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2014 DIGILAW 4185 (MAD)

Indirani Ammal v. S. Giridhari

2014-11-11

PUSHPA SATHYANARAYANA

body2014
Judgment Since the Appeals arise out of a same suit, they are disposed of by this common judgment. 2. The defendant in O.S. No. 708 of 1990, a suit for declaration and permanent injunction, has preferred the appeals in S.A. Nos. 433 and 434 of 2006 against the judgment and decree dated 23.07.2002 passed in A.S. Nos. 103 of 2001 and 6 of 2002 on the file of the Principal Subordinate Judge, Chengalpattu, wherein and by which the judgment and decree dated 08.10.2001 passed by the District Munsif, Chengalpattu, in O.S. No. 708 of 1990 with regard to declaration were confirmed while setting aside the decree and judgment of the trial Court in respect of 20' X 15' = 300 sq.ft. of land in possession of the appellant / defendant. 3. The case of the plaintiff is that he is the owner of the suit property which originally belonged to his paternal uncle one Janakiram Chettiar. It is stated that since he had no issues and the plaintiff was looking after him, out of love and affection, the said Janakiram Chettiar settled the suit property in his favour by a registered settlement deed dated 18.5.1970. The settlement deed was accepted by the plaintiff and acted upon and from the date of execution of the same, he had been in possession of the suit property paying the necessary revenue taxes. It is further stated that there are two thatched huts in the suit property out of which, one, put up by the plaintiff 15 years back with mud wall, is situate on the western side wherein the plaintiff has stored his articles and the other thatched shed situate on the eastern side was also put up by the plaintiff for use of watchman. While so, when the plaintiff was trying to put up a new wall with brick and mud with a view to renovate the eastern hut, the defendant, who has got no right or title over the suit property, taking advantage of the absence of the plaintiff from the village, tried to attempt and trespass over the same. The further case of the plaintiff is that the defendant also disputed his title and hence, he filed the suit for declaration and permanent injunction. 4. The further case of the plaintiff is that the defendant also disputed his title and hence, he filed the suit for declaration and permanent injunction. 4. Resisting the suit, the defendant filed written statement denying the right and title of the plaintiff as well as the alleged relationship of the plaintiff with Janakiram Chettiar. The defendant also denied the alleged settlement deed executed by the said Janakiram Chettiar on 18.5.1970. According to the defendant, the suit property was a vacant land and her father Munuswami Mudhaliar occupied the suit land in 1963. It is stated that after such occupation, he constructed the residential thatched house which is situate opposite to the Salt Line in Kelambakkam. The further case of the defendant is that the said house was bearing Door No. 1/32 and subsequently, it was changed to 1/191. It is alleged by the defendant that she had been living in the suit premises with her husband and that her marriage also had taken place in the same premises. Besides denying all the other allegations in the plaint, the defendant contended that there is no cause of action for the suit and sought for dismissal of the same. 5. Before the trial Court, the plaintiff examined himself as P.W.1 besides examining one Nammalvar as P.W.2 and marked Exs. A.1 to A.8. To nullify the case of the plaintiff, the defendant examined herself as D.W.1 besides examining three more witnesses as D.W.2 to D.W.4 and marked Exs. B.1 to B.5. The Commissioner's report and plan were marked as Exs. C.1 and C.2. 6. The trial Court, after an elaborate trial, on consideration of the materials available thereon as well as the depositions of the witnesses, finding that the plaintiff has got right in the suit property, decreed the suit granting declaration and insofar as the relief of injunction is concerned, excepting an extent of 300 sq.ft., ie., 20'X15', wherein door No. 1/191 is situate, injunction was granted in favour of the plaintiff. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree, the defendant and the plaintiff preferred Appeals Suits being A.S. Nos. 103 of 2001 and 6 of 2002 respectively, for their disallowed portion in the relief of injunction, on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Chengalpattu. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree, the defendant and the plaintiff preferred Appeals Suits being A.S. Nos. 103 of 2001 and 6 of 2002 respectively, for their disallowed portion in the relief of injunction, on the file of the Principal Subordinate Court, Chengalpattu. The Lower Appellate Court, which heard the appeals in common, on appreciation of the materials and the evidence as well as the facts and circumstances of the case, decreed the suit in toto dismissing the appeal of the defendant and decreeing the suit at the instance of the plaintiff. Feeing aggrieved, the defendant has preferred the present Second Appeals. 7. At the time of admission of the Second Appeals, the following substantial questions of law were formulated for consideration: (a) Whether the Courts below were right in not considering as to whether the alleged settlement deed alone, which is silent about the history of the alleged settlor's title, without any oral, independent evidence and without any other supporting documents of title, confer any title on the plaintiff with regard to the suit property? (b) Whether the Courts below were right in decreeing the suit by relying on the revenue documents and by holding that the execution of the settlement deed is proved without considering as to whether the contents of the settlement deed had been proved by the plaintiff? 8. Heard Mrs. G. Nalini, learned counsel appearing for the appellant and Mr. S. Ramesh, learned counsel for the respondent in both the Appeals and perused the records. 9. From the materials available on record, it is seen that a Commissioner was appointed in the suit at the instance of the defendant and he had also filed a report and plan marked as Exs. C.1 and C.2 respectively. The plaintiff who has sought for the relief of declaration, in support of his claim, had filed Ex. A.1 settlement deed dated 18.5.1970 by virtue of which, the suit 68 cents of land in S. No. 63 in Kelambakkam Village, was settled in his favour. Besides the settlement deed, the plaintiff also had filed Ex. A.2 which is the patta standing in his name which was received in the year 1987. The plaintiff also filed Exs. A.3, A.5 and A.7 property tax receipts standing in the name of Janakiram Chettiar while Exs. A.4 and A.6 are the house tax receipts in the name of the plaintiff himself. A.2 which is the patta standing in his name which was received in the year 1987. The plaintiff also filed Exs. A.3, A.5 and A.7 property tax receipts standing in the name of Janakiram Chettiar while Exs. A.4 and A.6 are the house tax receipts in the name of the plaintiff himself. The defendant who had been examined as D.W.1, has specifically admitted in her cross-examination that the suit land was a poramboke and not patta land and it was encroached by her grandfather and thereafter, her father was in possession and that now she continues to be in possession of the suit property. Therefore, it was contended by the defendant that the said Janakiram Chettiar could not have any title much less, to settle the same in favour of the plaintiff. 10. The defendant, in support of her contention that her marriage had taken place in the suit premises on 16.9.1983, had filed her Wedding Invitation, which is marked as Ex. B.1. However, the trial Court had disbelieved Ex. B.1 wedding invitation holding that the same has been created for the purpose of the case. 11. A perusal of Ex. B.1 would show that it was marked for the purpose of showing that Door No. 1/191 where her marriage took place, has been printed in the invitation. On the other hand, the reasoning given by the trial Judge is that insofar as the tax receipts paid by the defendant was concerned, it was her case that upto 1995 the receipts were lost and that the other receipts from the year 1983 were also lost. In such circumstance, the learned trial Judge had doubted the genuineness of the invitation which alone could have been spared and had rightly come to the conclusion that the wedding invitation was created for the purpose of this case. The Lower Appellate Court also held that Ex. B.1 could not be believed and relied upon for the purpose of proving possession of the defendant. It is also seen that Ex. B.2 ration card filed by the defendant which bears the name of her husband, was issued only in the year 1994 which is after the institution of the suit. Similarly, the other documents, viz., Ex. B.3, tax receipts, Ex. B.4 another ration card and Ex. It is also seen that Ex. B.2 ration card filed by the defendant which bears the name of her husband, was issued only in the year 1994 which is after the institution of the suit. Similarly, the other documents, viz., Ex. B.3, tax receipts, Ex. B.4 another ration card and Ex. B.5 voter Card of the defendant, are all of the years 1996, 1998 and 1997 respectively which are also subsequent to the institution of the suit. Hence, the Lower Appellate Court, without considering the same, rightly rejected the case of the defendant that she has been in possession of the suit property. 12. Further more, the trial Court had got misled by the Door Number given as 1/91 in Ex. B.2 whereas admittedly, it is 1/191 which relates to the suit property. Based on that, the trial Court had come to the conclusion that the hut on the eastern side measuring about 300 sq.ft. was in possession of the defendant and denied the relief of injunction to the plaintiff to that extent. Therefore, from the consideration of the documents filed by the defendant, it is clearly established that the defendant is not in possession of the suit property. It is also pertinent to point out at this juncture that merely because the defendant is unable to establish her possession or title, it does not automatically entitle the plaintiff to claim right to the property as it is settled principle that the plaintiff has to either fall or stand on his own pleadings and evidence and not to take advantage of the loopholes in the defendant’s case. 13. A perusal of Ex. A.1 settlement deed does not reveal the prior title of the settler in the suit property. Therefore, learned counsel for the appellant raised an objection that whether the settler had marketable title on the date of settlement. Be that as it may. The plaintiff has filed the other documents standing in his name as well as the settler which are prior to the suit, based on which the Courts below had decreed the suit. 14. Therefore, learned counsel for the appellant raised an objection that whether the settler had marketable title on the date of settlement. Be that as it may. The plaintiff has filed the other documents standing in his name as well as the settler which are prior to the suit, based on which the Courts below had decreed the suit. 14. To eliminate any kind of doubt about the title of the settler of the plaintiff, the respondent / plaintiff had filed a petition under Order 41 Rule 27 CPC in C.M.P. No. 1000/2013 in Second Appeal 433 of 2006, seeking to mark certain documents in which the document marked 'A' is a registered Partition Deed dated 05.01.1929. According to the petitioner / respondent herein, very recently, he could get the document which is a partition deed of the year 1929 as per which, one Gopathi Narayana Chettiar grandfather of the petitioner and Janakiram Chettiar had several properties to his ownership. Under the Partition Deed dated 05.01.1929, the suit schedule property was allotted to the paternal father of the petitioner. By virtue of the said Partition Deed, Janakiram Chettiar had become the absolute owner and thereafter, the same has been settled in favour of the petitioner by registered sale deed Ex. A.1. The description of the suit schedule property is contained as item No. 32 in the said Partition Deed. Therefore, the said Partition Deed clearly clarified the antecedent title of the settler of the plaintiff. As the said document is of more than 30 years old, learned counsel for the respondent contended that it could be admitted in evidence as per Section 90 of the Evidence Act. It is to be noted that by admitting the said document, the cause of action to the suit will not change or will introduce a new case in favour of the defendant. The said Partition Deed is only the antecedent document to Ex. A.1 which is already before this Court. 15. Similarly, the defendant / appellant filed M.P. No. 1 of 2014 seeking permission to produce certain documents which, though were available, could not be produced at the time of the suit. The said documents are the Service Discharge Certificate of the defendant's father, Post Office Savings Bank Passbook of the defendant's father and a letter addressed to her father Munuswami Mudhaliar. The said documents are the Service Discharge Certificate of the defendant's father, Post Office Savings Bank Passbook of the defendant's father and a letter addressed to her father Munuswami Mudhaliar. In all the above said documents, the address is given as 1/32 Kelambakkam, Opposite to Salt Line. According to the defendant, even in the written statement, it has been contended that the old Number for the portion in her occupation was given as 1/32 which is now renumbered as 1/191. However, there is no evidence or proof to show that it was re-numbered as 191 as the defendant has not correlated the old number 1/32 with that of 1/191. Further, the documents filed in the suit are all discredited as they were of post-suit documents. 16. Therefore, in the absence of any evidence to show that Door No. 1/32 was re-numbered 1/191 as pleaded by the defendant and since the same could not be established, reception of additional documents, even if allowed, will be useless. Hence, M.P. No. 1 of 2014 is dismissed. Insofar as the documents filed by the respondent in C.M.P. No. 1000 of 2013 is concerned, the first document viz., the Partition Deed dated 05.01.1929 alone is allowed and received as document because it is only the antecedent title deed of Ex. A.1. 17. The Commissioner who was appointed to note down the physical features of the suit property, had filed a plan and report which also show that there is an old thatched house shown as hut No. 1 which bears Door No. 1/185 and on both sides of the hut No. 1, there were innumerable Velikathan trees of about 10 to 15 years thickly grown till the southern end of the suit property. In paragraph 7 of the report, the Commissioner has further stated that the age of the walls of hut No. 2 would be about six months and this hut bore the Door No. 1/191. The report further reads that there were no household utensils or furniture inside the hut and the hut was kept clean and it had no electrification. Even from the report of the Commissioner, it can be gathered that the hut bearing Door No. 1/191 has not been occupied and there was no sign of habitation. The report further reads that there were no household utensils or furniture inside the hut and the hut was kept clean and it had no electrification. Even from the report of the Commissioner, it can be gathered that the hut bearing Door No. 1/191 has not been occupied and there was no sign of habitation. As pleaded by the plaintiff, the said hut was being renovated by him which is evident from the report of the Commissioner, who had mentioned that the age of the walls would be about six months and the ropes used in the hut also appeared new and a new wooden door was placed which had not yet been painted. 18. From the above discussion, it is amply clear that the plaintiff is the owner of the suit property and the defendant is trying to trespass into the same claiming to be in occupation of the same for more than the required statutory period. 19. Further, the defendant also claimed title by adverse possession based on the long statutory possession. However, it was contended by the learned counsel for the respondent / plaintiff that any person claiming adverse possession should prove the open, continuous and hostile possession to constitute adverse possession. 20. In this regard, learned counsel appearing for the respondent / plaintiff relied on the decision in P.T. Munichikkanna Reddy and others vs. Revamma and others [ (2007) 6 SCC 59 ] and more particularly, referred to paragraphs 10 to 19 which read as follows:- “NEW CONSIDERATION IN ADVERSE POSSESSION LAW 10. In that context it is relevant to refer to JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd v. United Kingdom wherein the European Court of Human Rights while referring to the Court of Appeal judgment JA Pye (Oxford) Ltd. v. Graham made the following reference: “Lord Justice Keene took as his starting point that limitation periods were in principle not incompatible with the Convention and that the process whereby a person would be barred from enforcing rights by the passage of time was clearly acknowledged by the Convention (Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms). This position obtained, in his view, even though limitation periods both limited the right of access to the courts and in some circumstances had the effect of depriving persons of property rights, whether real or personal, or of damages: there was thus nothing inherently incompatible as between the 1980 Act and Article 1 of the Protocol.” 11. This brings us to the issue of mental element in adverse possession cases-intention. 1. Positive Intention 12. The aspect of positive intention is weakened in this case by the sale deeds dated 11.04.1934 and 5.07.1936. Intention is a mental element which is proved and disproved through positive acts. Existence of some events can go a long way to weaken the presumption of intention to dispossess which might have painstakingly grown out of long possession which otherwise would have sufficed in a standard adverse possession case. The fact of possession is important in more than one ways: firstly, due compliance on this count attracts limitation act and it also assists the court to unearth as the intention to dispossess. 13. At this juncture, it would be in the fitness of circumstances to discuss intention to dispossess vis-a-vis intention to possess. This distinction can be marked very distinctively in the present circumstances. 14. Importantly, intention to possess can not be substituted for intention to dispossess which is essential to prove adverse possession. The factum of possession in the instant case only goes on to objectively indicate intention to possess the land. As also has been noted by the High Court, if the appellant has purchased the land without the knowledge of earlier sale, then in that case the intention element is not of the variety and degree which is required for adverse possession to materialize. 15. The High Court observed: “It is seen from the pleadings as well in evidence that the plaintiff came to know about the right of the defendants’, only when disturbances were sought to be made to his possession.” 16. In similar circumstances, in the case of Thakur Kishan Singh (dead) v. Arvind Kumar this court held: “5. As regards adverse possession, it was not disputed even by the trial court that the appellant entered into possession over the land in dispute under a licence from the respondent for purposes of brick-kiln. The possession thus initially being permissive, the burden was heavy on the appellant to establish that it became adverse. As regards adverse possession, it was not disputed even by the trial court that the appellant entered into possession over the land in dispute under a licence from the respondent for purposes of brick-kiln. The possession thus initially being permissive, the burden was heavy on the appellant to establish that it became adverse. A possession of a co-owner or of a licencee or of an agent or a permissive possession to become adverse must be established by cogent and convincing evidence to show hostile animus and possession adverse to the knowledge of real owner. Mere possession for howsoever length of time does not result in converting the permissible possession into adverse possession. Apart from it, the Appellate Court has gone into detail and after considering the evidence on record found it as a fact that the possession of the appellant was not adverse.” (emphasis supplied) 17. The present case is one of the few ones where even an unusually long undisturbed possession does not go on to prove the intention of the adverse possessor. This is a rare circumstance, which Clarke LJ in Lambeth London Borough Council v. Blackburn refers to: “I would not for my part think it appropriate to strain to hold that a trespasser who had established factual possession of the property for the necessary 12 years did not have the animus possidendi identified in the cases. I express that view for two reasons. The first is that the requirement that there be a sufficient manifestation of the intention provides protection for landowners and the second is that once it is held that the trespasser has factual possession it will very often be the case that he can establish the manifested intention. Indeed it is difficult to find a case in which there has been a clear finding of factual possession in which the claim to adverse possession has failed for lack of intention.” 18. Indeed it is difficult to find a case in which there has been a clear finding of factual possession in which the claim to adverse possession has failed for lack of intention.” 18. On intention, Powell v. Macfarlane is quite illustrative and categorical, holding in the following terms: “If the law is to attribute possession of land to a person who can establish no paper title to possession, he must be shown to have both factual possession and the requisite intention to possess (‘animus possidendi’).” * * * * If his acts are open to more than one interpretation and he has not made it perfectly plain to the world at large by his actions or words that he has intended to exclude the owner as best he can, the courts will treat him as not having had the requisite animus possidendi and consequently as not having dispossessed the owner. * * * * In my judgment it is consistent with principle as well as authority that a person who originally entered another’s land as a trespasser, but later seeks to show that he has dispossessed the owner, should be required to adduce compelling evidence that he had the requisite animus possidendi in any case where his use of the land was equivocal, in the sense that it did not necessarily, by itself, betoken an intention on his part to claim the land as his own and exclude the true owner. * * * * What is really meant, in my judgment, is that the animus possidendi involves the intention, in one’s own name and on one’s own behalf, to exclude the world at large, including the owner with the paper title if he be not himself the possessor, so far as is reasonably practicable and so far as the processes of the law will allow.” (Emphasis supplied) 19. Thus, there must be intention to dispossess. And it needs to be open and hostile enough to bring the same to the knowledge and plaintiff has an opportunity to object. After all adverse possession right is not a substantive right but a result of the waiving (willful) or omission (negligent or otherwise) of right to defend or care for the integrity of property on the part of the paper owner of the land. After all adverse possession right is not a substantive right but a result of the waiving (willful) or omission (negligent or otherwise) of right to defend or care for the integrity of property on the part of the paper owner of the land. Adverse possession statutes, like other statutes of limitation, rest on a public policy that do not promote litigation and aims at the repose of conditions that the parties have suffered to remain unquestioned long enough to indicate their acquiescence.” 21. In the above judgment, Their Lordships have considered the law of adverse possession by giving a new dimension. In such circumstances, I am of the view that no question of law, much less, substantial question of law arises for consideration. As such, the finding of the Lower Appellate Court requires no interference of this Court. 22. In view of the foregoing discussion, the Second Appeals fail and stand dismissed confirming the common judgment and decree dated 23.07.2002 passed by the Principal Subordinate Judge, Chengalpattu in A.S. Nos. 103 of 2001 and 6 of 2002. In view of the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to cost. 23. C.M.P. No. 1000 of 2013 in S.A. No. 433 of 2006 filed by the respondent / plaintiff is partly allowed admitting only the first document, viz., the Partition Deed dated 05.01.1929. Insofar as M.P. No. 1 of 2014 in S.A. No. 1 of 2014 filed by the defendant / appellant is concerned, as discussed earlier, in the absence of correlation of the Door Numbers, the documents cannot be accepted and, therefore, the same cannot be received in evidence. Hence, M.P. No. 1 of 2014 is dismissed.