Judgment : The defendant, who succeeded in the Trial Court, namely, District Munsif, Devakottai, in O.S.No.121 of 2005, and who lost in the 1st Appellate Court, namely, Sub Court, Devakottai, in A.S.No.4 of 2009 is before us. 2. The respondent/plaintiff claimed Rs.71,775/-towards principal and interest based on Ex.A1, promissory note, dated 13.04.2003. Inspite of receipt of suit notice, dated 25.08.2005, since no amount was paid, the suit has been instituted by the appellant/defendant. 3. The suit has been resisted by the appellant/defendant contending that he has been employed in the respondent's finance firm, since no salary was paid, when he demanded, he was paid Rs.10,000/- as against a blank promissory note during 2000, subsequently, he repaid Rs.5,000/-to Mr. Srinivasan, partner of the said finance firm, under a receipt and subsequently he had paid the remaining Rs.5,000/- and discharged. However, the respondent filled up the blank promissory note and made it suit promissory note, thus, he is not liable to pay any amount to him. 4. The Trial Court framed necessary issues and tried the suit. Plaintiff examined himself as P.W.1 and the scribe as P.W.2 and marked Exs.A1 to A4. The defendant examined himself as P.W.1 and did not let in any documentary evidence. 5. In the Trial Court, a new turn has taken place. Defendant noticing alteration, overwriting the number 3' in the year namely 2003 in Ex.A1, contended that it is material alteration and Ex.A1 is a void instrument and it cannot be enforced in a Court. 6. The Trial Court examined the said contention in the light of cross-examination of P.Ws.1 and 2 and concluded that it is a material alteration and held that Ex.A1 is a void document, it cannot be enforced in a court of law and thus dismissed the suit. 7. In the circumstances, the plaintiff appealed to the Subordinate Court, Devakottai, in A.S.No.4 of 2009. 8. The First Appellate Court of the view that it is a correction of a mistake occurred in Ex.A1 and it also noticed that there was no plea in the written statement with regard to material alteration, thus it had vacated the Decree and Judgment of the Trial Court and decreed the suit. 9. In the circumstances, defendant preferred this Second Appeal. 10. 9. In the circumstances, defendant preferred this Second Appeal. 10. At the time of admission of the second appeal, the then learned Brother framed the following substantial question of law: Whether the Lower Appellate Court is right in decreeing the suit when they are material alteration regarding the year of the pronote and in Ex.A4 it has been stated that the defendant agreed to pay the amount in January, 2003, while the pronote was dated April, 2003? 11. The learned counsel for the appellant/defendant contended that Ex.A1 has been exhibited during trial and the defendant had the opportunity to discover the material alteration in Ex.A1 only then, the cat came out of the bag. Further, in his cross-examination P.W.1 candidly admitted the alteration in respect of the year namely 2003 in Ex.A1. Under these circumstances, applying Section 87 of Negotiable Instruments Act, the Trial Court had rightly termed Ex.A1 a void instrument and thus dismissed the suit. However, it's decision has been simply upset by the Appellate Court without any valid and convincing reason. 12. The learned counsel for the appellant further contended that the law relating to material alteration has been dealt with in Section 87 of Negotiable Instruments Act. He would submit that alteration as to the date in an instrument, such as promissory note, which is in the nature of extending the time, is a material alteration and that will destroy the legal character of the promissory note. 13. In support of his contention, the learned counsel cited the following rulings: i. Allampatti Subba Reddy v. Neelapareddi ( AIR 1966 A.P. 267 ); ii. Jayantilal Goel v. Tmt.Zubeda Khanum, ( AIR 1986 A.P. 120 ); iii. This Court's decision in S.A.No.824 of 1999, dated 12.01.2012, (Periyasamy vs. Jayaraman). 14. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the respondent would contend that making a plea is very very important in written statement, in the absence of it, nothing could be taken note of by the Court. In the instant case, there is no plea of material alteration in the written statement, therefore there is no use in harpening further on the aspect of material alteration. The learned counsel would also contend that under his Ex.A4, letter dated 07.08.2003, the appellant had sought for time to pay the amount. 15. In the instant case, there is no plea of material alteration in the written statement, therefore there is no use in harpening further on the aspect of material alteration. The learned counsel would also contend that under his Ex.A4, letter dated 07.08.2003, the appellant had sought for time to pay the amount. 15. In reply, the learned counsel for the appellant read Ex.A4, wherein at the beginning there is a phrase that in the first week of January he will settle the dues. As per the version of the plaintiff, Ex.A1 itself is dated 13.04.2003. Thus, Ex.A4 is incongruence with Ex.A1 and it also exposes the material alteration introduced in Ex.A1. Infact, Ex.A4, instead of strengthening the respondent/plaintiff's case, it had strengthened the appellant's case. 16. We have given our deep consideration to the rival submissions, perused the case records and the decisions cited by the learned counsel for the appellant. 17. In Allampati Subba Reddy's case (supra), the quint essence of law relating to Section 87 of the Negotiable Instruments Act has been brought out and it reads as under: “(5) The law on the point seems to me to be clear. The English rule that a material alteration of a date makes it altogether void is summarised thus in Halsbury's Law's of England, III Edition, Vol.11, p.367, Paras.598 and 599:- “598. A writing proposed to be executed as a deed may be altered by erasure or interlineation or in any other way before it is so executed, and any alteration so made before execution does not affect the validity of the deed. Any alteration, erasure or interlineation appearing upon the face of a deed is presumed, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, to have been made before the execution of the deed” “599. If an alteration (by erasure, interlineation, or otherwise) is made in a material part of a deed, after its execution, by or with the consent of any party thereto or person entitled thereunder, but without the consent of the party or parties liable thereunder, the deed is thereby made void. If an alteration (by erasure, interlineation, or otherwise) is made in a material part of a deed, after its execution, by or with the consent of any party thereto or person entitled thereunder, but without the consent of the party or parties liable thereunder, the deed is thereby made void. The avoidance, however, is not ab initio, or so as to nullify any conveyancing effect which the deed has already had; but only operates as from the time of such alteration, and so as to prevent the person, who has made or authorised the alteration, and those claiming under him, from putting the deed in suit to enforce against any party bound thereby, who did not consent to the alteration, any obligation, covenant, or promise thereby undertaken or made.” (6) The law is not otherwise in India. The above said rule is quoted with approval in several Indian decisions. Section 87 of the Negotiable Instrument Acts statutorily adopts the said rule. Section 87 is so far as it is relevant is in the following terms:- “Any material alteration of a negotiable instrument renders the same void as against any one who is a party thereto at the time of making such alteration and does not consent thereto, unless it was made in order to carry out the common intention of the original parties;” It must be remembered that it is not any and every alteration that avoids the instrument. To have that effect the alteration must be in a material particular. A material alteration can be brought about by change of date or time of drawing or of the place of payment or by change in the sum payable, etc., etc. It is thus evident that the date of a promissory note is a material portion of it, and any alteration of such date will naturally void the promissory note, unless, of course, as stated in the Section such an alteration is made with the consent of the other party, or is made to effectuate the common intention of the original parties. It is wrong to assume that the date of the promissory note is merely a description. It indicates the time when the promissory note was executed. It is wrong to assume that the date of the promissory note is merely a description. It indicates the time when the promissory note was executed. In most cases the date is very material in calculating the date of the performance of the contract and more often fixing the period of limitation within which the plaintiff will have to institute the suit on the foot of such promissory note. It is immaterial whether the alteration is made in the date or month or year. Any such alteration being material must necessarily result in the avoidance of the promissory note. (7) It is true that in two cases alterations, though material, do not vitiate the instrument; firstly, when the alteration is made before the promissory note is executed, and secondly, if the alteration made was merely to correct a mistake, or to make it what it was originally intended to be. As stated earlier, the Section (S.87) itself states that the alteration can be made with the consent of the parties, or to carry out the common intention of the original parties. Any mistake occurring before the execution of the promissory note can, however, always be corrected before the document is actually executed. (8) The general rule in English law followed in India is that a party having custody or control of a document produced in evidence must explain the alteration. When the instrument on its production appears to have been altered, it is a general rule that the party offering it in evidence must explain its appearance, because every alteration in the case of a negotiable instrument renders it suspicious. It is only reasonable that the party claiming under it should remove the suspicion. It is true that it is not on every occasion that a party tendering an instrument in evidence is bound to explain any material alteration that appears upon its face. He must, however, explain when he is seeking to enforce it. It is plain that when the alteration appears to have been made contemporaneously with the document, or if it is made at some subsequent period with the privity of the parties charged and there is no fraud, it does not affect the validity of the instrument.” 18. He must, however, explain when he is seeking to enforce it. It is plain that when the alteration appears to have been made contemporaneously with the document, or if it is made at some subsequent period with the privity of the parties charged and there is no fraud, it does not affect the validity of the instrument.” 18. In Jayanthi Goel (supra) when a defence of material alteration has been taken up, the burden is upon the person, who is in possession of the instrument, to explain that there is no such alteration. 19. In AIR 1935 Mad 401, AIR 1940 PC 160 and in Vithianathan vs Murugayya Padayatchi and another (1985 TLNJ 265), it was held that it is not that only if the alteration is of any use or beneficial to the plaintiff it will be a material alteration. 20. The word 'alteration' suggests 'change'. It also suggests 'correction'. In material alteration to the word 'alteration', there is the prefix 'material'. It is not mere alteration, it should be material in nature. An alteration, which is material with reference to the instrument, will become material alteration. It is such that it will change the legal character, enforceability, vital aspect of the instrument. An alteration as to the date, month, time and name are very important. 21. The year 2003' has been mentioned in the written statement. In such circumstances, when promissory note was produced during the trial, the appellant/defendant subjected the respondent/plaintiff and his witness to cross-examination as to the alteration in the year mentioned in Ex.A1.Further, in the written statement, appellant/defendant has took up the plea that no such promissory note as pleaded in the written statement has been executed by him. 22. The principle of incohate instrument recognized in Section 20 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, pale into insignificance when the plea of material alteration is taken up. The ambit purpose and scope of Section 20 and Section 87 of Negotiable Instruments Act are different. Section 20 is intended to validate the Negotiable Instruments Act, whereas Section 87 is intended to invalidate the Negotiable Instruments Act. 23. Now, on examining Ex.A1, in the year, namely, 2003' number 3' has been altered. P.W.1 in his cross-examination admits that number 3' in the year has been corrected. In his cross-examination, P.W.2 had stated that it is just a correction. This is not the version of P.W.1. 23. Now, on examining Ex.A1, in the year, namely, 2003' number 3' has been altered. P.W.1 in his cross-examination admits that number 3' in the year has been corrected. In his cross-examination, P.W.2 had stated that it is just a correction. This is not the version of P.W.1. P.W.2 is more loyal to P.W.1 and he wants to save the face of P.W.1, but he has damaged his case. 24. When we closely examine Ex.A4, we see that the appellant/defendant referred to first week of January. The very version and the case of the respondent/plaintiff is that the promissory note came into being on 13.04.2003. Even in his cross-examination, he had stated that on the said date only he advanced the loan. Ex.A4 cuts Ex.A1 and it is indirect indication that something is missing as to the date in Ex.A1. 25. From the face of Ex.A1 and by the candid admissions of P.Ws.1 and 2 in their cross-examination, it is clear that in Ex.A3 in writing the year 2003, the number 3 has been overwritten and it has also been strengthened by the year and month in the Tamil month and year. 26. It is intended to extend the period of time. Normally such corrections are accepted after attestation. But, in Ex.A1 no such attestation. The theory of routine correction comes only for the first time when P.W.2 comes to the witness box and such an answer has not been given by P.W.1. There is alteration in Ex.A1as to certain vital aspect as to the year. It is an alteration as to time factor in Ex.A1. 27. In such circumstances, the Trial Court examined this factual situation and applied true position of law with regard to Section 87 of Negotiable Instruments Act and came to the conclusion that it is a vital alteration and it is invalid and it cannot be enforceable in a Court of law and refused to grant the decree. However, the First Appellate Court did not viewed the matter in proper perspective and it had come with it's own conclusion, even that is not the version in the plaint and that is not plaintiff's evidence. Ex.A1 came to be exhibited by the plaintiff in the Trial Court. It came from the possession of the plaintiff. 28. In such circumstances, the onus is upon the plaintiff to explain that it was not subjected to any material alteration. Ex.A1 came to be exhibited by the plaintiff in the Trial Court. It came from the possession of the plaintiff. 28. In such circumstances, the onus is upon the plaintiff to explain that it was not subjected to any material alteration. As regards the alteration P.W.1 did not open his mouth. Almost P.W.2 has become a proxy for P.W.1 on the aspect of alteration in Ex.A1. Therefore, the Trial Court has correctly viewed the factual matrix and correctly applied the law. However, this has been missed by the First Appellate Court and the First Appellate Court misread the evidence and misdirected itself and that has resulted in reversing the well considered Judgment of the Trial Court. Thus, this Court is of the view that Ex.A1 is affected by material alteration, as such it is void and it cannot be enforced in a Court of law. Thus, the substantial question of law is answered as against the respondent/plaintiff. 29. In view of the foregoings, this Second Appeal is allowed. The Judgment and Decree, dated 01.04.2009, passed in A.S.No.4 of 2009, on the file of the learned Subordinate Judge are set aside. Judgment and Decree, dated 25.11.2008, passed in O.S.No.121 of 2005, on the file of the learned District Munsif, Devakottai, are restored. Consequently, connected miscellaneous petition is closed. In the facts and circumstances, the parties are directed to bear their respective costs in this appeal.