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2014 DIGILAW 4433 (MAD)

C. Varahaswamy Chetty v. K. M. S. Abdul Kani

2014-11-26

R.KARUPPIAH

body2014
Judgment : 1. The deceased first revision petitioner alone filed this revision petition against the judgment and decree passed in RCA No.1 of 2002 wherein set aside the order and decreetal order passed in RCOP No.1/1998. During the pendancy of this revision petition, the sole revision petitioner died and the revision petitioners 2 and 3 are impleaded as Legal Representatives of the deceased revision petitioner. 2. The deceased first revision petitioner / landlord filed an eviction petition in RCOP.No.1 of 1998 under Section 10(3) (a) (1) and 10(3)(a)(iii) of Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, to vacate the respondent / tenant from the petition premises and deliver the same to the deceased revision petitioner. Brief facts stated in the petition are that the deceased revision petitioner was the owner of the petition premises and the respondent is a tenant under the deceased revision petitioner from 01.05.1995 to 30.04.1998. Since the schedule mentioned building required for running his business, the revision petitioner demanded the respondent to vacate the premises after expiry of a lease period, but, the respondent was evaded and also he filed a Civil Suit in O.S.No.31 of 1998 with false allegations and hence, the deceased revision petitioner filed the petition for eviction. 3. The respondent / tenant filed a detailed counter in which admitted that he is a tenant under deceased revision petitioner. The case of the respondent is that the tenancy is commenced from 1979 onwards and it is false to state that the deceased revision petitioner had demanded the respondent to vacate the premises after expiry of lease period. According to the respondent, before filing the eviction petition, no notice have been issued to the respondent and on that ground alone the eviction petition is liable to be dismissed. Further the deceased first revision petitioner was not employed and also he having alternative places to run a business. The respondent already filed a suit in O.S.No.275 of 1995 and the same was compromised and settled out of Court. Since the deceased revision petitioner started trouble to the respondent, the respondent filed another suit in O.S.No.31 of 1998 and it is pending. During the pendancy of the suit, the deceased first revision petitioner filed the present eviction petition with false contentions and therefore, prayed for to dismiss the petition. 4. Since the deceased revision petitioner started trouble to the respondent, the respondent filed another suit in O.S.No.31 of 1998 and it is pending. During the pendancy of the suit, the deceased first revision petitioner filed the present eviction petition with false contentions and therefore, prayed for to dismiss the petition. 4. The Rent Controller after hearing both side submissions and came to the conclusion that the requirement of the petition premises to run the old iron business by the deceased revision petitioner is a bonafide one and also the respondent herein failed to prove the contention that the deceased first revision petitioner had another shop, on his own to run the above said business and therefore, allowed the above Rent Control Original Petition and directed the respondent to vacate the premises within a period of three months. 5. Aggrieved over the above said findings, the respondent / tenant preferred a Rent Control Appeal in R.C.A.No.1 of 2002 before the Rent Control Appellate Authority. Before the Appellate Authority, the respondent / tenant contended that Section 10(3)(a)(i) is only applicable to the residential buildings, but, the petition premises is non residential building. Further, the learned counsel pointed out before the Appellate Authority that Rent Controller had failed to consider the fact that disputed building have two floors and the ground floor is used by the respondent herein (appellant in the appeal) for his business under the name and style of Raja Fancy Hall nearly more than 15 years and the deceased first revision petitioner failed to prove the bonafide requirement as pleaded in the petition and therefore, he is not entitled to evict the respondent. 6. The Rent Control Appellate Authority, on hearing both side contentions and accepted the fact that the schedule mentioned building is non-residential building and the respondent is a tenant. The Rent Control Appellate Authority has rejected the contention of the respondent that the eviction petition not maintainable since the eviction petition has been filed invoking the wrong provisions of Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960. The Rent Control Appellate Authority has rejected the contention of the respondent that the eviction petition not maintainable since the eviction petition has been filed invoking the wrong provisions of Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960. The Rent Control Appellate Authority has relied on the decisions reported in 1995 (2) LW 302 (Poongothai v. Zamurth Bibi and 5 others) and also 1998 (2) CTC 419 (Oil and Natural Gas Corporation, Cauvery Project Group General Manager(c), Karaikal v. Gouthamchand Gothi) and held that quoting of wrong provision of 10(3)(a)(i) of Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1960 in respect of non residential building is not fatal to the case of the landlord and therefore, rejected the contention of the tenant. 7. But the Appellate Authority allowed the appeal and dismissed the petitions filed by the deceased revision petitioner on other grounds by accepting the contentions of the respondent. It is relevant to extract the above said portions in paras 12 and 13 as follows:- “12. In this case, the respondent / landlord has filed this petition to evict the appellant / tenant from the schedule mentioned building for his own purpose for running of business in the said building. Admittedly, the respondent / landlord is residing in the first floor of the disputed building and the appellant / tenant is occupying the ground floor by carrying on his textile business from the year 1974. Earlier, I stated that there is no dispute regarding the tenancy agreement and also the respondent / landlord has not issued any legal notice to the appellant / tenant to demand him to vacate the schedule mentioned property. Under such circumstances, it is the bounden duty of the respondent / landlord to prove that his requirement is bonafide one. The essential requirement is that there must be a foundation or reasonable materials to come to the conclusion that there is a business either by the landlord or landlady or his or her son as the case may be, and it is for that business, the premises in question is required. Mere intention to start a business did not fall within the meaning of carrying a business under Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. Mere intention to start a business did not fall within the meaning of carrying a business under Section 10(3)(a)(iii) of Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. A person who was intending to do the business in the future is a person who is carrying on a business and is not entitled to apply for the relief under Section 19(3)(a)(iii). In this case, there is no pleading that the respondent / landlord has already carrying on business and also he wants the schedule mentioned property for shifting his business to the schedule mentioned property. In fact, the respondent / landlord has simply stated in his petition that he wants the schedule mentioned building for his own purpose for running of business in the said building. Admittedly, no proof has been placed on the side of the respondent / landlord to prove that he intended to start the business in the schedule mentioned property. Moreover, no particulars has been mentioned in his petition about the type of business which he was intended to start and the source of investment for the said business. Even though, the respondent / landlord was completed 77 years at the time of the filing of the petition, he wantonly mentioned his age as 40 years in his petition. Moreover, no evidence was adduced on the side of the respondent / landlord that his family members are also available to support the proposed business. On careful perusal of the order passed by the learned Rent Controller, I find that only on the basis of admission made by the appellant / tenant that the respondent / landlord is doing the old scrap business in the first floor, the learned Rent Controller has concluded the requirement of the respondent / landlord is bonafide one. More admission made by the appellant / tenant that the respondent / landlord is carrying the business of old scrap in the first floor would not amount that he required the schedule mentioned building for his own purpose of running business. Admittedly, it is not the case of the respondent / landlord that he is already carrying the business of old scrap in the first floor and he wants the schedule mentioned property for improving his business. Therefore, I find that the findings of the learned Rent Controller that the requirement of the respondent / landlord is bonafide is not at all acceptable. Therefore, I find that the findings of the learned Rent Controller that the requirement of the respondent / landlord is bonafide is not at all acceptable. Moreover, no document has been produced like licence, account books etc., on the side of the respondent / landlord to prove that he is carrying on business of old scrap in the first floor of the building. In view of the above said reasons, I finally decided that the respondent / landlord has miserably failed to prove that he is bonafidely required the schedule mentioned building for his own purpose for running business. 13. Apart from that from the available records, I find that the appellant/tenant is occupying the schedule mentioned building from the year 1974 as tenant under the respondent/landlord for carrying the business of textiles and even after the expiry of last lease agreement, the respondent/landlord has received the rent through Money Orders. Since the respondent/landlord has received the monthly rent through Money Order even after the expiry of last lease agreement for the period from 1.5.95 to 30.4.98. We may easily be presumed that the applicant/tenant is continued in possession of the schedule mentioned property as tenant. Moreover, no explanation offered on the side of the respondent/landlord for the non-issuance of lawyer's notice before filing of the petition. Coupled with the fact that the respondent/landlord has miserably failed to prove that his requirement is bonafide and not explained for the non-issuance of lawyer's notice before filing of this petition and also the appellant/tenant is occupying the schedule mentioned property as tenant from the year 1974 for running his business of textile, I find that his right is deserved to be protected. In view of the above said findings, I come to conclusion that the respondent/landlord is not entitled to vacate the appellant/tenant from the schedule mentioned property and as such the order and decreetal order of the learned Rent Controller are liable to be set aside and I answered this point accordingly.'' 8. Aggrieved over the above said judgment passed by the Appellate Authority, this revision petition has been filed by the deceased revision petitioner and after his demise during the pendency of the revision, the other revision petitioners 2 and 3 have been impleaded as his legal heir. 9. Heard the learned counsel appearing for the revision petitioners and the respondent and perused the materials available on record. 10. 9. Heard the learned counsel appearing for the revision petitioners and the respondent and perused the materials available on record. 10. Admittedly, the petition premises is non-residential building and the revision petitioners are landlord and the respondent is tenant in the petition premises. It is also not in dispute that even after expiry of three years, the revision petitioners received the rent from the respondent and the respondent is in possession continuously and paid the rent. In the above said circumstances, the deceased revision petitioner filed the eviction petition under Sections 10(3)a(i) and 10(3)a(iii). But, on perusal of the averments made in the petition revealed that the deceased sole revision petitioner filed this eviction petition on the ground that the schedule mentioned non-residential building required for running his own business. 11. The learned counsel appearing for both sides admitted that the deceased revision petitioner has wrongly mentioned the provisions of law in the eviction petition even though the petition premises is admittedly a non-residential building. It is relevant to extract the above said sections as follows:- ''10(3)(a): A landlord may, subject to the provisions of clause (d), apply to the Controller for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building. a(i) in case it is residential building, if the landlord requires it for his own occupation or for the occupation of [any member of his family] and if he or [any member of his family] is not occupying a residential building of his own in the city, town or village concerned; a(ii) in case it is a non-residential building which is used for the purpose of keeping a vehicle or adapted for such use, if the landlord requires it for his own use or for the use of [any member of his family] and if he or [any member of his family] is not occupying any such building in the city, town or village concerned which is his own; a(iii) In case it is any other non-residential building, if the landlord or [any member of his family] is not occupying for purposes of a business which he or [any member of his family] is carrying on, a non-residential building in the city, town or village concerned which is his own:'' 12. As rightly conceded by the learned counsel appearing for both sides, the eviction petition filed under 10(3)a(i) is not correct since the above said provision relates to only residential building, but, in the instant case, the petition premises is a non-residential building. The Appellate Authority correctly considered both side submissions in the above said fact and also considered the various decisions relied on by the revision petitioner and finally held that the wrong quoting of the provision of law is not fatal to the case and therefore, rejected the contention of the respondent. The learned counsel appearing for the respondent also not seriously objected regarding the above said finding of the Rent Control Appellate Authority. 13. In the above said circumstances, the main question to be decided is that whether the requirement of the petition premises for running a business by the deceased first revision petitioner is bonafide as contended by the revision petitioners and on that ground, the revision petitioners 2 and 3 are entitled to vacate the respondent, after the death of the deceased first revision petitioner ? Further, it is to be decided whether the revision petitioner suppressed the material facts in the eviction petition and on that ground also, the revision petitioners 2 and 3 are not entitled to the relief as contended by the learned counsel appearing for the respondent ? 14. Admittedly, the deceased sole revision petitioner in the original petition namely C.Veerasamy Chetty alone filed eviction petition on the ground that it requires for his own purpose for running a business. But, in the petition, the above said petitioner has not stated the particulars of business. The eviction petition is not filed for doing business by the family members. Admittedly, at the time of filing the petition for eviction, the son of the above said deceased petitioner working as District Information Officer in the Tiruvallur District Collectorate Office and also he residing at Tiruvallur in a quarters alloted to him. The daughter of the deceased petitioner also already married and living with her husband. Therefore, the deceased revision petitioner filed the present petition for eviction only for his own business and not doing business by the family members. In the above said circumstances, the deceased sole revision petitioner died during the pendency of the revision petition. The daughter of the deceased petitioner also already married and living with her husband. Therefore, the deceased revision petitioner filed the present petition for eviction only for his own business and not doing business by the family members. In the above said circumstances, the deceased sole revision petitioner died during the pendency of the revision petition. Hence, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent submitted that the relief sought for in the petition become infructuous after death of the sole revision petitioner. 15. The learned counsel appearing for the revision petitioners would submit that the requirement of the landlord continues even after his death of sole revision petitioner and therefore, the legal heirs of the deceased revision petitioner namely the son and daughter are entitled to seek eviction of the respondent even after the death of the sole revision petitioner. Further, the learned counsel appearing for the revision petitioners submitted that the deceased revision petitioner already doing business in the first floor and therefore, required the petition mention second floor portion which is occupied by the respondent as a tenant is required for doing business and no other building available for the revision petitioners for doing business and therefore, the respondent is liable to be evicted as prayed for in the eviction petition. 16. Per contra, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent submitted that in the petition, the deceased revision petitioner has not at all stated as he was doing business in the first floor and the petition premises is required for additional accommodation. Further, the learned counsel submitted that the details of the business going to run in the petition premises also not stated in the petition. Further the revision petitioner has not taking any steps to start the business in the petition premises or extension of the above said business already doing in the first floor. Therefore, this petition is filed only with an intention to evict the respondent suppressing all the relevant facts and therefore, absolutely no bonafide on the part of the deceased revision petitioner, and hence, the Rent Control Appellate Authority has correctly considered all the facts and given correct finding and the above said finding of the Rent Control Appellate Authority is not a perverse or illegal finding. 17. 17. Further, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent pointed out that if really the deceased revision petitioner requires the petition premises for doing business, he should send legal notice to vacate the premises before filing the eviction petition, but, in the instant case, the deceased revision petitioner not at all sent any legal notice to evict the respondent. From the above said conduct of the deceased revision petitioner itself proved that there is no bonafide on the part of the revision petitioner for eviction of the respondent. 18. As rightly pointed out by the learned counsel appearing for the respondent, the deceased revision petitioner has not stated the type of business is proposed to started in the petition premises. The deceased revision petitioner has suppressed the fact that he was doing business in the upstair portion. The deceased revision petitioner has not stated that the petition premises is required for additional accommodation for extending the existing business. As rightly pointed out by the Rent Control Appellate Authority, in the instant case, absolutely there is no pleading that the deceased revision petitioner has already carrying on business and also he requires the premises for shifting his business to the petition premises. The deceased revision petitioner has not produced any materials to prove his intention to start the business in the petition premises and the source of income to start the business in the petition premises and also at the time of evidence. As rightly discussed by the Appellate Court, the deceased revision petitioner had intentionally mentioned his age wrongly as 40 years even though he was completed 77 years, at the time of filing the petition. A perusal of the petition and the evidence revealed that the deceased revision petitioner has not stated the true facts in the petition and also at the time of evidence and suppressed several material facts. 19. As already discussed, the deceased sole revision petitioner died during the pendency of the civil revision petition. The legal heirs of the deceased revision petitioner impleaded as revision petitioners 2 and 3. The legal heirs have not filed any additional grounds to prove that even after the death of the deceased sole revision petitioner, the petition premises required for the revision petitioners 2 and 3 and also they have intention to run a business in the petition premises and having sufficient means to run a new business. The legal heirs have not filed any additional grounds to prove that even after the death of the deceased sole revision petitioner, the petition premises required for the revision petitioners 2 and 3 and also they have intention to run a business in the petition premises and having sufficient means to run a new business. Further, they have not produced any materials to prove the same. In the above said circumstances, the learned counsel appearing for the revision petitioners relied on the following decisions and contended that even after death of a revision petitioner, the legal heirs are entitled to proceed the eviction petition. (1) 1996(2) LW 320 (Ramadoss v. I.S. Vaidyanathasamy(Died) and another), (2) 2001 (3) LW 124 (Gaya Prasad v. Sh. Pradeep Srivastava), (3) 2010 (2) LW 189 (Seshambal (dead) Through L.Rs., v. M/s. Chelur Corporation Chelur Building & Others), (4) 2013 (5) CTC 169 (R.V.P. Shakunthala v. N.Hari Narayana(Deceased) and another). 20. As rightly pointed out by the learned counsel appearing for the respondent, the above said decisions are not helpful to the revision petitioners since the facts of the above said cases are not applicable to the facts of the present case. In the first decision reported in 1996(2) LW 320 (Ramadoss v. I.S. Vaidyanathasamy(Died) and another), revealed that the deceased landlord was running a hotel business and in the above said business his son (2nd respondent) also associated in the business. In the above said circumstances, the court has held that the benefit of eviction ensures to the benefit of the estate that the requirement of the landlord continues even after his death. Therefore, the above said decision is not helpful to the facts of the present case since the facts are differs. 21. A perusal of the second decision reported in 2001 (3) LW 124 (Gaya Prasad v. Sh. Pradeep Srivastava) revealed that 23 years ago, the petitioner filed petition for accommodation for his son to start the clinic. The Rent Controller found that the requirement of the deceased was bonafide, accordingly passed eviction order. The appellate court also dismissed the appeal filed by the tenant. After 15 years, the High Court taken up the matter and given finding that no ground to interfere with the findings of the courts below. The Rent Controller found that the requirement of the deceased was bonafide, accordingly passed eviction order. The appellate court also dismissed the appeal filed by the tenant. After 15 years, the High Court taken up the matter and given finding that no ground to interfere with the findings of the courts below. The tenant in the above said case pleaded to grant him six months time to vacate the premises before High Court and High Court also granted six months time. Long after the above said proceedings, the tenant came to know about the landlord's son joined in the provisional medical service on that premises, the appellant then moved before High Court and the High Court once again reviewed the order but, dismissed the petition. Aggrieved the above said order appellant preferred an appeal before Hon'ble Supreme Court and considering all the above said facts and then the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that the subsequent developments made also be taken into account in eviction proceedings. But, in the instant case as already discussed, the deceased revision petitioner himself not proved the bonafide requirement of the premises as discussed in detail by the Appellate Court. Further, the deceased revision petitioner filed eviction petition only to run his own business not for family members. Therefore, the above said decision is not helpful to the revision petitioners. 22. The third decision reported in 2010 (2) LW 189 (Seshambal (dead) Through L.Rs., v. M/s. Chelur Corporation Chelur Building & Others) and submitted that the subsequent development cannot be set out from the consideration and therefore, the legal heirs of the deceased revision petitioners are entitled to seek possession from the tenant even after the death of the deceased sole revision petitioner. The learned counsel appearing for the respondent submitted that the above said decision itself revealed that the legal heirs of the deceased revision petitioner is not entitled to the relief sought for by the deceased revision petitioner. It is relevant to extract the above said decision in paras 18 and 19 as under:- ''18. We may in particular refer to the decision of this Court in Shantilal Thakordas's case (supra) in which this Court had overruled the earlier decision rendered in Phool Rani & Ors. Vs. It is relevant to extract the above said decision in paras 18 and 19 as under:- ''18. We may in particular refer to the decision of this Court in Shantilal Thakordas's case (supra) in which this Court had overruled the earlier decision rendered in Phool Rani & Ors. Vs. Naubat Rai Ahluwalia ( 1973(1) SCC 688 ) and held that the law permitted the eviction of the tenant for the requirement of the landlord for occupation of the landlord as residence for himself and members of his family and that such a requirement was both of the landlord and the members of his family so that upon the death of this landlord the right to sue survived to the members of the family of the deceased. That is not the position in the instant case. As noticed earlier, the requirement pleaded in the eviction petition by the original petitioners was their own personal requirement and not the requirement of the members of their family whether dependent or otherwise. Indeed if the deceased landlords had any dependent member of the family we may have even in the absence of a pleading assumed that the requirement pleaded extended also to the dependent member of their family. That unfortunately for the appellants is neither the case set up nor the position on facts. The deceased couple did not have any dependent member of the family for whose benefit they could have sought eviction on the ground that she required the premises for personal occupation.' 19. In the light of what we have stated above, we have no hesitation in holding that on the death of the petitioners in the original eviction petition their right to seek eviction on the ground of personal requirement for the demised premises became extinct and no order could on the basis of any such requirement be passed at this point of time.'' 23. In the instant case as already discussed, the deceased revision petitioner has not filed the eviction petition to run a business by the deceased revision petitioner and his family members. Admittedly, in the instant case, the deceased revision petitioner filed eviction petition to run a business on his own not for family members. The second and third revision petitioners also not pleaded and proved that after death of the revision petitioner, the other revision petitioners intended to run a business in the petition premises. Admittedly, in the instant case, the deceased revision petitioner filed eviction petition to run a business on his own not for family members. The second and third revision petitioners also not pleaded and proved that after death of the revision petitioner, the other revision petitioners intended to run a business in the petition premises. It is also revealed that the legal heirs of the deceased revision petitioners (i.e.) P2 and P3 are living far away from the petition premises. Therefore, the above said decision is in support of the contention of the respondent and not helpful to the revision petitioner as rightly pointed out by the learned counsel appearing for the respondent. 24. With regard to the fourth decision relied on by the revision petitioner reported in 2013 (5) CTC 169 (R.V.P. Shakunthala v. N.Hari Narayana(Deceased) and another), as rightly contended by the learned counsel appearing for the respondent, the above said decision also not helpful to the revision petitioner since the facts of the above said case are differs from the facts of the present case. In the above said case, the landlord filed a petition for eviction on the ground of additional accommodation for landlord and also the family members. But, in the instant case, the eviction petition filed only to run a business by the deceased revision petitioner alone and the legal heirs are living far away places. Therefore, the above said decision also not applicable to the facts of the present case. 25. The learned counsel appearing for the respondent would contended that mere intention to start a business is not enough without taking any steps to start a business and in support of his contention, the learned counsel relied on two decisions as under:- (1) 1980 MLJ 327 (G.Nagarathnam v. District Library Officer) (2) 1980 MLJ 395 (Kanakavel Pillai v. Drugs and Chemicals). The relevant portion of the decision reported in 1980 MLJ 327 (G.Nagarathnam v. District Library Officer) reads as under:- '' ..... The expression ''carrying on business'' has been interpreted by a Division Bench of this Court in Reju Chettiar v. State of Tamil Nadu (1970) 1 MLJ 249 = 82 LW 695 = AIR 1970 Mad. 360 . The relevant portion of the decision reported in 1980 MLJ 327 (G.Nagarathnam v. District Library Officer) reads as under:- '' ..... The expression ''carrying on business'' has been interpreted by a Division Bench of this Court in Reju Chettiar v. State of Tamil Nadu (1970) 1 MLJ 249 = 82 LW 695 = AIR 1970 Mad. 360 . Speaking for the Bench, Veeraswami, C.J., pointed out that the expression ''carrying on business'' occurring in section 10(3)(a)(iii) may consist of a series of steps and even if one step is proved, the requirement of the section will be satisfied, but if there is no step at all whatever and the matter is only in the stage of intention, it is difficult to bring such a case under section 10(3)(a)(iii). Though it is not actually necessary to prove that the revision petitioner is carrying on a business, if she has taken one step in the series of steps for running a nursery school, her case could have been brought under section 10(3)(a)(iii). But, in this case, the only document filed to show that a step was taken, is Ex.P-5, a pamphlet which shows that a nursery school is run at No.39, Minor Trustpuram. This case hardly be said to be a step taken in the matter of commencing a nursery school. The revision petitioner is yet to commence the nursery school and before that she has published the pamphlet. It is no doubt true that she being a graduate wanted to employ herself by running a nursery school in her own premises and therefore, as regards the intention to start such a school there could be no doubt. But, in this case, no step, whatever, has been taken and the matter is only in the stage of intention. As there is no tangible and concrete evidence of commencement of a nursery school, mere intention to start or carry on a nursery school will not enable the petitioner to resort to section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act. On that view, this revision fails and is dismissed. No costs.'' 26. As there is no tangible and concrete evidence of commencement of a nursery school, mere intention to start or carry on a nursery school will not enable the petitioner to resort to section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act. On that view, this revision fails and is dismissed. No costs.'' 26. In another decision reported in 1980 MLJ 395 (Kanakavel Pillai v. Drugs and Chemicals), wherein discussed various decisions and finally held that mere intention of carrying on business is not enough to evict the tenant and the relevant portion of the decision is extracted as under:- ''From the foregoing, it is clear that apart from merely entertaining an intention of carrying on the business in plastics at Kumbakonam, the petitioner has not taken any other step in furtherance of such carrying on of the business and therefore, the petitioner cannot claim to come within the scope of the expression ''carrying on business'' in section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act and therefore, entitled to recover possession of the building from the respondent herein. The Appellate Authority was therefore right in holding that the petitioner cannot claim the premises in question from the respondent under section 10(3)(a)(iii) of the Act.'' 27. In the instant case as already discussed, the deceased revision petitioner or his legal heirs (i.e.) revision petitioners 2 and 3 are not at all taking any steps to carrying on business in the petition mention premises. Therefore, as rightly discussed and held by the Rent Control Appellate Authority, the legal heirs of the deceased revision petitioner namely the revision petitioners 2 and 3 have failed to prove the bonafide requirement of the petition mention premises to run a business. 28. The learned counsel appearing for the respondent also contended that it is not permissible by the High Court to re-appreciate the evidence and to arrive at a different finding unless the finding of the appellate court is perverse or illegal. In support of the above said contention, he relied on a decision reported in 2007 (4) MLJ 251 (B.Kishore v. D.Maragathavalli) in which para 18 reads as under:- ''Exercising revisional jurisdiction under Section 25 of the Act, it is not permissible for the High Court to re-appreciate the evidence and to arrive at a different finding unless the concurrent findings are perverse and illegal. There is nothing to show that the concurrent findings suffer from perversity or illegality calling for interference.'' 29. There is nothing to show that the concurrent findings suffer from perversity or illegality calling for interference.'' 29. In the instant case as already discussed, the deceased revision petitioner or his legal heirs, not pleaded all the relevant facts in the petition and also not proved the bonafide requirement to run a business and also not taken any steps to run the above said business. Therefore, this Court is of the considered view that the finding of the Rent Control Appellate Authority is not perverse or illegal and hence, this Court is not inclined to interfere in the above said correct finding of the first appellate court. In the result, the Civil Revision Petition is dismissed. No order as to costs.