JUDGMENT S.C. Das, J. 1. This second appeal, under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure is directed against judgment and decree dated 07.07.2005, passed by learned Addl. District Judge, West Tripura, Agartala in Title Appeal No. 31 of 2002 where-under the learned Addl. District Judge dismissed the appeal filed against the judgment and decree dated 16.06.2002, passed by learned Civil Judge, Jr. Division, Court No. 2, Agartala, West Tripura, in Title Suit No. 24 of 2001. 2. The second appeal has been admitted for hearing on the following substantial questions of law. "Whether the appellate Court can fix a time for construction of separate gate and pathway contrary to the agreement executed between the parties?" 3. Heard learned Sr. Counsel, Mr. A.K. Bhowmik for the appellant and learned Sr. Counsel Mr. S.M. Chakraborty for the respondent. 4. The appellant as plaintiff (hereinafter mentioned as plaintiff) instituted Title Suit No. 24 of 2001 in the Court of Civil Judge, Jr. Division, Court No. 2, Agartala, West Tripura against the defendant-respondent (here-in-after mentioned as defendant) seeking following relief:-- "(a) a decree be passed declaring the plaintiff's right to use the Schedule-C land for the movements of the plaintiff, her other family members, relatives and her cars in between the 'C' Schedule land and the public road; (b) a decree be passed granting perpetual injunction restraining the defendant, his family members, agents and workmen from interfering with the movements of the plaintiff, her other family members, relatives and her cars through the 'C' schedule land to the public road; (c) a Decree be passed granting mandatory injunction directing the defendant to perform his act to introduce a lock in the gate with double keys system keeping one key with the plaintiff and another with the defendant; (d) Grant such other relief or reliefs as the plaintiff is legally entitled to get; AND (e) Cost of this suit." The trial Court dismissed the suit and directed that the plaintiff shall be entitled to use the pay way mentioned in Schedule 'C' of the plaint for a period of 6(six) months during the period from 6-00 a.m. to 10-30 p.m. Aggrieved the plaintiff preferred Title Appeal No. 31/2002 in the court of District Judge and the learned Addl. District Judge by impugned judgment dated 07.07.2005 upheld the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court and extended time for 6(six) months from the date of passing the appellate judgment and decree. Aggrieved the plaintiff filed the present second appeal. 5. The undisputed rather admitted facts are-- "(i) Sri Rakhal Ranjan Kar, husband of the plaintiff is the full blood elder brother of the defendant and the land described in Schedule 'A' and 'B' belonged to Rakhal Ranjan Kar recorded in his name in Khatian No. 5361, Plot No. 14711-14714 of mouja-Agartala Town, Sheet No. 16. On 02.06.1998 vide registered sale deed No. 1-2902 dated 02.06.98 (Exbt. A) the said Rakhal Ranjan Kar transferred 'B' schedule land to the defendant. On the same day i.e. on 02.06.1998 Rakhal Ranjan Kar and the defendant further entered into a registered agreement (Exbt. 4) that the path way described in Schedule-'C' of the plaint shall be used by the family of both the brothers for all intends and purposes until Rakhal Ranjan Kar at the equal cost of both the brother construct an alternative path way filling up the pond of 'A' Schedule land for their independent egress and ingress. (ii) On 18.09.1998 Rakhal Ranjan Kar by executing a registered sale deed transferred 'A' schedule land to his wife, the plaintiff and the plaintiff became owner of 'A' schedule land." 6. It is the case of the plaintiff that 'C' schedule land is the only path way for the egress and ingress of the family of plaintiff and defendant and both the family had been using the same in terms of agreement dated 02.06.1998 (Exbt. 4) and there was a locking system of the Gate with two keys having one key with the plaintiff and another key with the defendant but from 1st week of March, 2001 the defendant changed the lock of the gate with two keys and in its place put up his own lock and kept the keys with him only and thereby causing hindrance in the smooth egress and ingress of the plaintiff and her family members. It is further alleged by the plaintiff that from 25th of March, 2001 the defendant has been interfering with the movement of the plaintiff and her family members and relatives as well as the cars through the said path way and therefore, the plaintiff brought the suit seeking the reliefs as stated hereinbefore. 7. The defendant contested the suit by filing written statement, inter alia, contending that 'C' schedule path way is a land of the defendant situated on his purchased land of Schedule-'B' and that the plaintiff and her husband has got no perpetual right to use the path way causing inconvenience to the defendant. 'B' schedule land is in the absolute ownership of the defendant and the plaintiff as well as her husband has got no right, title and interest over it. It is further contended by the defendant that the agreement was signed between the defendant and husband of the plaintiff. Since the husband of the plaintiff has transferred 'A' schedule land after the agreement was signed, the plaintiff has got no right to claim any benefit of the agreement signed between the defendant and husband of the plaintiff. The plaintiff and her family members causing hindrance to the safety, security and privacy of the defendant while using the 'C' schedule path way having no right, title and interest in the same. Since plaintiff has got their own land to construct their path way they would do so and they cannot have any absolute right to use the path way through the 'B' schedule land of the defendant. 8. The trial Court in course of trial framed four issues namely- "i. Is the suit maintainable in law? ii. Has the plaintiff right to use the 'C' Schedule land for movement? iii. Is the plaintiff entitled to the decree as prayed for? iv. To what other reliefs the parties are entitled?" 9. In course of trial on behalf of the plaintiff two witnesses were examined and the following documents were exhibited-- "i. General Power of Attorney executed by the plaintiff in favour of Rakhal Ranjan Kar-Ext. 1. ii. Registered Sale deed bearing No. 1-5443 dated 18.9.98-Ext. 2. iii. Certified copy of sale deed bearing No. 29962 dt. 2.6.98- Exbt. 3 (S/O). iv. Registered Agreement bearing No. 1-2903 dt. 2.6.98 - Ext. 4." 10. 1. ii. Registered Sale deed bearing No. 1-5443 dated 18.9.98-Ext. 2. iii. Certified copy of sale deed bearing No. 29962 dt. 2.6.98- Exbt. 3 (S/O). iv. Registered Agreement bearing No. 1-2903 dt. 2.6.98 - Ext. 4." 10. On behalf of defendant also two witnesses were examined and the purchased deed of the defendant dated 2.6.98 was proved as Exbt. A. 11. The trial Court decided Issue No. 1 in favour of the plaintiff but decided Issue Nos. 2 and 3 against the plaintiff and accordingly dismissed the suit. The appellate Court upheld the judgment of the trial Court and hence, this second appeal. 12. Learned Sr. counsel Mr. Bhowmik has submitted that Exbt. 4 is the agreement signed between the two brothers i.e. husband of the plaintiff and defendant on 02.06.1998, i.e. the date husband of the plaintiff namely Rakhal Ranjan Kar executed the sale deed in favour of the defendant. It has been clearly stipulated in the agreement that the first party i.e. Rakhal Ranjan Kar, his family members and relatives and others including his vehicle etc. shall continue to use the path way described in Schedule 'C' of the plaint till an alternative path after filling up the pond with a gate is constructed at the equal costs of both the brothers. The terms of the agreement cannot be disturbed by the Court and the Court of law is bound by the terms of the agreement between the parties. 13. Learned Sr. counsel, Mr. Chakraborty has submitted that in the event Rakhal Ranjan Kar transferred the 'A' schedule land to his wife, the plaintiff, the force of agreement has gone and by virtue of that agreement, the plaintiff cannot claim the same right of use of the path way which her husband would do. Referring to section 29 of the Indian Contract Act, learned counsel further submitted that the terms of the agreement is vague and hence, the agreement has no force in the eye of law. 14. As already stated earlier, the husband of the plaintiff namely Rakhal Ranjan Kar and the defendant are full blood brothers and the land described in Schedule 'B' has been sold by Rakhal Ranjan Kar to the defendant and an agreement was signed between Rakhal Ranjan Kar and the defendant on the same day of transfer of B Schedule land. 14. As already stated earlier, the husband of the plaintiff namely Rakhal Ranjan Kar and the defendant are full blood brothers and the land described in Schedule 'B' has been sold by Rakhal Ranjan Kar to the defendant and an agreement was signed between Rakhal Ranjan Kar and the defendant on the same day of transfer of B Schedule land. It is an admitted position that 'C' schedule path way is running through the 'B' schedule land. Exbt. 4, the registered agreement dated 02.06.1998 is therefore the crux of the suit. On a careful perusal of Exbt. 4 as I find, the trial Court as well as the appellate Court has failed to correctly construe the registered agreement signed between the parties. Rakhal Ranjan Kar, the husband of the plaintiff and the defendant being full blood brothers consciously entered into the agreement and registered it on the same date the 'B' schedule land was transferred by the husband of the plaintiff. 15. Exbt. 4, the agreement clearly contains the description of 'A' schedule land and 'B' schedule land which belonged to Rakhal Ranjan Kar i.e. husband of the plaintiff and the defendant. In the hand sketch map attached to the agreement which has been duly mentioned in the agreement itself clearly stipulates the demarcation of 'A' Schedule and 'B' schedule land marked as 'ka' and 'kha' and the pond portion of Rakhal Ranjan Kar and the defendant marked as 'Gha' and 'Ga'. The building portion of both the brothers also mentioned in the said agreement in the part mentioned as 'ka' abd 'kha'. The term No. 4 of the agreement is very clear and specific wherein it is stated that in the southern boundary of the homestead of the defendant and northern boundary of the pond portion of the defendant i.e. in between the land mentioned as 'kha' and 'ga' of the hand sketch map attached to the agreement a path way with gate has been constructed at the expenses of both the brothers and it has been clearly stipulated that both the brothers with their family shall have the right to use the gate and path way up to the public road situated to the south of the gate and that the members of both the families and relatives etc., including their maruti car and taxi etc., shall have the right to use the gate and road. It is also clearly stipulated in the agreement that if in the near future the first party i.e. Rakhal Ranjan Kar constructs a separate gate in his land i.e. through his own land i.e. 'gha' portion of the land of the hand sketch map, the expenses of such construction of the gate shall be borne by both the brothers equally. It is also clearly stated that until and unless the pond is filled up and separate gate is constructed, the first party i.e. Rakhal Ranjan Kar, husband of the plaintiff shall have the right to use the gate and the road for their movement with their vehicles maruti car, taxi etc. and second party will have no right to create any disturbance therein. 16. There is no ambiguity in the terms of the agreement. I cannot agree with the submission of learned Sr. counsel Mr. Chakraborty that the agreement is void because of uncertainty. The contents of the agreement are very clear and specific and I find no uncertainty or ambiguity in the agreement. A provision in a contract will be void for uncertainty if the court cannot reach to a conclusion as to what was in the draftsman's mind or where it is not safe for the court to prefer one possible meaning to other equally possible meanings. A provision of a contract may be uncertain if it is unintelligible, if it is meaningless; if the court is unable to select between a variety of meanings fairly attributable to it, and the circumstances are not such that one or other party to the contract may elect between meanings; where the court is unable to discern the concept which the parties had in mind; or where the terms of the contract require further agreement between the parties in order to implement them. 17. It is settled proposition of law that an agreed term of an agreement should be read in its true sense as reflected in the agreement. The court cannot re-write the agreement and make out a different meaning of the agreement than that the agreement stipulated. The parties to the agreement are bound by it even it is found to be disadvantageous to one of the parties afterwards. No term of the agreement can be improved or enlarged beyond what is written in the agreement itself. 18. The parties to the agreement are bound by it even it is found to be disadvantageous to one of the parties afterwards. No term of the agreement can be improved or enlarged beyond what is written in the agreement itself. 18. Rakhal Ranjan Kar, the husband of the plaintiff sold out 'B' schedule land to the defendant on 02.06.1998 and at the same time i.e. on the date of execution of the sale deed itself the agreement, Exbt. 4 was executed consciously by both the brothers stipulating clearly therein that the path way running through the 'B' schedule land and the gate thereof which was constructed at the equal cost of both the brothers should continue to be used by the family of both the brothers including that of the entry of their vehicles and that the second party i.e. the defendant shall not raise any obstruction or create any hindrance in use of that path way by the husband of the plaintiff and other family members of the plaintiff till an alternative path way is constructed through 'A' schedule land of Rakhal Ranjan Kar, husband of the plaintiff after filling up of the pond. The agreement is very clear and specific and there is no ambiguity in it. The trial Court wrongly arrived at a conclusion that the agreement was simply a grant or permission to use the path way and that the plaintiff and her husband cannot claim to use it in perpetuity. The terms of the agreement clearly stipulates that until an alternative path way is constructed through his own land by the husband of the plaintiff, the family of Rakhal Ranjan Kar shall be entitled to use the path way for all intends and purposes as stipulated in the agreement. The trial Court failed to construe the agreement as per law. The judgment passed by the appellate Court is no judgment in the eye of law since it is found to be very cryptic and nothing has been discussed in the appellate Court judgment. 19. It is the salient principle of law of contract that parties to a contract must perform their respective promises unless such performance is dispensed with or excused under the provisions of the Contract Act or of any other law. 19. It is the salient principle of law of contract that parties to a contract must perform their respective promises unless such performance is dispensed with or excused under the provisions of the Contract Act or of any other law. Here the terms of the agreement entered between the brothers is clear, specific and there is no ambiguity at all to understand it. There is nothing to hold that it is uncertain in any manner. 20. The argument of learned Sr. counsel Mr. Chakraborty that it is uncertain and therefore is void, has no force at all since I find no uncertainty in the agreement and it is found to be very specific and clear. In the event the plaintiff's husband constructs a path way after filling up the pond through 'A' schedule land, only in that event the plaintiff's husband will lose his right to use the 'C' schedule path way and not before that. It is also clearly stipulated that in the event such a separate path way is constructed, 50% of the cost for construction of the gate should be borne by the defendant. So, until that separate path way is constructed, the plaintiff's husband has a right with his family to use the path way in terms of the agreement and such terms and conditions cannot be said to be uncertain or ambiguous in any manner. 21. The argument that when Rakhal Ranjan Kar transferred 'A' scheduled land to the plaintiff, the agreement entered between Rakhal Ranjan Kar and defendant lost its force cannot be accepted since it is clearly stipulated in the agreement that the family members of Rakhal Ranjan Kar including his vehicles shall have the right to use the path way till the alternative path way is constructed. So the right of using the path way by the plaintiff being the family members of Rakhal Ranjan Kar exists and hence, the argument advanced cannot be accepted and is found to be devoid of any merit. 22. Issue Nos. 2 and 3, therefore, is liable to be decided in favour of the plaintiff and those are decided accordingly. So the right of using the path way by the plaintiff being the family members of Rakhal Ranjan Kar exists and hence, the argument advanced cannot be accepted and is found to be devoid of any merit. 22. Issue Nos. 2 and 3, therefore, is liable to be decided in favour of the plaintiff and those are decided accordingly. The plaintiff and other members of her family and relatives as well as their vehicles shall have the right to use 'C' scheduled path way up to the public road and the defendant is restrained from disturbing the plaintiff and family members of Rakhal Ranjan Kar and relatives as well as cars from using the path way to their inconvenience. The plaintiff and the defendant may use a lock with double key system keeping one of the keys with each of them. In the event the plaintiff constructs a path way through 'A' scheduled land after filling up the pond mentioned in schedule-'A' land of the plaint, the plaintiff will lose her right to use the 'C' scheduled path way. 23. The Second appeal is accordingly allowed. 24. The judgment and decree dated 10.06.2002, passed by learned Civil Judge, Jr. Division, Court No. 2, Agartala, West Tripura in T.S. 24 of 2001 and affirmed by learned Addl. District Judge, West Tripura, Agartala by judgment and decree dated 07.07.2005, passed in T.A. 31 of 2002, are set aside. 25. Prepare appellate decree accordingly. 26. Send back the L.C. records along with a copy of this judgment.