully pleaded in answer to the plaintiff’s suit that the latter could not enforce it in a Court of law. There is, therefore, no reason why the defendant should not be able to impeach the alienation more especially when we remember that the office of a dohlidar is similar to that of a trustee, and that it is open to one trustee, to impeach the validity of an alienation made by his predecessor”. 6. xx xx xx 7. xx xx 8. In Tirkha and others v. Dwarka Parshad and another, 1972 RLR 563 : 1972 PLJ 614, a Single Bench of this Court relying on Sewa Ram’s case (supra), held that any alienation by a dohlidar would be void ab initio. It was held to be non est. The latter paragraph of the judgment in Sewa Ram’s case, as extracted above, was quoted in the judgment to draw sustenance for the view taken. The view taken in Trikha’s case was relied upon in Dharma v. Smt. Harbai, 1976 RLR 641 : 1976 PLJ 617 (DB), to hold that an alienation of a dohli was void ab initio. The Bench further went on to say that dohli was not a permanent tenure, and the moment the dohlidar fails to render the requisite services for which the dohli was created, the dohli rights are extinguished and the property reverts to the original proprietors. In Bharat Dass v. Gram Sabha Village Jahajgarh and others, 1973 RLR 280 : 1973 PLJ 117, the tenure in that case was spelled out to be a dohli. The former paragraph, as extracted above from Sewa Ram’s case, was quoted in the judgment at two places to draw sustenance for the view taken. 9. xx xx xx xx 10. xx xx xx xx 11. xx xx xx xx 12. xx xx xx xx 13. In Baba Nand Ram’s case (supra), the special contract conceived of by A.D. Koshal, J. in which the dohlidar undertakes not to pay any rent to the landowner but binds himself to perform certain other obligations to others, as it appears to us, is not ‘a special contract’ but for which he would be liable to pay rent for that land to ‘that other person’. It appears to us that the service rendered by a dohlidar to institutions or persons other than the creator of the dohli, strictly speaking does not fall either within the concept of rent or within that of a tenant. The liability to pay rent to the creator of the dohli, or the latter’s right to claim rent in the event of the terms of dohli not being faithfully observed, is altogether missing in the nature of the creation of the tenure. It is equally inconceivable how a validly created trust in the event of the trustee or his successors-in- interest failing or refusing to perform their duties could warrant the abolition of the trust causing extinguishment of dohli rights or that the property reverts to the original proprietors. The observations of the Bench in Dharma’s case (supra) are in the nature of obiter dicta and do not seem to have arisen on the facts of that case. We, therefore, hold that though a dohlidar is not an owner of the land as the term is well understood yet is otherwise a landowner for the purposes of the Act. The other questions whether he is a trustee or that his alienations are void ab initio do not arise in the present case, though we have our doubts about the correctness of the view in that regard taken by the Lahore High Court in Sewa Ram’s case (supra). 14. A passing reference need be made that out of the four classes of owners mentioned to have emerged in paragraph 175 of Douie’s Settlement Manual, the ala malikan have ceased to exist and the adna malikan have come to be full proprietors. That instance of dual ownership was abolished by the Punjab Abolition of Ala Malikiyat and Talukdari Rights Act, 1952. This obliterates classes of owners mentioned at serial numbers (a) and (c) and merged in class mentioned at serial number (b). Just two kinds of owners are prevalent now - (i) who are owners of and or their heirs, and (ii) landowners on the basis of possession. 15. The concept of perpetual tenancy as conceived of in Section 8 of the Punjab Tenancy Act in the light of Sections 5, 6 and 7 has also become non- existent on account of Punjab Occupancy Tenants (Vesting of Proprietary Rights) Act, 1952. Occupancy or perpetual tenants have been made owners of the land. 15. The concept of perpetual tenancy as conceived of in Section 8 of the Punjab Tenancy Act in the light of Sections 5, 6 and 7 has also become non- existent on account of Punjab Occupancy Tenants (Vesting of Proprietary Rights) Act, 1952. Occupancy or perpetual tenants have been made owners of the land. This Act came about to carry out agrarian reforms and to remove the intermediaries. And the dohlidar is a perpetual tenant as conceived of in Sewa Ram’s and Khema Nand’s case (supra) of the Lahore High Court followed in the cases of Bharat Dass and Baba Nand Ram by this Court, then there is no reason why such like tenure should be allowed to exist in the face of the aforementioned statute. The reason is obvious. The succession to occupancy tenancy was governed by Section 59 of the Punjab Tenancy Act whereas succession to the dohli tenure is either natural or traditional. The occupancy tenure is capable of sale carrying with it a pre-emptory obligation to offer it in the first instance to the landowner. There is no such obligation in the dohli tenure treating it for the moment, though not holding, that is transferable. The occupancy rights are capable of being sold in execution of a decree against the occupancy tenant, but the rights of a dohlidar are not subject to such permissible process of Court under the law as understood. Alienations made by occupancy tenants are voidable at the instance of the landowner. For these reasons, which are only some of them, we differ from the view that the dohli tenure is of a perpetual tenancy or is ever covered by the concept of tenancy at all. The view to the contrary taken by above referred to two decisions of the Lahore High Court does not appear to us to be correct. We do not expressly follow the decisions of the Lahore High Court in Sewa Ram’s case and Khema Nand’s case and overrule the Single Bench decisions afore-quoted taking the view based thereon on this aspect. 16. Now when the dohlidar is not a perpetual tenant as held by us, application of the dohli tenure in Douie’s Settlement Manual as an instance of malik kabza and hence that of a landowner for the purposes of the Land Revenue Act and derivatively for the purposes of the Act, appears to us crystal clear. 16. Now when the dohlidar is not a perpetual tenant as held by us, application of the dohli tenure in Douie’s Settlement Manual as an instance of malik kabza and hence that of a landowner for the purposes of the Land Revenue Act and derivatively for the purposes of the Act, appears to us crystal clear. He is a landowner because he is in possession of the land. We take the view as taken by H.R. Sodhi, J. in Mahant Sirya Nath’s case (supra) and hold that a dohli tenure is an instance of malik kabza and a dohlidar, a landowner for the purposes of the Act.” Analysis of the Reasons for the conflict in the two views : 30. The first view proceeds on general assumption about the term ‘dohli’ as being a ‘grant’ or ‘trust’ for religious purpose, while the second view treats the term ‘dohli’ as ‘gift’ creating full ownership. If ‘dohli’ is treated as ‘grant’ or ‘trust’ for religious purpose, obviously the ‘dohlidar’ will be merely a trustee and will have no right to use the property for purposes other than for which trust was created. If the trust property is used for any other purpose, the ‘dohli’ tenure will come to an end and revert back to the original owner. On the other hand, if ‘dohli’ was merely a ‘gift’, donee will become absolute owner on accepting the gift. 31. Survey of above case-law shows that view taken in Sewa Ram’s case (supra) by a Division Bench of Lahore High Court has been followed in the other 12 judgments listed above. In the second view, in Baba Badri Dass’s case (supra) also by a Division Bench, the earlier view was not over-ruled, though correctness thereof was doubted. It was observed that question whether ‘dohlidar’ was trustee and whether alienation by him was void ab initio, did not arise in that case, only question therein being whether qua tenant inducted by him, ‘dohlidar’ was landowner so as to evict the tenant. Thus, even after the decision in Baba Badri Dass’s case (supra) on 26.8.1981, view taken in Sewa Ram’s case (supra) has been followed in judgments mentioned at Sr. Nos. 6 to 12 in the earlier part of this judgment. Thus, even after the decision in Baba Badri Dass’s case (supra) on 26.8.1981, view taken in Sewa Ram’s case (supra) has been followed in judgments mentioned at Sr. Nos. 6 to 12 in the earlier part of this judgment. In Sittal Dass’s case (supra), which is again a judgment by Division Bench, it was observed that view taken in Sewa Ram’s case (supra) continued to hold the field. 32. It may also be noticed that in some of the judgments, question of proving the terms of ‘dohli’ and result of noncompliance of the terms has also been adverted to. In Dharma’s case (supra), it was observed that if “the Dohlidar fails to render the requisite services for which the Dohli was created, the Dohli rights are extinguished and property reverts to the original proprietors.” In Dhani Ram’s case (supra), it was observed :- “Apart from that the defendants did not produce Sharat Wajib-Ul-Arz in the case to prove that it was outright gift to the Dohlidars and he was thus competent to make the alienation. In the absence of such evidence, it could not be successfully argued on behalf of the appellants that defendant No. 1 being Dohlidar had become the owner of the suit land and, was thus competent to make the alienation. The learned counsel for the respondents also referred to the customary law of the Rohtak District by E. Joseph, I.C.S. Settlement Officer. In reply to question No. 94 relating to the gifts it was stated therein : “All tribes say that a gift must not be conditional or implied. It may be oral or in writing but an oral gift must be entered in the revenue papers. Transfer of possession is in all cases compulsory.” Note : The commonest form of gift is that of a Bigha or so of land in Dohli for religious purposes. Possession in these cases is given though sometimes the landlord retains possession and gives the produce to the dohlidar. It is the essence of a dohli that the landlord pays the revenue. Possession in these cases is given though sometimes the landlord retains possession and gives the produce to the dohlidar. It is the essence of a dohli that the landlord pays the revenue. Land may of course be gifted outright to a religious man the donee becoming full owner and paying revenue.” Thus under the circumstances, if the defendant No. 1 claimed himself to be the full owner and paying revenue it was obligatory for him to produce the Sharat Wajib-Ul-Arz or any other cogent evidence to support this claim and as observed earlier he has failed to prove it on the record.” 33. In Lakshmi Chand’s case (supra), it was observed :- “Whatever be the nature of a dohli tenure, it is certainly a right in property which will be inherited by the heirs on the death of the Dohlidar and the succession will take place in accordance with the provisions of the Hindu Succession Act. In this view of the matter, the plaintiff who is the daughter of Chiranji Lal is entitled to succeed to his estate on his death being a class I heir.” 34. Thus ‘dohli’ tenure has to be held to be inalienable if ‘dohli’ is a grant or trust for religious purpose. On the other hand, if ‘dohli’ is a gift, restriction on alienability will not apply. Crucial issue for holding whether ‘dohli’ tenure was alienable or not will depend upon terms of ‘dohli’, express or implied. Answer to the Question Referred : (i) The ‘dohli’ tenure may be a rent-free grant for the benefit of a temple, mosque or shrine or to a person for a religious purpose and the grant continues till the holder carries out the duties of his office and can be terminated on failure to carry out the said duties as held in Sewa Ram’s case (supra). ILR 2 Lahore 313 : AIR 1922 Lahore 326 relied. (ii) ‘Dohlidar’ may be a landowner qua his tenant in the situation mentioned in Baba Badri Dass’s case (supra). 1982(1) ILR 491 relied. ILR 2 Lahore 313 : AIR 1922 Lahore 326 relied. (ii) ‘Dohlidar’ may be a landowner qua his tenant in the situation mentioned in Baba Badri Dass’s case (supra). 1982(1) ILR 491 relied. (iii) ‘Dohlidar’ may be an owner if ‘dohli’ is in the nature of gift and at the time of creating ‘dohli’, no condition for use of the dohli land for the benefit of a temple, mosque or shrine or other religious purpose is imposed, as noticed in judgments of this Court in Baba Badri Dass case, 1982(1) ILR 491 and Dhani Ram’s case (supra) (1984 PLJ 234). (iv) If a ‘dohli’ is held to be a grant for a religious purpose, its management, alienability and succession will not be governed by law of management, alienability or succession of an individual’s property but by succession, management or alienation of a religious property.” 20. In the light of above referred position of law, I proceed to answer the substantial questions of law as under: Question no.(i) 21. In the present case, perusal of revenue records reveals that ownership vests in real owners i.e. Chandgi Ram and others, however, name of the plaintiff appears in the column of cultivation as ‘dohlidar’. Column no.9 of jamabandis, which deals with the rent, reveals that it is mentioned that ‘dohli’ will be without payment of rent (lagan) being gift (baawaja punarath) and ‘revenue’ will be paid by the ‘owner’ and ‘aabyana’ will be paid by the ‘dohlidar’ , meaning thereby limited rights have been given to the plaintiff and ownership vests in the original owners. This is very much clear from the jamabandi for the year 1967- 68 which has been placed on record as Ex.P-3. Similar entries are depicted in the subsequent jamabandis. From the revenue records, it is clear that ‘dohli’ was created for limited purpose and the ownership rights do not vest in dohlidar’ and the same is not alienable. A ‘dohlidar’ cannot transfer his right which he is having. This question is answered to the effect that ‘dohli’ is inalienable in the present case. A ‘dohlidar’ cannot sell the land by way of sale deeds and both the courts below have rightly set aside the sale deeds. Question Nos.(ii) and (iii) 22. What will be the effect of the Act where some rights have been conferred on ‘dohlidar’ in pursuance to the provisions of this Act? 23. A ‘dohlidar’ cannot sell the land by way of sale deeds and both the courts below have rightly set aside the sale deeds. Question Nos.(ii) and (iii) 22. What will be the effect of the Act where some rights have been conferred on ‘dohlidar’ in pursuance to the provisions of this Act? 23. Before I deal with the Act, it would be appropriate to point out that this Act has come into effect w.e.f 9th June, 2011 in pursuance to the Notification issued by the Haryana Government. It would be appropriate to refer to Sections 1(4) and 2 of the Act which read as under: “1(1) xxxxx 1(2) xxxxx 1(3) xxxxx 1(4) This Act shall be applicable to Dohlidar, Butimar, Bhondedar, Muqararidar or any other similar class or category of persons which the State Government may notify in the Official Gazette. 2. It would be appropriate to refer to Sections 1(4) and 2 of the Act which read as under: “1(1) xxxxx 1(2) xxxxx 1(3) xxxxx 1(4) This Act shall be applicable to Dohlidar, Butimar, Bhondedar, Muqararidar or any other similar class or category of persons which the State Government may notify in the Official Gazette. 2. In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires:- (a) “appointed day” means in relation to Dohlidar, Butimar, Bhondedar or Muqararidar, recorded as such in revenue record for more than twenty years, the day on which this Act comes into force and in other cases where twenty years have not yet been completed and such person is recorded as Dohlidar, Butimar, Bhondedar or Muqararidar on or before the date of commencement of this Act, the day on which the person fulfils the condition of twenty years; (b) “Collector” means the Collector of the district in which the land, in respect of which such rights are vested in a Dohlidar, Butimar, Bhondedar or Muqararidar under this Act, is situated and includes any officer not below the rank of an Assistant Collector of the First Grade specially empowered by the State Government to perform the duties of a Collector under this Act; (c) “Commissioner” means the Commissioner appointed under the Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887 (Punjab Act 17 of 1887); (d) “Dohlidar, Butimar, Bhondedar or Muqararidar” means a person who has been recorded as such in the revenue record and includes his predecessor and successor in interest; (e) “Financial Commissioner” means the Financial Commissioner appointed under the Punjab Land Revenue Act, 1887 (Punjab Act 17 of 1887); (f) “land” means land which is occupied by a Dohlidar, Butimar, Bhondedar or Muqararidar and given to him by landlord in lieu of services rendered and includes the sites of buildings and other structures on such land; (g) landowner” means a person under whom a Dohlidar, Butimar, Bhondedar or Muqararidar holds land and includes his predecessors and successors; (h) “”State Government” means the Government of the State of Haryana the Administrative Department.” 24. Perusal of above provisions of the Act reveals that for conferring right of ownership, this Act is applicable between the land ‘owner’ and ‘dohlidar’ and their predecessors and successors-in-interest. This Act does not apply to a dispute between ‘dohlidar’ and the person who is purchaser from ‘dohlidar’. In the civil suit, even owner is not a party. Perusal of above provisions of the Act reveals that for conferring right of ownership, this Act is applicable between the land ‘owner’ and ‘dohlidar’ and their predecessors and successors-in-interest. This Act does not apply to a dispute between ‘dohlidar’ and the person who is purchaser from ‘dohlidar’. In the civil suit, even owner is not a party. Thus, right qua conferring title on the ‘dohlidar’ is not in issue, nor required to be determined. It is settled principle of law that a statute does not operate retrospectively unless it is specifically provided for in the statute. The issue of such a nature arose in Shyam Sunder and another vs. Ram Kumar and another 2001(3) R.C.R.(Civil) 754. In that case, issue before the Hon’ble Supreme Court was with regard to the substituted provisions of the Punjab Pre-emption Act, 1913 and following question was framed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court: “What is the effect of substituted Section 15 introduced by the Haryana Amendment Act, 1995 (hereinafter referred to as the Amending Act 1995) in the parent Act i.e. The Punjab Pre-emption Act (hereinafter referred to as the parent Act) as applicable to the State of Haryana whereby the right of a co-sharer to pre-empt a sale has been taken away during the pendency of an appeal filed against a judgment of the High Court affirming the decree passed by the trial Court in a preemption suit”. 25. While answering the said question in Shyam Sunder’s case (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under: “48. The result of the aforesaid discussion is that the amending Act being prospective in operation does not affect the rights of the parties to the litigation on the date of adjudication of the pre-emption suit and the appellate court is not required to take into account or give effect to the substituted Section 15 introduced by the amending Act.” 26. In view of law laid down in Shyam Sunder’s case (supra), it is to be held that the Act is prospective in nature. The Act was made applicable w.e.f 9th June, 2011 vide Notification No.S.O.52/H.A.I/2011/ S.I./2011 dated 09.06.2011. A ‘dohlidar’ has no right to execute sale deed in respect of the ‘dohli’ prior to 09.06.2011 as he cannot acquire title prior to that date. The Act was made applicable w.e.f 9th June, 2011 vide Notification No.S.O.52/H.A.I/2011/ S.I./2011 dated 09.06.2011. A ‘dohlidar’ has no right to execute sale deed in respect of the ‘dohli’ prior to 09.06.2011 as he cannot acquire title prior to that date. Since a ‘dohlidar’ cannot become owner of a ‘dohli’ prior to 09.06.2011, therefore, the Act is not applicable to appeals pending on 09.06.2011. The substantial questions of law are answered accordingly. 27. In view of above, there is no merit in the present appeal. 28. However, with regard to issue of conferment of title on a ‘dohlidar’, the ‘dohlidar’/plaintiff will be at liberty to proceed in accordance with law to claim ownership, if any, accrues to him in accordance with law. 29. Disposed of in the aforementioned terms. ---------0.B.S.0------------ —————————