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Himachal Pradesh High Court · body

2014 DIGILAW 411 (HP)

Inder Singh v. National Thermal Power Corporation

2014-04-21

DHARAM CHAND CHAUDHARY, SANJAY KAROL

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Judgment : Sanjay Karol, Judge (Oral) Petitioners have prayed for the following reliefs: “i) That a writ of mandamus may kindly be issued directing the respondents to consider the case of the present petitioners to provide them same and similar relief as has been awarded in to the nearest and adjacent villages i.e. Padhyar as the land is also same and similar kind and the purpose of notification under Section 4(i) is the same for the purpose of construction of hydroelectric project. ii) That the indulgence of this Hon’ble Court is humbly requested by these poor, illiterate and ignorant people who could not file reference under Section 18 due to poverty and ignorance and whose lands are also situated in same and similar way as situated in Villages Hawani Kol, Padhyar where the award has been enhanced and the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India has also directed in one of the case titled Premji Nathu versus State of Gujarat SCC 2012 p.250 where the same and similar relief has been awarded to the persons who could not file S.L.P. or appeal before the High Court. The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India has awarded the same and similar relief to them. Therefore the petitioners are in the same situation where the indulgence of this Hon’ble Court is necessary to provide them justice. Therefore, it is humbly requested that this Hon’ble Court may kindly exercise their extra-ordinary jurisdiction and where the same and similar relief or benefit to the petitioner who could not move application under Section 18 of the Act for enhancement has been given may kindly be enhanced in the interest of justice and fair play.” 2. Facts are not much in dispute. Land for public purpose was acquired by the State in District Solan. In the case of present petitioners, Notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’) was issued on 6th December, 2000. Acquisition proceedings stood completed with the passing of the award by the Collector on 12th July, 2006. Undisputedly, present petitioners accepted the amount so awarded by the Collector. In fact, it is not disputed before us that none of the landowners, whose land was acquired by the very same notification, filed any application under Section 18 of the Act. Thus, acquisition proceedings came to an end in the year, 2006 itself. 3. Undisputedly, present petitioners accepted the amount so awarded by the Collector. In fact, it is not disputed before us that none of the landowners, whose land was acquired by the very same notification, filed any application under Section 18 of the Act. Thus, acquisition proceedings came to an end in the year, 2006 itself. 3. With regard to land situated in the neighbourhood, though for the same public purpose, respondents initiated acquisition proceedings by issuing separate Notification under Section 4 of the Act. Even separate award was passed under Section 11 of the Act. Persons, whose land stood acquired in terms of this Notification, filed applications under Section 18 of the Act, which stood decided by the District Judge on 25th June, 2009. After a gap of three years, present petitioners sought enhanced amount of compensation in terms of award passed by the District Judge. Petitioners’ applications under Section 28-A, filed before the Land Acquisition Collector, on 21st October, 2009, stand rejected on 14th December, 2012. 4. In support of his contentions, Mr. Virender Thakur, learned counsel for the petitioners has invited our attention to Para-24 of the decision rendered by the Apex Court in Premji Nathu versus State of Gujarat and another, (2012) 5 SCC 250 . We are afraid the ratio of law laid down is, apart from not being a binding precedent, totally inapplicable to the given facts. The apex Court, in exercise of its powers under Articles 136 and 142 of the Constitution of India, directed disbursement of enhanced amount of compensation to such of the land owners, who could not approach the Court. The apex Court was dealing with a case where land owners were governed by the same and similar Notification, which is not the case in hand. Here separate parcels of land were acquired vide separate acquisition proceedings. 5. Petitioners accepted the award passed by the Land Acquisition Collector in the year 2006 and waited only till the year 2009 to file an application under Section 28-A, which was not only highly belated but in fact not maintainable at all. Land was acquired by separate and distinct notification. It cannot be said that petitioners’ legally justiceable right stands infringed. As such, we find no merit in the present petition and the same is dismissed. Pending applications, if any, shall also stand disposed