T. Vaiphei, J. -- This writ petition is directed against the order dated 9-3-2011 issued by the Commissioner/Secretary, Education Department, Government of Assam (respondent 1) dismissing the petitioner from service. 2. The facts leading to the filing of this writ petition, as pleaded by the petitioner, may be briefly noticed at the very beginning. The petitioner was at the time of issuing the impugned order was holding the substantive post of Deputy Director of Education, Assam. During his tenure, he used to hold different positions including the post of District Elementary Education Officer (“DEEO”), Sivsagar, which post he held between 1992 and 1996. During his stint at Sivsagar, a disciplinary proceeding was drawn up against him vide the letter dated 4-12-2003 issued by the respondent No. 1 charging him with releasing salaries for 394 teachers whose names did not tally with the list of schools and the teachers approved by the Government. He was also charged with subsequently releasing the salaries of 73 teachers out of 564 in a phased manner though the names of teachers and schools in these cases also did not tally with the approved list of the Government. Thus, the substance of the charge is that he had released salaries to 473 teachers against the retention order of 564 posts for the year 2002-03 in a phased manner and did not release the salaries for the remaining teachers. 3. The petitioner responded to the show cause on 22-12-2003 by contending that, factually, he received the retention order of all the 564 number of teachers from the Directorate of Elementary Education and did release those salaries as a Government servant in the course of carrying out the directions of his superior authorities. According to him, even after undergoing the gruelling process of a full-fledged departmental enquiry, the authorities did not find any illegal acts against him, and his conduct was found to be appropriate and in accordance with law in terms of the enquiry report of the enquiry officer. As a result, the respondent No. 1 vide his order dated 10-8-2005 exonerated him with all the charges with the customary warning to be more careful in future. 4. However, notwithstanding the clean chit given to him earlier, while he was working as DEEO, Sivsagar, the respondent No. 1 again asked him to show cause on exactly similar and identical charges vide the communication dated 7-5-2008. 4. However, notwithstanding the clean chit given to him earlier, while he was working as DEEO, Sivsagar, the respondent No. 1 again asked him to show cause on exactly similar and identical charges vide the communication dated 7-5-2008. It is the further case of the petitioner that while going through the show cause, he stumbled upon the order dated 18-3-2008 passed by this Court in C.R. No. 2497/97 (wrongly mentioned therein as C.R. No. 2497/91) whereby it had been observed, without his knowledge and without making him a party to the writ petition, that one of the two officers responsible for issuing illegal appointments of the petitioners therein and for granting extensions of such appointments was him (the petitioner herein) and directed the departmental Secretary to enquire into the culpability of any particular officer which in the ordinary course was sufficient to initiate departmental action against that particular officer. On 2-7-2008, he duly submitted his reply to the show cause followed by his supplementary written statement dated 28-9-2008 wherein he denied all the charges levelled against him and reiterated that all those appointments were done by him under the Government orders which were valid and binding upon him as a subordinate officer. He, therefore, prayed for dropping the departmental proceedings being conducted against him. 5. Dissatisfied with the stance taken by the petitioner, a departmental enquiry was thereafter held against him by appointing one Shri H.K. Baidya, Joint Secretary to the Government of Assam, Education (Elementary) Department as the Enquiry Officer. Though he participated in the enquiry by denying all the charges, his defence was handicapped by the denial of legal assistance which, contends the petitioner, vitiates the entire enquiry proceeding. While waiting for the result of the enquiry, he suddenly came to know through the order dated 10-3-2011 issued by the Deputy Commissioner, Cachar that in terms of the order dated 9-3-2011, he had been dismissed from service. It is contended by him that before issuing the impugned order, he was never served with a copy of the enquiry report nor was he ever served with any notice about the proposed penalty in violation of Article 311(2) of the Constitution. He ultimately managed to obtain the enquiry report through an application under the RTI Act. 6. It is contended by him that before issuing the impugned order, he was never served with a copy of the enquiry report nor was he ever served with any notice about the proposed penalty in violation of Article 311(2) of the Constitution. He ultimately managed to obtain the enquiry report through an application under the RTI Act. 6. He submits that the impugned order is also illegal inasmuch as there was no mandatory consultation with or prior approval of the Assam Public Service Commission before issuing the impugned order of dismissal. His grievance is that though he has been accused of making illegal appointments and thus put to harassment and humiliation, which ultimately resulted in his dismissal from service for the alleged illegal appointment of 319 teachers, these appointees have always been getting their regular salary from the Government till now and were never removed from their services. His further grievance is that Dr. H.K. Sahu, the then Director of Higher Education was subjected to disciplinary proceeding on similar/identical charges, but he was awarded with the punishment of fine of `12,000/- only to be recovered from his pension. On merit, he contends that the Department could not produce any documentary evidence to substantiate Charge No. 1. He, therefore, prays that the impugned dismissal order, which is ex facie illegal, be set aside. 7. The writ petition is resisted by the respondent authorities through the respondent No. 1, who has filed his affidavit-in-opposition. The case of the answering respondent is that though the first departmental enquiry was subsequently dropped, it came to the notice of this Court in the said C.R. No. 2497/97 and the respondent authorities that on the basis of the order dated 17-9-1998 purportedly issued by then Director of Elementary Education, a large number of teachers were appointed against non-plan posts. It later on came to light that the said order dated 17-9-1998 was issued without the authority of the Government of Assam, and was accordingly withdrawn on 2-9-2002. This Court recorded a finding to that effect in its order dated 18-3-2008. It was on the basis of such finding of this Court that a fresh disciplinary proceeding was initiated against the petitioner. On being apprised of such development, this Court closed the writ proceeding vide the order dated 2-3-2010 with some directions. 8. This Court recorded a finding to that effect in its order dated 18-3-2008. It was on the basis of such finding of this Court that a fresh disciplinary proceeding was initiated against the petitioner. On being apprised of such development, this Court closed the writ proceeding vide the order dated 2-3-2010 with some directions. 8. It is also the case of the answering respondent that the petitioner in his written statement dated 2-7-2008 and his supplementary written statement dated 28-9-2008 admitted that such illegal appointments were made by him by carrying out the orders of the Government and superior authority. When his reply was found to be not satisfactory, rather there was admission on his part, the disciplinary authority decided to appoint the enquiry officer. The answering respondent categorically denies that there was any procedural lapse in the proceeding. On completion of the enquiry, the enquiry officer submitted his report holding that the ad-hoc appointments had been made without holding any written test/interview which amounts to violation of Government norms and procedure. The petitioner also failed to produce any document to show that he had acted as per instructions of higher officials. The enquiry officer held the petitioner as partially responsible as against the charges levelled. According to the answering, the petitioner in his deposition before the enquiry officer had clearly admitted that as per records, he made appointment of 230 such teachers and not 319 as alleged and asserted that during that period, ad-hoc appointments were permissible and as per the instruction of the then Director of Elementary Education, he was compelled to make those appointments without the concurrence of the Sub-Divisional Level Advisory Board. 9. The answering respondent further admitted in the enquiry that due to different political pressure over the Chairman and the Members of the Board, such ad-hoc appointments were made for a period of three months and that since there was delay in holding the meeting of the Board, such appointments were extended from time to time and were subsequently approved by the Board. He, however, admitted that he had no record of the selection made by the Sub-Divisional Level Selection Board. It was on the basis of the aforesaid findings that the disciplinary authority imposed the impugned penalty of dismissal upon the petitioner. He, however, admitted that he had no record of the selection made by the Sub-Divisional Level Selection Board. It was on the basis of the aforesaid findings that the disciplinary authority imposed the impugned penalty of dismissal upon the petitioner. It is submitted that a copy of the enquiry report was sent to him by registered post, and even if the report was not received by him that, ipso facto, will not vitiate the entire proceedings if no prejudice is proved by him. It is also contended that consultation with the Assam Public Service Commission is directory and cannot be said to be mandatory. It is pointed out that this Court declined to strike down those appointments in view of the long lapse of time, but it ordered that necessary administrative action should be taken against the officers responsible for such gross irregularities. These are the sum and substance of the case of the respondent authorities. 10. I have carefully perused the pleadings of the parties together with the enquiry report as well as the impugned order of the disciplinary authority. In the course of hearing, Mr. These are the sum and substance of the case of the respondent authorities. 10. I have carefully perused the pleadings of the parties together with the enquiry report as well as the impugned order of the disciplinary authority. In the course of hearing, Mr. S.S. Dey, the learned senior counsel for the petitioner, has advanced the following contentions, namely, (a) the petitioner cannot be subjected to two departmental proceedings on the same set of facts, which were sought to be proved by the same set of evidence; as the previous departmental proceedings ended in exonerating him from the charges, the instant departmental enquiry cannot be sustained in law; (b) no enquiry report was supplied to him before issuing the impugned order of dismissal, and no mandatory show cause notice was issued to him either before issuing the impugned order; (c) though the Enquiry Officer partially found him guilty of the charges on the ground that he was merely acting on the direction of his superior officers, the disciplinary authority conveniently overlooked such findings and proceeded to find him guilty of all the charges and chose to impose maximum penalty of dismissal from service; (d) there was no consultation with the Assam Public Service Commission (APSC) before dismissing him from service, which vitiates the impugned order; (d) there was non-application of mind by the disciplinary authority on the material facts of the case which resulted in recording perverse findings and (e) the penalty of dismissal imposed upon the petitioner, on the basis of partial finding of his guilt on the charges, is grossly disproportionate, more so, when other similarly situated officials have not been meted out similar punishment. He, therefore, submits that the departmental enquiry and the impugned order emanating therefrom suffer from the vice of non-application of mind, procedural improprieties, and are otherwise illegal, arbitrary and discriminatory and cannot be sustained in law. In support of his various contentions, he relies on the following decisions:- (i) Registrar-General, High Court of Patna, (2012) 6 SCC 357 ; CRPF v. Surinder Kimar, (2011) 10 SCC 244 ; (iii) Punjab National Bank and ors v. KK Verma, (2010) 13 SCC 494 ; Bank of India & anr. v. Degalu Suryanarayana (1999) 5 SCC 762 ; Managing Director, ECIL v. B. Karunakar, (1993) 4 SCC 727 and UOI & ors. v. Mohd. Ramzan Khan, (1991) 1 SCC 588 . 11. v. Degalu Suryanarayana (1999) 5 SCC 762 ; Managing Director, ECIL v. B. Karunakar, (1993) 4 SCC 727 and UOI & ors. v. Mohd. Ramzan Khan, (1991) 1 SCC 588 . 11. On the other hand, Mr. D. Saikia, the learned Additional Advocate General for Assam, supports the impugned order and contends that the petitioner has been involved in the past education scam of fake appointments of teachers and is the author of serial fraudulent appointments of teachers thereby creating havoc in the Education Department of Assam and making a mockery of the concept of recruitment of teachers based on merit and fairness. But for the findings made by this Court in C.R. No. 2497 of 1997, the illegal acts of commission and omissions in the appointment of teachers bordering on fraud, the petitioner would have been exonerated of his nefarious activities. He submits that admitted facts need not be proved and when the petitioner himself admitted that he made the impugned appointments, albeit on the instructions of his superior authorities, what more proof is required? If the petitioner takes the plea that he had acted under the direction of his superior authority, it is for him to prove with evidence that he did so; he is unable to discharge this burden. Assuming but not admitting that he had acted under the directions of his superior authority also, argues the learned AAG, he cannot escape his liability on this count inasmuch as he had knowingly carried out the illegal directions of his superior authority; he knew that there was a ban on recruitment in the State of Assam in those days. He refutes the contention of the learned senior counsel that consultation with APSC is mandatory and submits that consultation with APSC is merely directory and failure to consult the APSC before issuing the order of dismissal does not create legally enforceable right for the petitioner. He admits that a copy of the enquiry report was indeed not supplied to the petitioner by the disciplinary authority before taking a decision thereon, but he is unable to satisfy this Court even after receiving the same that any prejudice has been caused to him due to non-receipt of the report. He admits that a copy of the enquiry report was indeed not supplied to the petitioner by the disciplinary authority before taking a decision thereon, but he is unable to satisfy this Court even after receiving the same that any prejudice has been caused to him due to non-receipt of the report. In any view of the matter, concludes the learned AAG, the impugned order is perfectly in order and is warranted by the evidence on record and satisfies the doctrine of proportionality in all respects and does not need the interference of this Court. To fortify his submissions, he takes me to the following decisions:- Union of India v. TV Patel, (2007) 4 SCC 785 ; (1996) 3 SCC 364 ; (1971) 2 SCC 168 ; (1969) 2 SCC 240 and AIR 1957 SC 912 . Mr. C. Baruah, the learned standing counsel for APSC, however, drawing my attention to the decision of the Apex Court in SN Narula v. UOI, (2011) 4 SCC 591 , submits that the APSC ought to have been consulted before issuing the impugned order as required by Article 320(3)(c) of the Constitution. 12. In so far as consultation with the APSC is concerned, the Apex Court after reviewing its previous decisions held in Union of India v. T.V. Patel, (2007) 4 SCC 785 that consultation with the Public Service Commission under Article 320(3)(c) of the Constitution is not mandatory. This is what it said: “25. In view of the law settled by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Srivastava1 we hold that the provisions of Article 320(3)(c) of the Constitution of India are not mandatory and they do not confer any right on the public servant so that the absence of consultation or any irregularity in consultation process or furnishing a copy of the advice tendered by the UPSC, if any, does not afford the delinquent government servant a cause of action in a court of law.” 13. As for the non-supply of the enquiry report, I asked the learned senior counsel for the petitioner in the course of hearing as to whether I should set aside the impugned order and remand the case to the disciplinary authority for re-examination at the stage of submission of the enquiry report in accordance with the decision of the Apex Court in Managing Director, ECIL v. B. Karunakar, (1993) 4 SCC 727 , he answered in the negative. Therefore, this issue does not survive for consideration. Coming now to the validity of the findings of the disciplinary authority, the law is now well-settled that the scope of judicial review in the matter of departmental enquiry inclusive of the penalty imposed upon the delinquent official is quite limited, after all, this Court is not sitting in an appeal over the decision of the disciplinary authority. The leading authority in this field is the decision of the three-Judge Bench of the Apex Court in the High Court of Judicature at Bombay v. Shashikant S. Pant, (2000) 1 SCC 416 . For better appreciation of the decision, I may briefly refer to the facts of that case. The respondent therein was a Judicial Officer against whom disciplinary proceedings were initiated on the basis of a complaint. The enquiry officer exonerated him of the charges but the Disciplinary Committee of the High Court, after issuing show cause notice to the respondent, held the charges as proved against him. The Governor on the recommendation of the High court imposed penalty of compulsory retirement on him. A Division Bench of the High Court on the judicial side, however, quashed the penalty on the ground that the Disciplinary Committee had not put forward adequate reasons for differing with the findings of the enquiry officer. The division Bench made the following observations in this regard ? “when the disciplinary authority differed from the findings entered by an enquiry officer, it is imperative to discuss materials in detail and contest the conclusions of the enquiry officer and then record their own conclusions”. Besides, the Division Bench propounded the following legal proposition ? The division Bench made the following observations in this regard ? “when the disciplinary authority differed from the findings entered by an enquiry officer, it is imperative to discuss materials in detail and contest the conclusions of the enquiry officer and then record their own conclusions”. Besides, the Division Bench propounded the following legal proposition ? “It is an established principle in disciplinary jurisprudence that when the disciplinary authority differs from the findings of the enquiry officer, it has to discuss the entire case threadbare and establish that each finding of the enquiry officer was totally improbable; that in the light of the materials the only conclusion that can be arrived at by an ordinary prudent man, is the conclusion arrived at by the disciplinary authority”. Setting aside the decision of the Division Bench, the apex Court held: “16. The Division Bench of the High Court seems to have approached the case as though it was an appeal against the order of the administrative/disciplinary authority of the High Court. Interference with the decisions of the departmental authorities can be permitted, while exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution if such authority had held proceedings in violation of the principles of natural justice or in violation of statutory regulations prescribing the mode of such enquiry or if the decision of the authority is vitiated by considerations extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case, or if the conclusion made by the authority, on the very face of it, is wholly arbitrary or capricious that no reasonable person could have arrived at such a conclusion, or ground very similar to the above. But we cannot overlook that the departmental authority (in this case the Disciplinary Committee of the High court) is the sole judge of the facts, if the enquiry has been properly conducted. The settled legal position is that if there is some legal evidence on which the findings can be based, then adequacy or even reliability of that evidence is not a matter for canvassing before the High court in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the constitution. 17. The settled legal position is that if there is some legal evidence on which the findings can be based, then adequacy or even reliability of that evidence is not a matter for canvassing before the High court in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the constitution. 17. In State of A.P. v. S. Sree Rama Rao1 this Court has stated so and further observed thus: “The High Court is not constituted under Article 226 of the constitution as a court of appeal over the decision of the authorities holding a departmental enquiry against a public servant: it is concerned to determine whether the enquiry is held by an authority competent in that behalf, and whether the rules of natural justice are not violated. Where there is some evidence, which the authority entrusted with the duty to hold the enquiry has accepted and which evidence may reasonably support the conclusion that the delinquent officer is guilty of the charge, it is not the function of the High Court in a petition for a writ under Article 226 to review the evidence and to arrive at an independent finding on the evidence.” (Underlined for emphasis) 14. It is against the backdrop of the law so propounded by the Apex Court that I now propose to examine whether the interference of this Court is called for in the findings of the disciplinary authority. It is against the backdrop of the law so propounded by the Apex Court that I now propose to examine whether the interference of this Court is called for in the findings of the disciplinary authority. The findings recorded by the enquiry officer are that the charged officer had appointed 230 persons in the posts of Assistant Teacher of ME Schools on ad-hoc basis for a period of three months as admitted by him in his statement before him; that the charged officer admitted that before issuing the above appointments, he had not obtained the approval of the Sub-Divisional Advisory Board (SDAB); that the appointments were issued in anticipation of the approval of the SDAB; that the charged officer admitted that since there was delay in holding the meetings of SDAB, the above appointments were extended from time to time; that he admitted that the above teachers were allowed to continue in their services until further orders; that the plea made by the charged officer that he had issued the ad-hoc appointments of Assistant Teacher due to political pressure and other circumstances was unacceptable; that the charged officer could not produce any Government order regarding permission for issuing appointments on ad-hoc basis prior to 1996; that the Government had issued order in 1996 and 2001 banning all ad-hoc appointments; that the ad-hoc appointments had been issued without holding any written test/interview which tantamount to commission of grave violation of Government norms and procedures and give rise to serious doubts about the entire process of appointment of teachers. It was on the basis of the aforesaid findings that the enquiry officer held the petitioner guilty of the charges. The disciplinary authority accepted the findings and imposed the impugned order of dismissal. As the enquiry officer had based some of his findings on the admission purportedly made by the petitioner, I have taken the pain of reading his deposition recorded by the enquiry officer, which is annexed at Annexure-A to the Affidavit-in-opposition. 15. On going through the said deposition, it is as clear as daylight that the petitioner, on his own admission, has deposed that “[I]t is not true that as the DEEO, Sivsagar I had appointed 319 M.E. School teachers, as alleged, during the period mentioned herein above. Rather, as per Govt. records it is mentioned that I had appointed 230 such teachers. Rather, as per Govt. records it is mentioned that I had appointed 230 such teachers. As per records, the remaining (319-230) 89 teachers were appointed by Shri Hiri Kumar Sahu during his tenure. Those teachers were initially appointed for a period of 3 months against regular vacancy and as per my knowledge such appointments were made both in plan and non-plan posts. During that period, ad-hoc appointments were opened and I was compelled to make appointments of those teachers without concurrence of the Sub-Divisional Level Advisory Board as per the direction of the Director of Elementary Education. ….. It is further mentioned that during that period, on account of different political pressure upon the Chairman and the members of the Board such ad-hoc appointments had to be made for 3 months. …” The learned AAG, drawing my attention to Rule 3 of the Assam Elementary Education (Provincialization) Rules, 1977, submits that such ad-hoc appointments without advertising the posts in newspapers and without undergoing the selection process undertaken by the Selection Board is illegal, and the petitioner has clearly acted contrary to law in making such appointments, which act of commission or omission constitutes misconduct. 16. Though there is an admission about appointing 230 teachers, an attempt is nevertheless being made by the learned senior counsel to demonstrate that such appointments have been made by him either on the direction of the Director of Elementary Education or under political pressure, and the petitioner cannot, ipso facto, be faulted with. This submission is only to be noted to be summarily rejected inasmuch as no illegal action of a Government can be condoned simply on the ground that he was following or carrying out the direction of his superior authority. Moreover, even assuming that such defence can be legally tenable also, there is no shred of evidence produced by the petitioner to show that such illegal appointments were made by him on the direction of the Director of Elementary Education or under political pressure. He did not even say that he was under political pressure: he merely said that such appointments had to be made for three under different political pressure upon the Chairman and the members of the Board. He did not even say that he was under political pressure: he merely said that such appointments had to be made for three under different political pressure upon the Chairman and the members of the Board. A desperate attempt was again made by the learned senior counsel that such admission has lost its significance once a full-fledged departmental enquiry was held against the petitioner, and the petitioner can be held guilty of the charge only independent of such admission. The learned senior counsel has completely overlooked the fact that such admission is still on record as deposed to by the petitioner in the course of the enquiry as already noticed. He also would like to contend that such admission cannot be held admissible. This contention cannot also be accepted inasmuch as it is a fairly settled position of law that admission is the best piece of evidence against the person making the admission. It is, however, open to the person making the admission to show why the admission is not to be acted upon.? See Delhi Transport Corpn. V. Shyam Lal, (2004) 4 SCC 88. No reason is given as to why the admission cannot be acted upon. Thus, it can be truly and emphatically said that this is a case in which there is some evidence, which the disciplinary authority has accepted and which evidence reasonably support the conclusion that the petitioner is guilty of the charges: the adequacy of that evidence is not a matter for canvassing before this Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. 17. This then takes me to the last submission of the learned senior counsel that the penalty of dismissal imposed upon the petitioner on the partial finding of guilt is harsh, grossly disproportionate and has the potential of shocking the conscience of this Court. As already noticed, the finding against the petitioner on his act of commission or omission is not a partial finding but a total finding. Two hundred and thirty teachers were appointed by him without any regard for the recruitment rules and by throwing into the winds all norms of recognized form of recruitment in violation of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. Two hundred and thirty teachers were appointed by him without any regard for the recruitment rules and by throwing into the winds all norms of recognized form of recruitment in violation of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution. He has single-handedly blocked the prospects of many meritorious unemployed educated youth from securing public employment through competition and, that too, by use of fair means thereby generating public cynicism in the fairness of the very system. No, the conscience of this Court cannot be shocked by the penalty of dismissal imposed upon him by the disciplinary authority: he should have also been put behind bar in addition to dismissal from service. Any penalty less than that of dismissal will send a wrong signal to other officials who are prone to commit similar misconduct. This is the one little contribution which can be made by this Court to cleanse the system of administration and ensure that the administration is conducted in accordance with legally accepted norms. Why other officials equally guilty of the same misconduct are not punished or punished lightly is one thing this Court is not in position to answer since the responsibility to fix them is left by the legislature upon the Government of the day. Therefore, no interference is called in the impugned penalty of dismissal. Lastly, it has been argued that the petitioner cannot be subjected to another enquiry after he has been exonerated of the same charge. In my opinion, there is no such thing as double jeopardy in a departmental enquiry. Moreover, the enquiry has been conducted by the respondents in compliance with the direction of this Court in C.R. No. 2497 of 1997. Therefore, both the departmental proceeding and the impugned order cannot be faulted with in any manner. 18. For the reasons stated in the foregoing, there is no merit in this writ petition, which is hereby dismissed. However, I direct the parties to bear their respective costs.