ORDER : J.K. MAHESHWARI, J. 1. This petition under Section 439(2) of Cr.PC has been filed seeking cancellation of bail granted to non-applicant Nos. 1 and 2 by ASJ, Barwah. Both were made accused in Crime No. 51/13 registered at Arakshi Kendra, Balvada for an offence under Sections 306 and 34 of IPC whereby deceased Pankaj Dubey, husband of accused Sapna, committed suicide on 12-2-2013 at about 11.00 p.m. The prosecution recovered a suicide note wherein allegations of abetment to commit suicide were levelled, in addition statements were also recorded, however, on such allegations, both the non-applicant Nos. 1 and 2 and co-accused Sapna were implicated in this case. The facts leading to file this case are that both the non-applicants applied under Section 438 of Cr.PC seeking anticipatory bail bearing No. 51/2013 (15/2013), which was rejected on 1-4-2013 by the Additional Sessions Judge, Barwah on merits. On rejection, they have filed bail application under Section 438 of Cr.PC (M.Cr.C. No. 4455/2013) before this Court, which was dismissed, for want of prosecution on having case diary available. Then they have filed 2nd bail application before ASJ, Barwah bearing No. 60/2013, under Section 438 of Cr.PC, which was granted, as per order dated 9-7-2013 on the ground of parity with co-accused Sapna. It is not in dispute that co-accused Sapna applied under Section 438 of Cr.PC before the Sessions Court as well as before this Court but her bail applications were rejected. Thereafter, she has surrendered to the custody and applied under Section 439 of Cr.PC before the Additional Sessions Judge, Barwah, which also was rejected, but granted by the High Court under Section 439 of Cr.PC. However, grant of anticipatory bail to non-applicants on the basis of parity with co-accused Sapna has been assailed, being abuse of process of law. 2. It is the contention of Shri N.J. Dave, learned Counsel representing applicant, that on rejection of bail of the non-applicant Nos. 1 and 2 by the Trial Court under Section 438 of Cr.PC, and by the High Court, the second bail application under Section 438, Cr.PC ought not to be entertained and granted by ASJ, Barwah. 2. It is the contention of Shri N.J. Dave, learned Counsel representing applicant, that on rejection of bail of the non-applicant Nos. 1 and 2 by the Trial Court under Section 438 of Cr.PC, and by the High Court, the second bail application under Section 438, Cr.PC ought not to be entertained and granted by ASJ, Barwah. In fact, the recourse was available to them to apply either before High Court by filing IInd anticipatory bail, or before Hon'ble the Supreme Court, however, without having any substantial change in the circumstances, grant of anticipatory bail by Additional Sessions Judge, is not permissible. In support of his contention reliance has been placed on a judgment of Full Bench consisting of five Judges of Calcutta High Court in the case of Sri Sudip Sen Vs. The State of West Bengal, (2010) CriLJ 4628, wherein it is held that if a person chooses to straightway move to the High Court in first instance and his application is rejected, on the same set of facts and circumstances he will not be entitled to move to the Court of Sessions for second time but may invoke extraordinary powers seeking special leave to appeal in Supreme Court. In such circumstances, the subsequent bail granted under Section 438, Cr.PC to non-applicant Nos. 1 and 2 by Additional Sessions Judge is unsustainable and is amounting to abuse of the process of the Court, which may be cancelled. 3. Shri K.R. Dilliwal, learned Counsel representing both the non-applicant accuseds has argued in support of the contents of the order passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Barwah, and urged that subsequent anticipatory bail has rightly been granted because non-applicants were senior citizens, not having good health, and also on the ground of parity with co-accused Sapna. In case, some procedural mistake is found, it may be ignored looking to their age, and the order to grant anticipatory bail may not be cancelled. It is further his submission that the non-applicants were granted anticipatory bail, however, this petition under Section 439(2) for cancellation of their bail is not maintainable, however, on the said preliminary objection, this petition ought to be dismissed. 4. Shri Rahul Vijayvargiya, learned Panel Lawyer appearing on behalf of the State submits that after rejection of first anticipatory bail application on merits by the Additional Sessions Judge, Barwah, non-applicant Nos. 4. Shri Rahul Vijayvargiya, learned Panel Lawyer appearing on behalf of the State submits that after rejection of first anticipatory bail application on merits by the Additional Sessions Judge, Barwah, non-applicant Nos. 1 and 2 have applied to the High Court, which was dismissed for want of prosecution but after perusal of case diary, which was available on the said date. However, grant of repeat bail by the ASJ, Barwah is amounting to abuse of process of Court and also amounting to judicial indiscipline. In support of his contention, reliance has been placed on a judgment of this Court in the case of Satish Babu Lodhi Vs. State of M.P., ILR [2012] MP 632. The judgment of Sudip Sen (supra), contending that Subordinate Court should not oblige to entertain and grant the repeat anticipatory bail after rejection by the High Court. It is also submitted by him that issue of age and health was before the ASJ, Barwah while rejecting the first application on merit, which cannot be treated as change in circumstances. So far as grant of bail to the co-accused Sapna under Section 439, Cr.PC cannot be said the change in circumstance for granting the repeat bail application under Section 438 of Cr.PC. It is also his contention that principles of grant of bail under Sections 438 and 439 of Cr.PC are entirely different, however, grant of bail under Section 439, Cr.PC by the High Court to co-accused Sapna may not be a substantial change in the circumstances to allow their repeat bail. In view of foregoing, prayer is made for cancellation of bail of both the non-applicants. 5. In this case vide order dated 12-3-2014, an explanation was sought from the Additional Sessions Judge, Barwah (Ms. Jasveer Kaur Sasan) why she has granted repeated application for anticipatory bail to non-applicant Nos. 1 and 2 after its rejection by her on merit on 1-4-2013, and also by this Court in M.Cr.C. No. 4455/2013 on 20-6-2013. It is further sought, whether the Court has vested with the jurisdiction to grant repeat anticipatory bail after rejection by the High Court in the light of the judgment of Full Bench of Calcutta High Court in the case of Sudip Sen (supra). It is further sought, whether the Court has vested with the jurisdiction to grant repeat anticipatory bail after rejection by the High Court in the light of the judgment of Full Bench of Calcutta High Court in the case of Sudip Sen (supra). An explanation has also sought for why the grant of repeat anticipatory bail after rejection by the High Court, should not be treated as an act of judicial indiscipline in the light of a judgment of Supreme Court in the case of Shahzad Hasan Khan Vs. Ishtiaq Hasan Khan and Another, AIR 1987 SC 1613 , and of this Court in the cases of Satish Babu Lodhi (supra), and Daini @ Raju Vs. State of M.P., (1989) MPJR 187. 6. In furtherance to it, her explanation has been received, by which referring the judgment of Sudip Sen (supra), Babu Singh and Others Vs. State of U.P., AIR 1978 SC 527 , Manohar Vs. The State of Madhya Pradesh, ILR [2007] MP 837, said that the subsequent bail application may be entertained if there is a material change in the circumstances, however, entertaining the repeat bail application, is not barred. It is explained that because the co-accused Sapna was enlarged on bail, subsequent to the decision of the earlier application of the accused and there was an affidavit, showing their health status, however, adhering to the principle of parity, the repeat application was granted. Further referring the judgment of Shri Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia and Others Vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1980 SC 1632 , which is followed in Criminal Appeal No. 2271/2010, Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre Vs. State of Maharashtra and others, and in the case of Savitri Agarwal and Others Vs. State of Maharashtra and Another, AIR 2009 SC 3173 , it is explained that the principle to grant the bail under Sections 438 and 439 of Cr.PC are similar. It is further said that the High Court has considered the anticipatory bail of co-accused Sapna on merits while in the case of non-applicants, it was dismissed for want of prosecution. In the circumstances, non-applicant Nos. 1 and 2 have rightly been granted anticipatory bail. It is further said that the High Court has considered the anticipatory bail of co-accused Sapna on merits while in the case of non-applicants, it was dismissed for want of prosecution. In the circumstances, non-applicant Nos. 1 and 2 have rightly been granted anticipatory bail. It is said that her act does not fall within the purview of judicial indiscipline, hardly it may be an error of judgment because the orders have been passed as per various pronouncements of the Supreme Court and the High Court without any fear, favour or ill-will towards anyone. At last, it is stated that if any of my order is not found to be precisely befitting to the parameters to which I acted bonafidely, however, she has tendered unconditional apology for the same. 7. After hearing learned Counsel for the parties and on going through the facts of the case, the questions crop-up for consideration are as under:-- "(1) Whether Additional Sessions Judge was right to grant repeat bail under Section 438 of Cr.PC to the non-applicant Nos. 1 and 2 after rejection of their anticipatory bail by High Court, though for want of prosecution? (2) Whether grant of bail to the co-accused Sapna under Section 439, Cr.PC by the High Court would amounting to material change in the circumstances, and make a ground of parity to allow repeat bail application under Section 438, Cr.PC to non-applicant Nos. 1 and 2? (3) Whether the grant of repeat anticipatory bail after rejection by the High Court, would amount to an act of judicial indiscipline or error of judgment?" 8. Prior to adverting the argument on merit, the question of maintainability of this petition under Section 439(2) of Cr.PC to cancel the anticipatory bail of both the non-applicants is required to be answered. In this regard, on plain reading of the language of Section 439(2) of Cr.PC, it is clear that the High Court and the Court of Sessions may direct any person, who has been released on bail "under this chapter" to be arrested and committed to custody. The provisions of Sections 437, 438 and 439 have been enumerated in Chapter XXXIII of Cr.PC. However, even for cancellation of anticipatory bail, and to issue direction of arrest and commit to the accused in custody, the direction can be issued on filing the petition under Section 439(2) of Cr.PC. The provisions of Sections 437, 438 and 439 have been enumerated in Chapter XXXIII of Cr.PC. However, even for cancellation of anticipatory bail, and to issue direction of arrest and commit to the accused in custody, the direction can be issued on filing the petition under Section 439(2) of Cr.PC. However, the argument of non-maintainability of application under Section 439(2) of Cr.PC, for cancellation of anticipatory bail, is improper and it is hereby repelled. 9. In the facts of this case, claiming parity while seeking anticipatory bail grant of regular bail to co-accused is the core issue, however, before dealing the aforementioned questions, and to advert the arguments on merit, it is thought proper to refer the background in which Section 438 of Cr.PC was inserted in the Code of Criminal Procedure, with a view to find out the broad parameters to grant anticipatory bail. 10. Section 438 of Cr.PC confer powers to issue direction of grant bail to a person apprehending his arrest, if the said Court is having "reasons to believe" that he/she may be arrested on an accusation of having committed a non-bailable offence. Under the said provisions, if the Court is having reason to believe of accusation of person may grant bail in anticipation. The connotation anticipatory bail has not been defined in Cr.PC, but in the light of the judgments of the Apex Court in the case of Balchand Jain Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1976) 4 SCC 572, it has been clarified that the bail granted in anticipation of arrest would be a grant of bail under the direction of Court, therefore, such order would fall within the purview of grant of anticipatory bail. It has further been clarified that the power of grant of "anticipatory bail" is somewhat extraordinary in character and may be exercised only in exceptional cases, where it appears that a person might be falsely implicated, or a frivolous case might be lodged against him, or there are reasonable grounds for holding that a person accused of an offence is not likely to abscond, or otherwise misuse the liberty while on bail. The power being rather unusual in nature, it is entrusted only to the higher echelons of judicial service, i.e., a Court of Session and the High Court. Thus, ambit of the power conferred by Section 438 of the Code was held to be limited. 11. The power being rather unusual in nature, it is entrusted only to the higher echelons of judicial service, i.e., a Court of Session and the High Court. Thus, ambit of the power conferred by Section 438 of the Code was held to be limited. 11. It is relevant that old Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 did not contain any provisions corresponding to Section 438 of present Cr.PC, 1973. The said section has been inserted in Cr.PC as per 41st report of the Law Commission, which was accepted by the Central Government in Draft Bill Clauses 447 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1970 conferring power to grant anticipatory bail, to the High Courts and the Court of Sessions. The Law Commission observe, we agree that this would be a useful addition, though we must add that in very exceptional cases such power should be exercised. We are further of the view that in order to ensure that the provision is not put to abuse at the instance of unscrupulous petitioners, thus, final order should be made only after notice to the Public Prosecutor and the initial order should only be an interim one. Further, the relevant section should make it clear that the direction can be issued only for reasons to be recorded, if the Court is satisfied that such a direction is necessary in the interest of justice. 12. In view of the foregoing, it is apparent that as per the report of Law Commission, Section 438 of Cr.PC was inserted in Chapter XXXIII. In the case of Gurubaksh Singh Sivia (supra), the question posed for consideration before the Constitutional Bench was to consider the correctness or otherwise of principles of law laid down by the Full Bench of the High Court of Gurbaksh Singh Sibia Vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1980 SC 1632 , wherein, the Bench of the High Court summarised the law relating to anticipatory bail as reflected in Section 438 of the Code laying down eight principles, which were to be kept in mind while exercising discretionary power to grant anticipatory bail. State of Punjab, AIR 1980 SC 1632 , wherein, the Bench of the High Court summarised the law relating to anticipatory bail as reflected in Section 438 of the Code laying down eight principles, which were to be kept in mind while exercising discretionary power to grant anticipatory bail. The Constitutional Bench of the Apex Court while disagreeing in principle with the constraints, which the High Court had engrafted on the power conferred by Section 438 of the Code, inter alia, observed that the Legislature has conferred a wide discretion on the High Court and the Court of Session to grant anticipatory bail since it felt, firstly, that it would be difficult to enumerate the conditions under which anticipatory bail should or should not be granted and secondly, because the intention was to allow the Higher Courts in the echelon a somewhat free hand in the matter of grant of relief in the nature of anticipatory bail. The Apex Court has observed as under:-- "Generalisations on matters, which rest on discretion and the attempt to discover formula of universal application when facts are bound to differ from case to case frustrate the very purpose of conferring discretion. No two cases are alike on facts and, therefore. Courts have to be allowed a little free play in the joints if the conferment of discretionary power is to be meaningful. There is no risk involved in entrusting a wide discretion to the Court of Session and the High Court in granting anticipatory bail because, firstly, these are higher Courts manned by experienced persons, secondly, their orders are not final but are open to appellate or revisional scrutiny and above all because, discretion has always to be exercised by Courts judicially and not according to whom, caprice or fancy. On the other hand, there is a risk in foreclosing categories of cases in which anticipatory bail may be allowed because life throws up unforeseen possibilities and offers new challenges. Judicial discretion has to be free enough to be able to take these possibilities in its stride and to meet these challenges." 13. On the other hand, there is a risk in foreclosing categories of cases in which anticipatory bail may be allowed because life throws up unforeseen possibilities and offers new challenges. Judicial discretion has to be free enough to be able to take these possibilities in its stride and to meet these challenges." 13. In view of the foregoing, it is apparent that the Constitutional Bench observed that discretionary power had conferred by the Legislature on the higher echelons in the criminal justice delivery system however, it cannot be put in the form of straitjacket rules for universal application as the question whether to grant bail or not depends for its answer upon a variety of circumstances, however, all those should be referred while extending such benefit in a judicial verdict. It can be observed that any of the circumstances in a case may turn down to a different conclusion in another case, however, unnecessary putting restriction with respect to exercise a power by the Legislature on the High Court or Sessions Courts as per Section 438 of Cr.PC would not be in the fair administration of the justice. It is suffice to observe that while granting bail the power, which are of the extraordinary character ought to be exercised in exceptional cases and such discretion should be exercised with due care and caution depending upon the circumstances justifying to exercise such powers. In the said case, the Apex Court has further observed as under:-- "The observations made in Balchand Jain regarding the nature of the power conferred by Section 438 and regarding the question whether the conditions mentioned in Section 437 should be read into Section 438 cannot, therefore, be treated as concluding the points, which arise directly for our consideration. We agree, with respect, that the power conferred by Section 438 is of an extraordinary character in the sense indicated above, namely, that it is not ordinarily resorted to like the power conferred by Sections 437 and 439. We also agree that the power to grant anticipatory bail should be exercised with due care and circumspection but beyond that it is not possible to agree with the observations made in Balchand Jain in an altogether different context on an altogether different point." 14. We also agree that the power to grant anticipatory bail should be exercised with due care and circumspection but beyond that it is not possible to agree with the observations made in Balchand Jain in an altogether different context on an altogether different point." 14. In view of foregoing facts, it is apparent that while introducing the Section 438 of Cr.PC due care and caution was taken by the Legislature and by the various precedents of Hon'ble the Apex Court, such powers ought to be exercised by the High Court and the Court of Session when the said Court has reason to believe that accusation in a non-bailable offence against a citizen is due to false implication or a frivolous case has lodged against him or there are reasonable grounds for holding that a person accused of an offence is not likely to abscond, or otherwise misuse his liberty while on bail. The said power ought to be exercised in exceptional cases with due care and circumspection and not otherwise, after recording reasons and satisfaction by the Court. It has also made clear that power conferred under Section 438 of Cr.PC is not ordinarily resorted to like the power under Sections 439 and 437 of Cr.PC. 15. In the said context, to draw the distinction for grant of regular bail under Sections 437 and 439 of Cr.PC are also required to be dealt with. As per Section 439 special powers of High Court or Court of Session to release of any person accused of an offence and in custody to an offence of the nature specified in sub-section (3) of Section 437 imposing any condition, which it considers necessary for the purposes mentioned in that sub-section has been specified. The High Court and Court of Session also confers the power to set aside or modify the conditions imposed by the Magistrate while releasing a person on bail. The said powers can be exercised by the High Court or the Court of Session in an offence punishable with death imprisonment or imposition of sentence for 7 years or more; otherwise in other offences, the powers under Section 437 can be exercised by the Magistrate. However, under Section 439 the bail is the rule subject to imposition of certain conditions while exercising the discretion by the Courts. However, under Section 439 the bail is the rule subject to imposition of certain conditions while exercising the discretion by the Courts. But under Section 438, the said discretion ought to be exercised having reason to believe by the Courts specifying the exceptional circumstances to grant such power assigning reason. In the said context, all the three questions posed for answer, are required to be considered. 16. Now to advert to the argument as advanced by learned Counsel for the parties, first of all, the Full Bench judgment of the Calcutta High Court consists of five Judges in the case of Sudip Sen (supra), is required to be seen. In the said judgment after considering the provisions of Sections 438 and 439 of Cr.PC. It was observed that both the sections operate in different field however, with respect to grant of anticipatory bail to the questions posed for answer, the Court sum up their conclusion as under:-- "31. We, therefore, sum up our conclusions thus:-- (1) Whether the applicant/accused can move second application for anticipatory bail in case his first application is rejected; if yes, in what contingencies before the same Court or to the Superior Court? (a) A person has a right to move either the High Court or the Court of Session for directions under Section 438, Cr.PC at his option. In case a person chooses to move the Court of Session in the first instance and his application for grant of anticipatory bail under Section 438 is rejected, he can again move the High Court for the same reason under Section 438, Cr.PC itself. (b) Where a person chooses to straightway move the High Court in the first instance and his application is rejected on the same set of facts and circumstances, he will not be entitled to move the Court of Session for the second time, but may invoke the extraordinary powers of the Supreme Court by seeking special leave to appeal in the Supreme Court. (c) A person will be entitled to move the High Court or the Court of Session, as the case may be, for the second time. He can do so only on the ground of substantial change in the facts and circumstances of the case due to subsequent events. (c) A person will be entitled to move the High Court or the Court of Session, as the case may be, for the second time. He can do so only on the ground of substantial change in the facts and circumstances of the case due to subsequent events. However, he will not be entitled to move the second application on the ground that the Court on earlier occasion failed to consider any particular aspect or material on record or that any point then available to him was not agitated before the Court." 17. In view of the aforesaid, it is clear that in case a person chose to move the Court of Sessions in the first instance and his application for grant of anticipatory bail is rejected he can move to the High Court for the same reason seeking anticipatory bail under Section 438, Cr.PC, where a person chose to move the High Court and the application is rejected then on the same set of facts and circumstances he will not entitle to move the Court of Sessions for the second time after rejection by the High Court. The said person may invoke the extraordinary powers of the Supreme Court seeking special leave to appeal. It is further apparent that a person will be entitled to move the High Court or the Court of Sessions for second time on the substantial change in the facts and circumstances of the case due to subsequent event, otherwise he will not be entitled to move the second application on the ground that the Court on earlier occasion failed to consider any particular aspect or material on record or that any point then available to him was not agitated before the Court. 18. In this regard, guidance can be taken from the judgment of Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of Bimla Devi (Smt) Vs. 18. In this regard, guidance can be taken from the judgment of Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of Bimla Devi (Smt) Vs. State of Bihar and Others, (1994) 2 SCC 8 , wherein the Apex Court in Para 2 has observed as under:-- "In view of the fact that the Judicial Magistrate at a later stage has himself cancelled the bail, it is not necessary for us to pass any order with regard to the petitioner's prayer for cancellation of bail but the disturbing feature of the case is that though two successive applications of the accused for grant of bail were rejected by the High Court yet the learned Magistrate granted provisional bail. The course adopted by the learned Magistrate is not only contrary to settled principles of judicial discipline and propriety but also contrary to the statutory provisions. See in this connection, Shahzad Hasan Khan Vs. Ishtiaq Hasan Khan and Another, AIR 1987 SC 1613 . The manner in which the learned Magistrate dealt with the case can give rise to the apprehensions, which were expressed by the complainant in her complaint, which was treated by this Court as a writ petition and is being dealt with as such. In the course that we are adopting, we would not like to comment upon the manner in which the learned Magistrate dealt with the case any more at this stage. We in the facts and circumstances stated above, direct that a copy of this order be sent to the Chief Justice of the Patna High Court for taking such action on the administrative side as may be deemed fit by him." 19. This Court was having an occasion to consider to maintain and to grant the subsequent bail application though under Section 439 of Cr.PC, which was granted by the Court of Sessions after rejection by the High Court. In the case of Satish Babu Lodhi (supra), relying upon the judgment of Bimla Devi (supra), this Court has held as under:-- "In view of the law laid down in the aforesaid judgments, it is apparent that the subsequent bail petition filed before the High Court is required to be placed before the same Judge before whom the earlier bail petition was filed. After rejection of bail by the High Court, the Subordinate Court should not oblige to entertain and grant the bail, if it is so it affects the judicial discipline. The subsequent bail petitions must mention all the earlier attempts made either before the Subordinate Court or before the High Court and their fate. The relevant orders ought to be produced before the Court considering the subsequent bail petitions. The bail petition is expected to incorporation a statement of all facts and circumstances considered relevant by the applicant in support of his prayer to apprise the correct facts. Setting forth such averments, may likely to give an opportunity to the opposite party to controvert it. In support of the said pleadings, the affidavit or the documents are also advised. The grant of bail in a non-bailable offence is a discretion, which can be exercised judiciously based upon the methodised by analogy, disciplined by system and subordinated to the primordial necessity." 20. Thus, as per the law laid down by the Full Bench of Calcutta High Court and the judgment of Supreme Court as well of this Court, it is required to be examined that in the facts of the present case, the grant of subsequent anticipatory bail by the Additional Sessions Judge, Barwah is in accordance to law. 21. In the facts of the case in hand, it is apparent that non-applicant Nos. 1 and 2 have filed the anticipatory bail application bearing No. 51/2013 (15/2013) before the Additional Sessions Judge, Barwah, on 1-4-2013 observing that the benefit to grant the anticipatory bail can be allowed in rarest of rare cases and the case of non-applicants was not found of exceptional circumstances, however, rejected their bail. Then, they have applied before the High Court for grant of anticipatory bail M.Cr.C. No. 4455/2013, which was rejected vide order dated 20-6-2013 on having the case diary available, in want of prosecution. Later, the non-applicant Nos. 1 and 2 have filed a second anticipatory bail before the ASJ, Barwah, bearing No. 60/2013, which is granted by order impugned on the ground of parity with co-accused Sapna. Here, it is relevant to observe that the bail application of accused Sapna under Section 438 was rejected on the same day vide order dated 1-4-2013 bearing bail application No. 51/2013 (15/2013) by the same Judge. Here, it is relevant to observe that the bail application of accused Sapna under Section 438 was rejected on the same day vide order dated 1-4-2013 bearing bail application No. 51/2013 (15/2013) by the same Judge. Then, she has filed anticipatory bail bearing M.Cr.C. No. 2871/2013, before this Court, which was also rejected on 17-4-2013. Thereafter, she has surrendered to the custody and applied for grant of bail under Section 439 before the Court of Sessions, which was also rejected. Then applied under Section 439 of Cr.PC for regular bail, which was granted by this Court in M.Cr.C. No. 3378/2013 on 9-5-2013. It is also relevant to observe that at the time of the dismissal of the bail application of non-applicant Nos. 1 and 2 under Section 438 of Cr.PC for want of prosecution on 20-6-2013, the co-accused Sapna was granted bail prior to the said date, however, the said ground was available for consideration before this High Court but it was not persuaded but after getting dismissal their bail for want of prosecution, again applied before the Court of Sessions under Section 438 of Cr.PC, indicating the said fact, which was granted vide order dated 9-7-2013 on the ground of parity with the co-accused Sapna, although rejection of their bail in the knowledge of ASJ, Barwah. 22. In view of the discussion made hereinabove, it is apparent that as per the judgment of the Apex Court as well as of this Court and of other High Courts. the grant of subsequent anticipatory bail by the Additional Sessions Judge was beyond her competence after rejection of the application of the accused persons by the High Court as there was no substantial change in facts and circumstances. The power exercised by the Additional Sessions Judge granting bail to the non-applicant is amounting to abuse of process of the Court, which cannot be sustained in law. Accordingly, the question No. 1 is answered in favour of the applicant and against the non-applicant Nos. 1 and 2. 23. So far as the question No. 2 is concerned, it is to be examined that the grant of bail to the co-accused Sapna under Section 439, Cr.PC and the affidavit showing the ailment filed by the accused persons would amounting to change in the circumstances. 1 and 2. 23. So far as the question No. 2 is concerned, it is to be examined that the grant of bail to the co-accused Sapna under Section 439, Cr.PC and the affidavit showing the ailment filed by the accused persons would amounting to change in the circumstances. In the facts of the present case, where the bail of the co-accused Sapna was rejected by the High Court under Section 438 of Cr.PC, thereafter, she has applied under Section 439, Cr.PC before the Court of Session and later on, granted by the High Court under Section 439, Cr.PC cannot be equated to grant of bail under Section 438, Cr.PC. As per the discussion made hereinabove and the law laid down in the case of Gurubux Singh Sevia (supra) and Sudip Sen (supra), it is apparent that the parameters and principles to grant bail under Sections 438 and 439, Cr.PC are different. However, on rejection of the bail of the co-accused under Section 438, and grant under Section 439 would not lead to accept the material change in the circumstances to other co-accused persons. So far as the affidavit filed by the accused showing ailment on account of their age, would also not be a change circumstance for grant of bail to the accused persons under Section 438 of Cr.PC after rejection by the same Judge on merit holding that it is not the rarest of rare case falls within the exceptional circumstances to exercise the jurisdiction under Section 438, Cr.PC. In view of the above discussion, the question No. 2 is hereby answered accordingly. 24. The question No. 3 posed for answer relates back to an act of the Judge amounting to judicial indiscipline or as per her answer it is an error of judgment. In this regard, looking to the discussion made hereinabove, it is clear that after rejection of the anticipatory bail by the ASJ, Barwah and High Court, subsequent grant is without material change of the circumstances, which is amounting to abuse of process of the Court. In this regard, looking to the discussion made hereinabove, it is clear that after rejection of the anticipatory bail by the ASJ, Barwah and High Court, subsequent grant is without material change of the circumstances, which is amounting to abuse of process of the Court. It is further relevant to observe that such issue has been discussed by Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of Bimla Devi (supra) and also by this Court in Satish Babu Lodhi (supra), against which an SLP was preferred, which has been dismissed, however, if the detailed discussion has been made in this judgment, it may affect adversely to the carrier of the Judge. In my opinion, it is not in the fair administration of justice to discuss the said question in detail and answer the same. In this respect, it is suffice to observe that copy of this order be sent to District Judge, Mandleshwar. The Principal Registrar (Vigilance and Inspection), Jabalpur and also to the Portfolio Judge for taking note of the said issue and to proceed further if so advised. 25. Accordingly, this petition is hereby allowed. The repeat bail application granted to non-applicant Nos. 1 and 2 by the order impugned is hereby set aside. It is directed that from the date of delivery of the judgment within two weeks, the non-applicant Nos. 1 and 2 shall surrender to the custody and may apply for regular bail under Section 439, Cr.PC otherwise the police authorities shall take them into custody and proceed in accordance to law. Let a copy of this order be sent by Bench Registry to the District & Sessions Judge, Mandleshwar, Principal Registrar (Vigilance and Inspection), Jabalpur and to Hon'ble the Portfolio Judge of District Mandleshwar to proceed further if so advised. C.c. as per rules.