Research › Search › Judgment

Jharkhand High Court · body

2014 DIGILAW 443 (JHR)

Rakesh Ranjan v. State of Jharkhand

2014-03-31

R.R.PRASAD

body2014
ORDER Heard learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, learned counsel for the State and learned senior counsel appearing for O.P. No. 2. 2. This application is directed against the order dated 16/07/2012, passed in Criminal Revision No. 199 of 2010, whereby and whereunder the learned Additional Sessions JudgeI, Jamshedpur, has affirmed the order dated 04/08/2010, passed in C/1 Case No. 502 of 2006, refusing to discharge the petitioners from the case. 3. Before adverting to the submissions, advanced on behalf of the petitioners, the case of the prosecution needs to be taken notice of. 4. A complaint was lodged on 21/04/2006 by the complainant/O.P. No. 2, alleging therein that he did find wild birds being captivated in a cage height of which was never sufficient enough to allow the birds to have free movement. At the same time, it was also found that the Club, i.e. G. Town Club to which the petitioners are the Secretary and Manager, had fixed the light in the cage which created unnatural environment to the birds. The said occurrence, as per the case of the complainant, took place in the month of October, 2005, whereas the complaint was filed on 21/04/2006. Thereupon, the cognizance of the offence under Section 11 (1) (e) of the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act and also under Section 9 of the Wild Life Protection Act, was taken against the petitioners vide order dated 03/02/2007. Subsequently, an application for discharge was filed wherein a plea was taken that the prosecution cannot be maintained in view of the provision as contained in Section 36 of the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, 1960, which prevents the prosecution being launched after expiration of three months from the date of the commission of the offence. That plea was rejected by the Court below holding therein that the plea taken with respect to limitation would be taken into account at the time of final disposal of the case. That plea was rejected by the Court below holding therein that the plea taken with respect to limitation would be taken into account at the time of final disposal of the case. That order was challenged before the Revisional Court and the Revisional Court also did not accept the plea advanced on behalf of the petitioners on the ground that the prosecution has not been launched only for commission of the offence under Section 11 (e) of the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, but also under Section 9 of the Wild Life Protection Act, though according to the learned counsel appearing for the petitioners, the Revisional Court, when did not find the case being made out under Section 9 of the Wild Life Protection Act, discharged the petitioners from being prosecuted under Section 9 of the Wild Life Protection Act. Being aggrieved with that order, this application has been filed. 5. Mr. S.K.Murari, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners submits that once the Revisional Court has found that no offence is made out under Section 9 of the Wild Life Protection Act, then rejection of the plea, taken with respect to limitation, appears to be bad. In this regard, learned counsel by referring to Section 36 of the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, submitted that as per the case of the prosecution the birds were found to have been kept in a cage having insufficient height in the month of October, 2005, whereas the complaint was lodged after expiry of three months from that day, i.e. 21/04/2006 and, thereby, the prosecution under Section 11(1)(e) of the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, cannot be maintained and the petitioners are fit to be discharged from the case. 6. As against this, learned senior counsel appearing for the complainant/O.P. No.2, submits that the nature of the offence is as such that it can be said to be a continuing offence and, thereby, the plea, which has been taken on behalf of the petitioners, is not available. 7. In the context of the submissions, one needs to take notice of the provision as contained in Section 11 (1)(e) of the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, which reads as follows: “(11) 1. 7. In the context of the submissions, one needs to take notice of the provision as contained in Section 11 (1)(e) of the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, which reads as follows: “(11) 1. If any person (a) to (d) (e) keeps or confines any animal in any cage or other receptacle which does not measure sufficiently in height, length and breadth to permit the animal a reasonable opportunity for movement.” 8. From perusal of the said provision, it does appear that if one is found keeping or confining any animal in any cage or other receptacle having insufficient height, length or breadth restricting the animal to have reasonable opportunity to movement, one can be said to have committed offence under Section 11 (1)(e) of the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act. Thus, it can be said that the person committed offence on the date when he was found to have kept or confined any animal in any cage having insufficient height, length or breadth, then the nature of offence as has been described under Section 11(1)(e) of the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, cannot be said to be continuing offence. In that event, the provision as contained in Section 36 of the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, would certainly come to play, which reads as follows: “36. Limitation of prosecutions. - A prosecution for an offence against this Act shall not be instituted after the expiration of three months from the date of the commission of the offence.” 9. Admittedly, the petitioners were found to have kept/confined the birds in a cage in the month of October, 2005, whereas the complaint was filed after three months from that date, i.e. 21/04/2006, and thereby, the prosecution cannot be maintained, but the Court below did not consider all these aspect of the matter in right perspective. Accordingly, the orders passed by the Court below and also by the Revisional Court, are hereby quashed. 10. In the result, the petitioners are discharged from the case.