JUDGMENT Navin Sinha, J. 1. This appeal was admitted for hearing on 24.11.1999. The appellant was granted bail on 26.09.2006 considering that he was in custody since 14.12.1998. Bail was cancelled on 06.8.2014 upon submission of his Counsel that he could not be contacted and warrants may be issued against him. The appellant was taken into custody on 26.9.2014. Another Counsel moved an application for grant of bail, which was allowed as the Court was of the opinion that the bail had not been cancelled on the grounds of any allegation for misuse of privilege of bail. No Counsel appeared on behalf of the appellant when the appeal was called for hearing today. In these circumstances, rather than to again adjourn the appeal or issue fresh warrants against the appellant when he does not appear to be at fault in placement of the appeal. We requested Shri U.S. Ahluwalia, Advocate, who was present in the Court room to assist us in disposal of the matter. Shri Ahluwalia has meticulously taken us through the exhibits, evidence and the impugned judgment. Learned State Counsel has also fully assisted us in deciding this appeal. The appellant who is husband of the deceased stands convicted under Section 302 IPC and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life and fine of Rs. 2000/-. In the event of failure to pay fine he was required to undergo further six months rigorous imprisonment. He has also been convicted under Section 201 IPC and sentenced to undergo five years rigorous imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs. 1000/-. In the event of failure to pay the fine he was required to undergo further six months rigorous imprisonment as ordered on 17.6.1999 by the Second Additional Sessions Judge, Bilaspur, in Sessions Trial No. 36 of 1999. 2. Merg, Exhibit P/1 was lodged by the appellant on 5.12.1998 at about 18:45 hours that his wife hid committed suicide by burning herself inside the house, the same day at about 15:00 hours. He had gone to the fields and his mother had also gone out. His mother came back at about 3:00 p.m. The tin door of the room was closed and his mother saw the deceased dead through the gap in the door. FIR, Exhibit P/3, was registered on basis of the same on 13.12.1998. He had gone to the fields and his mother had also gone out. His mother came back at about 3:00 p.m. The tin door of the room was closed and his mother saw the deceased dead through the gap in the door. FIR, Exhibit P/3, was registered on basis of the same on 13.12.1998. The post-mortem of the deceased was done on 6.12.1998 at about 1 p.m., by Dr. M.S. Pal, P.W. 10 who found the following injuries on the deceased: i. Scalp hair was completely charred. ii. Tongue was protruded outside the mouth and bitten in between the teeth. iii. The whole body with charred with peeling of skin over the sole, thigh. iv. Multiple extensive linear laceration of medial side of both thighs upto knee joint extending upwards towards the external genetalia was present. v. Laceration of external genitalia was seen and the picture obscured by completely burnt cloth applied over the lower part of abdomen. vi. Herniation of the loop of the intestines from the left pelvic area. Intestines are pale in colour. vii. Multiple extensive laceration - linear was also seen over the back of both thighs extending downwards from gluteal muscles to the knee joint. viii. Charring is less marked on the extremities, upper arm, forearm & legs (both sides). No other marks of external injuries are seen. Smell of kerosene was coming from the body. The cause of death was opined as hemorrhage and shock resulting from multiple laceration of body parts mentioned confirming that the burns were postmortem in nature and the time lapsed since death prior to post-mortem was estimated as within 24 hours. 3. Shri Ahluwalia assisting us on behalf of appellant submitted that there was no eye-witness to the occurrence. The evidence is circumstantial in nature. All links in the chain of circumstances must be proved beyond reasonable doubt as compatible only with the guilt of the appellant. If there is a doubt or break in the chain of circumstantial links and another hypothesis not compatible with the guilt of the appellant is also possible, the benefit of doubt must go to the appellant and he be acquitted. The Trial Court has disbelieved any motive on the part of the appellant. P.W. 4 Shakuni Bai has deposed that when she came the deceased was burning. The evidence that has come is that she was already dead. The Trial Court has disbelieved any motive on the part of the appellant. P.W. 4 Shakuni Bai has deposed that when she came the deceased was burning. The evidence that has come is that she was already dead. Moreover, P.W. 4 has not mentioned anything about the time when she saw the appellant at home on her way back from the pond to establish that it was in proximity to the time when the appellant came and told that the deceased had died of burn injuries. This becomes important because the appellant had taken a plea of alibi in the Merg itself and the prosecution has led no evidence to prove that it was a false defence. 4. The Merg states that the tin door of the room in which the deceased died was closed. It was opened when the mother of the appellant came and saw the deceased. The inquest report, Ex. P-7 also states that the door was pushed open. It cannot be said with absolute certainty that the appellant was the assailant as it is possible the deceased set herself on fire in a closed room. The conviction is therefore not sustainable as the allegations cannot be said to have been proved beyond all reasonable doubt against the appellant and there was another possible version of the manner in which death may have occurred. 5. Counsel for the State opposing the appeal submitted that P.W. 4 has deposed barely three to four months after the occurrence. Events must have been relatively fresh in her mind. The issue with regard to the time when she saw the appellant at home and when the appellant came to tell her that the deceased died of burns is not so crucial as to disbelieve the entire prosecution case. The appellant states that the occurrence is at about 3 O'clock. The postmortem done next day about 1:00 pm states that the death had occurred less than 24 hours ago. There has been no cross examination of P.W. 4. If alibi was taken as a defence it was for the appellant to prove the same by leading defence evidence. 6. Referring to the inquest report, it was submitted that the door was not locked from inside but opened on a gentle push only. There has been no cross examination of P.W. 4. If alibi was taken as a defence it was for the appellant to prove the same by leading defence evidence. 6. Referring to the inquest report, it was submitted that the door was not locked from inside but opened on a gentle push only. It was next submitted that under Section 313 Cr.P.C., it was specifically asked to the appellant that P.W. 4 came to his house. He further acknowledged that the body was lying in the middle of the door meaning thereby that the door was open. It is apparent from the post-mortem report that the deceased had been brutally assaulted before death and the injuries on the body were visible to the naked eye. The appellant despite awareness of the injuries lodged a false case that his wife had died of burn injuries. 7. We have considered the submissions made on behalf of the parties and perused the evidence on record also. The deceased was the wife of the appellant. She was aged about approximately 18 years and was recently married to the appellant. She died in her matrimonial house not by burn injuries but due to ante mortem injuries revealed in the post-mortem indicative of a brutal assault leading to death. The tongue was protruding which suggests strangulation also which may not have been visible in the post-mortem because of the charring of the body. These ante mortem injuries were externally visible as also the protruding tongue. Despite the above and with the knowledge of the nature of death the appellant lodged a false police report of death by burning. This is an incriminating factor against him and an important link in the chain of circumstances against him. 8. When he lodged the Merg and FIR he did not say anything about having animosity with another who may have committed the assault or give any other explanation with regard to ante mortem injuries much less that he suspected of anyone else of having committed the assault. 9. Exhibit P-7, the inquest report states that the tin door was not locked and the latch inside the door was open. The spot map, Exhibit P-10 and Exhibit P-17 take it beyond the pale of any controversy that death had taken place inside the room of the house in broad day light. 9. Exhibit P-7, the inquest report states that the tin door was not locked and the latch inside the door was open. The spot map, Exhibit P-10 and Exhibit P-17 take it beyond the pale of any controversy that death had taken place inside the room of the house in broad day light. The appellant in his statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C., stated that he wanted to lead defence evidence but the order sheet dated 11.6.1999 records that subsequently he himself voluntarily stated that he did not wish to lead any defence evidence. In Kundula Bala Subrahmanyam Vs. State of A.P. (1993) 2 SCO 684, dealing with death inside the house it was observed as follows:-- "27. ...Since, the deceased had admittedly suffered burn injuries in the kitchen of her house, there was an obligation on the part of the appellants and the father-in-law of the deceased, who have admitted their presence in the house at the time of occurrence, to explain the circumstances leading to the deceased dying of 90% burn injuries. None has been offered........" 10. P.W. 4 had deposed barely three to four months after the occurrence. Obviously events must have been relatively fresh in her mind. She stated that while returning from the pond she saw the appellant standing in his courtyard. The deceased was pasting cow-dung on the wall. The house of the witness was barely thirty to fifty steps away from that of the appellant. The appellant came to the area near her house and informed the villagers generally that his wife had died of burn injuries. The witness went to the house of the appellant along with others. The fact that she may have stated that the deceased was still burning is not very relevant but is a very trivial exaggeration. It is further evidence that the witness seeing the appellant in the court yard, the death and the appellant stating that the deceased died due to burns were all in close proximity of time. Since it was very close to the occurrence burn marks and embers may have still have been in the room and the stench of burning flesh overpowering for her to say so. The witness was not cross-examined at all. 11. Alibi is a weak defence. Since it was very close to the occurrence burn marks and embers may have still have been in the room and the stench of burning flesh overpowering for her to say so. The witness was not cross-examined at all. 11. Alibi is a weak defence. If the appellant took the plea of alibi, it was for him to lead evidence in support of the same especially when P.W. 4 was not cross examined at all. Initially he said he wanted to lead evidence in defence but suddenly retracted. No reason has been urged for this change in stance. Death having taken place inside the house, the appellant having been home in proximity of time, he lodging a wrong report regarding death, the prosecution having discharged the obligation of proving a prima facie case, the onus shifts on the appellant under Section 106 of the Evidence Act to explain how his wife was assaulted in the aforesaid manner and by whom and that the injuries were not ante mortem in nature. In State of Rajasthan Vs. Kashi Ram (2006) 12 SCC 254 it was observed as follows:-- "23. The provisions of Section 106 of the Evidence Act itself are unambiguous and categoric in laying down that when any fact is especially within the knowledge of a person, the burden of proving that fact is upon him. Thus, if a person is last seen with the deceased, he must offer an explanation as to how and when he parted company. He must furnish an explanation which appears to the court to be probable and satisfactory. If he does so he must be held to have discharged his burden. If he fails to offer an explanation on the basis of facts within his special knowledge, he fails to discharge the burden cast upon him by Section 106 of the Evidence Act. In a case resting on circumstantial evidence if the accused fails to offer a reasonable explanation in discharge of the burden placed on him, that itself provides an additional link in the chain of circumstances proved against him. Section 106 does not shift the burden of proof in a criminal trial, which is always upon the prosecution. In a case resting on circumstantial evidence if the accused fails to offer a reasonable explanation in discharge of the burden placed on him, that itself provides an additional link in the chain of circumstances proved against him. Section 106 does not shift the burden of proof in a criminal trial, which is always upon the prosecution. It lays down the rule that when the accused does not throw any light upon facts which are specially within his knowledge and which could not support any theory or hypothesis compatible with his innocence, the court can consider his failure to adduce any explanation, as an additional link which completes the chain...." 12. The trial Court having disbelieved the motive on account of dowry coupled with cruelty is not very relevant as absence of motive cannot lead to presumption of innocence. Likewise motive cannot be substantial piece of evidence for conviction, but it can only be corroborative evidence. 13. The fact that weapon of assault was recovered on his confession has not been properly proved in accordance with law or that there was no forensic report with regard to blood stains on the weapon of offence or the clothes of the appellant seized during investigation. Exhibit P-21 and P-22 are not so crucial as to lead to a presumption of innocence against him. 14. The appellant has completely failed to discharge the onus of a fact specifically with in his knowledge with regard to manner of death of his wife inside the house under Section 106 of the Evidence Act. The chain of circumstances stand conclusively established. The deceased was his wife. She died at home in the afternoon. The appellant has failed to prove alibi. Despite ante mortem injuries visible to the naked eye including the protruding tongue he lodged a false report that she died of burning. The defence that the door was closed from inside stands falsified and the body was lying in the middle at the door. It has been proved that he was home at the time of death and went to the village and made a false statement to the villagers for creating evidence in his favour. Initially he claimed to lead defence evidence but suddenly retracted without any explanation. No other explanation has been offered regarding the ante-mortem injuries and the manner of death. It has been proved that he was home at the time of death and went to the village and made a false statement to the villagers for creating evidence in his favour. Initially he claimed to lead defence evidence but suddenly retracted without any explanation. No other explanation has been offered regarding the ante-mortem injuries and the manner of death. It is not the case of the appellant that an intruder had come and assaulted his wife or even that he suspected any other because of previous animosity to justify retaliatory action. We therefore find no reason to interfere with the order of conviction. The appellant is on bail. His bail bonds are cancelled. The appellant is directed to surrender forthwith and/or be taken into custody for undergoing the remaining period of sentence. The appeal is dismissed.