Judgment A.S. Pachhapure, J. 1. The appellant has challenged the judgment and decree in O.S. No. 44/2008 dated 15.09.2009, dismissing her suit filed for partition and separate possession of the share in the house property and payment of share in the Provident Fund, Family Pension, Education Fund etc. 2. The parties would be referred to as per their ranks before the Trial Court for the sake of convenience. 3. The facts relevant for the purpose of this appeal are as follows: The appellant who is the plaintiff before the trial Court is the mother of Channappa Kshatri, whereas the 1st defendant is her daughter-in-law and wife of Channappa (the deceased). Channappa (the deceased) is the son of the plaintiff and the husband of the 1st defendant and was serving as a conductor in KSRTC and the 2nd defendant is his employer. Defendants 3 to 5 are the insurers, whereas the 6th defendant is a financier. Channappa (the deceased) during the service, died on 22.02.2008 in a road traffic accident. His last drawn gross salary was Rs. 12,175.85 paise. The plaintiff and the 1st defendant were entitled to the Provident Fund, Family pension, Education Fund and also the amount under the insurance policies. The deceased had purchased a site bearing plot No. 186 in Sy. No. 310/1 situated at Mahalbagayat, Bijapur. He constructed a house at his own cost. On his death, the plaintiff though was in difficulty, was not given her share. Hence, she instituted the suit for partition and separate possession of her one half share in the house property and share in the familpension and other monetary benefits. 4. The 1st defendant filed her written statement and contended that the suit is not maintainable, as the joint family properties are not included in the suit and other sons of the plaintiff are not the parties. She admitted that the plot was the self-acquired property of Channappa and he having put up the construction of a building by raising loan under an unregistered mortgage transaction. It was her contention that Abdulajij Gesudraj Inamdar, the mortgagee is a necessary party to the suit. It was also her contention that the deceased has the 1/8th share in the joint family properties and his other brothers were not impleaded in the suit. It was her contention that Abdulajij Gesudraj Inamdar, the mortgagee is a necessary party to the suit. It was also her contention that the deceased has the 1/8th share in the joint family properties and his other brothers were not impleaded in the suit. So also she contented that the family owned a tractor and trailer and it was necessary for the plaintiff to include all these properties in the suit. Contending that a false suit has been instituted, she sought for the dismissal of the suit with compensatory costs of Rs. 10,000/-. 5. The 3rd defendant has filed the written statement which has been adopted by defendant No. 4 and it is his specific contention that a sum of Rs. 8,989/- has been paid to the 1st defendant through a cheque dated 31.05.2008 due under the policy of the deceased, as the 1st defendant was the nominee. 6. The 5th defendant has filed the written statement denying the averments made and calling upon the plaintiff to prove the averments in the plaint. 7. On the basis of these pleadings, the trial Court has framed the following issues: 1) Whether plaintiff proved that, she is having 1/2 share in all the suit properties? 2) Whether defendant No. 1 proves that, Sri Abdulajij Gesudraj Inamdar is necessary party to this suit and without impleading him suit cannot be proceeded with? 3) Whether defendant No. 1 further proves that, the plaintiff has not included other landed properties and house property as mentioned in para No. 4 of written statement into the hatchpot of the suit? 4) Whether defendant No. 1 further proves that, suit is bad for non-joinder of necessary parties as claimed in para No. 4 of the written statement? 5) What decree or order? 8. During the trial, the plaintiff was examined as PW. 1 and in her evidence, the documents Ex. P1 to P3 were marked. The defendants examined DWs. 1 and 2 and in their evidence, documents Exs. D1 to D5 were marked. 9. The Trial Court, after hearing the counsel and on appreciation of the evidence on record, dismissed the suit on the ground that the other joint family properties are not included in the suit and a suit for partition in the absence of all other joint family properties and other co-parceners cannot be maintained. D1 to D5 were marked. 9. The Trial Court, after hearing the counsel and on appreciation of the evidence on record, dismissed the suit on the ground that the other joint family properties are not included in the suit and a suit for partition in the absence of all other joint family properties and other co-parceners cannot be maintained. Aggrieved by the judgment and decree of dismissal, the plaintiff has filed this appeal. 10. I have heard the learned counsel for both the parties. 11. The point that arise for my consideration is: Whether in the present suit instituted for partition of self acquired properties of Channappa (the deceased), was it necessary for the plaintiff to include the joint family properties and to implead the members of the joint family? 12. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the suit instituted by the appellant is confined only to the self-acquired properties of Channappa (the deceased), the son of the appellant and husband of the 1st defendant and it is not necessary for the plaintiff to include the joint family properties, as the plaintiff has no intention to severe the joint family status and as the suit properties are the self acquisitions, wherein plaintiff and the 1st defendant are only the class-1 heirs, it was not necessary to institute a suit for general partition. Hence, he submits that the judgment and decree of the trial Court dismissing the suit is erroneous and illegal. On the other hand, learned counsel for respondent No. 1 submits that in a suit instituted for partition, all the joint family properties will have to be included and all the sharers should be impleaded. He submits that a suit for partial partition of specified items can only be an exception and in the instant case, as the suit was not filed for partition of all the joint family properties and the suit is not covered by any exceptions, the trial Court was justified in dismissing the suit as not maintainable. 13. It is not in dispute that the plaintiff, the mother of Channappa (the deceased) and the 1st defendant, the wife of Channappa (the deceased) are the only class-1 heirs to succeed to the self-acquired properties of Channappa (the deceased). 13. It is not in dispute that the plaintiff, the mother of Channappa (the deceased) and the 1st defendant, the wife of Channappa (the deceased) are the only class-1 heirs to succeed to the self-acquired properties of Channappa (the deceased). So also it is not in dispute that the suit house is the self-acquired property of Channappa and in the monetary benefits, except the class-1 heirs, no other persons have any share. It is in these circumstances that the question raised in this appeal has to be determined. 14. Learned counsel for the respondent has placed reliance on the decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court reported in AIR 1981 Andhra Pradesh 84 (Vemavarapur Mallikarjuna Rao v. Chaturvedula Siva Sankara Prasad and others). In the said decision it has been held that normally a suit instituted for partition should be one for partition of the entire joint family properties and all the co-sharers should be impleaded. The suit for partial partition of specified items can only be an exception. In the aforesaid case the suit was not filed in respect of all the joint family properties and it was not covered by the exception and hence was held to be not maintainable. 15. So also in a decision of this Court reported in ILR 1998 Kar. 681 (Sri Tukaram vs. Sri Sambhaji & Ors.) it was held that a suit for partial partition is not maintainable except in exceptional cases. 16. So also the Apex Court had an occasion to consider this aspect and in the decision reported in AIR 2009 SC 1089 (S. Satnam Singh and others Versus Surender Kaur and another) it is held that ordinarily, a suit for partial partition may not be entertained - When parties have brought on records by way of pleadings and/or other material that apart from the property mentioned by plaintiff in his plaint, there are other properties which could be a subject matter of the partition, Court would be entitled to pass a decree even in relation thereto. 17. As could be seen from the principle laid by the Courts in the aforesaid judgments, the suits instituted therein were suit for partition and separate possession of the properties of a joint family. 17. As could be seen from the principle laid by the Courts in the aforesaid judgments, the suits instituted therein were suit for partition and separate possession of the properties of a joint family. Whenever a partition is claimed in respect of joint family properties, it is necessary for the parties to include all the properties of the joint family and the sharers, seek the severance in the status of the joint family by claiming partition. In such suits, it is necessary to include all the properties for the reason that in the final decree proceedings, adjustment of the shares of the parties is done on the basis of the principle of equity and to adjust the shares depending upon the nature of the properties, fertility of land etc., the Court requires inclusion of all the properties to work out equities as it may result in one of the shares, not getting share in each of the items of the portable properties and it may necessary for adjustment of conflicting rights and liabilities, as it is an essential requirement of partition. This would avoid even the multiplicity of the proceedings between the parties. 18. The principles laid down by the Courts in the aforesaid judgment does not apply to the facts on hand. The first and foremost reason is that the suit properties are the self-acquired properties of Channappa (the deceased). In these self-acquired properties, it is only his mother and wife, who are entitled to a share. The brothers of deceased Channappa cannot claim the share in the self-acquired properties of the deceased, as they are not the class-1 heirs. The provisions applicable for the share in the self-acquired properties is governed by Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. The parties do not in dispute that except the plaintiff and defendant No. 1, there are no other class-1 heirs. Though the brothers of Channappa (the deceased) who do not have a share in the suit properties, may be proper parties but certainly they are not necessary parties. The lis between the parties could be determined in their absence. The parties do not in dispute that except the plaintiff and defendant No. 1, there are no other class-1 heirs. Though the brothers of Channappa (the deceased) who do not have a share in the suit properties, may be proper parties but certainly they are not necessary parties. The lis between the parties could be determined in their absence. To take an illustration, where, 'A' and 'B' are the brothers and 'A' has self-acquired properties purchased from his own income, being a Government Servant, these properties acquired from his own income, he can give it to his wife or children and there is no necessity for him to consult his brother 'B' and he could continue as a member of the joint family with his brother, despite the partition of his self-acquired properties with his wife and children. The question of working out equities also does not arise, as the suit properties are the self-acquired properties, for which there cannot be any adjustment of equity with the joint family properties. So there is no bar for the plaintiff to seek her share in the self-acquired properties of her son leaving apart her share in the joint family properties held by the joint family. Both the parties even after this partition can continue to be the members of joint family and enjoy the joint family properties. There need not be a severance in the joint family status. Therefore, despite the fact that the joint family properties are not included, the lis between the parties could be decided by granting their share. 19. If there was any dispute by the defendant that the house property in the name of Channappa (the deceased) is the joint family property, then it was necessary for the plaintiff to implead the other co-parceners or the sharers. In the absence of any such defence and having admitted the fact that the suit properties being the self-acquired properties, the brothers of Channappa (the deceased) are not necessary parties. Even if there is a collusion between the plaintiff and the defendant to obtain a decree for their share in these properties, as the decree does not bind on the brothers of Channappa (the deceased), they have a right to challenge this decree in case if they have any grievance. But their absence as parties to this, is not a bar to maintain the suit. But their absence as parties to this, is not a bar to maintain the suit. Therefore, when the brothers of Channappa (the deceased) are not necessary parties, the suit instituted is maintainable even in the absence of his brothers. 20. The trial Court relied upon the decisions which are applicable, in a case where there is a suit for general partition of joint family properties and all the joint family properties were not included in the hotchpot and applying the said principle, the suit came to be dismissed as not maintainable. The trial Court, lost sight of the fact that the suit properties are the self-acquired properties and except the plaintiff and defendant No. 1, there are no other sharers. Therefore, it ought to have held that the plaintiff could claim her share in the self-acquired properties. For this reason, the impugned judgment and decree deserve to be set aside. As the plaintiff and defendant No. 1 have an equal share in the suit properties, the plaintiff is entitled to a decree to an extent of half share. Accordingly, the point is answered in negative. Consequently, the appeal is allowed. The judgment and decree impugned in this appeal are set aside. The suit instituted by the appellant is decreed, granting half share in the suit properties.