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2014 DIGILAW 4119 (MAD)

Karthik Homes, Rep. by its Partner M. Latha Chendur Illam, Chennai v. S. Manvizhi

2014-11-05

T.RAJA

body2014
Judgment 1. The plaintiff before the trial Court is the appellant in this second appeal. For the sake of convenience, the parties are described as they were before the trial Court. The plaintiff had filed the suit praying for a judgment and decree to direct the defendant to pay a sum of Rs.3,76,990/-together with interest at the rate of 25% per annum on Rs.2,30,375/-from the date of plaint till the date of realisation with four other reliefs for a direction to the defendant to pay a sum of Rs.670/- with future interest at the rate of 25% per annum from the date of filing the suit till the date of realisation; for a declaration that the plaintiff is having a charge over the suit schedule flat as per Section 55(4)(b) of the Transfer of Property Act; for permanent injunction restraining the defendant and her men from in any way interfering with the possession of the suit flat till the entire amount was paid to the plaintiff and for payment of costs of the suit, on the ground that after the sale deed was executed in favour of the defendant in respect of the undivided share over the land measuring 290 sq.ft., on 29.11.2004 pursuant to the execution of construction agreement on the same date followed by a cheque for payment of a sum of Rs.75,860/-, which was not realised due to want of sufficient funds, for which the defendant undertook to make payments, but defaulted in doing so for stage-wise instalments, besides E.B. deposit, Metrowater deposit & drainage deposit and when she failed and neglected to pay a sum of Rs.3,30,375/-, thereafter, having wrongly filed a complaint before the District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum, Chennai in C.C.No.9 of 2006 for handing over vacant possession of the suit flat, the plaintiff was constrained to file the present suit for recovery of the balance amount as per the agreement, since admittedly the plaintiff is entitled to recover a total sum of Rs.3,76,990/-, inasmuch as Rs.75,860/- towards cost of unpaid sale price of land; Rs.1,94,140/-due under the construction agreement, Rs.60,375/- towards three phase E.B. deposit, metrowater deposit and drainage deposit and Rs.46,615/- towards interest at the rate of 25% per annum from 31.8.2005. 2. 2. The claim of the plaintiff before the trial Court shows that the defendant purchased 290 sq.ft., of undivided share in the suit flat for Rs.1,25,860/-and further agreed for payment of the construction cost for the suit flat bearing No.A1, First Floor in Door No.18, Fifth Street, AVM Colony, Virugambakkam, Chennai at Rs.7,44,140/-. For this sale of undivided share of land, only a sum of Rs.50,000/- was paid in cash and the cheque issued by the sister of the defendant for the sum of Rs.75,860/- was also dishonoured for want of sufficient funds. In view of that, the defendant undertook to pay the same and further agreed to pay a sum of Rs.7,44,140/-towards the construction cost. While entering into a construction agreement on 29.11.2004, the defendant agreed to pay Rs.25,000/- as advance and for the balance of Rs.7,19,110/-, she agreed to pay the same as per the details given as under:- Stages Percentage Amount Rs. Tentative date of completion i) On completion of basement level 30% 2,16,000/- 31.01.2005 ii) On completion of roofing level for respective floors 30% 2,16,000/- 31.05.2005 iii) On completion of lintel level for respective floor 30% 2,16,000/- 30.04.2005 iv) At the time of laying flooring tiles 5% 35,555/- 30.06.2005 v) At the time of handing over of key of the premises 5% 35,555/- 31.8.2005 3. The plaintiff further admits that the defendant made the payment of Rs.25,000/- as advance. As agreed by the parties, the suit flat was completed on 31.8.2005. While so, although the defendant paid Rs.3,40,000/- on 13.7.2005 and Rs.2,10,000/-on 31.8.2005 towards the construction cost, she failed to pay the balance sale price of Rs.75,860/- for the land cost and Rs.60,375/- towards E.B.deposit, metrowater deposit, drainage deposit and the balance construction cost. When the defendant failed to pay the balance sale price of Rs.75,860/- for the land cost, Rs.60,375/- towards E.B. deposit, metrowater deposit, drainage deposit and the balance construction cost of Rs.1,94,140/-, she promised to pay the same after availing loan from ICICI Bank, for which she requested the plaintiff to issue a receipt as if she had paid the margin amount of Rs.3,19,970/- to the plaintiff to enable the defendant to show the same to the bank. However, the plaintiff refused to issue such a false receipt. In the meanwhile, a notice dated 3.10.2005 was sent by the defendant projecting as if a sum of Rs.3,19,970/- was paid. However, the plaintiff refused to issue such a false receipt. In the meanwhile, a notice dated 3.10.2005 was sent by the defendant projecting as if a sum of Rs.3,19,970/- was paid. The plaintiff, therefore, issued a suitable reply dated 7.10.2005 denying the receipt of the said amount, but demanded the payment of Rs.3,30,375/-. Under this background, the defendant filed C.C.No.9 of 2006 before the District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum, Chennai for deficiency of service and for a direction to handover the suit flat to her. 4. In reply to the C.C.No.9 of 2006 filed before the consumer forum, a detailed counter affidavit was filed making a categorical statement that the plaintiff was entitled to a charge over the property under Section 55(4)(b) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 without handing over possession to the defendant. It was also further claimed by the plaintiff that as there was a dispute in respect of the payment of sale consideration for the land and also the payment of cost of construction of the flat as per the agreement, there must be an issue in respect of the alleged payment under the disputed receipt on 24.8.2005. Under this background, the trial Court passed a decree directing the defendant to pay a sum of Rs.3,76,990/-together with interest at the rate of 25% per annum from the date of suit till the date of decree on Rs.3,30,375/- and thereafter at 6% per annum till the date of realisation, another sum of Rs.670/-with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of suit till realisation along with creation of charge over the suit flat for the said dues and also granted permanent injunction restraining the defendant from interfering with the possession of the suit flat till the payment of the suit amount. Aggrieved by the same, an appeal was filed. The first appellate Court, by allowing the appeal, set aside the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court in O.S.No.3192 of 2006 dated 17.2.2009, holding that since the possession was not handed over to the defendant and there were no dues to be paid by her, the claim of interest did not arise. Aggrieved by the same, the present second appeal has been filed. 5. Aggrieved by the same, the present second appeal has been filed. 5. This Court, while admitting the second appeal, framed the following substantial questions of law for consideration: ''(i) Whether the Lower Appellate Court under law is entitled to misread and misinterpret the documents and evidences of the witnesses? (ii) Whether the Lower Appellate Court is correct in law in non-appreciating the evidence of the trial Court and documents filed before the trial Court? (iii) Whether the Lower Appellate Court in law is correct to hold that entire sale consideration is paid by the respondent when the cheque Ex.A3 remains unpaid which forms part of the sale deed namely Ex.A7? (iv) Whether Lower Appellate Court is correct in law in non-appreciating and interpreting Section 55(4)(b) of the Transfer of Property Act as the possession of undivided share was transferred on the date of sale deed itself without appreciating that the suit is for recovery of unpaid sale price and the appellant has a charge over the property sold?'' 6. Mr. P. Wilson, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant/plaintiff, while arguing on the first three substantial questions of law as to whether the lower appellate Court is entitled to misread and misinterpret the documents and evidences of the witnesses; whether the lower appellate Court is correct in law in non-appreciating the evidence of the trial Court and documents filed before the trial Court and whether the lower appellate Court is correct to hold that entire sale consideration is paid by the respondent when the cheque Ex.A3 remains unpaid which forms part of the sale deed namely Ex.A7, submitted that when the cheque bearing No.143035 dated 29.11.2004 drawn on Indian Overseas Bank, Cathedral branch, Anna Salai, Chennai for a sum of Rs.75,860/- was not realised, since the drawee branch was instructed not to honour the cheque, the unpaid cheque relied upon as Ex.A3 by the plaintiff's side goes to show that the defendant had not paid Rs.75,860/-towards the cost of the land. While so, towards the agreed construction cost of Rs.7,44,140/-, when the defendant had paid a sum of Rs.25,000/-as advance on the date of agreement, namely, 29.11.2004 and another sum of Rs.3,40,000/-on 13.7.2005 with one another sum of Rs.2,10,000/-on 31.8.2005, for which two receipts were issued in Exs.A9 and A10, there cannot be any dispute with regard to these facts. While so, towards the agreed construction cost of Rs.7,44,140/-, when the defendant had paid a sum of Rs.25,000/-as advance on the date of agreement, namely, 29.11.2004 and another sum of Rs.3,40,000/-on 13.7.2005 with one another sum of Rs.2,10,000/-on 31.8.2005, for which two receipts were issued in Exs.A9 and A10, there cannot be any dispute with regard to these facts. As such, out of the total construction cost, the plaintiff claims that the defendant had paid only a sum of Rs.5,75,000/- and there remains the balance of Rs.1,94,140/-. Along with this Rs.1,94,140/-, the defendant was also liable to pay a sum of Rs.60,375/-towards E.B., metrowater and drainage deposits. Admittedly, this amount also has not been made in violation of the agreement. Besides, the plaintiff had also paid on behalf of the defendant a sum of Rs.575/-to the Corporation as tax on 20.7.2005 and another sum of Rs.92/-as metrowater tax on 1.9.2005 as per Exs.A5 & A6 respectively due to the neglect of the defendant. Accordingly, a sum of Rs.3,76,990/- has been proved to be payable by the defendant towards the flat, which includes the interest at Rs.25,000/-per annum from 31.8.2005 calculated at Rs.46,615/-. 7. Continuing further, the learned senior counsel for the plaintiff further pleaded that when the defendant conceded in her evidence that a sum of Rs.3,19,970/-was not paid through cheques as stated in Ex.B3 and further conceded that after handing over Ex.B3 to the ICICI Bank, she got the receipts for the entire sum of Rs.3,19,970/-, strangely, she was not able to produce any such receipts in evidence. This clearly shows that the defendant has not paid Rs.3,19,970/- as claimed by her. As against all these admissions and confessions made by the defendant before the trial Court with regard to the disputed payment of Rs.3,19,970/-, without there being any evidence for the payment of Rs.3,19,970/-, when it has been proved by the plaintiff that the defendant has not paid or proved the payment of the said amount, the first appellate Court, taking unnecessary adverse inference against the plaintiff, wrongly looking at Ex.A3-dishonoured cheque, came to an erroneous conclusion that nowhere the seal of the banker for receipt of the cheque was found and there was no endorsement of the banker to prove the dishonour. The adverse inference wrongly taken by the first appellate Court in the facts of the present case is wholly unwarranted, he pleaded. The adverse inference wrongly taken by the first appellate Court in the facts of the present case is wholly unwarranted, he pleaded. Moreover, when the plaintiff has admittedly filed the suit for recovery of a sum of Rs.3,76,990/- together with interest at the rate of 25% per annum on Rs.2,30,375/- claiming that as per clauses 12 and 33 of the construction agreement, the defendant has failed to pay the entire amount, by specifically establishing before the trial Court that no amount as claimed by the defendant under the cheques was paid, since the copy of the Ex.B3 receipt was a bogus one, the plaintiff has discharged her initial burden of proof as per Section 101 of the Evidence Act with regard to the non-payment by clearly producing the relevant bank account statement-Ex.A15 to show that such payment to the tune of Rs.3,19,970/- did not pass through from the defendant's side to the plaintiff, the first appellate Court wrongly concluded that the plaintiff failed to prove the non payment of Rs.3,76,990/-. The said approach adopted by the first appellate Court was completely wrong, he pleaded. 8. Learned senior counsel further submitted that when there was a written agreement between the parties to pay a sum of Rs.7,44,140/- as sale consideration, the defendant had paid a sum of Rs.25,000/- as advance under the agreement on 29.11.2004, another payment of Rs.3,40,000/-on 13.7.2005 and one another payment of Rs.2,10,000/- on 31.8.2005, for which receipts were also issued under Exs.A9 and A10, the plaintiff has proved that a sum of Rs.5,75,000/- alone was paid and there remains a balance of Rs.1,94,140/-. That apart, when the plaintiff also claimed that the defendant was liable to pay a sum of Rs.60,375/- towards E.B., metrowater and drainage deposits, which she failed to pay in violation of the agreement, and it was further claimed that a sum of Rs.575/- was paid by the plaintiff towards Corporation tax on 20.7.2005 and another sum of Rs.92/- as metrowater tax on 1.9.2005 as per Exs.A5 & A6 respectively due to the neglect of the defendant, the defendant, by producing the bogus receipt-Ex.B3 dated Nil, counter claimed that a sum of Rs.3,19,970/- was paid towards the difference apart from the admitted payments. Therefore, the learned senior counsel submitted that when the plaintiff was able to prove that the undated Ex.B3 receipt is a forged one utilised by the defendant for the purpose of obtaining bank loan for the purchase of the flat, the trial Court rightly came to the conclusion that when the defendant claimed to have paid under Ex.B3 a sum of Rs.3,19,970/-by way of cheques on various dates towards part payment of the flat cost, the defendant, during her cross examination, wrongly claimed that she had paid the said sum of Rs.3,19,970/-only in cash. Since the contradictory statement made by the defendant that she had paid the said amount of Rs.3,19,970/- by way of cheques on various dates towards part payment of the flat cost, simultaneously taking a totally different contra stand that the amount was paid in cash, the trial Court disbelieved her case, for the reason that when the defendant claimed that she has got receipts for the entire sum of Rs.3,19,970/-, she was not able to produce any such receipts in evidence. Further, contrary to the contents of Ex.B3, the defendant claimed that she had paid the same only in cash. Under this heavy contradictory statement, the trial Court decreed the suit as prayed for by the plaintiff. 9. Concluding his arguments, the learned senior counsel submitted that when the trial Court, while discussing in detail the genuineness of Ex.B3 with that of the evidence adduced by the defendant, firstly in chief examination that she had made the above payments through various cheques and secondly in cross examination that she paid the same only by cash, categorically held that the said version cannot be accepted, the first appellate Court, without there being any single evidence as to whether the undated receipt Ex.B3 was genuine or forged one, erroneously reversed the findings of the trial Court without assigning any reason whatsoever, violating the mandatory conditions mentioned under Order 41, Rule 33 of the Civil Procedure Code, hence, the well-reasoned judgment and decree passed by the trial Court should be restored by setting aside the erroneous impugned judgment. In support of his claim, he has relied upon a Division Bench judgment of this Court in Manoharakumari v. Anitha and another reported in 2010-2-L.W. 851 for the proposition that Section 73 of the Evidence Act permits comparison of signature and writing of a person with others admitted or proved to have been written by that person and even if no expert has been examined, the Court is competent to compare the admitted or proved wrongs with the disputed writing. In view of the above ruling, the trial Court compared the admitted signature of the defendant as found in the plaint and in the Ex.B3, finally, has identified that the signature found in Ex.B3 was forged by the defendant, whereas the first appellate Court, without even dealing with that part of the finding, unfairly and unjustifiably disturbed the well-reasoned judgment of the trial Court, he pleaded. Adding further, Mr. P. Wilson submitted that when it is a well settled legal position that the findings of fact recorded by the trial Court mainly on appreciation of oral evidence should not be lightly disturbed unless the approach of the trial Court in the appraisal of evidence was erroneous, contrary to the well established principles of law, the first appellate Court without bearing in mind this important principle, indeed, forgetting that the trial Court had the advantage and opportunity of seeing the demeanour of witnesses, ought not to have reversed the judgment of the trial Court. As the approach adopted by the first appellate Court is patently erroneous, per se, seeing the reasonings given in the impugned judgment, the same is liable to be interfered with. 10. Arguing on the last substantial question of law as to whether the lower appellate Court is correct in non-appreciating and interpreting Section 55(4)(b) of the Transfer of Property Act and whether the plaintiff has got charge over the flat in question, the learned senior counsel submitted that again the first appellate Court committed yet another mistake in holding that the defendant was not liable to pay the amount as claimed under Exs.A11 and A13, since the first appellate Court has not even discussed briefly the case of the defendant in the impugned judgment. Further, without keeping in mind what was pleaded, argued by the defendant and discussed by the trial Court with regard to the defence taken by the defendant, the first appellate Court, merely framing the issue whether the finding of the learned XII Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, Chennai in O.S.No.3192 of 2006 dated 17.2.2009 is liable to be dismissed for the reasons stated in the grounds of appeal, wrongly allowed the appeal. On this basis, the learned senior counsel prayed for setting aside the impugned judgment. 11. Learned counsel appearing for the defendant submitted that when the total cost of the flat was only Rs.7,50,000/-and that the defendant had already paid over and above the said amount, the claim made by the plaintiff was against the agreements Exs.A2 and A7. Adding further, he has stated that a perusal of clause 4 of the construction agreement clearly shows that the plaintiff is entitled to interest at the rate of 25% per annum for the defaulted amount. But in the present case, a sum of Rs.3,19,790/- had been paid by the defendant towards the dues apart from the admitted payment of Rs.25,000/- as advance on 29.11.2004, another sum of Rs.3,40,000/- on 13.7.2005 and one another sum of Rs.2,10,000/- on 31.8.2005. Therefore, the claim of the plaintiff that the above said amount of Rs.3,19,970/- was not paid, cannot be accepted. In support of his claim, he would further plead that Ex.B3, the letter pad of the plaintiff is clearly showing the receipt of Rs.3,19,970/-, as per the signature made by Ms. M. Latha, Managing Partner of Kartik Homes. To prove that the Ex.B3 is a genuine receipt, the defendant also produced the Exs.A8 & A9 issued by the plaintiff, which are also in the printed format, for the payments received by the plaintiff. M. Latha, Managing Partner of Kartik Homes. To prove that the Ex.B3 is a genuine receipt, the defendant also produced the Exs.A8 & A9 issued by the plaintiff, which are also in the printed format, for the payments received by the plaintiff. In view of the fact that the defendant has proved the payment of Rs.3,19,970/- under Ex.B3, the further demand made by the plaintiff under Ex.A13 clearly negatives the case of the plaintiff that the defendant had failed to pay the balance sale consideration so as to claim a charge over the flat under Section 55(4)(b) of the Transfer of Property Act, because when the plaintiff, after receipt of the excess amount upto Rs.9,44,970/-, had failed to handover possession of the flat and came forward with the counter claim of Rs.3,30,375/- by his letter dated 23.9.2005, the defendant was constrained to approach the District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum by filing C.C.No.9 of 2006 seeking a direction to the plaintiff to handover vacant possession of the flat No.F1, First Floor, Door No.18, Fifth Street, AVM Colony, Virugambakkam, Chennai and also to pay a compensation of Rs.10 lakhs, for the reason that the plaintiff refused to handover possession. The District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum, after perusing the agreement and also the cheques, came to the conclusion that the plaintiff has not produced any document to prove that the said cheque was returned for insufficiency of funds. Therefore, what could not be proved by the plaintiff in respect of Ex.B3 before the consumer forum, cannot contend before this Court that Ex.B3 is a forged document. As a matter of fact, when the defendant had already filed a complaint before the District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum for handing over vacant possession of the flat on the proven fact that she had paid a sum of Rs.9,44,970/-as against the agreed sum under the construction agreement of Rs.7,44,110/-and on receipt of the said amount the plaintiff failed to handover possession of the flat, the consumer forum, after a heavy contest, came to the conclusion that the entire amount for the construction of the flat had already been paid by the defendant to the plaintiff and as such, the plaintiff was not entitled to have any lien over the flat. On this basis, the complaint filed by the defendant was allowed directing the plaintiff to handover vacant possession of the flat immediately. On this basis, the complaint filed by the defendant was allowed directing the plaintiff to handover vacant possession of the flat immediately. Therefore, once again the plaintiff cannot complain that Ex.B3, under which the defendant claimed to have paid a sum of Rs.3,19,970/-, was a forged one. 12. Finally, assailing the approach adopted by the trial Court in decreeing the suit during the day of boycott of Courts by the Advocates from 2.2.2009 to 28.2.2009, during which period no counsel appeared before the Court, the learned counsel pleaded that the trial Court had passed an order without hearing the defendant, as a result, she was unable to adduce evidence and cross examine the other side. But the first appellate Court has rightly reversed the judgment of the trial Court, hence, the impugned judgment cannot be found fault with. If for any reason the impugned judgment is set aside, the matter may be remitted to the trial Court to allow the defendant to adduce evidence, as she has not appeared before the trial Court, to disprove the case of the plaintiff, he pleaded. 13. This argument advanced by the learned counsel for the respondent for remanding the matter to the trial Court, on the ground that the defendant failed to produce documents before the trial Court, is highly unacceptable, for the reason that when the defendant had filed the appeal before the first appellate Court against the judgment of the trial Court on the ground that the Presiding Officer took charge only in the first week of January, 2009 and pronounced the judgment on 17.2.2009 without hearing the counsel, despite the fact that the advocates were boycotting the Courts from 2.2.2009 to 28.2.2009, the first appellate Court, accepting this ground, came to the conclusion that it is true that the advocates were boycotting the Courts from 2.2.2009 to 28.2.2009, therefore, the request of the learned counsel for the defendant to re-appreciate the evidence became inevitable to decide the appeal. On this basis, the first appellate Court, in an effort to re-appreciate the evidence, framed the following points for consideration:- ''(i) Whether the appellant paid the sale consideration and the cost of the construction? (ii) Whether the amount claimed by the respondent is supported by the statement of accounts? (iii) Whether the respondent is entitled to create charge over the flat u/s 55(4)(b) of Transfer of Property Act? (ii) Whether the amount claimed by the respondent is supported by the statement of accounts? (iii) Whether the respondent is entitled to create charge over the flat u/s 55(4)(b) of Transfer of Property Act? (iv) Whether the respondent is entitled to claim interest over the alleged balance of sale consideration and the balance of cost of the construction of the building? (v) Whether the payment made by the appellant under a receipt dated 24.8.2005 for Rs.3,19,970/- is a fabricated one?'' Since the first appellate Court has re-appreciated the evidence produced by the plaintiff and the defendant, the question of remanding the matter as sought by the learned counsel for the defendant cannot be acceded to. 14. Secondly, it has to be seen whether the first appellate Court has misread and misinterpreted the documents and evidences of the witnesses with regard to the payment of money by the defendant. The averments made by the plaintiff in O.S.No.3192 of 2006 and the averments made by the defendant as complainant before the District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum in C.C.No.9 of 2006 clearly show that the plaintiff and the defendant entered into a construction agreement dated 29.11.2004, under which the defendant agreed to purchase 290 sq.ft., of undivided share of land from and out of 'A' schedule land having built up area of 700 sq.ft., in the first floor for a lumpsum consideration of Rs.7,44,110/-. On the said date, the agreement shows that the defendant had paid a sum of Rs.25,000/-as advance and agreed to pay the balance amount of Rs.7,19,110/- on the following dates:- Stages Percentage Amount Rs. Tentative date of completion 1) On completion of basement level 30% 2,16,000/- 31.01.2005 2) On completion of roofing level for respective floors 30% 2,16,000/- 31.05.2005 3) On completion of lintel level for respective floor 30% 2,16,000/- 30.04.2005 4) At the time of laying flooring tiles 5% 35,555/- 30.06.2005 5) At the time of handing over key of the premises 5% 35,555/- 31.08.2005 Clause-4 of the agreement indicates that if any of the instalment is unpaid after due notice, the allottee shall be liable to pay interest calculated at 25% per annum on the overdue instalments from the date of default till the date of payment to the Developer. Clause-5 of the agreement also shows that if the allottee fails to pay the overdues, then the Developer shall be at liberty to terminate the contract by giving thirty days written notice and the Developer shall be entitled to claim damages. In the present case, the plaintiff admitted that the defendant had paid Rs.25,000/- as advance and she had completed the construction of the suit flat on 31.8.2005 as agreed. The plaintiff further admitted that the defendant had paid a further sum of Rs.3,40,000/- on 13.7.2005 and another sum of Rs.2,10,000/-on 31.8.2005 towards the construction cost. But it was mentioned that the defendant failed to pay the balance sale price of Rs.75,860/- for the land cost and Rs.60,375/- towards E.B. metrowater and drainage deposits and the balance construction cost of Rs.1,94,140/-. Admittedly, the defendant had paid Rs.5,75,000/- under Exs.A9 & A10. It was further admitted by the plaintiff that the plaintiff had paid a sum of Rs.575/- towards Corporation tax on 20.7.2005 for the flat, as it was already constructed and another sum of Rs.92/- as metrowater tax on 1.9.2005, which are marked as Exs.A5 & A6 respectively due to the neglect of the defendant. On this basis, the balance amount payable by the defendant, as claimed by the plaintiff, shows that the defendant is due and payable a sum of Rs.3,76,990/-as detailed hereunder:- 1. Toward cost of unpaid sale price of land Rs. 75,860/- 2. Amount Due under the Construction Agreement Rs. 1,94,140/- 3. 3 phase EB deposit, Metrowater deposit Drainage deposit Rs. 60,375/- 4. Interest claimed @ 25% per annum from 31.08.2005 Rs. 46,615/- Total Rs. 3,76,990/- 15. As against the above claim, the defendant contended that the total cost of the flat was only Rs.7,50,000/- and she had paid over and above the said cost and that the above cost of Rs.7,50,000/- would include the land cost also. On this basis, it was claimed that the claim made by the plaintiff goes against the construction agreement. The trial Court, after perusing clause-4 of the construction agreement, came to the conclusion that the plaintiff was entitled to interest at 25% per annum for the defaulted amount. It could be seen that the construction came to be over on 31.8.2005. On this basis, it was claimed that the claim made by the plaintiff goes against the construction agreement. The trial Court, after perusing clause-4 of the construction agreement, came to the conclusion that the plaintiff was entitled to interest at 25% per annum for the defaulted amount. It could be seen that the construction came to be over on 31.8.2005. Be that as it may, now the defendant contends that a sum of Rs.3,19,970/-has been paid towards part payment of the flat cost, apart from the admitted amount, under Ex.B3. The trial Court, by looking at Ex.B3 under which the defendant claimed to have paid a sum of Rs.3,19,970/-, went into the validity of Ex.B3. On the other hand, the plaintiff denied the payment of the said amount under Ex.B3 on the ground that it was a forged one. In this context, the evidence adduced by D.W.1 shows that Ex.B3 does not contain any date. However, it says that a sum of Rs.3,19,970/- was paid by way of cheques on various dates towards part payment of the flat cost. If this recital in Ex.B3 is true, it will be easy for the defendant to establish such payments through cheques. But the defendant has not resorted to produce any cheques to prove that she has paid the amount under Ex.B3, so as to disprove the claim of the plaintiff that she has not paid Rs.3,19,970/-. In this connection, it may be useful to refer to Section 101 of the Evidence Act, which reads as under:- ''101. Burden of proof.--Whoever desires any Court to give judgment as to any legal right or liability dependent on the existence of facts which he asserts, must prove that those facts exist. When a person is bound to prove the existence of any fact, it is said that the burden of proof lies on that person.'' 16. A careful perusal of the above section clearly shows that if anyone approaches the Court to give a judgment on any legal right or liability depending on the existence of facts which the person who approaches the Court asserts, must prove that such facts exist by discharging his burden. A careful perusal of the above section clearly shows that if anyone approaches the Court to give a judgment on any legal right or liability depending on the existence of facts which the person who approaches the Court asserts, must prove that such facts exist by discharging his burden. In the present case, when the plaintiff, right from the day of execution of the construction agreement on 29.11.2004, has claimed that the defendant has not paid the balance sale consideration of Rs.3,19,970/-, when she admitted that the defendant had paid only Rs.5,75,000/- and also clearly challenged that the Ex.B3 is a forged document, the burden of proof as per Section 101 of the Evidence Act has been clearly discharged by the plaintiff, as a result, the defendant is called upon to discharge her burden to disprove the same. When the plaintiff, by producing the construction agreement, Ex.A2, the sale deed, Ex.A7, the notices issued by the plaintiff, Exs.A11 and A13, has questioned the payment of Rs.3,19,970/- by the defendant by discharging her burden of proof under Section 101 of the Evidence Act, the burden shifts upon the defendant to disprove the said claim. Although the defendant has claimed that she did pay the above said amount of Rs.3,19,970/-by way of several cheques on various dates towards part performance of the flat cost under Ex.B3, the payment of Rs.3,19,970/-by the defendant through cheques on various dates has not been established. One more important thing is that when D.W.1 conceded in her evidence that a sum of Rs.3,19,970/- was not paid through cheques as stated in Ex.B3, she has again conceded that Ex.B3 was handed over to ICICI Bank. But there is no evidence let in as to the sanction of loan directly to the plaintiff by the ICICI Bank on receipt of Ex.B3, except the oral claim of D.W.1. In fact, even though D.W.1 claimed that she has got receipts for the entire sum of Rs.3,19,970/-, she was not able to produce any such evidence to disprove the case of the plaintiff. Contrary to the contents of Ex.B3, D.W.1 would further claim that she had paid the said sum of Rs.3,19,970/- only in cash. In fact, even though D.W.1 claimed that she has got receipts for the entire sum of Rs.3,19,970/-, she was not able to produce any such evidence to disprove the case of the plaintiff. Contrary to the contents of Ex.B3, D.W.1 would further claim that she had paid the said sum of Rs.3,19,970/- only in cash. When D.W.1 in the chief examination claimed to have paid the entire amount of Rs.3,19,970/- through cheques on various dates, completely made a somersault in the cross examination by stating that she had paid the entire amount only in cash. In view of the diametrically opposite stand taken by the defendant with regard to the payment of Rs.3,19,970/-, the trial Court came to the right conclusion that the plaintiff has established her case and that she was entitled to the reliefs claimed for recovery of Rs.3,76,990/- together with interest at the rate of 25% per annum on Rs.2,30,375/- from the date of plaint till the date of realisation and for a direction to pay a sum of Rs.670/- with future interest at the rate of 25% per annum from the date of filing the suit till the date of realisation as well as for a declaration that the plaintiff is having a charge over the suit schedule flat as per Section 55(4)(b) of the Transfer of Property Act and for permanent injunction restraining the defendant and her men from in any way interfering with the possession of the suit flat till the entire amount was paid to the plaintiff. Sadly, the first appellate Court, without even answering how the defendant has dispelled the proven claim made by the plaintiff with regard to the payment of Rs.3,19,970/- under Ex.B3, unnecessarily misplacing the burden of proof under Section 101 of the Evidence Act, has wrongly disturbed the well-reasoned judgment of the trial Court. In view of the above, by answering the substantial questions of law in favour of the plaintiff, this Court is unable to support the impugned judgment, since the evidence on record were completely misread, more particularly, Ex.B3 by the first appellate Court. In view of the above, by answering the substantial questions of law in favour of the plaintiff, this Court is unable to support the impugned judgment, since the evidence on record were completely misread, more particularly, Ex.B3 by the first appellate Court. In view of the above conclusions, this Court is of the considered view that the defendant has failed to prove the payment of Rs.3,19,970/- to the plaintiff, hence, the plaintiff-Seller is entitled to have a charge upon the property by virtue of Section 55(4)(b) of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 for the amount of purchase money or any part thereof remaining unpaid. Therefore, the second appeal deserves to be allowed and the impugned judgment and decree are liable to be set aside. 17. Before parting with the case, it may be mentioned that after the plaintiff and the defendant entered into the construction agreement under Ex.A2, the defendant had paid the advance amount of Rs.25,000/- and for the balance of Rs.7,19,110/-, though the defendant claims to have paid Rs.3,19,970/-, without paying the said amount, she had filed a complaint before the District Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum, Chennai in C.C.No.9 of 2006 seeking for a direction against the plaintiff/opposite party therein to hand over vacant possession of Flat F1, First Floor at Door No.18, Fifth Street, AVM Colony, Virugambakkam, Chennai-89, on the ground that Rs.3,19,970/- was received by the plaintiff on various dates, but she did not honour the agreement. Very unfortunately, without even properly assessing the claim of the plaintiff/opposite party, the District Consumer Redressal Forum committed a serious mistake in passing a cryptic order, allowing the claim of the defendant/complainant therein, without even any discussion with regard to the payment aspect. Remarkably, in the suit filed by the plaintiff, the undated Receipt under Ex.B3, marked by the defendant claiming payment by her, was proved to be a forged one. The defendant did not prove payment of the aforesaid sum before the District Consumer Redressal Forum/trial Court/lower appellate Court nor before this Court. Thus, her conduct clearly shows that she had filed a misconceived complaint before the District Consumer Forum amounting to abuse of process of the Court. Therefore, this Court, by taking note of the conduct of the defendant, is unable to restrain from expressing its anguish on the abuse of process of law/Court. Thus, her conduct clearly shows that she had filed a misconceived complaint before the District Consumer Forum amounting to abuse of process of the Court. Therefore, this Court, by taking note of the conduct of the defendant, is unable to restrain from expressing its anguish on the abuse of process of law/Court. In other words, such a litigant, in my view, must be dealt with suitably. 18. As a general rule, suppression of material fact by a litigant disqualifies such a litigant from obtaining any relief. This Rule has been evolved out of the need of the Courts to deter a litigant from abusing the process of the Court by deceiving it. 19. Today some of the litigants do not have fear or know the consequences of misleading the court, the reason is that when the courts on certain occasions show its liberal approach on various reasons such approach is being understood by some litigants. This has given rise to huge docket population in the courts which results denial of timely justice to the needy citizens therefore, at times the courts have to send some message to wrong doer as an eye opener. 20. Useful reference can be had from the judgment of the Apex Court in State of Maharashtra and others vs. Sarangharsingh Shivdassingh Chavan and another, 2011 (1) SCC 577 , wherein, in similar and identical circumstances, taking note of the fact that an affidavit filed by the litigant was clearly misleading, differing with the less imposition of fine of Rs.25,000/- by the High Court of Bombay has imposed the exemplary cost of Rs.10,00,000/- on the Maharashtra Government. 21. In yet another occasion, the Apex Court in Ramrameshwari Devi vs. Nirmala Devi, 2011 (8) SCC 249 , deprecating the dilatory tactics and the harassment of opposite party, ultimately resulting in wastage of court's time and also unjust benefit to the wrong doer under the existing system of administration of civil litigation came down heavily to slap the exemplary cost of Rs.2,00,000/-. 22. 22. In a similar and identical circumstance, when a plaintiff obtained a fraudulent decree suppressing the compromise decree following the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra and others vs. Sarangharsingh Shivdassingh Chavan and another, 2011 (1) SCC 577 and Ramrameshwari Devi vs. Nirmala Devi, 2011 (8) SCC 249 , supra, I have imposed an exemplary cost of Rs.1 lakh in P.Subramania Chetty vs. P.N.Narayana, P.N.Dinesh and Tahsildar, Taluk Office, Pallipattu S.A.No.441/2012 dated 21.07.2014. The relevant portion of the judgment is extracted hereunder:- "It is not in dispute that an appeal under Section 100 CPC can be entertained by the High Court on the substantial question of law. There is no quarrel over this legal position, however, if the findings of the subordinate courts on facts are contrary to evidence on record and are perverse, such findings can be interfered with by the High Court in an appeal under Section 100 CPC, because the High Court cannot shut its eyes to perverse findings of courts below. In the present case, the findings of fact arrived at by the courts below are contrary to evidence on record and therefore I am justified in setting aside the same, answering the second substantial question of law in favour of the appellant. Taking note of the conduct of the plaintiffs who have not only misrepresented both the courts, but also intentionally suppressed the compromise decree passed in favour of their father, this Court is inclined to impose an exemplary cost of Rs.1 lakh, payable to the appellant herein by the respondents 1 and 2, within a period of four weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this judgment." 23. In the present case, initially the defendant misled the District Consumer Forum by false complaint and obtained an order. When the plaintiff filed a civil suit for recovery, the defendant again made a serious attempt before the civil Court by producing Ex.B3/forged receipt to show as if she had paid Rs.3,19,970/- to the plaintiff. Clear findings have been given by the trial Court that the defendant had marked the forged receipt under Ex.B3 to disprove and defeat the plaintiff's case and claim. She continued here falsehood before the learned first appellate court. Even before this Court, the defendant resorted to the same deceiving tactics by building up a false claim on the fake document-Ex.B3. Clear findings have been given by the trial Court that the defendant had marked the forged receipt under Ex.B3 to disprove and defeat the plaintiff's case and claim. She continued here falsehood before the learned first appellate court. Even before this Court, the defendant resorted to the same deceiving tactics by building up a false claim on the fake document-Ex.B3. When a party approaches the High Court, he/she must place all the facts before the Court without any reservation and if there is a false statement or a twisted fact placed before Court, then the Court should not hesitate to curb such practice by imposing exemplary costs. In the present case, when the defendant made a false story before the District Consumer Forum against the plaintiff that she had paid a huge amount of Rs.3,19,970/-under Ex.B3 a forged document and attempted to deceive the abovesaid amount, this Court is of the considered view that she should be made to pay the same amount to the plaintiff, accordingly, the defendant is directed to pay a sum of Rs.3,19,970/-under Ex.B3 to the plaintiff within a period of four weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. 24. In the result, the second appeal stands allowed and the impugned judgment and decree are set aside and the judgment and the decree granted by the learned trial court are hereby confirmed.