Judgment : This Second Appeal arises out of a simple money suit in O.S.No.66 of 2004, instituted in the Court of learned Subordinate Judge, Uthamapalayam. The defendant is the appellant. 2. The life history of the Second Appeal proceeds on the following lines. 3. Plaintiff advanced a loan of Rs.50,000/-to the defendant on 23.03.2002. Defendant executed in his favour Ex.A.1 suit promissory note dated 19.06.1999. Since the amount was not paid, plaintiff issued her Exs.A.2 and A.3, lawyer's notices. But, no reply, no money. So, this suit for recovery of money. 4. This money claim has been opposed by the defendant by filing a written statement. 5. The plea in the written statement proceeds on the following lines. 6. Defendant borrowed money from Thavamani, her husband's brother Rasu Thevar and his wife Rajathi under a mortgage bond dated 21.10.1999. Defendant was paying the interest. But they did not give her any receipt. Further, on the instruction of Raju Thevar, defendant paid Rs.1,50,000/- towards the principal to Raju Thevar's daughter and son-in-law, namely, Ananthi and Jeyakumar. However, no receipt was given. Since from November, 2001 payment of interest was pending, during December, 2001, at the insistence of Thavamani, Rasu Thevar and Rajathi the defendant gave them a blank paper and a blank promissory note with her signatures alone. However, Rasu Thevar used the name of his benami/plaintiff and filed the suit filling up the blank promissory note. He has also filed another suit in O.S.No.154 of 2002 using the other blank signed document. Defendant did not know the plaintiff. He did not borrow any money from him. 7. The trial Court framed issues and tried the suit. Plaintiff Kubenthiran and one Sundaramoorthi were examined as P.Ws.1 and 2, Exs.A.1 to A.3 were marked, while defendant Logarani examined herself as D.W.1 and marked Exs.B.1 and B.2. 8. Considering the arguments of both and appreciating the evidence adduced, the trial Court accepting the case of the plaintiff, applied Section 118, 20 of the Negotiable Instruments Act and concluded that the defendant had failed to prove her case and thus decreed the suit. 9. Thereafter, the defendant had gone to the next appellate Court/Fast Track Court, Periyakulam. The learned appellate Judge considering the evidence and the arguments of both dismissed the appeal. 10. Thus, now the Second Appeal is before us. 11. 9. Thereafter, the defendant had gone to the next appellate Court/Fast Track Court, Periyakulam. The learned appellate Judge considering the evidence and the arguments of both dismissed the appeal. 10. Thus, now the Second Appeal is before us. 11. Now, before us, the learned counsels exhibited their forensic skill by performing autopsy on the judgments of the trial Court as well as the first appellate Court. The Judgments and not the Judges are under attack. 12. The learned counsel for the appellant would further submit that merely because the signature has been admitted, it cannot be said that the execution of the promissory note itself has been admitted. 13. It has been contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that at no point of time either in the pleadings or in the written statement or in the evidence, the defendant has admitted execution of Ex.A.1 as a promissory note. The consistent plea of the defendant is that her signature has been snatched from her on the compulsion of one Rasu Thevar and his supporters. Plaintiff Kubendran is a stranger to the defendant. He is his stooge, phantom and bubble. Kubendran is a veil of the said Rasu Thevar. 14. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that both the trial Court as well as the 1st appellate Court have not even touched the defendant's case. 15. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondent /plaintiff would submit that the defendant is a knowing lady. Very wise. Intelligent. Fully conscious of her mental faculty, she had signed in the printed promissory note. Now, in order to wriggle out of the adverse situation, she is speaking otherwise in her written statement. Above all, under Exs.A.2 and A.3, detailing the borrowings and the execution of the promissory note, notices were sent to the defendant, she had received them, but kept mum. Primarily, as to the execution of Ex.A.1 promissory note, evidence of P.Ws.1 and 2 have been let in and the execution has been proved and under such circumstances, the presumption under Section 118 arises in favour of the plaintiff. In this respect, the learned counsel cited MANI VS. ELUMALAI ( 2002 (3) CTC 598 ). 16. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions of both sides, perused the record of the case and the impugned judgments and the decision cited. 17. In this respect, the learned counsel cited MANI VS. ELUMALAI ( 2002 (3) CTC 598 ). 16. I have given my anxious consideration to the submissions of both sides, perused the record of the case and the impugned judgments and the decision cited. 17. The respondent says that on 19.06.1999, defendant borrowed Rs.1,50,000/- from him and agreed to repay the same with prescribed rate of interest and executed Ex.A.1 promissory note. However, execution of Ex.A.1 as a promissory note in favour of the plaintiff has been denied. Defendant says that Ex.A.1 itself is a creation of one Rasu Thevar and his men and plaintiff Kubendran is a part of the said gang. 18. Negotiable Instruments Act contains certain Special Rules of Evidence. Section 118 of the said Act says that once the execution of the negotiable instruments is proved, that it has been executed for consideration has to be presumed, some more presumptions thereon are as to date, time, name etc. Similar presumption is found in Section 139 of the same Act. Similar presumption has also been incorporated in Section 114 (a) of the Indian Evidence Act. 19. These presumptions are created by law. They are created through legal provisions. So, they are "legal presumptions". They are of two types. 'Shall presume' and 'may presume'. If it is 'shall presume', it is mandatory. There is no exemption. It has to be taken as it is. But, in the other type, namely 'may presume', it is open to be refuted, contradicted, displaced and disproved. So it is not 'conclusive' but 'rebuttable'. 20. Now who is to prove the execution of the promissory note. How to prove it. What is the consequences of such proof. How the defendant could escape from it. What he has to do. The Hon'ble Apex Court in BHARAT BARREL DRUM MFG. CO. VS. AMIN CHAND PAYRELAL ( 1999 (3) S.C.C. 35 ), has dealt with these aspects. 21. In order to raise the said legal presumption under Section 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, in his favour the plaintiff has to let in evidence to prove the due execution of the promissory note. When once he has so established the arising of the presumption under Section 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is a natural fall out. However, the defendant can displace it by raising a probable defense. When once he has so established the arising of the presumption under Section 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is a natural fall out. However, the defendant can displace it by raising a probable defense. A mere denial in the written statement is not enough. To prove his defense, he need not let in direct evidence but to show that the passing of consideration is improbable or doubtful or illegal, the defendant should bring on record the circumstances and factual aspects that would make a prudent man to disbelieve the existence of consideration for the promissory note. When once defendant so establishes the absence of consideration, the onus shift to the plaintiff, thereafter, it is for him to prove execution of the promissory note. Thus, the 'onus' is moving like a pendulum, like a 'shifting stand'. But, at the same time, the initial duty/burden of each, namely, plaintiff to prove the execution and defendant to rebut the presumption arising under Section 118 Negotiable Instruments Act will never change. They are permanent features in a suit instituted on the footing of a negotiable instrument. When the defendant fails to rebut the legal presumption, again the legal presumption under Section 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act will stand as it is. The decision in MANI (supra) is also on similar lines. 22. Now, in the instant case, the defendant is stated to have bounded to pay the principal and interest under Ex.A.1 promissory note dated 19.06.1999. 23. P.W.1 plaintiff Kubendran deposed in extenso as to the execution of Ex.A.1 promissory note. P.W.2, who is stated to have scribed Ex.A.1 also spoken in support of execution of it. Both have withstood the cross examination. No dent has been made in their evidence. What more one may expect from a plaintiff for due execution of a promissory note. The plaintiff cannot do magic, nor dance, nor sing, nor cry loudly to prove execution of the promissory note. Top of it all, defendant admits her signature in Ex.A.1. 24. Now, the headache is for the defendant. She has to rebut the said legal presumption. Her specific plea in her written statement is that she never knew the plaintiff, she did not know who he is. Top of it all, defendant admits her signature in Ex.A.1. 24. Now, the headache is for the defendant. She has to rebut the said legal presumption. Her specific plea in her written statement is that she never knew the plaintiff, she did not know who he is. Her version of the case is that these are all wrong doings of one Rasu Thevar and his gang members which consists of Rajathi, Anandhi and Jeyakumar and also the plaintiff. Further, discharge of a mortgage bond also has been stated. 25. Ex.A.1 is a printed promissory note form. When a person signs in such a promissory note form, he would have signed it with such intention. That apart, Section 20 of Negotiable Instrument Act authorizes the holder of the negotiable instrument, which is incomplete, inchoate, holder to fill up the blanks with amount up to the amount covered under the stamp value. Therefore, on the anvil of Section 20, the plea of the defendant has to be negatived. 26. The most disadvantageous aspect as against the defendant her having kept quiet even after receiving plaintiff's lawyer notice. There was no immediate reply to the plaintiff lawyer's notice. It is an indication that the defendant could not be able to give contrary reason. Truth is stranger than fiction. Without immediately responding to the suit notice, subsequently fictional statement in a concocted form have been couched in the written statement. 27. Thus, execution of Ex.A.1 has been duly proved by the plaintiff. Now, the fallout is arising of the legal presumption under Section 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act in favour of the plaintiff. 28. All remain as her plea in her written statement. A mere plea is not equallent to proof. It will remain as it is unless proved by acceptable evidence, if not admitted by the other side. 29. However, in the instant case, no such evidence has been adduced to substantiate the defendant's plea in the written statement. Except the highly interest testimony of defendant in the nature of negative evidence, nothing is there on her side. Thus, it is seen that the legal presumption arose in favour of the plaintiff under Section 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act has not been displaced by the defendant. Thus, the legal presumption remain unshackled not to be overrun by a violent side wind. 30. Thus, it is seen that the legal presumption arose in favour of the plaintiff under Section 118 of the Negotiable Instruments Act has not been displaced by the defendant. Thus, the legal presumption remain unshackled not to be overrun by a violent side wind. 30. In winding up our discussion on the evidence and the arguments of the learned counsel and also on the judgment of the Courts below, we are of the irresistible conclusion that the conclusion arrived at by the trial Court as well as the appellate Court are not flawed and their views are perfectly all right. 31. In the end, as there is no merit in this appeal, this appeal fails and it is dismissed. The judgment of the trial Court and the first appellate Court are upheld. However, in the facts and circumstances, parties are left to bear their respective costs in this Second Appeal.