Judgment 1. The appellant was convicted for an offence under Section 498-A IPC and sentenced to undergo two years rigorous imprisonment and to pay a fine of Rs.2,000/-, in default, to undergo three months simple imprisonment by the judgment of the learned Sessions Judge, Magalir Neethimandram, Chennai in S.C.No.195/1999, dated 14.1.2003, and aggrieved by the same, the appeal is filed. 2. The appellant was charge sheeted for offences under Section 498-A and 302 IPC for having ill-treated his wife, the deceased, with cruelty and also murdered her by pouring kerosene on her. During trial, on the basis of the evidence, the learned Sessions Judge acquitted the appellant for the offence under Section 302 IPC and convicted him for the offence under Section 498-A IPC. 3. The prosecution examined 10 witnesses. PW.1 is the mother of the deceased. PW.2 and PW.6 are the brothers of the deceased. PW.3 is a neighbour. PW.4 is the Judicial Magistrate, who recorded Dying Declaration. PW.5 is the Doctor. PW.7 is the brother of the accused. PW.8 is the Mahazar witness. PW.9 and PW.10 are the Investigating Officers. 4. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant that the learned Sessions Judge having acquitted the appellant for the offence under Section 302 IPC holding that the deceased committed suicide and the appellant did not abet the commission of suicide by his wife, ought to have held that the charge for the offence under Section 498-A IPC was also not proved by the prosecution and erred in convicting the appellant for the said offence. The learned counsel submitted that the marriage between the appellant and the deceased was solemnised on 16.4.1997. The occurrence took place on 29.12.1997. It is not in dispute that the appellant's mother also sustained burn injuries in the same incident and she also died. He further submitted that no eye-witness was examined to prove that either the appellant or his mother poured kerosene on her and as a result of that, she died. Therefore, the learned Sessions Judge rightly acquitted the appellant for the offence under Section 302 IPC. He also submitted that the deceased gave F.I.R. wherein she has clearly admitted that she committed suicide and her mother-in-law attempted to save her and in that process, she also sustained burn injuries and both of them were admitted in the hospital. Therefore, the learned Sessions Judge rightly acquitted the appellant for the offence under Section 302 IPC. He also submitted that the deceased gave F.I.R. wherein she has clearly admitted that she committed suicide and her mother-in-law attempted to save her and in that process, she also sustained burn injuries and both of them were admitted in the hospital. Ex.P.7 is the statement given by the deceased at hospital to PW.9, Sub-Inspector of Police and that was the first statement given by her immediately after the occurrence. In the statement, she only stated that her husband, the appellant herein, suspected her fidelity and used to keep her in a room locked and on 29.12.1997, after her mother-in-law returned from the Tahsildar's office, the deceased wanted to go to her mother's house and that was not permitted by the mother-in-law and thereupon a wordy altercation took place between them and therefore, the deceased committed suicide by pouring kerosene on her. He therefore, submitted that Ex.P.7, earlier statement given by the deceased would clearly prove that there was no harassment or cruelty committed by the appellant or his mother and suspicion of fidelity by the appellant and kept her in a locked room cannot be construed as cruelty with the meaning of Section 498-A IPC and the evidence of PW.1, PW.2 and PW.6 also did not lead to the conclusion that the appellant treated the deceased with cruelty and without properly appreciating the statement of the deceased, the trial court erred in convicting the appellant for the offence under Section 498-A IPC. 5. The learned Government Advocate (Criminal Side) submitted that the Sessions Judge having regard to Ex.P.7 rightly acquitted the appellant for the offence under Section 302 IPC. Nevertheless, having regarding to the evidence of PW.1, PW.2 and PW.6 and having regarding to Ex.P.7, the learned Sessions Judge rightly convicted the appellant under Section 498-A IPC. Therefore, there is no need to interfere with the conviction of the appellant. Nevertheless, having regarding to the evidence of PW.1, PW.2 and PW.6 and having regarding to Ex.P.7, the learned Sessions Judge rightly convicted the appellant under Section 498-A IPC. Therefore, there is no need to interfere with the conviction of the appellant. He submitted that PW.1, the mother of the deceased, deposed in clear terms that the appellant suspected her daughter's fidelity and also aborted a foetus when she was five months pregnant and also demanded jewel and the same was corroborated by PW.2 and PW.6 and the fact that the appellant suspected her fidelity and kept her in a locked room would be sufficient to convict the appellant for cruelty and therefore, the trial Court rightly convicted the appellant for the offence under Section 498-A IPC. 6. On the basis of the submissions made by the learned counsel for the appellant and the learned Government Advocate (Criminal Side) for the respondent, we will have to see whether the prosecution proved the case that the appellant has committed the offence punishable under Section 498-A IPC beyond reasonable doubt? 7. As stated supra, initially, the appellant was charged for the offences under Section 302 and 498-A of the IPC and he was only convicted for the offence under Section 498-A IPC and he was acquitted for the offence under Section 302 IPC. Therefore, we will have to see whether there are evidence to arrive at the conclusion that the appellant treated her with cruelty. 8. PW.1 is the mother of the deceased. PW.2 is the brother of the deceased. Admittedly, the marriage of the appellant and the deceased was solemnised on 16.4.1997 and the occurrence took place on 29.12.1997 and it is the evidence of PW.1 that within 10 days from the date of marriage, the appellant demanded more jewels. Therefore, a complaint was given before Ice House Police Station against the appellant and his mother and police also enquired and warned and advised the appellant to live with his wife. Thereafter, the deceased became pregnant and she was five months' pregnant, the appellant suspected her and mad her to abort the foetus. It is also stated by PW.1 that the deceased informed her about the abortion at the instance of appellant. Except the demand of dowry within 10 days from the date of marriage and the abortion of five months' old foetus, no cruelty was attributed to the appellant by PW.1. It is also stated by PW.1 that the deceased informed her about the abortion at the instance of appellant. Except the demand of dowry within 10 days from the date of marriage and the abortion of five months' old foetus, no cruelty was attributed to the appellant by PW.1. PW.1 also admitted that the abortion was in the month of May, 1997. She also admitted that there was no quarrel between her daughter, the deceased and the mother-in-law. She saw her daughter 15 days earlier to the incident and it is not her case that, at that time, the deceased complained about the appellant. PW.2, brother of the deceased, also corroborated the evidence of PW.1 by saying that immediately after the marriage within 10 days, the appellant demanded more jewels and therefore, a complaint was given and the appellant was warned and thereafter, the appellant used to lock her in a room and that was informed to him by his sister. Thereafter, also, a complaint was given before the Ice House Police Station and the appellant agreed to live with the deceased and he did not say any incident of cruelty or harassment after that. 9. Therefore, it is seen from the evidence of PW.1 and PW.2 that there was a demand of jewel immediately after the marriage and police complaints were given and after enquiry, the appellant was warned. The appellant also gave an undertaking before the Police Station to live with his wife happily. No attempt was made by the prosecution to summon the complaint given by the deceased against her husband or the complaint given by PW.1 against her son-in-law, the appellant, about the incident that took place 10 days after the marriage regarding the demand of more jewels. Further, reading of evidence of PW.1 and PW.2 would prove that except the incident that took place immediately after the occurrence regarding demand of jewels, there was no ill-treatment or harassment by the appellant against his wife, the deceased. Even according to PW.1, the abortion took place in the month of May, 1997 and whether it was a natural abortion or forcible one at the instance of the appellant, there is no evidence to that effect and except these allegations, there was no allegation of cruelty against the appellant. 10. Even according to PW.1, the abortion took place in the month of May, 1997 and whether it was a natural abortion or forcible one at the instance of the appellant, there is no evidence to that effect and except these allegations, there was no allegation of cruelty against the appellant. 10. As stated supra, in Ex.P.7, the complaint given by the deceased before the police which was the basis for registering the case, she has not stated that immediately before the incident, the appellant treated her with cruelty or quarreled with her or demanded any dowry. Therefore, in the absence of any incident that took place immediately before the death and the allegation of cruelty or demand of dowry that took place eight or nine months earlier and thereafter, they were living together, in my opinion, the incident which had taken place eight months earlier cannot be a ground to convict a person for the offence under Section 498-A IPC. Further, in this case, it has to be seen that admittedly, mother-in-law of the deceased, namely, the appellant's mother also sustained burn injuries and she also died immediately after the incident. It is admitted by the deceased in Ex.P.7 F.I.R. that she herself poured kerosene on her and when her mother-in-law attempted to save her, she also sustained burn injuries. If there is no cordial relationship between the mother-in-law and the daughter-in-law, namely, the deceased and they were quarreling with each other, the mother-in-law would not have attempted to save the daughter-in-law. It is further stated by PW.3 that he saw the appellant rushing towards his house and coming out with his wife with burn injuries on his shoulder, when she was taken to hospital in an auto-rickshaw, he enquired his wife "why you have done this" and that would also lead to the presumption that the appellant would not have treated the deceased with cruelty. 11. According to me, the suspicion of the husband about fidelity of his wife six or seven months earlier to the occurrence and demand of dowry eight or nine months earlier to the occurrence and thereafter, when they were living happily and there was no evidence to the effect that even after the abortion, husband was suspecting her fidelity or husband was ill-treating her, the appellant cannot be convicted for the offence under Section 498-A IPC. These aspects were not properly appreciated by the trial Court and the trial court presumed that the appellant must have treated his wife with cruelty as the appellant made her to abort the foetus when she was five months pregnant. For that, no evidence was adduced by the prosecution. Hence, the conviction of the appellant under Section 498-A IPC has not been proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt. 12. In the result, the Criminal Appeal is allowed and the impugned judgment of conviction and sentence imposed on the appellant is set aside and the appellant is acquitted of the charge levelled against him. He is set at liberty. The bail bond executed by him shall stand terminated and the fine amount, if any, paid by him shall be refunded to him.