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2014 DIGILAW 4284 (MAD)

R. Mathivanan v. Director of Rural Development Department, Chennai

2014-11-17

D.HARIPARANTHAMAN

body2014
Judgment 1. The petitioner filed O.A.No.1293 of 2003. On abolition of the Tribunal, the matter stood transferred to this Court and re-numbered as W.P.No.17218 of 2007. 2. The petitioner was working as a Rural Welfare officer Grade -II at the relevant point of time. He was issued with an order of recovery dated 05.05.1995 for an amount of Rs.1,25,268/-by the second respondent, viz., the District Collector. The petitioner filed an appeal against the said order before the first respondent. The first respondent Appellate Authority passed an order dated 26.09.1996 confirming the order of the second respondent. 3. Challenging the said order, the petitioner filed O.A.No.9639 of 1998 before the Tamil Nadu Administrative Tribunal. The grievance of the petitioner therein was that the order of the Appellate Authority was a non-speaking order. The Tribunal agreed with the stand taken by the petitioner and set aside the order of the Appellate Authority, vide order dated 19.09.2002. It is relevant to extract paragraphs 5, 6 and 7 of the order of the Tribunal dated 19.09.2002 made in O.A.No.9639 of 1998:- "5. The Appellate Authority has not passed any speaking order. No reasons whatsoever is given in the order passed by the Director as to whey he has confirmed the order of the disciplinary authority. The issue involved is simple in as much as the applicant has received advance of a total amount of Rs.1,40,000/- between 1992 and 1993, and in 1994, he has executed only work to a lesser extract. Evidence of the Supervisor, evidence of the Engineer are available before the enquiry officer. Therefore, the appellate authority has to find out whether the disciplinary authority has correctly arrived at the shortage of work for which alone the applicant would be called upon to account for. The applicant would state that there is enough evidence available in the enquiry and on that basis, he would be able to convince that the amount sought to be recovered is highly excessive and atleast to that extent his liability would not come. 6. The applicant would state that there is enough evidence available in the enquiry and on that basis, he would be able to convince that the amount sought to be recovered is highly excessive and atleast to that extent his liability would not come. 6. Therefore, the learned counsel for the applicant would pray for remand of the matter to the appellate authority namely the Director of Rural Development, Chennai so that the Appellate Authority can consider the evidence and appreciate the same with reference to the stand taken by the applicant and arrive at a conclusion on total re-appreciation of the evidence made available by the disciplinary authority. 7. Therefore, the application is allowed. The order passed by the Appellate authority is set aside and the Appellate authority will given an opportunity for the applicant to present his case and then dispose of the matter by passing a reasoned order. The appellate authority shall dispose the appeal on the lines indicated within a period of three months from this date. The time frame is given because the recovery is being made from the applicant which is not stayed." 4. Even though the Tribunal in paragraph 7 of the order, dated 19.09.2002 has categorically directed the Appellate Authority to give opportunity to the petitioner before passing the order after remand, the first respondent without complying with the aforesaid direction of the Tribunal had passed the order, dated 07.02.2003 without giving opportunity to the petitioner. 5. The petitioner has filed this Original Application to quash the aforesaid orders of the respondents. In Ground (ii), the petitioner has specifically pleaded that he was not given opportunity before passing the order and the same is extracted hereunder:- "ii) It is respectfully submitted that while deciding the appeal the Applicant has not given any opportunity to put forth the case. Inspite of the direction of this Hon'ble Tribunal, the 1st respondent has not given any opportunity to the applicant. Therefore the impugned orders passed by the respondents are liable to be set aside." 6. In the reply affidavit filed by the respondents, the aforesaid averment made by the petitioner is not controverted. Further, the impugned order also does not disclose that an opportunity before passing the order was given to the petitioner. 7. Therefore the impugned orders passed by the respondents are liable to be set aside." 6. In the reply affidavit filed by the respondents, the aforesaid averment made by the petitioner is not controverted. Further, the impugned order also does not disclose that an opportunity before passing the order was given to the petitioner. 7. It is stated that in the mean time, the petitioner reached the age of superannuation and the amount of recovery involved in this original application was withheld from his terminal benefits. 8. In these circumstances, the impugned orders of the respondents are liable to be set aside and accordingly, the same are set aside and the matter is remanded back to the first respondent. The first respondent viz., the Appellate Authority is directed to pass a fresh order in terms of the order of the Tribunal, dated 19.09.2002 made in O.A.No.9639 of 1998, within a period of six weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. In the event of Appellate Authority allowing the appeal, the petitioner is entitled to get the amount refunded. The writ petition stands allowed. No costs.