JUDGMENT : S. TAMILVANAN, J. We have heard the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner as well as the learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the respondents 1 to 4. 2. This Habeas Corpus petition has been filed by the petitioner, who is the father of the alleged detenue, M. Subhalakshmi, aged about 7 years. The detenue has been in the custody of the fifth respondent, who is none other than the mother of the detenue and wife of the petitioner herein. 3. It is also brought to our notice that GWOP No. 2177 of 2011, seeking custody of the child, was filed and the same is also pending before the Family Court, Chennai, which has to be decided by the said forum. 4. Mr. M. Sivathanu, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner submits that it is not safe for the child to be in the custody of the fifth respondent and according to the learned counsel for the petitioner, the Habeas Corpus Petition is maintainable, under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 5. In support of his contention, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, relied on the following decisions : (i) Hamza Haji v. State of Kerala (decided by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Appeal (Civil) No. 3535 of 2006 on 18-8-2006 ( AIR 2006 SC 3028 ). (ii) S. P. Chengalvaraya Naidu (dead) by LRs. v. Jagannath (dead) by LRs., AIR 1994 SC 853 . 6. In Hamza Haji v. State of Kerala ( AIR 2006 SC 3028 ) the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Appeal (Civil) No. 3535 of 2006 on 18-8-2006 has held in paragraph 19 as follows : '19. The order of the Forest Tribunal in the case on hand had merged in the decision in MFA No. 328 of 1981 rendered by the High Court. The governing decision, therefore, was the decision of the High Court. When seeking to question the decision as being vitiated by fraud, the proper course to adopt was to move the Court that had rendered the decision, by an application. In a case where an appeal is possible, an appeal could be filed. The House of Lords indicated in Kinch v. Walcott (supra) that it will be in the power of the party to the decision complaining of fraud to apply directly to the Court which pronounced the judgment to vacate it. In a case where an appeal is possible, an appeal could be filed. The House of Lords indicated in Kinch v. Walcott (supra) that it will be in the power of the party to the decision complaining of fraud to apply directly to the Court which pronounced the judgment to vacate it. The Full Bench of the Bombay High Court in Guddappa Chikkappa Kurbar v. Balaji Ramji Dange (AIR 1941 Bombay 274) observed that no Court will allow itself to be used as an instrument of fraud and no Court, by the application of rules of evidence or procedure, can allow its eyes to be closed to the fact that it is being used as an instrument of fraud. In Hip Foong Hong v. H. Neotia and Company (1918 Appeal Cases 888) the Privy Council held that if a judgment is affected by fraudulent conduct it must be set aside. In Rex v. Recorder of Leicester (1947 (1) KB 726) it was held that a certiorari would lie to quash a judgment on the ground that it has been obtained by fraud. The basic principle obviously is that a party who had secured a judgment by fraud should not be enabled to enjoy the fruits thereof. In this situation, the High Court in this case, could have clearly either quashed the decision of the Forest Tribunal in OA No. 247 of 1979 or could have set aside its own judgment in MFA No. 328 of 1981 dismissing the appeal from the decision of the Forest Tribunal at the stage of admission and vacated the order of the Forest Tribunal by allowing that appeal or could have exercised its jurisdiction as a Court of record by invoking Article 215 of the Constitution to set at naught the decision obtained by the appellant by playing a fraud on the Forest Tribunal. The High Court has chosen to exercise its power as a Court of record to nullify a decision procured by the appellant by playing a fraud on the Court. We see no objection to the course adopted by the High Court even assuming that we are inclined to exercise our jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India at the behest of the appellant.' 7. Learned couynsel for the petitioner also relied on a decision in S. P. Chengalvaraya Naidu (dead) by LRs. We see no objection to the course adopted by the High Court even assuming that we are inclined to exercise our jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India at the behest of the appellant.' 7. Learned couynsel for the petitioner also relied on a decision in S. P. Chengalvaraya Naidu (dead) by LRs. v. Jagannath (dead) by LRs., reported in AIR 1994 SC 853 , wherein the Supreme Court, in para 7, held as follows : '7...... The principle of ' finality of litigation' cannot be pressed to the extent of such an absurdity that it becomes an engine of fraud in the hands of dishonest litigants. The Courts of law are meant for imparting justice between the parties. One who comes to the Court, must come with clean hands. We are constrained to say that more often than not, process of the Court is being abused. Property-grabbers, tax-evaders, bank-loan-dodgers and other unscrupulous persons from all walks of life find the Court process a convenient lever to retain the, illegal-gains indefinitely. We have no hesitation to say that a person whose case is based on falsehood, has no right to approach the Court. He can be summarily thrown out at any stage of the litigation.' 8. We are of the view that both the decisions relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner are not applicable to the facts and circumstances of this case, since the girl child, aged about 7 years is in the custody of her mother, which cannot be construed as an illegal custody. 9. The scope of Habeas Corpus Petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution is limited and the same is for the noble object of securing the personal liberty and protection of any individual. As the mother has the custody of her minor daughter, that cannot be said as kidnapping or illegal custody, so as to get an order, by way of filing Habeas Corpus Petition. Similarly, when the child in in the custody of the natural guardian, either father of mother, that cannot be said as an illegal custody. 10. Learned counsel for the petitioner vehemently argues that the mother is not entitled to have the custody of the school going child, M. Subhalakshmi, however, we are not inclined to accept the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner. 10. Learned counsel for the petitioner vehemently argues that the mother is not entitled to have the custody of the school going child, M. Subhalakshmi, however, we are not inclined to accept the arguments advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner. The fifth respondent, having the custody of the child, is none other than the mother of the alleged detenue and it cannot be disputed that the mother has right to have the custody of the minor child. Even if there are grounds for seeking custody of the child, the petitioner should approach only the appropriate Court. It is not proper on the part of the petitioner to approach this Court to exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction, by way of filing this Habeas Corpus petition, to have the custody of the minor giri child from the mother of the child. 11. It is well settled proposition of law that when there is an efficacious alternative remedy available to a party, the remedy should be obtained through appropriate forum and not by way of filing the Habeas Corpus Petition. The averments made in the accompanying affidavit are only based on only disputed questions of fact, which cannot be gone into by this Court in this Habeas Corpus Petition. 12. Learned Additional Public Prosecutor submits that it is an abuse of process of law and the proper remedy for the petitioner is to approach the appropriate forum for seeking the relief, hence, this Habeas Corpus Petition could not be encouraged by this Court. 13. Having gone through the material papers and the arguments advanced by both the learned counsel, we are of the considered view that the petitioner, who is the father of the minor girl is not entitled to seek the remedy of custody of the child, by way of this Habeas Corpus Petition, filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, by raising a plea of illegal detention of the child by the mother, since the child is in the custody of the mother. 14. On the facts and circumstances, we are of the view that the Petition is liable to be dismissed and accordingly, the Habeas Corpus Petition is dismissed. Petition dismissed.