JUDGMENT 1. Heard Mr. Kholkar, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants and Mr. Sardessai, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of respondents. 2. Admit on the following substantial question of law:- (i) Whether the suit for Mandatory and Permanent Injunction is maintainable when the title of the plaintiffs has been disputed. (ii) Whether the Appellate Court committed illegality in holding that the suit filed by the plaintiffs is not barred by the law of limitation when new relief sought by the plaintiffs by way of amendment in the year 2010 was barred by limitation. (iii) Whether the Appellate Court overlooked the document viz. inventory proceedings no.187/1909, Exhibit c-112 colly which states that the suit property which is described under item no.3 and which is further divided into plots 'C' and 'D' were allotted to Ana Luiza and Serafine Antonio Francisco and not to the plaintiffs and that the plaintiffs did not have right, title or interest in the suit property. (iv) Whether the suit can proceed after the amendment application is allowed, without affording opportunity to the defendants to file additional written statement or without affording opportunity to the newly added defendant to file written statement. (v) Whether the suit for declaration and mandatory injunction is mandatory when some of the co-owners are not impleaded in it. (vi) Whether the suit for injunction without asking for declaration and possession is maintainable. 3. Mr. Sardessai, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents waives service of notice on the respondents after admission. By consent, heard forthwith. 4. This appeal is directed against the judgment, order and decree dated 22/02/2013 passed in Regular Civil Appeal No.31/2012 by the District Judge-II, South Goa, Margao ('First Appellate Court'). 5. By the impugned judgment, the judgment and decree dated 13/01/2012 passed by the learned Civil Judge, Junior Division, Sanguem, Goa ('trial Court') in Regular Civil Suit No.56/2000 has been quashed and set aside and the said suit has been decreed. The defendants are permanently restrained from interfering in any manner with the suit property and from raising any construction therein. They have been directed to demolish the portion of the house so far constructed in the suit property and to restore the land to its original position. The Sale Deed dated 11/05/1992 executed by Shri Orlendo Lobo, Iyres Lobo and Eddy Lobo in favour of defendant no.1, has been declared as null and void. They have been directed to demolish the portion of the house so far constructed in the suit property and to restore the land to its original position. The Sale Deed dated 11/05/1992 executed by Shri Orlendo Lobo, Iyres Lobo and Eddy Lobo in favour of defendant no.1, has been declared as null and void. 6. The appellants and respondent no. 3 are the plaintiffs, whereas respondents no.1 and 2 are the defendants in the said suit. Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the manner as they are arrayed in the said suit. 7. Initially, the said suit was filed by plaintiffs no.1 and 2 against four defendants. The said suit was filed in May 1994 and registered as Special Civil Suit N0. 73/1994. The present respondent no.1 was defendant no.1 whereas Shri Orlendo Lobo, Iyres Lobo and Eddy Lobo, the brothers of the plaintiffs no. 1 and 2, were defendants no.2 to 4. The suit was for permanent injunction and mandatory injunction. The permanent injunction was to restrain defendant no. 1 from interfering in any manner with the suit property and from raising any construction therein and to restrain defendants no.2 to 4 from selling or transferring the suit property either wholly or in part thereof to any person or changing the nature of the said property. The mandatory injunction was to direct the defendant no.1 to demolish the portion of the house so far constructed in the suit property and to restore the land to its original position. 8. The case of the plaintiffs was as follows : There is a property known as “Modvolgaly” also known as “Mordevoril Xir” situated at village Sanguem (formerly at Cotarlim) bearing Matriz No.39 and Survey No.19/8 of village Sanguem. The said property is the ancestral property of the plaintiffs, which was originally belonging to the paternal grandfather of plaintiffs no.1 and 2. Upon the death of said paternal grandfather, the suit property was inherited by the father of the plaintiffs no.1 and 2, by name Delfin Joao Lobo, along with other children of Delfin Joao Lobo and upon death of parents of plaintiffs no.1 and 2, the same was inherited by plaintiffs no.1 and 2 and other children of late Delfin Joao Lobo. The father of plaintiffs no.1 and 2, namely Delfin Joao Lobo died on 13/07/1980 and their mother Smt. Isaura Miranda Lobo died on 09/7/1980. The father of plaintiffs no.1 and 2, namely Delfin Joao Lobo died on 13/07/1980 and their mother Smt. Isaura Miranda Lobo died on 09/7/1980. Plaintiffs no.1 and 2 are sisters and defendants no.2 to 4 are their brothers. Plaintiffs no.1 and 2 have three brothers and two sisters all of them being married except one sister by name Celda Lobo and brother by name Iyres Lobo. Plaintiffs are, therefore, the co-owners of the suit property and that the same is still enjoyed and possessed in common by the plaintiffs as well as by defendants no. 2 to 4 along with other co-owners. The suit property is joint and is not partitioned amongst the co-owners and in the survey records, the name of late father of plaintiffs no. 1 and 2 has been recorded. Defendant no.1 has no right title or interest to the suit property or any part thereof. But somewhere in July, 1993, she attempted to carry out construction in the suit property, but due to timely objection from the plaintiffs, she could not do anything. Defendant no.1 claims to have purchased a piece of land from the suit property from the other co-owners namely the defendants no.2 to 4. Defendant no.1 moved an application for mutation of survey record before the Talathi of Sanguem somewhere in June, 1993, about which the plaintiff no. 1 learnt from her mundkar. Plaintiff no.1 objected to the said mutation, by her letter dated 18/06/1993 informing the Talathi that the Sale Deed is defective, since all the co-owners of the properties, were not parties to the same. A day prior to filing of the suit, the plaintiffs found that defendant no.1 had started illegal construction of the house in the suit property, without obtaining licence from the Municipality and also without obtaining Sanad for conversion of the land. Plaintiffs no. 1 and 2 objected to the same, but the defendant did not pay any heed. Hence, the suit. 9. Defendant no.1 filed her written statement on 01/06/1994. She alleged that the plaintiffs have no right, title or interest to the suit plot or to any portion thereof as the plaintiffs have knowledge of the fact that defendants no. 2 to 4 are absolute owners in possession of the suit plot. Defendants no. Hence, the suit. 9. Defendant no.1 filed her written statement on 01/06/1994. She alleged that the plaintiffs have no right, title or interest to the suit plot or to any portion thereof as the plaintiffs have knowledge of the fact that defendants no. 2 to 4 are absolute owners in possession of the suit plot. Defendants no. 2 to 4, as absolute owners in possession and enjoyment of the suit property, have transferred a plot admeasuring 446 square metres from the suit property in favour of defendant no.1 and thus, defendant no.1 stepped into the shoes of defendants no. 2 to 4. Defendant no. 1, after executing Sale Deed, became absolute owner of the said plot from the suit property under Survey No.19/8, admeasuring 446 square metres and she is in peaceful possession and enjoyment of the same. Defendant no.1 obtained the conversion sanad and also obtained construction licence from the Sanguem Municipality. Defendants no. 2 to 4 informed defendant no. 1 that the plaintiffs were compensated in respect of the share of the property by payment of dowry at the time of her first marriage by an Anti- Nuptial Agreement and that plaintiff no.1 out of her first marriage, has one son and one daughter and thereafter, plaintiff no.1 took divorce from her husband and remarried another person from Margao and gave birth to one more child and thus, is settled at Margao and never came to Sanguem and is well aware that she has no right or interest in the suit property. The plaintiffs have not challenged the Sale Deed executed by defendants no.2 to 4 in favour of defendant no.1 and, therefore, the plaintiffs cannot disturb the peaceful possession of defendant no.1. Defendant no.1 started constructing the residential house and continued with the construction till 11/05/1994 and the construction has reached about 3 to 4 metres height and she has incurred expenses to the extent of an amount of more than Rs. 35,000/-. On account of injunction, the defendant has stopped the construction. 10. The defendants no. 2, 3 and 4 filed their written statement on 22/06/1994, alleging as under: The suit is bad for non-joinder of proper and necessary parties. The plaintiffs have no title to the suit property. The suit is barred by Law of Limitation. 35,000/-. On account of injunction, the defendant has stopped the construction. 10. The defendants no. 2, 3 and 4 filed their written statement on 22/06/1994, alleging as under: The suit is bad for non-joinder of proper and necessary parties. The plaintiffs have no title to the suit property. The suit is barred by Law of Limitation. Originally, the suit property was owned by grandfather of these defendants and upon his death, the grandmother instituted inventory proceedings No.187/1909 before the Civil Judge, Senior Division at Quepem and the suit property was described under Item No. 3 and was divided into plots C and D. Plot C was allotted to Smt. Ana Luiza, who died as spinster and plot D was allotted to Serafin Antonio Francisco, who died as bachelor. The father of these defendants was in possession of the suit plot along with these defendants and after his death, these defendants continued to possess and enjoy the same. Plaintiff no.1 got married in the year 1970 and never turned up to the parental house. Subsequently, she took divorce from her first husband and was remarried. At the time of marriage, plaintiff no.1 gave declaration about receipt of dowry and she relinquished all her rights in respect of her parental property. Plaintiff no.2 got married some time in the year 1968 and did not turn back to the parental properties. Plaintiff no. 2 has been instigated by plaintiff no.1 to join plaintiff no.1 to teach lesson to their brothers, who are in peaceful possession of the suit properties. It is false that the plaintiffs are co-owners of the suit property. The said defendants executed a sale deed in favour of defendant no.1 and conferred title of plot of land admeasuring 446 square metres in favour of defendant no.1 and since then, defendant no.1 has absolute right, title and interest over the suit plot from the suit property. 11. The said suit was re-registered as Regular Civil Suit No.56/2000 on 27/12/2000. Subsequently, the plaintiffs no.1 and 2 filed amendment application to which learned Advocate gave no objection and in terms of order dated 22/12/2010, the plaintiffs added the prayer of declaration, in the plaint, to declare that the Sale Deed dated 11/05/1992, executed by the said defendants no. 2 to 4 in favour of defendant no.1, is null and void. Subsequently, the plaintiffs no.1 and 2 filed amendment application to which learned Advocate gave no objection and in terms of order dated 22/12/2010, the plaintiffs added the prayer of declaration, in the plaint, to declare that the Sale Deed dated 11/05/1992, executed by the said defendants no. 2 to 4 in favour of defendant no.1, is null and void. The husband of plaintiff no.1, by name John Pascoal D'Souza, purchased the rights of the co-owners of the suit property including from defendants no.3, 4 and 5, by Sale Deed dated 10/01/2000 and thus became co-owner along with plaintiffs no.1 and 2. The defendants no. 2 and 3 expired and as per the order dated 27/08/2002, their names were deleted. Subsequently, said husband of plaintiff no.1 namely Shri John Pascoal D'Souza, came to be added as defendant no.3, to the suit. Since said John Pascoal D'Souza (defendant no. 3) is the husband of plaintiff no.1, he came to be transposed as plaintiff no.3, by order dated 21/03/2003. The defendant no.4 also expired and as per order dated 22/12/2010, his name was also deleted. The defendant no.1 got married during the pendency of the suit. The husband of the defendant no.1 was added as defendant no.2 as per order dated 22/12/2010. Thus, at the time of disposal of the suit, there were three plaintiffs, who are now the respondents and two defendants who are now the appellants, in this second appeal. 12. Following issues were framed by the Trial Court in view of the rival contentions of the parties : “1. Whether the Plaintiffs prove that defendant no. 1 is liable to be restrained from interfering in any manner in the suit property described in para 1 of the plaint and from raising any construction therein? 2. Whether plaintiffs prove that they are entitled for Mandatory Injunction against defendant no. 1 to demolish the portion of the house constructed in the suit property and to restore the land to its original condition ? 3. Whether plaintiffs prove that they are entitled to cancel the sale deed dated 11-2-1992 executed in favour of defendant no.1? 4. Whether defendants prove that the suit is bad for non joinder of necessary parties? 5. Whether defendants prove that suit is barred by law of limitation? 6. Whether defendant no. 1 proves that she purchased area of 446 sq. mtrs from survey no. 4. Whether defendants prove that the suit is bad for non joinder of necessary parties? 5. Whether defendants prove that suit is barred by law of limitation? 6. Whether defendant no. 1 proves that she purchased area of 446 sq. mtrs from survey no. 19/8 by registered and valid Sale deed ? 7. What order? what relief ?” 13. The plaintiffs examined plaintiff no.1 as PW1, one Paixao Antonio Juliao as PW2, One Willy @ Wilfred Miranda as PW3 and a Surveyor namely Rasiklal Dangui as PW4. The defendants examined defendant no.1 as DW1 and an Engineer Vilas Raikar as DW2. 14. Vide Judgment dated 13/1/2012, the learned Trial Court answered the issues no. 1 to 4 in the negative and issues no. 5 and 6 in the affirmative. Trial Court observed that since as per the plaint itself, the defendant no.1 has carried out construction in the suit property it means that defendant no.1 is in possession of the same and, therefore, it was incumbent upon the plaintiff, in view of dispute as regards ownership, to file a suit for declaration and possession of plot and consequential reliefs. The Trial Court further found that the description of the suit property in the land registration document at exhibit 56 colly is only in respect of 2/3rd of half of the property and the said description differs from boundaries mentioned in paragraph 1 of the plaint. It further found that the boundaries as mentioned in the Deed of Sale dated 10/01/2000 which is at exhibit C-60 also do not tally with those mentioned in the plaint. The Court also found that the boundaries mentioned in the other sale deeds dated 10/01/2000, (exhibit C-61) and Sale Deed 10/04/2000 (exhibit C-62) do not tally with the boundaries mentioned in the plaint. The trial Court was of the view that the Deed of Succession and Qualification of heirs produced by PW1 at exhibit C-64 does not help the plaintiffs. The Trial Court held that though there is deposition regarding inventory proceedings bearing No.187/1909, however, the plaintiffs failed to produce inventory proceedings, due to which, adverse inference has to be drawn. The Trial Court found that the deposition of PW1 was totally unreliable, untrustworthy and shaken in the cross-examination. The Trial Court held that though there is deposition regarding inventory proceedings bearing No.187/1909, however, the plaintiffs failed to produce inventory proceedings, due to which, adverse inference has to be drawn. The Trial Court found that the deposition of PW1 was totally unreliable, untrustworthy and shaken in the cross-examination. According to the Trial Court, three sale deeds at exhibits 61, 62 and 63 with regard to the suit property are hit by lis pendens as the same are produced during the pendency of the suit. The Trial Court also found that the evidence of PW2, PW3 and PW4 does not prove the case of the plaintiffs. It was found that PW4 had not drawn any plan at the time of filing of the suit in the year 1994. The Trial Court, on the other hand, found that the defendant no.1 had produced the sale deed at exhibit C-92 showing that she became owner of the suit property and also produced the sanad at exhibit C-94 colly and municipal licence at exhibit C-119 colly showing that she had started the construction by following necessary formalities. The Trial Court found that though in paragraph 14 of the plaint, it was mentioned that the cause of action arose on 11/05/1994, however, there was not even whisper in the plaint of any incident having occurred on that day. The Trial Court found that the plaintiffs had knowledge of the sale deed sought to be declared as null and void way back at the time of filing of the suit in the year 1994, but the amendment regarding the declaration was incorporated in the year 2010, which is beyond the period of limitation. It was, therefore, held that the relief of declaration is barred by law of limitation. Consequently, the suit came to be dismissed. 15. The plaintiffs filed Regular Civil Appeal No. 31/2012 before the District Court, South Goa at Margao. The learned First Appellate Court formulated the following points for determination: “1. Whether the plaintiffs have proved that they had co-ownership rights in the suit property? 2. Whether the defendants have proved that there was relinquishment of rights by the plaintiff no. 1 & 2? 3. Whether the amendment reverts back to the date of filing of the suit? 4. The learned First Appellate Court formulated the following points for determination: “1. Whether the plaintiffs have proved that they had co-ownership rights in the suit property? 2. Whether the defendants have proved that there was relinquishment of rights by the plaintiff no. 1 & 2? 3. Whether the amendment reverts back to the date of filing of the suit? 4. Whether the impugned Judgment and decree passed by the learned trial Judge is arbitrary, perverse and is therefore required to quashed and set aside?” 16. The First Appellate Court answered the points no.1, 3 and 4 in the affirmative and point no. 2 in the negative. The Court found that the original defendants no.2, 3 and 4 in their written statement had admitted that they were related to the plaintiffs no.1 and 2 and that they sold their rights in the suit property in favour of plaintiff no.3, husband of plaintiff no.1. It therefore, held that the plaintiffs have acquired right in the suit property. The First Appellate Court further found that though the defendants pleaded about Deed of Relinquishment, however, no such Deed of Relinquishment was produced by them on record. It, therefore, held that defendant no.1 cannot be called as bonafide purchaser of the suit plot. The First Appellate Court held that from the evidence on record, the plaintiffs have proved that they had co-ownership right in the suit property. The First Appellate Court found that the ownership document of inscription produced by PW1 shows that the name of the grandfather of the plaintiffs has been recorded as owner. He further found that the survey records showed the name of father of the plaintiffs as occupant. Admittedly, the plaintiffs no.1 and 2 are the sisters of original defendants no. 2 to 4. The property, therefore was common to the plaintiffs as well as to the original defendants no. 2 to 4. One co-owner is in possession of the property for and on behalf of the other co-owners. It further held that the amendment seeking prayer of cancellation of sale deed reverts back to the date of filing of the suit and if it should not have reverted back, the Trial Judge ought to have dismissed the application at the relevant time. Therefore, it has been held that the Trial Court could not have held that the suit is barred by law of limitation. Therefore, it has been held that the Trial Court could not have held that the suit is barred by law of limitation. The First Appellate Court relied upon the judgment of this Court in the case of “Maria Florinda Menezes e Moniz and others Vs. Nicolau Menezes e Quadros and others”, [1990(2) Goa L.T. 328] and held that if requisite facts are established, the Court can cancel the sale deed without their being any declaration sought for. The First Appellate Court, therefore, held that the judgment and order of the Trial Court is perverse and based on conjecture and surmises and the reasoning given are not in tune with the facts brought on record and the law involved. Consequently, the judgment and decree dated 13/01/2012 passed by the trial Court came to be quashed and set aside and the suit has been decreed. Aggrieved by the impugned judgment and decree of the First Appellate Court, the plaintiffs have filed the present Second Appeal. 17. Mr. Kholkar, learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the defendants, submitted that the prayer to declare the sale deed dated 11/05/1992, of the defendants as null and void was added to the plaint subsequently in the year 2010 and the husband of the defendant no.1 was also added as party, subsequently. His grievance is that no opportunity was given to the defendant no. 2 to file any written statement and even no opportunity was given to the defendant no. 1 to file additional written statement after amendment. He submitted that the defendants had produced the records of Inventory proceedings No.187/1909 as Exhibit C-112, which were initiated upon the death of the grand father of the plaintiffs and which clearly revealed that the father of the plaintiffs did not get the suit property. He submitted that the plaintiffs did not produce the title document and their ownership was expressly disputed by the defendants and hence in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case reported in AIR 2008 SC 2033 , the plaintiffs were not entitled for reliefs since there was no prayer for declaration of ownership of the suit property and possession thereof. Learned Counsel submitted that the relief to declare the Sale deed dated 11/05/1992 as null and void was time barred and was added by amendment carried out in 2010 and in the order on amendment application there was no finding that the amendment reverts back to the date of the filing of the suit which is 27/12/2000. According to him, therefore, the suit was clearly barred by limitation. He pointed out that the said amendment was allowed on account of “No objection” given by the learned Advocate of the defendants, without instructions from the defendants. According to him, the NOC was not binding on the defendants. Learned Counsel submitted that in terms of Section 105 of C.P.C., the defendants in this appeal, have challenged the order dated 22/12/2010 allowing the amendment to the plaint. He urged that the defendants had produced their sale deed on record whereas the plaintiffs had not produced the sale deed or inventory proceedings. He urged that the Trial Court had rightly dismissed the suit but the First Appellate Court, without valid legal reasons allowed the same. According to him, the judgment of the First Appellate Court being perverse, is liable to be quashed and set aside. 18. Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the defendants relied upon the following judgments : (i) Uptron India Limited Vs. Shammi Bhan and another; [ (1998) 6 SCC 538 ]. (ii) South Konkan Distilleries and another Vs. Prabhakar Gajanan Naik and others, [ (2008) 14 SCC 632 ] (iii) Vishwambhar and others V. Laxminarayana (Dead) through L.Rs. and another, [ AIR 2001 SC 2607 ] (iv) Shri Marcus D'Costa Vs. Shri Anand Bhissi Gaonkar, [2001 (2) Goa L.T. 46] (v) T. L. Muddukrishana and another Vs. Smt. Lalitha Ramchandra Rao, [ AIR 1997 SC 772 ] (vi) Central Council for Research in Ayurveda and Siddha and another Vs. Dr. K. Santhakumari, [(2001) 5 SC 60] (vii) Goetze (India) Limited Vs. Employees' State Insurance Corporation, [ (2008) 8 SCC 705 ] (ix) P. Chandrasekharan and others Vs. S. Kanakarajan and others, [ (2007)5 SCC 669 ] (x) Vijay Kumar Talwar Vs Commissioner of Income Tax, Delhi, [ (2011)1 SCC 673 ] (xi) Narayan Ram Shet Shirodkar Vs. Rajiv Fondu Gunde, [2013 (6) Mh.L.J. 450] 19. On the other hand, Mr. Employees' State Insurance Corporation, [ (2008) 8 SCC 705 ] (ix) P. Chandrasekharan and others Vs. S. Kanakarajan and others, [ (2007)5 SCC 669 ] (x) Vijay Kumar Talwar Vs Commissioner of Income Tax, Delhi, [ (2011)1 SCC 673 ] (xi) Narayan Ram Shet Shirodkar Vs. Rajiv Fondu Gunde, [2013 (6) Mh.L.J. 450] 19. On the other hand, Mr. Sardessai, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the plaintiffs invited my attention to the plaint and to the written statement filed by original defendants no.2, 3 and 4 and submitted that the co-ownership of the plaintiffs is admitted. He pointed out that the original defendants no. 2, 3 and 4 have admitted that originally the suit property was owned by their grandfather. Learned Counsel submitted that admittedly, the grandfather of the said defendants no.2, 3 and 4 is also grandfather of the plaintiffs. He drew my attention to paragraph 3 of the written statement of defendants no. 2, 3 and 4, wherein it is averred that the father of the defendants was in possession of the suit plot and the after the death of the father, they continued to possess and enjoy the suit property and that plaintiff no.1 and 2, who got married in the year 1970 and 1968 respectively, never turned up to the parental house. The learned Counsel, therefore, submitted that admittedly, plaintiffs had also right in the suit property and whether they turn up or not, the said right cannot be lost unless there is relinquishment of the same. He submitted that in respect of plaintiff no.2, there was not even an alleged relinquishment and in respect of plaintiff no.1, alleged relinquishment was not registered and therefore, the original defendants no. 2, 3 and 4 who were only the co-owners of joint suit property could not have sold the specific portion of the property to the defendant no.1. According to him, therefore, the sale deed dated 11/5/1992 was ab-initio void due to which there was no need of even an amendment to the plaint for declaration that the said sale deed was null and void. He pointed out that the defendants no.2 to 4 were not claiming exclusive possession of the suit property. According to him, even if the amendment, which was proposed by the plaintiffs to the plaint was not allowed then also it would not change the fortunes. He pointed out that the defendants no.2 to 4 were not claiming exclusive possession of the suit property. According to him, even if the amendment, which was proposed by the plaintiffs to the plaint was not allowed then also it would not change the fortunes. He submitted that there was no necessity for seeking declaration. The learned Counsel on behalf of the plaintiffs relied upon the “State of Maharashtra Vs. Pravin Jethalal Kamdar (dead) L.Rs.”, [ 2000 (3) SCC 460 ]. Learned Counsel, therefore, submitted that a suit for possession simpliciter could be filed and in the course of suit, it could be contended that the said sale deed was a nullity. The learned Counsel also relied upon the case of “Sant Lal Jain Vs Avtar Singh”, [ (1985) 2 SCC 332 ]. He submitted that merely because some stones were dumped in the suit property that does not necessitate filing of suit for recovery of possession. He submitted that prayer for mandatory injunction was sufficient. He pointed out that in the said Inventory Proceedings No.187/1909, what was involved was half of 2/3rd and not the entire suit property. He further submitted that since the other co-owners admit that the plaintiffs are also the co-owners, the present defendants cannot oppose. The learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the plaintiffs submitted that the said sale deed dated 11/5/1992 was executed only by the defendant no.1, since that was prior to her marriage. Since defendant no.1 got married, her husband i.e. defendant no. 2 was added. He pointed out that defendant no. 2 did not desire to file Written Statement. According to the learned Counsel, even otherwise, defendant no. 2 cannot have any defence other than that of his wife i.e. defendant no.1. He submitted that even if there was some lapse, that was just procedural lapse, which did not cause any prejudice to the defendants. He further pointed out that insofar as the amendment carried out to the plaint, is concerned, there was no objection given by the learned Counsel for the defendants and, therefore, the defendants are bound by the said no objection and this no objection was not on any law point but on facts for allowing the amendment application as filed. Mr. Sardessai, learned Counsel, therefore, urged that various judgments relied upon by the learned Counsel for the defendants on concession, will not be applicable. Mr. Sardessai, learned Counsel, therefore, urged that various judgments relied upon by the learned Counsel for the defendants on concession, will not be applicable. He, therefore, submitted that no substantial question of law arises in the present appeal and, therefore, the appeal deserves to be dismissed as findings rendered by the First Appellate Court are not perverse. 20. I have perused the entire material on record. I have considered the submissions advanced by the learned Counsel for the parties and I have also considered the judgments relied upon by them. 21. The suit property originally belonged to Shri Delfin Joao Lobo, the grandfather of the plaintiffs no. 1 and 2 and the original defendants no 2, 3 and 4. The plaintiffs through PW1 produced the land registration description and inscription document which shows that the property is inscribed in the name of Delfin Joao Lobo. Form no. I & XIV of the suit property bearing survey no. 19/8 also shows the name of Delfin Jose Lobo, the father of the plaintiffs no. 1 and 2 and the original defendants no.2, 3 and 4, as the occupant. The defendant no. 1 had purchased a specific portion admeasuring 446 square metres identified on the plan annexed to the sale deed dated 11/051992, as PART 'A', from the original defendants no.2, 3 and 4 namely Shri Orlendo Lobo, Shri Ayres Lobo, and Shri Eddy Lobo. The sale deed says that the vendors are the heirs of Delfin Jose Lobo. Admittedly, the plaintiffs no. 1 and 2 are also the heirs of said Delfin Jose Lobo, being his daughters. The sale deed does not mention the names of the plaintiffs as heirs and as having relinquished their rights to the suit property. The sale deed does not mention as to how the said original defendants no.2, 3 and 4 became exclusive owners of the suit property bearing Matriz no.39 and survey no.19/8 of village Sanguem. 22. According to the defendants, upon the death of the grandfather of the defendant no. 1 and plaintiffs no. 1 and 2, there were inventory proceedings no. 187/1909, initiated by their grandmother and the suit property was described under item no. 3 and the same was divided into plots no. 22. According to the defendants, upon the death of the grandfather of the defendant no. 1 and plaintiffs no. 1 and 2, there were inventory proceedings no. 187/1909, initiated by their grandmother and the suit property was described under item no. 3 and the same was divided into plots no. 'C' and 'D' and that plot 'C' was allotted to Smt. Ana Luiza who died as spinster and plot 'D' was allotted to Serafin Antonio Fransisco who died as bachelor. A perusal of the inventory proceedings reveal that at item no. 3 only 2/3rds of half of the property “Modcolgalle” was included. Since the inventory proceedings were initiated by the widow of Delfin Joao Lobo, the same could have been only regarding his half share in the assets, since the widow was entitled to the other half. Even otherwise, the defendants have not explained as to what happened to the said plots 'C' and 'D' of Ana Luiza and Serafino Antonio, after their death. The original defendants no.2, 3 and 4 took plea of having acquired prescriptive and possessory title to the suit property. The said plea of prescriptive title was as vague as vagueness can be. The defendants no. 2, 3 and 4 alleged that the plaintiff no 2 got married some where in 1968 and did not turn back to the parental properties. Thus admittedly, the plaintiff no. 2 has right to her parental properties which include the suit property. It is not possible that the plaintiff no.2 would lose rights to her parental properties, on account of her marriage. 23. It was alleged by the original defendants no.2, 3 and 4 that the plaintiff no. 1 got married in the year 1970 and never turned up to her parental house; got divorce from first husband and remarried and that at the time of marriage, made declaration of having received dowry and relinquished all her rights in the parental property. Belatedly, on 05/05/2009, the defendant no.1 had filed an application under Section 65 of the Evidence Act, before the Trial Court, to produce a Xerox copy of alleged declaration dated 10/04/1970 allegedly made by the plaintiffs no.1 and 3 at the time of their marriage saying that the original was with original defendants no.2, 3 and 4 who have died. Belatedly, on 05/05/2009, the defendant no.1 had filed an application under Section 65 of the Evidence Act, before the Trial Court, to produce a Xerox copy of alleged declaration dated 10/04/1970 allegedly made by the plaintiffs no.1 and 3 at the time of their marriage saying that the original was with original defendants no.2, 3 and 4 who have died. Since the defendant no.1 failed to satisfy as to why and under what circumstances a Xerox copy was prepared and as to who was in possession of the original at that time and further since the ingredients of Section 63(2) or (3) of the Evidence Act were not fulfilled, the Trial Court dismissed the said application. The said Xerox copy of the alleged declaration (relinquishment) was rightly refused to be taken on record by the Trial Court. The said declaration was not registered. Therefore, since there was no relinquishment of their rights by the plaintiffs no.1 and 2, as per the pleadings of the original defendants no. 2, 3 and 4, the plaintiffs no.1 and 2 were co-owners of the undivided suit property. The sale deed dated 11/05/1992, by which the defendants no.2, 3 and 4 sold specific portion admeasuring 664 square metres of the suit property, without their being partition, but without participation of the plaintiffs no. 1 and 2, was abinitio void and not binding on the plaintiffs. The learned First Appellate Court, has rightly held that from the evidence on record, the plaintiffs have proved that they had co-ownership right to the suit property. 24. In paragraph 12 of the plaint, filed in May 1994, the plaintiffs had already pleaded that the suit property is common and the original defendants no. 2, 3 and 4 had no right to sell the same to the defendant no. 1 without the consent and intervention of the plaintiffs and that the said sale deed is null and void. On the date of filing of the suit in May, 1994, the prayer for declaration that the sale deed dated 11/05/1992 is null and void, would have been within the prescribed time limit. On 22/12/2010, the plaintiffs filed application for amendment to the plaint only to incorporate the prayer (bb) for declaration that the sale deed dated 11/05/1992 is null and void, etc. On 22/12/2010, the plaintiffs filed application for amendment to the plaint only to incorporate the prayer (bb) for declaration that the sale deed dated 11/05/1992 is null and void, etc. Learned Advocate for the defendants gave no objection and by order passed on the same day, the application was allowed. Hence, the prayer reverted back to the date of filing of the suit. 25. It is the contention of learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the defendants that the 'No objection' given by the Advocate for the defendants for amendment to the plaint is not binding on the defendants. In the case “UptronIndia Limited” (supra), relied upon by the learned Counsel for the defendants, it has been held by the Apex Court that a wrong concession on a question of law, made by a Counsel, is not binding on his client and such concession cannot constitute a just ground for a binding precedent. In the case of “Dr. K. Santhakumari” (supra), also relied upon by the defendants, it has been held that if the learned Counsel for a party has made an admission or concession inadvertently, under a mistaken impression of law, it is not binding on his client and the same cannot enure to the benefit of any party. In the case of “Goetze (India) Ltd.” (supra), it has been held that since the liability to pay interest is statutory, there is no power of waiver. The above ratios are not applicable to the present case since here the learned Advocate for the defendants had given 'No objection' to the amendment sought to be carried out by the plaintiffs to the plaint and not to any point of law raised by way of amendment. The NOC was never withdrawn claiming that the same was given inadvertently, under a mistaken impression of law and the same cannot be taken as waiver of any statutory liability. It can only be said that the defendants knew that the amendment was only a formality ad that the required averments for said prayer were already existing in the plaint. Therefore, there is no force in the submission that the concession given by the Advocate for the defendants was not binding on the defendants. 26. It can only be said that the defendants knew that the amendment was only a formality ad that the required averments for said prayer were already existing in the plaint. Therefore, there is no force in the submission that the concession given by the Advocate for the defendants was not binding on the defendants. 26. It is another contention of the learned Counsel for the defendants that the said amendment cannot revert back to the date of plaint and that the prayer was barred by limitation. In the case of “South Konkan Distilleries and another” (supra), relied upon by the learned Counsel for the defendants, the Supreme Court has held that one of the cardinal principles of law in allowing or rejecting an application for amendment of the pleadings is that the Courts generally, as a rule, decline to allow amendments, if a fresh suit on the amended claim would be barred by limitation on the date of filing of the application. However, it has been added that the above would be a factor to be taken into account in the exercise of discretion as to whether the amendment should be ordered and does not affect the power of the Court to order it, if that is required in the interest of justice. Thus, it is not a rule that every amendment which is barred by limitation should be rejected. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case supra has observed that an amendment of written statement and counterclaim barred by limitation can be allowed when amendment merely adds to facts already on record. In the present case it was already on record that the sale deed dated 11/05/1992 was bad since it was executed without the consent and intervention of the plaintiffs no. 1 and 2 who are co-owners. There was also an averment in the plaint that the said sale deed was null and void. By way of amendment, the plaintiffs, with 'No objection' given by the learned Advocate for the defendants, which was never withdrawn, had only added the prayer to declare the said sale deed as null and void. The judgment in the case of “South Konkan Distilleries and another”(supra), in fact helps the plaintiffs. By way of amendment, the plaintiffs, with 'No objection' given by the learned Advocate for the defendants, which was never withdrawn, had only added the prayer to declare the said sale deed as null and void. The judgment in the case of “South Konkan Distilleries and another”(supra), in fact helps the plaintiffs. In the case of “Vishwambhar and others” (supra), relied upon by the learned Counsel for the defendants, it has been held by the Apex Court that where in a suit for recovery of possession from purchaser filed by minor on his attaining majority, if no prayer for setting aside sale deeds is made, and such a prayer is subsequently added by way of amendment and such amendment is after a period of 3 years from the date minor attaining majority, the suit for setting aside transfers could be taken to have been filed on the date of the amendment of the plaint was allowed and not earlier than that. In the case supra, from the averments made in the plaint, it could not be said that all the necessary averments for setting aside the sale deeds were contained in the plaint and adding of specific prayer for setting aside the sale deeds was a mere formality. It was found that by introducing the prayer for setting aside the sale deeds, the basis of the suit was changed to one setting aside the alienation of the property by the guardian. In the present case, the facts are different. Here, there were averments already contained in the plaint enough for setting aside the sale deed dated 11/05/1992. Only actual prayer was not there, which has been introduced subsequently with the 'No objection' given by the learned Advocate for the defendants. The amendment in the present case reverted back to the date of the filing of the suit. In the case of “Shri Marcus D'Costa” (supra), a Single Judge of this Court has held that it is well settled that the Court cannot entertain a relief which is expressly barred by limitation for it has no jurisdiction to entertain such a relief and it would be against public policy to do so. In the case of “Shri Marcus D'Costa” (supra), a Single Judge of this Court has held that it is well settled that the Court cannot entertain a relief which is expressly barred by limitation for it has no jurisdiction to entertain such a relief and it would be against public policy to do so. It is observed that having recorded a clear finding that the proposed amendment was barred by limitation, it was not open to the Court to allow the amendment in question whereby new relief was sought which was admittedly barred by limitation. In the case supra, the order allowing amendment was itself challenged in the Civil Revision Application. The said relief was hopelessly barred by limitation and the Trial Court had itself made such an observation. In the present case, the defendants, through their Counsel, gave 'No objection' to the amendment and only at the time of final arguments before the Trial Court alleged that the same cannot revert back to the date of filing of the suit. The defendants did not file any additional written statement claiming that the prayer of declaration was barred by law of limitation. 27. In the case of “T. L. Muddukrishana” (supra), it has been held thus: “8. Under these circumstances, it must be held that for the purpose of limitation, what is material is that the limitation begins to run from the date the parties have stipulated for performance of the contract. The suit required to be filed within three years from the date fixed by the parties under the contract. Since the application for amendment of the plaint came to be filed after the expiry of three years, certainly it changed the cause of action as required to be specified in the plaint. The suit for mandatory injunction is filed and the specific performance was sought for by way of an amendment. The cause of action is required to be stated initially in the plaint but it was not pleaded. It was sought to be amended, along with an application for specific performance which, as stated earlier, was rejected. Under these circumstances, even by the date of filing of the application, namely, November 5, 1992, the suit was barred by limitation. The cause of action is required to be stated initially in the plaint but it was not pleaded. It was sought to be amended, along with an application for specific performance which, as stated earlier, was rejected. Under these circumstances, even by the date of filing of the application, namely, November 5, 1992, the suit was barred by limitation. The high Court, therefore, was right in refusing to permit the amendment of the plaint.” The above judgment was in the case of Specific performance of agreement entered into between parties for sale of immovable property. Cause of action which was required to be stated initially in the plaint was not pleaded. In the present case since there was already an averment, regarding the illegality of the sale deed, existing in the plaint, it cannot be said that Cause of action required for to be stated initially in the plaint was not pleaded. The above judgment is not applicable to the present case. 28. The learned First Appellate Court has rightly relied upon the case of “Maria Florinda Menezes e Moniz and others Vs. Nicolau Menezes e Quadros and others” [1990 (2) Goa L. T. 328], in which this court has held that if the required facts are established, the Court can cancel a sale deed without any declaration being sought. 29. It is the contention of the learned counsel for the defendants that the suit filed for Mandatory and Permanent Injunction, without prayer for declaration of ownership and recovery of possession was bad and the Trial Court had rightly dismissed the suit on this ground. There is absolutely no substance in the above submission. The cause of action for filing the suit arose on 11/05/1994, on which day the defendant no. 1 started the illegal construction of the house in the suit property. In the suit filed in May 1994, i.e. without any delay, the plaintiffs, inter alia, prayed for Mandatory Injunction to direct the defendants to demolish the said construction and to restore the land to its original position. Merely because the defendant no.1, in her written statement, claimed that the plaintiffs had no right, title or interest to the suit plot, that does not mean that a cloud was raised over the plaintiffs' title and that they were not in possession. Merely because the defendant no.1, in her written statement, claimed that the plaintiffs had no right, title or interest to the suit plot, that does not mean that a cloud was raised over the plaintiffs' title and that they were not in possession. The plaintiff no.3 is the person who purchased the rights of all the co-owners including the original defendants no.2, 3 and 4. The ownership of the plaintiffs has been established beyond doubt. The sale deed in favour of the defendant no.1 was null and void. The possession taken by the defendant pursuant to the said illegal sale deed and some construction done in the suit property without consent of the plaintiffs was nothing but trespass. Hence, the plaintiffs had no reason to pray for declaration of ownership or for recovery of possession. In the case of “Sant Lal Jain” (supra), the Apex Court has observed that in an eviction suit, relief should not be denied merely because the plaint in form appears to be for mandatory injunction to vacate the premises though in essence it is for ejectment. 30. The points that no opportunity was given to the defendant no.2 to file written statement or no opportunity was given to the defendant no.1 to file additional written statement, after amendment, etc were not initially raised before the Trial Court for it to render finding on the same. Be that as it may, the defendant no.2 is nobody else than the husband of the defendant no.1 and it was the defendant no.1 alone who had purchased the plot. The defendant no. 2 came to be added after the defendant no.1 married him. He cannot have any defence, other than that taken by the defendant no.1. The defendants did not make any grievance before the Trial Court, in this regard. There is no substance in such objections which are taken by way ODF afterthought. 31. It is not known as to who are the other co-owners who are not impleaded in the suit. Even otherwise, the suit is not for declaration of ownership of suit property. The suit is for permanent injunction, mandatory injunction and declaration of sale deed in favour of defendants as null and void. The suit is for benefit of all the co-owners. 32. In view of the above, all the substantive questions of law, as framed above, are answered against the defendants. The suit is for permanent injunction, mandatory injunction and declaration of sale deed in favour of defendants as null and void. The suit is for benefit of all the co-owners. 32. In view of the above, all the substantive questions of law, as framed above, are answered against the defendants. The findings on facts as rendered by the First Appellate court are not perverse but are proper on correct appreciation of the material on record. No interference with the impugned judgment, order and decree is called for. There is no merit in the appeal. 33. In the result, the appeal is dismissed, with no order as to costs in the facts and circumstances of the case.