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2014 DIGILAW 41 (SIK)

State of Sikkim v. Aita Hang Subba @ Kaley

2014-07-02

NARENDRA KUMAR JAIN, S.P.WANGDI

body2014
JUDGMENT Wangdi, J. This Appeal is directed against the impugned judgment dated 01.04.2013 in S.T.Case No.17 of 2010 of the Learned Sessions Judge, South and West Sikkim at Namchi, by which the respondent/accused was acquitted of the charge under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code (for short ‘IPC’) for having caused the death of the deceased, Rajesh Chettri. 2. The facts of the case so far as it is relevant for the purpose of disposal of this Appeal are that on 26.04.2010 when the deceased Rajesh Chettri had gone to the house of one Dik Bahadur Rai at Upper Barakheley, Singling, West Sikkim to participate in the marriage celebration of his daughter, an altercation took place between him and the respondent/accused, Aita Hang Subba, in the courtyard of the said Dik Bahadur Rai at about 1400/1430 hours and that the respondent/accused person was seen hitting the deceased Rajesh Chettri with a rounded firewood causing the deceased severe head injuries with the respondent/accused in the process which he was also injured over his left eye. The fight was ultimately stopped by Som Bahadur Rai, PW4, and Mani Lall Subba, PW3, who led the deceased to his house. In the early morning of the next day, the wife of the deceased, Beena Subba, finding the condition of her husband/the deceased critical, decided to take him to the Namchi District Hospital and while doing so, stopped at the Soreng Police Station and informed of her husband’s condition and sought for a medical examination requisition form. No sooner had she put up her complaint, N/K Dhan Bahadur Tamang, informed of the deceased having died, which was later confirmed by Dr. Praveen Gurung, the Medical Officer at the Soreng P.H.C. The motive of the respondent/accused to put the deceased to death was prima facie established when the Soreng Police Station found from the records of the Police Station that a case under Section 457/380 IPC under FIR No. 06(04)10 dated 27.04.2010 had earlier been registered against the respondent/accused, on a complaint lodged by the deceased Rajesh Chettri. Therefore, Soreng P.S. case FIR No.8(04)10 dated 27.04.2010 under Section 302 IPC was registered against the respondent/accused and taken up for investigation. 3. Therefore, Soreng P.S. case FIR No.8(04)10 dated 27.04.2010 under Section 302 IPC was registered against the respondent/accused and taken up for investigation. 3. Upon investigation, it was revealed that a marriage ceremony of the youngest daughter of one Dik Bahadur Rai was held at Upper Barakheley on 25.04.2010 and on the next day, i.e., on 26.04.2010, the said Dik Bahadur Rai invited the youth of the locality to help him in winding up and putting away things. After completion of the work at about 1000 hours, all the youths who had gathered to help were offered lunch. After the lunch was over, most of the youths left the house except for few of them who stayed behind to enjoy with the rum and beer offered to them by the said Dik Bahadur Rai. In a group of 6 persons consisting of the respondent/accused, the deceased Rajesh Chettri @ Raju, Mingma Sherpa @ Pala (PW-9), Som Bahadur Rai (PW-4), Mani Lall Subba (PW-8) and Yuvraj Subba (PW-3), the respondent/accused and Yuvraj Subba (PW-3) were engaged in a cheerful banter when some mud fell into the glass of the deceased. This led to an argument between the respondent/accused and the deceased which got aggravated into a physical fight. They were separated by Som Bahadur Subba (PW-4) and Mani Lall Subba (PW-8), but the respondent/accused rushed to the kitchen of the house and picked up a solid piece of firewood from behind it and hit the deceased with it on the head felling the deceased to the ground. Even then the respondent/accused continued to assault him mercilessly hitting him 2/3 times on the head and the back. They were again separated by PW-4, PW-8, and PW-9 and the deceased, led away to his residence by Mani Lall Subba, PW-8, and Som Bahadur Rai, PW-4. 4. In the evening, when Beena Subba, wife of the deceased returned home, she found the deceased asleep and did not disturb him presuming him to be under the influence of alcohol. The next morning, at about 0400 hours, she tried waking up her husband finding him snoring heavily. When he did not respond and found him in an unconscious state, she called out to the other members of the family and neighbours and with their help took him to the Soreng P.H.C. for medical treatment. The next morning, at about 0400 hours, she tried waking up her husband finding him snoring heavily. When he did not respond and found him in an unconscious state, she called out to the other members of the family and neighbours and with their help took him to the Soreng P.H.C. for medical treatment. As the doctor was not available at the P.H.C., the duty nurse advised her to take the victim to the Namchi District Hospital. Finding that the deceased had an injury over his left eye, she decided to report the matter to the police and went to the Police Station where she lodged an FIR. When she was being examined by the O.C. Mani Lall Subba, PW-8, appeared at the Police Station and informed that the victim who was in a vehicle parked below the Police Station had stopped breathing. The deceased thereafter was rushed to the Soreng P.H.C. after obtaining a requisition form for medical examination but, he succumbed to his injury on the way and was accordingly declared dead. 5. On the basis of the evidence collected during the investigation, a prima facie case under Section 302 IPC was found to have been made out against the respondent/accused for having caused the death of the deceased by assaulting the deceased with a firewood to feed fat the grudge he bore against him for having lodged a complaint against him in the Soreng P.S. earlier and making him to suffer judicial custody for almost three months. 6. The learned Sessions Judge (South and West) Sikkim, having found prima facie materials framed charge under Section 302 IPC against the respondent/accused which when read over to him he pleaded not guilty and claimed trial. 7. After conclusion of the trial, the learned trial Court having found that the prosecution had failed to prove the charge against the respondent/accused, acquitted him by the impugned judgment resulting in the Appellant State filing the present Appeal under Section 378 Cr.P.C. 8. Necessary leave under sub-section 3 of Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure having been granted and processes issued, the Appeal was admitted for hearing which was finally heard on 26.06.2014. 9. Mr. Necessary leave under sub-section 3 of Section 378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure having been granted and processes issued, the Appeal was admitted for hearing which was finally heard on 26.06.2014. 9. Mr. J. B. Pradhan, the learned Public Prosecutor while pressing the Appeal, submitted at the very inception that the prosecution was not pressing the charge against the respondent/accused under Section 302 IPC but under either of the two parts of Section 304 IPC as the evidence clearly established that the death of the deceased was caused in a drunken brawl in which the deceased was assaulted by the respondent/accused in the heat of the moment with no premeditation. 10. Assailing the finding of the learned trial Court, Mr. J. B. Pradhan submitted that glaring evidence of the deceased being assaulted by the respondent/accused leading to his death were completely overlooked. It was submitted that evidence of at least three eye witnesses, namely, Yuvraj Subba, PW-3, Mani Lall Subba, PW-8 and Mingma Sherpa, PW-9, clearly established the factum of the respondent/accused hitting the deceased on his head with a rounded firewood. The evidence of the Medico Legal Expert, PW-14 and the Medical Report, Exbt.20, the disclosure statement by the respondent/accused recorded under Section 27 of the Evidence Act, 1872, Exbt.6, recovery of the check shirt, M.O. II vide Exbt.8 and Forensic Report Exbt.1 read with the evidence of the I.O. PW17, would clearly establish that the respondent/accused had caused the death of the deceased by hitting him on his head with a blunt weapon as described by the eye witnesses. While making his submission, Mr. J. B. Pradhan, the learned Public Prosecutor took us through the entire evidence so far as it was relevant to support his contentions. 11. Mr. S. S. Hamal, the learned Advocate appearing for the respondent/accused, strongly urged that the Appellant State had failed to make out any case for this Court to interfere in the present proceedings. Relying upon Murugesan and Ors. v. State through Inspector of Police : AIR 2013 SC 274 , it was submitted that a heavy burden was cast upon the prosecution for the purpose and that neither substantial nor compelling reasons had been made out to enable this Court to interfere with the findings of the learned trial Court. Relying upon Murugesan and Ors. v. State through Inspector of Police : AIR 2013 SC 274 , it was submitted that a heavy burden was cast upon the prosecution for the purpose and that neither substantial nor compelling reasons had been made out to enable this Court to interfere with the findings of the learned trial Court. It was submitted that the views of the learned trial Court as found in the impugned judgment being one of the views possible to be drawn from the fact and circumstances and the evidence on record, it ought not be disturbed only because another view was possible. Mr. Hamal contended that there was no evidence at all to prove that the fatal injury suffered by the deceased was caused by the weapon of offence, Exbt. M.O.I. Relying upon the evidence of PWs 3, 8 and 9, it was submitted that there was conflicting evidence as regards the fact of the deceased having been hit on the head and that their evidence would rather show that he was hit on his back. 12. As per the learned Counsel, the medical report, Exbt.20, does not conform to the evidence as regards the nature of the assault which as per him, in any case, was filled with contradictions. The evidence of the Medico Legal Specialist, PW-14, that “one two strike by wooden stick like M.O.-I cannot cause injuries described in Exbt.20” would also establish that the cause of the death of the deceased was not on account of the assault on him by the respondent/accused with the weapon M.O.-I, but could also have been caused by a fall. He stressed upon the evidence of PW-14 appearing in his cross-examination, by which he stated that “It is possible that if a drunken man falls from a height, similar types of injuries can be caused……..”. In order to reinforce this submission, the learned Counsel also referred to the evidence of PW-3 in whose cross-examination it is stated that “It is true that on one of the footpaths between the house of the deceased and the marriage house a small section of the footpath above the house of the deceased is difficult and there is a slope (dill) also”. 13. 13. It is further his submission that the fact that the deceased was hale and hearty and cheerful after he had been taken to his house from the marriage house, as would appear from the evidence of PW-4, also would belie the prosecution story of the deceased having died as a result of the assault on him by the respondent/accused. 14. It was next contended that the statement recorded under Section 27 of the Evidence Act, 1872, marked Exbt.6, was unreliable in view of the contradictory statement appearing in the evidence of PW-8. Attention was drawn to the following portion of the cross-examination of PW-8 which is reproduced below: - PW-8 Cross-examinatiion by Ld. Legal Aid Counsel Shri Bandhan Rai for the accused person. “………………………It is true that the accused did not make any statement to the Police about M.Os. I and II in my presence. It is true that I do not know what is written in Exhibits 7 and 8. I also do not know what Exhibits 7 and 8 are…………………” 15. As per him, the unreliability of the statement under Section 27 of the Evidence Act, 1872 Exbt.6, rendered the recoveries said to have been made in pursuance of it unreliable and of no evidentiary value and consequently, the CFSL Report, Exbt.1, would also be of no value. 16. Under such circumstances, it was strenuously urged that there was no error committed by the trial Court in the impugned judgment that called for interference by this Court. 17. We have given thoughtful consideration to the submissions made on behalf of the parties. Before we embark upon the merits of the Appeal, we deem it essential to meet one of the objections raised on behalf of the respondent/accused that in an appeal against conviction it would not be permissible for this Court to review and re-appreciate the evidence. This objection, in our view, is certainly flawed in view of catena of decisions that hold to the contrary. Out of those, we may refer to Chandrappa & Ors. v. State of Karnataka : 2007 (3) SCALE 90 in which after analyzing a large number of earlier decisions on the question, it was held as follows: - “42. This objection, in our view, is certainly flawed in view of catena of decisions that hold to the contrary. Out of those, we may refer to Chandrappa & Ors. v. State of Karnataka : 2007 (3) SCALE 90 in which after analyzing a large number of earlier decisions on the question, it was held as follows: - “42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding powers of appellate Court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge; (1) An appellate Court has full power to review, reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded; (2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 put no limitation restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate Court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law; (3) Various expressions, such as, ‘substantial and compelling reasons’, ‘good and sufficient grounds’, ‘very strong circumstances’, ‘distorted conclusions’, ‘glaring mistakes’, etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate Court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of ‘flourishes of language’ to emphasize the reluctance of an appellate Court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate Court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every persons shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.” 18. In view of trite position now obtaining in Appeals against acquittal, we find no merit in the submission placed by the learned Counsel for the respondent/accused. 19. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court.” 18. In view of trite position now obtaining in Appeals against acquittal, we find no merit in the submission placed by the learned Counsel for the respondent/accused. 19. Proceeding on the anvil of the above law, we may now consider as to whether the learned trial Court has correctly appreciated the evidence and as to whether the conclusion arrived at in the impugned judgment is vitiated on account of erroneous appreciation of evidence or is perverse. 20. There is no dispute of the fact that a physical altercation had taken between the deceased and the respondent/accused. This is also the finding of the learned trial Court, when it is observed in the impugned judgment that “There is no dispute about the incident and the instant incident is a fallout of quarrel between the respondent/accused and the deceased when a piece of mud fell into the tea cup of the deceased from the hand of the respondent/accused”. It is also not the case of the respondent/accused that there was no altercation between him and the deceased. 21. Now the question is did the deceased sustain the injuries due to the assault by the respondent/accused and, were those the injuries that caused his death ? This is a question which is seriously contested on behalf of the respondent/accused. Mr. S. S. Hamal, the learned Counsel for the respondent/accused relied upon the evidence of PW-4, PW-8, PW-9 and PW-14 to belie the case of the Appellant State that the death of the deceased was caused by the injuries sustained by him due to the assault by the respondent/accused with the weapon of offence. We may reproduce below the relevant portions of the evidence of the said witnesses relied upon on behalf of the respondent/accused: - PW-3 “…………It is true that I cannot say whether the victim was assaulted on his back or on the back of his head. I only saw the accused assaulting the victim once…..” PW-8 “……….It is true that the accused assaulted the victim only twice with the ‘danda’ on his back…..” PW-9 “………It is true that I saw the victim being assaulted on his back by the accused. I only saw the accused assaulting the victim once…..” PW-8 “……….It is true that the accused assaulted the victim only twice with the ‘danda’ on his back…..” PW-9 “………It is true that I saw the victim being assaulted on his back by the accused. It is true that I did not see the victim being assaulted on his head by the accused……..” 22. As per Mr. Hamal, the aforesaid evidence establishes the fact that the deceased was not hit on the head but on his back, which as per him, was not in conformity with the medical report, Exbt.20, which mentions that the victim had suffered head injury which caused his death and that this was fully corroborated by the evidence of Medico Legal Specialist, PW-14, which we have already referred to earlier. 23. The evidence of PW-4, as per the learned Counsel, indicates that the deceased was hale and hearty long after the incident with no sign of headache or pain, thereby belying the case of the prosecution that the death of the deceased was caused by the assault on him with the weapon of offence, M.O.-I. 24. In the impugned judgment, the learned trial Court has referred to and relied upon the aforesaid evidence amongst others as regards the assault and accepted the contention of the learned Counsel for the respondent/accused to hold that the eye witnesses PWs 3, 8 and 9 did not support the case of the prosecution, as they were rendered unreliable due to their contradictory statements. We may refer to paragraphs 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, 35 and 36 of the impugned judgment. 25. In our view, the learned trial Court, while accepting the contentions made on behalf of the learned defense Counsel, appears to have overlooked other glaring evidence which overwhelmingly prove that the deceased had died due to the injury sustained by him as a result of the assault on his head from behind by the respondent/accused. We find this established by the evidence of the very witnesses, namely, PW-3, PW-8, PW-9 and PW-14 and the Medico Legal Autopsy Report, Exbt.20 relied upon on behalf of the respondent/accused. The evidence of these witnesses which are found to be consistent and corroborative of each other. We may reproduce the relevant portions of their evidence in seriatim hereunder: - PW-3 “…………Sometime later the victim came back and charged the accused. The evidence of these witnesses which are found to be consistent and corroborative of each other. We may reproduce the relevant portions of their evidence in seriatim hereunder: - PW-3 “…………Sometime later the victim came back and charged the accused. The accused in turn caught hold of a wooden ‘danda’ and struck the victim on his head. Thereafter the persons present there separated them and sent both the accused and the victim to their respective houses. I learnt that on the following day the victim succumbed to his injuries.” Cross-examination by Ld.Legal Aid Counsel Mr. Bandhan Rai for the accused person. “………………It is not a fact that the accused did not assault the victim with a wooden ‘danda’. PW-8 “………In the afternoon at about 1/2 p.m. a quarrel took place between the accused and Rajesh Chettri. During the scuffle that followed the accused assaulted the victim with a wooden ‘danda’. PW-9 “……..I heard some people shouting at the place of the incident and when I looked I also saw the accused assaulting the deceased with a cylindrical shaped firewood M.O.I. The persons present there separated the deceased and the accused and the victim was taken and escorted to his house………” PW-14 “…………It is possible that if a drunken man falls from a height, similar types of injuries can be caused but the pattern of the injuries would be different…………..” (emphasis supplied) 26. As would appear from the above, the evidence of the witnesses are consistent in stating that the accused had struck the victim on his head. This is categorically stated in his evidence by PW-3 who is corroborated in full measure by PWs 8 and 9 on the fact that the deceased was assaulted by the respondent/accused with a wooden ‘danda’. On a close examination of the portions of the evidence appearing in the cross-examination of these witnesses reproduced earlier which are said to be contradictory and accepted as such by the learned trial Court, in our view, do not vitiate the evidence of these witnesses of the respondent/accused having assaulted the deceased on his head with a wooden ‘danda’. On a close examination of the portions of the evidence appearing in the cross-examination of these witnesses reproduced earlier which are said to be contradictory and accepted as such by the learned trial Court, in our view, do not vitiate the evidence of these witnesses of the respondent/accused having assaulted the deceased on his head with a wooden ‘danda’. Extracted portions of the cross-examination of PW-3 only indicates that the witness was not aware as to whether the deceased was assaulted on his back or on the back of the head but has re-emphasized that the accused struck the victim on his head with a wooden ‘danda’ which is the only assault that he had witnessed. As regards PW-8, his cross-examination extracted earlier, would only prove that it was twice that the deceased was struck on the back by the respondent/accused before he separated them. This however, does not detract from the fact that he was also struck on the head as deposed by PW 3. Similar is the case with regard to the extracted portion of the cross-examination of PW-9. There is no denial that the deceased was struck on his head but only that he did not see him doing so. 27. The evidence of PW-14 that one or two strikes by wooden stick like M.O.-I cannot cause the injuries described in Exbt.20, in our view, is only an expression of his opinion having no bearing on the established fact that the deceased had suffered fracture of the skull, causing arachnoid hemorrhage and was due to blunt trauma. In any case, we find that this witness has gone on further to state that “but the pattern of the injuries would be different” to complete the sentence referred to on behalf of the respondent/accused. In other words, a drunken man falling from a height may sustain similar type of injuries but the pattern of such injuries would be different, thereby confirming that the injuries found on the deceased was likely to be caused by the use of a blunt weapon as opined by him in the Medical Report, Exbt.20. 28. We also find no evidence at all to suggest that the deceased had suffered a fall after he was escorted to his house, except for the vague suggestions made to the PWs-8 and 9 that we have noted earlier. 28. We also find no evidence at all to suggest that the deceased had suffered a fall after he was escorted to his house, except for the vague suggestions made to the PWs-8 and 9 that we have noted earlier. Contrary to the evidence of PW-14 the learned trial Court appears to have accepted the possibility that the injuries found on the upper and lower eyelids of the deceased could have been caused by a fall from a height as he was fully drunk. It is also found noted in paragraph 43 of the impugned judgment, that besides the bruises and abrasions, there were no injuries found on the body of the deceased and had further gone on to deal with the report pertaining to this aspect. While doing so, the learned trial Court appears to have completely overlooked the crucial injuries which were described by PW-14 as found in the Medico Legal Autopsy Report, Exbt-20, relevant portions of which reads as under: “Ante-mortem injuries: 1. Abrasion 3x2 cm over the forehead above the left eye 2. Black eye present over the left side 3. Swelling with abrasion over the left maxilla measuring 3x4 cm 4. Abrasion 2x3 cm over the base of the neck left side over the clavicle 5. Abrasion over right elbow 2.8 x1.8 cm 6. Abrasion left elbow 2x1.5 cm 7. Lacerated wound 1x0.5 cm over the base of left 5th metacarpal 8. Contused abrasion 0.5x2 cm over the upper inner aspect of left upper arm 9. Contused abrasion 0.5x2 cm over the upper inner aspect of right arm 10. Scalp haematoma 5x3.3 cm over the left frontal bone. 11. Scalp haematoma 4x2.8 cm over the occiput 4 cm above hairline. 12. Comminuted fracture of right parietal bone extending upto the left side. 13. Extra dural haemorrhage 7x5x2 cm over the right temporal bone. 14. Diffused sub-arachnoid haemorrhage present over the surface of the brain. (emphasis supplied) 29. The learned trial Court in arriving at the conclusion appears to have ignored the opinion regarding the cause of death being due to extra dural haemorrhage with sub-arachnoid haemorrhage as a result of fracture of skull due to blunt weapon. 30. 14. Diffused sub-arachnoid haemorrhage present over the surface of the brain. (emphasis supplied) 29. The learned trial Court in arriving at the conclusion appears to have ignored the opinion regarding the cause of death being due to extra dural haemorrhage with sub-arachnoid haemorrhage as a result of fracture of skull due to blunt weapon. 30. In our view, therefore, the finding as to the cause of the death arrived at by the learned trial Court is clearly perverse to the evidence on record and appears to have relied upon minor discrepancies to discard the case of the prosecution. 31. In Joseph S/o Kooveli Poulo v. State of Kerala : 2000 (5) SCC 197 it has also been held as follows: - “It is not that every discrepancy or contradiction matters much in the matter of assessing the reliability and credibility of a witness or the truthfulness of his version. Unless the discrepancies and contradictions are so material and substantial and that too are in respect of vitally relevant aspects of the facts deposed, the witnesses cannot be straight away condemned and their evidence discarded in its entirety” 32. In Ramesh Harijan vs. State of Uttar Pradesh : 2012 (5) SCC 777 , while dealing with an appeal against acquittal, the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed as under: - “28. A similar view has been reiterated in Appabhai vs. State of Gujarat (SCC pp.246-47, para 13) wherein this Court has cautioned the courts below not to give undue importance to minor discrepancies which do not shake the basic version of the prosecution case. The court by calling into aid its vast experience of men and matters in different cases must evaluate the entire material on record by excluding the exaggerated version given by any witness for the reason that witnesses nowadays go on adding embellishments to their version perhaps for the fear of their testimony being rejected by the court. However, the courts should not disbelieve the evidence of such witnesses altogether if they are otherwise trustworthy. 29. In Sucha Singh v. State of Punjab (SCC pp. 113-14, para 51) this Court had taken note of its various earlier judgments and held that even if major portion of the evidence is found to be deficient, in case residue is sufficient to prove guilt of an accused, it is the duty of the court to separate grain from chaff. In Sucha Singh v. State of Punjab (SCC pp. 113-14, para 51) this Court had taken note of its various earlier judgments and held that even if major portion of the evidence is found to be deficient, in case residue is sufficient to prove guilt of an accused, it is the duty of the court to separate grain from chaff. Falsity of particular material witness or material particular would not ruin it from the beginning to end. The maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus has no application in India and the witness cannot be branded as a liar. In case this maxim is applied in all the case it is to be feared that administration of criminal justice would come to a dead stop. Witnesses just cannot help in giving embroidery to a story, however true in the main. Therefore, it has to be appraised in each case as to what extent the evidence is worthy of credence, and merely because in some respects the court considers the same to be insufficient or unworthy of reliance, it does not necessarily follow as a matter of law that it must be disregarded in all respects as well. …………………………………………………” (emphasis supplied) 33. The statement of the respondent/accused person recorded under Section 27 of the Evidence Act, 1872, Exbt.6, was discarded by the learned trial Court by accepting the submission on behalf of the respondent/accused that recovery of the wooden ‘danda’ M.O.-I was not made in pursuance of such statement, as the evidence of PW-8 and PW-9, witnesses to the statement and recovery of M.O.-I were found to be contradictory and also in view of the direction passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Narpal Singh v. State of Haryana : AIR 1977 SC 1066 , wherein it was pointed out that I.O. should not associate any eye witness when recovering memos because that partakes of an attempt to make the witness omnibus. While rejecting the recovery of M.O.-I the learned trial Court in its finding has relied upon certain portions of the cross-examination of PW-8 and the evidence of PW-13. Heavy stress has been laid upon the evidence of PW-13 who in his evidence has stated that at about 3.00 p.m. he was awakened by a commotion outside and heard that a quarrel had taken place between the deceased and the accused. Heavy stress has been laid upon the evidence of PW-13 who in his evidence has stated that at about 3.00 p.m. he was awakened by a commotion outside and heard that a quarrel had taken place between the deceased and the accused. He, however, did not see them but found articles scattered all over the courtyard including a wooden ‘danda’ M.O.- I. He then picked up the articles and placed them in its respective places puttingg M.O.-I on a heap of firewood near the toilet. He further went on to state that on 27.04.2010, the I.O. seized M.O.-I from his possession vide seizure memo Exbt.7 in the presence of the accused. The relevant portion of the statement under Section 27 of the Evidence Act, 1872, Exbt.6, reads as under: - “……..Then I went to the kitchen and brought one piece of fire wood which was similar to rod, and I came towards courtyard. Rajesh also come near the stairs. Rajesh fell down on the stairs and lied in a prone position and I hit him with that piece of wood, then brother Santay again stopped us. Then uncle Rajesh was taken by Mani Lall to his home. I threw that wood in the courtyard and went to my house. Then I changed my white check shirt as it was torn. After that I again went towards the house of Dik Bdr. Rai. I can identify the white check shirt and that wood. When I went there I didn’t find the wood in the courtyard. I can identify the wood if shown to me.” (emphasis supplied) 34. As would appear from the above, the respondent/accused is categorical in stating that after having assaulted the deceased with a wooden ‘danda’ and escorted away to his home, he had thrown the wood in the courtyard and went home where he changed his white check shirt finding it torn and returned back to the house of Dik Bahadur Rai and that, if shown to him, he could identify the white check shirt and the wood. When he returned to Dik Bahadur’s house he did not find the wood in the courtyard and is found to have re-emphasized that he could identify the wood if shown to him. When he returned to Dik Bahadur’s house he did not find the wood in the courtyard and is found to have re-emphasized that he could identify the wood if shown to him. This is consistent with and fully corroborative of the evidence of PW-13, relevant portion of which we may reproduce for convenience and better appreciation:- “As I was tried (sic) due to work on the previous night, I went to sleep. When I woke up at about 3 p.m. due to the clamour of people, I heard that there was a quarrel between the victim and the accused. I did not see them in the courtyard of our house. I saw stools and other articles scattered all around including a wooden ‘danda’ M.O.I in the courtyard. I took the articles in their proper places and kept the M.O.I in a heap of firewood bear (sic) toilet.” ………………………………………………………………… “On 27.04.2010, the I.O. also seized the M.O. I from my possession vide seizure memo Exhibit 7 wherein Exhibit 7(d) is my signature. The accused was also present during the seizure of M.O.I vide seizure memo Exhibit 7. …………” (emphasis supplied) 35. The evidence of PWs 7 and 8 have to be considered in the light of Exbt.6 which they witnessed having been recorded by the I.O. in the Police Station and the fact that they had accompanied him to the place of occurrence led by the respondent/accused. The factum of the statement, Exbt.6, having been recorded appears to be beyond doubt and is consistent with the evidence of PW-13. The evidence of PW-8 and PW-9 are inconsistent only to limit extent of the place from where the wooden ‘danda’ was recovered because as per them it was from a dry field behind the kitchen. The seizure of the ‘danda’ stands established and duly identified by the respondent/accused vide seizure memo Exbt.7 which also is consistent with what the respondent/accused had stated in Exbt.6 that he could identify the wood if shown to him. The discrepancies in the evidence of PWs 8 and 9, in our view, are minor and does not shake the foundation of the prosecution case. The discrepancies in the evidence of PWs 8 and 9, in our view, are minor and does not shake the foundation of the prosecution case. No doubt, PW-8 in the cross-examination has made statement which appear to be contradictory to the ones recorded earlier, but in our view, the consistent statement of PW-9 which corroborates the bulk and crucial aspect of the evidence of PW-3 and PW-8 and also by the first I.O. PW-17, we do not find any reason to discard the entire evidence of the prosecution. It is also relevant to note that in pursuance of the statement, Exbt.7, M.O. II, a blood stained check shirt was recovered from the house of the respondent/accused at his instance vide Exbt.8. We find consistency in the material part of the evidence of all the witnesses and having regard to the trite position that falsity of particular material witness or material particular would not ruin the evidence of the prosecution from the beginning to end and that the maxim falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus has no application and that the witnesses can be branded as liars (State of Rajasthan v. Darshan Singh (supra)). We do not find any reason as why the statement recorded under Section 27 of the Evidence Act, Exbt.6, and the recovery in consequence thereof be not accepted. The decision in Narpal Singh v. State of Haryana, in our view, does not set at naught the evidence in the present case as those are found to be beyond reproach and, therefore, reliable. The learned trial Court in rejecting such glaring evidence in an obviously perfunctory manner by merely quoting the portion of the decision, is difficult for us to accept as a correct approach. 36. The other aspect is the rejection of the CFSL Report, Exbt.1. The learned trial Court appears to have rejected the report based on insignificant and inconsequential discrepancies in the evidence. We find substantial material and evidence on record to except the veracity of the CFSL Report, Exbt.1. While the recovery of M.O.-I and M.O.-II stand proved as already observed, the evidence of PW-8 in his cross-examination in stating that “It is not a fact that the red stains on M.Os.I and II were wet and not dried up. We find substantial material and evidence on record to except the veracity of the CFSL Report, Exbt.1. While the recovery of M.O.-I and M.O.-II stand proved as already observed, the evidence of PW-8 in his cross-examination in stating that “It is not a fact that the red stains on M.Os.I and II were wet and not dried up. It is true that I cannot say what the red stained were of”, would clearly establish that the wooden ‘danda’ and the check shirt M.O.-I and M.O.-II were blood stained suspectedly with blood. This is consistent with the statement of the I.O. to the effect that “On 27/04/2010 at 1350 hrs I seized one dirty torn white checked shirt MO II with sustains suspected to be blood or paint from the accused vide seizure memo Exhibit 8 in presence of witnesses Mingma Sherpa and Manilal Subba wherein Exhibit 8(a) and (b) are the signatures of the witnesses, Exhibit 8(c) is the LTI of the accused and Exhibit 8(d) is my signature.” The evidence of PW-19, the second I.O., would also corroborate in full measure the evidence of aforesaid prosecution witnesses, as would appear from the portion extracted below: - “I also collected autopsy report Exhibit 20. Thereafter, I forwarded the weapon of offence dry firewood M.O.I, shirt of the accused, M.O.II containing blood like stain M.O.II, trousers of the victim containing blood like stains M.O.III and blood sample of the deceased M.O.IV and blood sample of the accused M.O.V, Blood sample of the accused was collected in plastic vial M.O.VI and filter paper M.O.VII to avoid degeneration.” The witness has been found to have remained firm and appears to have withstood the test of cross-examination. 37. The evidence of PW-14, who is the Medico Legal Specialist conducting the autopsy on the dead body of the deceased, has clearly stated that he handed over to the I.O. a sample of blood after the autopsy. 38. PW-1, Pradeep Kumar Mishra, Junior Scientific Officer of the Central Forensic Laboratory, Bhopal, appeared in the witness box and proved Exbt.1, the Forensic Report, as per which all the exhibits consisting of the wooden ‘danda’ (dried firewood), Exbt.A, the check shirt, Exbt.B, the trousers, Exbt.C the blood stained sample of the deceased Exbt. 38. PW-1, Pradeep Kumar Mishra, Junior Scientific Officer of the Central Forensic Laboratory, Bhopal, appeared in the witness box and proved Exbt.1, the Forensic Report, as per which all the exhibits consisting of the wooden ‘danda’ (dried firewood), Exbt.A, the check shirt, Exbt.B, the trousers, Exbt.C the blood stained sample of the deceased Exbt. D, the blood sample of the accused E2 and blood sample on filter paper E2 marked M.O.I, M.O.II, M.O.III, M.O.IV, M.O.V and M.O.VI respectively, contained human blood of group ‘A’. The entire evidence of the prosecution as regards the CFSL Report Exbt.1 cannot be discarded simply because the letter forwarding the samples to the CFSL was not produced. 39. From what have been discussed above and on perusal of the evidence and the impugned judgment, we cannot but hold that the learned trial Court has committed a gross error by completely misreading the evidence and overlooked and ignored glaring ones which would undoubtedly fall within the mischief of perversity. As held in the case of State of Rajasthan v. Darshan Singh (supra) “………paramount importance of the court is to ensure that miscarriage of justice is avoided. The benefit of doubt particularly in every case may not nurture fanciful doubts or lingering suspicion and thereby destroy social defence. A reasonable doubt is not an imaginary trivial or merely possible doubt, but a fair doubt based upon reason and common sense.” 40. The question that would now fall for consideration is as to whether the respondent/accused is liable for offence punishable under Section 302 IPC or some other offence as submitted by the learned Public Prosecutor. 41. In the present case, there is no dispute of the fact that the unfortunate incident took place as a consequence of a drunken brawl and it was in a fit of anger at the spur of the moment that the fatal blow was struck by the respondent/accused causing the death of the deceased as a consequence. Admittedly, there was no premeditation and no motive could be traced in the respondent/accused causing the death of the deceased. Even the I.O. in his evidence has admitted that there was no premeditation. 42. Considering the entire facts and circumstances, we are of the view that the offence clearly falls under Section 304 Part II IPC. 43. In the result, the State Appeal is allowed in part. Even the I.O. in his evidence has admitted that there was no premeditation. 42. Considering the entire facts and circumstances, we are of the view that the offence clearly falls under Section 304 Part II IPC. 43. In the result, the State Appeal is allowed in part. The impugned judgment of the learned trial Court is set aside. The respondent/accused is convicted under Section 304 Part II IPC. 44. However, as regards the sentence, having regard to the facts and circumstances, particularly the fact that the respondent/accused is a young man of about 24 years now, the offence having been committed when he was just about 20 years, in our view, interest of justice will be served if the period of sentence is restricted to the period of imprisonment already undergone by the respondent/accused. Ordered accordingly. 45. A copy of this judgment along with the records of the learned Sessions Judge, South and West Sikkim at Namchi, be transmitted forthwith for its due compliance.