JUDGMENT : Soumen Sen, J. The subject matter of challenge in this writ petition is an Award dated August 13, 2013 passed by Second Industrial Tribunal, Kolkata arising out of an order of reference dated September 2, 2011 by which the dispute between the writ petitioner, namely, M/s. Institute for Steel Development & Growth (IFSDAG) and their workman, namely, Laddulal Paswan was referred to the Second Industrial Tribunal for adjudication. 2. The facts in nutshell are mentioned hereinafter. The private respondent was engaged by IFSDAG as sweeper in 2003 at an initial salary of Rs. 600/- and he continued to discharge his duties as sweeper till May 22, 2008 when he was informed by the Assistant Manager of the Company that his services would not be required any further. 3. In between there was an increment in the salary and the last drawn salary was Rs. 825/-. The Assistant Manager of the writ petitioner No. 1 on May 22, 2008 handed over a cheque for a sum of Rs. 265/- as salary for nine days and asked the private respondent not to report for duty since Management had taken a decision to terminate his services with effect from May 22, 2008. 4. The private respondent was working as a sweeper having duty hours from 9:30 A.M. to 5:00 P.M. at the branch office of the premises of the petitioner situated at 57 D, Ballygunge Circular Road, Kolkata-700 019 which was subsequently shifted to Premises No. 18/2, Gariahat Road, Kolkata. 5. Due to this shifting of the office, his service was terminated. Immediately after termination from service with effect from May 22, 2008, the private respondent wrote a letter wherein he had objected to such illegal termination and prayed for reinstatement in service with full back wages. Although the Management had received the said letter but they did not reply, nor did they withdraw the order of termination. 6. In view of the aforesaid, the workman approached the Labour Commissioner for redressal and since the matter could not be settled before the Conciliation Officer the matter was referred to Industrial Tribunal for adjudication. The issues involved in the reference are: (i) Whether the termination of service of Shri Laddulal Paswan by the management of M/s. Institute For Steel Development & Growth (IFSDAG) by way of refusal of employment with effect from 22-05-2008 is justified? The issues involved in the reference are: (i) Whether the termination of service of Shri Laddulal Paswan by the management of M/s. Institute For Steel Development & Growth (IFSDAG) by way of refusal of employment with effect from 22-05-2008 is justified? (ii) What relief, if any, he is entitled to? The writ petitioners appeared before the Tribunal and filed their written statement. 7. In the written statement the petitioners have denied the existence of employer and employee relationship as well as the jurisdiction of the Tribunal. It was contended that the private respondent was not an employee of the Institute and the Institute is not an industry within the meaning of Section 2(j) of the Industrial Dispute Act. The Institute is situated at 52/1A, Ballygunge Circular Road, Kolkata-700 019 and part of their establishment was shifted to a rented office situated at 57D, Ballygunge Circular Road, Kolkata-700 019 in April 2003 under a lease agreement for five years. 8. The said office comprised of three rooms and two toilets where the workman was employed to clean the two toilets. He was paid Rs. 20/- per day for discharging his work. The workman also worked as a sweeper in an adjacent apartment, namely, Radhika Apartment. Upon expiry of the lease on May 22, 2008, the Institute was shifted to Nilanjan Apartment at 18/2, Gariahat Road which is away from 57D, Ballygunge Circular Road, Kolkata-700 019 and as such it was felt that it would not be convenient for the workman to work at the new office as he would be required to travel long distance from where he resides. 9. The matter was decided by the Tribunal both on oral and documentary evidence. The Tribunal arrived at a finding that the service of the petitioner was illegally terminated with effect from May 22, 2008. In arriving at the said finding, the Tribunal has taken into consideration the evidence both oral and documentary adduced by the parties. 10. The Tribunal has considered the evidence of the workman that he used to work as sweeper at 57 D, Ballygunge Circular Road, Kolkata-700 019 from 2003 to 2008 at a monthly salary of Rs. 600/- which was subsequently enhanced to Rs. 800/-. 11. 10. The Tribunal has considered the evidence of the workman that he used to work as sweeper at 57 D, Ballygunge Circular Road, Kolkata-700 019 from 2003 to 2008 at a monthly salary of Rs. 600/- which was subsequently enhanced to Rs. 800/-. 11. While the office was shifted to Gariahat Road he was terminated from his service by the Company without assigning any reason and before termination the Company did not issue any show-cause notice or charge-sheet. The company was, however, satisfied with the work of the petitioner. 12. The private respondent before the Tribunal exhibited documents to show that the workman used to receive salary by way of cleaning charges from May 1, 2008 to May 8, 2008. The witness on behalf of the Company has stated that the workman used to clean the toilets as and when required and there were two toilets in the Institute. He usually used to work for twenty minutes to clean those toilets. The office was thereafter shifted to Nilanjan Apartment, Gariahat Road where the workman visited on few occasions to clean the toilets. The service of the petitioner was not terminated by the Management and it is due to his inconvenience to come to the new office from his residence, the petitioner had left the job. The Management used to pay the workman cleaning charges month wise at his request. 13. In short the evidence was that the private respondent used to work as a sweeper of the Company for which he was paid cleaning charges month wise and the service was not terminated. The workman had left his job at his own accord due to inconvenience after shifting of the office. 14. The Tribunal has taken into consideration the definition of workman and retrenchment and held that the workman was able to make out a specific case of retrenchment, inasmuch as, there are evidence to the effect that the private respondent had worked for a continuous period of five year from 2003 to 2008 before shifting of the office from Ballygunge Circular Road to Gariahat Road and even thereafter he worked for few days at the new establishment without any break in service and there was no evidence on record to show that he voluntarily left the service. Moreover, his work was found satisfactory and he was paid his remuneration by way of cleaning charges month by month. 15. Moreover, his work was found satisfactory and he was paid his remuneration by way of cleaning charges month by month. 15. It was on the basis of such evidence and satisfaction recorded by the Tribunal it was held that the petitioner is a workman within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the Industrial Dispute Act and he was retrenched in breach of Section 25-F(a) and (b) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. 16. Although a question was raised before the Industrial Tribunal that the petitioner is not an "industry" within the meaning of Section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act, the same was not urged before this Court. 17. Mr. Anant Kumar Shaw, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioners challenging the said Award argued that there is no employer-employee relationship between the petitioners and the private respondent and unless there is a determination that the said private respondent is a workman the question of either reinstatement or passing any order in exercise of the power conferred under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 could not and does not arise. 18. It is submitted that the workman had failed to produce any evidence before the Tribunal to establish that he was appointed by the petitioners as a sweeper in a permanent post. The evidence on record, according to Mr. Shaw, would show that he was doing a part time job as sweeper at the office of the Company for about twenty minutes and for the rest of the time he used to work in an adjacent premises as sweeper. 19. There is no employer and employee relationship between the petitioners and the private respondent. Since he was not appointed to any post, inasmuch as, he was not enrolled as an employee of the establishment nor any salary certificate has ever been issued in favour of the said private respondent, it could not be said that the said private respondent is an employee or a workman of the writ petitioner. 20. Mr. Shaw has drawn attention to the deposition of the private respondent in which he stated that he is residing at Radhika Apartment at 57D, Ballygunge Circular Road, Kolkata-700 019 without payment of rent and he was allowed to stay there as he used to work there from morning to night. 20. Mr. Shaw has drawn attention to the deposition of the private respondent in which he stated that he is residing at Radhika Apartment at 57D, Ballygunge Circular Road, Kolkata-700 019 without payment of rent and he was allowed to stay there as he used to work there from morning to night. It is submitted that this itself would establish that he worked on a contractual basis at the premises in question and he was doing the work of sweeper in different flats of Radhika Apartment as well as premises No. 57D, Ballygunge Circular Road, Kolkata. Mr. Shaw has referred to the decision reported in 1997(76) FLR 237 : 1997 (4) SCC 391 ; (Himanshu Kumar Vidyarthi & Ors.v. State of Bihar & Ors., and 2000 (1) LLJ 387 (Employees' State Insurance v. Surya Printmac Industries) in order to emphasis that having regard to the nature of the work done by the said private respondent he cannot be said to be a permanent employee of the establishment. 21. It is submitted that there is a clear distinction between the word 'employment' and 'engagement' and every engagement does not partake the nature of permanent employment. 22. The learned counsel has referred to various vouchers produced by the writ petitioners in support of the contention. It is submitted that none of the vouchers disclosed by the private respondent would show that any salary was paid to the petitioner or there is any relationship of employer and employee between the petitioner and the private respondent. It is further submitted that the private respondent was paid charges for cleaning the office toilet. The vouchers prepared give particulars of jobs for which the payments were made to the private respondent. These vouchers would not show that such amount, were paid by way of salary. 23. Au Contraire, Mr. C.R. Bakshi, the learned counsel representing the workman justifies the impugned award. It is submitted that the respondent workman had worked continuously for a period of five years in the establishment of the writ petitioners which would be adequately borne out from the documents exhibited in the proceeding as well as from the oral testimony. It is further submitted that the objection raised by the workman immediately after termination record that he was not only performing the work as a sweeper but at times he used to do the work of a peon. 24. Mr. It is further submitted that the objection raised by the workman immediately after termination record that he was not only performing the work as a sweeper but at times he used to do the work of a peon. 24. Mr. Bakshi had referred to the evidence of the workman and submitted that in his deposition he had stated that he used to work at the establishment as sweeper from 9:30 A.M. to 5:00 P.M. before the office was shifted to Gariahat Road. At time he also even worked as a peon. However, with regard to the deposition as recorded during cross-examination with regard to his stay at Radhika Apartment, it is submitted that during translation from Hindi to English the learned Tribunal has erroneously recorded that he used to work at Radhika Apartment from morning to night. It is submitted that the evidence has to be read as a whole. 25. Mr. Bakshi had referred to the affidavit-in-opposition filed in this proceeding in which the workman has stated that he used to stay at Radhika Apartment and worked in the premises during free office hours, namely, before 9:30 A.M. and after 5:00 P.M. 26. Mr. Bakshi has referred to the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported in (2011) 6 SCC 584 (Devinder Singh v. Municipal Council, Sanapur) in order to demonstrate that the petitioners comes within the purview of workman under Section 2(s) of the Industrial Dispute Act and he could not be retrenched without compliance of the mandatory requirement of Section 25F. 27. It is submitted that the Tribunal being a fact finding Court, the writ court in exercising supervisory jurisdiction would not function as an Appellate Court and the finding of fact reached by the inferior Court like Tribunal on appreciation of fact and evidence could not be questioned in the writ proceeding. Only error of law apparent on the face of record could be corrected but not an error of fact, however, grave it may appears to be. 28. It is further submitted that the writ jurisdiction can only be extended to cases where orders are passed by the inferior Court or Tribunal in excess of their jurisdiction or failure to exercise jurisdiction vested in them or if it has acted illegally and improperly causing serious miscarriage of justice. 29. 28. It is further submitted that the writ jurisdiction can only be extended to cases where orders are passed by the inferior Court or Tribunal in excess of their jurisdiction or failure to exercise jurisdiction vested in them or if it has acted illegally and improperly causing serious miscarriage of justice. 29. It is, thus, argued that in the instant case the award passed by the Tribunal is not assailable since it could be said that the findings arrived at by the Tribunal is perverse or there is an error of law apparent on the face of record. 30. The undisputed facts that emerge from the evidence both oral and documentary adduced by the parties are that the private respondent was appointed as a sweeper to clean the toilets of the establishment of the petitioner situated at 57D, Circular Road in April, 2003 and he continued to work as sweeper till 2008 when the lease had expired. 31. That the private respondent worked satisfactorily at the premises in question before his service was discontinued is also not in dispute. The private respondent also worked after shifting of office of the petitioner to Nilanjan Apartment, Gariahat Road on few occasions. According to the writ petitioners he voluntarily left the service. 32. There is no magic in the word "salary" and/or "wages". Wages would ordinarily mean sums earned for service rendered. Section 2(rr) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 gives an inclusive definition of "wages" to include all remuneration capable of being expressed in terms of money, which would, if the terms of employment expressed or implied were fulfilled, be payable to a workman in respect of his employment or all work done in such employment. 33. The workman is defined under Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act to mean any person (including an apprentice) employed in any industry to do any manual, unskilled, skilled, technical, operational, clerical or supervisory work for hire or reward, whether the terms of employment be expressed or implied. The definition of workman does not say that to claim its status of a workman, a person concerned should be whole time employer or is holding a post in the establishment. The definition of the workman does not make any distinction between a temporary, casual and/or permanent employee. 34. The definition of workman does not say that to claim its status of a workman, a person concerned should be whole time employer or is holding a post in the establishment. The definition of the workman does not make any distinction between a temporary, casual and/or permanent employee. 34. In Divisional Manager, New India Assurance Company Ltd. v. A. Sankaralingam reported in (2008) 10 SCC 698 it was held that a bare perusal of the definition of "workman" in Sections 2(s) and 25-B of the Industrial Disputes Act would reveal that the applicability of the said Section is not limited to only full-time employees but requirement is that the workman claiming continuous service must fulfil the specific conditions amongst others laid down in the two provisions so as to seek the protection of Section 25-F. 35. In Divisional Manager (supra) the writ petitioner was appointed on 2nd January, 1986 as a sweeper-cum-water carrier in the office of the appellant on a monthly wage of Rs.130. He, therefore, made a request for regularisation when he was informed orally that his work would not be required with effect from 15th March, 1999. Thereupon the writ petitioner sought the intervention of the appropriate Government which resulted in the reference and ultimately the Hon'ble Supreme Court considered the matter and held in favour of the respondent workman. 36. In Devinder Singh v. Municipal Council, Sanapur reported in (2011) 6 SCC 584 after considering a catena of decisions on this point it was held that there is nothing in the plain language of Section 2(s) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 from which it can be inferred that only a person employed on a regular basis or a person employed for doing whole-time job is a workman and the one employed on temporary, part-time or contract basis on fixed wages or as a casual employee or for doing duty for fixed hours is not a workman. 37. In Devinder Singh (supra) the appellant was engaged by the Municipal Council with effect from 1st August, 1994 for doing the work of clerical nature. He was paid a consolidated salary of Rs. 1000 per month and he continued to be in the service of the respondent till 29th September, 1996 and on and from 30th September, 1996 his service was discontinued without giving him notice and compensation as per the requirement of Section 25-F of the Act. He was paid a consolidated salary of Rs. 1000 per month and he continued to be in the service of the respondent till 29th September, 1996 and on and from 30th September, 1996 his service was discontinued without giving him notice and compensation as per the requirement of Section 25-F of the Act. 38. Even if it is assumed that the private respondent worked in Radhika Apartment during his off time, it could not be said that the petitioner is not a contractual employee or a temporary part-time employee of the writ petitioner. The immediate letters of protest issued by the workman shows that he made a positive assertion that he worked as a peon as well. Such letters were not replied. Mr. Shaw has emphatically submitted that the private respondent was employed contractually on daily wages and disengagement of the petitioner from service could not be construed as retrenchment under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The learned Counsel has relied upon the observation in Himanshu Kumar (supra) in which the Hon'ble Supreme court held: "daily wage employees who have no right to any post cannot claim retrenchment benefits on disengagement". The disengagement of such employees on completion of work, on facts, was held to be valid because such daily wagers were not appointed according to rules against any post. They were appointed according to the need of the work and they had no right to post. 39. I am, however, unable to accept the submission made on behalf of the writ petitioners. It is not in dispute that the private respondent had worked for five years continuously without any break in service and he even volunteered to work in the new establishment. The petitioner, in fact, was allowed to work on few occasions. Thereafter, the petitioner was not allowed to work at the Nilanjan Apartment. 40. There should be "free labour on free soil" with no exploitation of labour force. The engagement of employees whether part-time or casual and make them to work continuously for several years and, thereafter, to disengage and disown them would be apart from an unfair labour practice, a kind of carrying a legacy of subjugation by a superior capital force. 41. The preamble of the Constitution sets a socialistic goal to be achieved by the nation. 41. The preamble of the Constitution sets a socialistic goal to be achieved by the nation. Even before the introduction of the word "socialist" by amendment of the Constitution, in my view, there are sufficient indication in the preamble which casts an obligation upon the nation to ensure social justice. The State and more particularly the instrumentalities of the State are under an obligation to ensure that such goal is achieved. The dignity of labour needs recognition. The hire and fire rule has no place in our service jurisprudence. The various labour legislation's aim to achieve this goal. 42. The private respondent worked for five years continuously without any interruption and his service was discontinued on a plea that the petitioner has voluntarily left the service as he found it difficult to work at the new office of the petitioner which is at a distance from the old working place. The petitioner, however, contends that the petitioner has not disengaged the service of the private respondent. If that is the case, it is difficult to appreciate why the private respondent was not allowed to work and there is no contemporaneous evidence that he was allowed to continue with the cleaning work as he was doing in the old office. The letters issued by the private respondent workman immediately complaining that he was not allowed to join work at the new work place has not been contemporaneously denied. In fact, the materials-on-record as well as the evidence would show that the petitioner has categorically stated that they have never disengaged the private respondent. However, there is no explanation offered as to why the petitioner was not allowed to work at the new office when he expressed his willingness to work at the said place and, in fact, had worked on few occasions before he was disengaged. 43. On the basis of the materials and evidence on record it cannot be said that the industrial tribunal has acted illegally and/or with material irregularity in deciding the matter in favour of the workman. The writ court with its self-imposed limitations would not act as an appellate authority to scrutinise the order passed by the industrial tribunal. The appreciation of facts and evidence by the industrial tribunal ordinarily should not be interfered with unless the order is patently illegal or perverse. The writ court with its self-imposed limitations would not act as an appellate authority to scrutinise the order passed by the industrial tribunal. The appreciation of facts and evidence by the industrial tribunal ordinarily should not be interfered with unless the order is patently illegal or perverse. The award of the tribunal does not suffer from the vice of perversity or illegality. Moreover, the fact of the case of the petitioner is similar to case decided by the Hon' ble Supreme Court in Divisional Manager (supra). The Tribunal did not award back wages. In view of the aforesaid, the writ petition stands dismissed. However, there shall be no order as to costs. The urgent xerox certified copy of this judgment, if applied for, be given to the parties on usual undertaking.