JUDGMENT : Jayant Patel, J. As all the appeals arise from the common judgment and order passed by the learned Sessions Judge, they are being considered simultaneously. 2. All the appeals are preferred against the judgment and order passed by the learned Sessions Judge for conviction and sentence of the respective appellants for the offence under Section 302 read with Section 120B of IPC and for the conviction and sentence for the offence under Section 201 read with Section 120B of IPC. For the sake of convenience, Accused Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5 are referred to as "A-1, A-2, A-3, A-4, and A-5" for short. 3. The short facts of the case are that a complaint was filed by Chehrabhai Jesungbhai Gol Patel - Accused No. 1 (A-1) with Gadh Police Station on 8.8.2007, stating that his nephew Devjibhai Narsangbhai @ Devabhai (deceased), who is disabled by both the legs, was living with him and was looking after the agricultural work and for his movement, he had kept four-wheeler scooter. On 7.8.2007, when the complainant went to his type-class shop and came back at about 7.30 p.m., he found that his nephew (deceased) was not present at the well and when he inquired with his wife, he was told that the deceased had gone towards Kushkal in his scooter and the deceased did not come back for a long time, until late night. Thereafter, in the morning, the complainant was informed by his uncle's son Laxmanbhai on phone that the scooter of the deceased was lying on the side of the road, opposite to the agricultural field of Laxmanbhai and Devabhai was also lying there. The complainant went to the place and found that the scooter was lying of the deceased and nearby Devabhai (deceased) was lying in dead condition and it was observed that the blows were given with the sharp weapon on the neck and on the left hand and both the rear wheels were dismantled. It was stated in the complaint that there were no injuries of accident. The Police thereafter investigated into the complaint and initially no substantial material was found, but subsequently, when it was further inquired and investigated, it was found that the complainant was also involved in the commission of crime for causing death of the deceased. Thereafter the charge-sheet was filed against all the accused by the police. The Police thereafter investigated into the complaint and initially no substantial material was found, but subsequently, when it was further inquired and investigated, it was found that the complainant was also involved in the commission of crime for causing death of the deceased. Thereafter the charge-sheet was filed against all the accused by the police. The learned Sessions Judge framed the charges and thereafter the trial was conducted. The prosecution, in order to prove the guilt of the accused, examined various witnesses and produced documentary evidences. The details of the witnesses as well as all the documentary evidences are recorded by the learned Sessions Judge are at page 5 of the judgment. The learned Sessions Judge thereafter recorded the statements of the accused under Section 313 of Cr.P.C., wherein all the accused denied the evidences against them and in the further statement, A-3 stated that a false case is filed against him. However, A-1 and A-2 as well as A-5 submitted written further statements at Exh.140 and Exh.141 respectively, wherein A-1 and A-2 stated that the deceased was brought up by them and nothing is recovered and A-2 has not shown the parts of coat and the panchnama is not prepared in presence of A-2 and Kantibhai (PW-3) (Exh.26) is not an independent witness and he has given false evidence. It was also stated by A-1 and A-2 that the place is not shown by Tinaji to the police and no weapon is recovered by the police or panchnama is not made and it was also stated that Ghemar (PW-7) (Exh.47) is also not an independent witness and the deceased was his nephew and, therefore, false evidence is given. It was also stated that A-1 and A-2 were not knowing A-5 and the information was given by A-1 to the police. In the further statement, A-5 stated that the false case is filed against him and he has not said for showing knife or mobile and nothing was recovered in presence of A-5, nor any panchnama was prepared in presence of A-5. It was also stated that A-5 was not knowing A-1 and A-2. In the further statement, A-5 stated that the false case is filed against him and he has not said for showing knife or mobile and nothing was recovered in presence of A-5, nor any panchnama was prepared in presence of A-5. It was also stated that A-5 was not knowing A-1 and A-2. The learned Sessions Judge thereafter heard the prosecution as well as defence and found that the prosecution has been able to prove the case for the offence under Section 302 read with Section 120B of IPC against A-1, A-2, A-3 and A-5 and the learned Sessions Judge also found that the prosecution has been able to prove the case for the offence under Section 201 read with Section 120B of IPC against A-1, A-2 and A-3, therefore, the learned Sessions Judge held the concerned accused guilty for the respective offences, but the learned Sessions Judge found that the prosecution has not been able to prove the case for the charged offences against A-4 and, therefore, acquitted A-4. The learned Sessions Judge thereafter heard the prosecution and defence for imposition of sentence and ultimately imposed sentence for the life imprisonment with the fine of Rs. 1,000/- and further one month S.I., for default in payment of fine upon A-1, A-2, A-3 and A-5 for the offence under Section 302 read with Section 120B of IPC. The learned Sessions Judge also imposed sentence upon A-1, A-2 and A-3 for seven years' R.I. with the fine of Rs. 500/- and further one month's S.I., for the default in payment of fine for the offence under Section 201 read with Section 120B of IPC. The learned Sessions Judge also directed for set off and the sentences to be undergone concurrently. It is under these circumstances, Criminal Appeal No.27/2010 has been preferred by Chehrabhai Jesungbhai Gol Patel (A-1) and Manguben (A-2), wife of Chehrabhai Jesungbhai Gol, Criminal Appeal No.167/2010 has been preferred by Bhuraji Chaturji Thakore (A-3) and Criminal Appeal No.292/2010 has been preferred by Abdul @ Rahemanbhai Ibrahimbhai Sheikh (A-5) against conviction and sentences. 4. The learned Counsel appearing for A-1 and A-2, Mr. Yogesh Lakhani with Mr. Gondaliya with Mr. Digant B. Kakkad as well as learned Counsel appearing for A-3 Mr. Vaghela and learned Counsel appearing for A-5 Mr. Jayraj Chauhan with Mr. Paresh Patel as well as Mr. 4. The learned Counsel appearing for A-1 and A-2, Mr. Yogesh Lakhani with Mr. Gondaliya with Mr. Digant B. Kakkad as well as learned Counsel appearing for A-3 Mr. Vaghela and learned Counsel appearing for A-5 Mr. Jayraj Chauhan with Mr. Paresh Patel as well as Mr. Pandya, learned APP have taken us through the entire evidences on record. We have considered the judgment and the reasons recorded by the learned Sessions Judge. We have heard the learned Counsel appearing for the respective appellants-original accused and the learned APP for the State. 5. The case of the prosecution can be said as based on circumstantial evidence, since Tinaji (PW-27) (Exh. 91) did not support the case of the prosecution and had turned to be hostile, though as stated initially before the police, he had witnessed the incident of causing death of the deceased. If we consider the overall evidence, the same can be segregated for the respective accused and can also be considered for hatching of conspiracy to cause death of the deceased. 6. As per the prosecution case, as it has come on record, A-1 and A-2, having a motive, hatched a conspiracy with A-3, who was working as labourer on sharing basis with A-1 and A-2, to cause death of the deceased. A-3, for A-1 and A-2, engaged A-5 for causing death. As per the prosecution case, as it has come on record, as a part of the conspiracy for committing crime, A-1, A-2, A-3 and A-5 have played active role in the commission of offence, with the object of causing death of the deceased and thereafter, A-1, A-2 and A-3 played the role for destroying the evidences of the crime of causing death of the deceased. There are disclosure statement and subsequent discovery of the incriminating material at the instance of A-1, A-2, A-3 and A-5 for commission of crime. The evidence of Sardarbhai Parthibhai (PW-1) (Exh.19), Jeetabhai Umedbhai (PW-2) (Exh.24), supported the case of the prosecution on the aspect of motive of A-1 and A-2 and also for the dispute for sharing of the amount with the deceased and the ill-treatment given to the deceased. The evidence of Sardarbhai Parthibhai (PW-1) (Exh.19), Jeetabhai Umedbhai (PW-2) (Exh.24), supported the case of the prosecution on the aspect of motive of A-1 and A-2 and also for the dispute for sharing of the amount with the deceased and the ill-treatment given to the deceased. As per Sardarbhai (PW-1) the deceased had reported to him just one day prior to the incident that he was beaten by his uncle and aunt and on the next day when he visited, the deceased reported that he was also beaten by A-3. The defence, in the cross-examination of the said witness, has not been able to bring about any material contradiction to the aforesaid aspect. The evidence of aforesaid PW-1 and PW-2 shows that as the other agricultural land was sold, the money was to be shared, the land was also to be divided, Rs. 4,00,000/- were to be paid by A-1 and A-2 to the deceased, out of which Rs. 2,00,000/- were to be paid immediately and Rs. 2,00,000/- were to be paid at the time of Diwali. Such evidence supports the case of the prosecution, not only for the dispute, but for a strong motive, since after the death of the deceased, there was no successor of the property and the only sharer was the deceased. 7. By the testimony of Kantibhai (PW-3) (Exh.26), the discovery panchnama for the place of offence (Exh.29) and inquest panchnama (Exh.30) is duly proved. Further, through the evidence of the said witnesses, discovery of jute thread for tying of the coat, the bedding and the supports and the legs of the coat are proved at the instance of A-2, wife of A-1. The place at which the incriminating material was kept is shown by A-2 and further incriminating material is found of supports and the legs of the coat containing blood stains too. 8. As per the FSL and Serological Report at Exh.132, blood is found from the side support of the coat (wooden iss-frame) and the leg of the coat (wooden pia-stand) and all such blood group is matching to the blood group of the deceased, inasmuch as from the clothes of the deceased, the very blood group is found. 9. 8. As per the FSL and Serological Report at Exh.132, blood is found from the side support of the coat (wooden iss-frame) and the leg of the coat (wooden pia-stand) and all such blood group is matching to the blood group of the deceased, inasmuch as from the clothes of the deceased, the very blood group is found. 9. Ghemarbhai (PW-7) (Exh.41) - panch witness has fully supported the case of the prosecution, through his testimony in the pointing out panchnama (Exh.44) for the place of the offence shown by A-1 and the incriminating material discovered. As per the said panchnama (Exh.44) the place at which the incident had happened is shown and further the place at which the earth containing blood of the deceased was removed and fresh clay was poured is identified. After removal of clay covering the place, certain clay is discovered containing blood. The ashes of burnt article of cotton clothes forming part of bedding and of the jute thread is also discovered. As per FSL - Serological Report (Exh.132) the blood is found from the clay which was discovered and the said blood is matching to the blood group of the deceased. 10. Babubhai-panch (PW-4) for recovery of the clothes of the deceased through panchnama (Exh.36), has admitted his signature on the panchnama. The another panch, Virabhai (PW-6) for recovery of scooter of the deceased during the panchnama (Exh.40) has admitted the signature on the panchnama. The next panch, Bhikhabhai (PW-8) for recovery of the clothes of A-3 by the panchnama (Exh.48) has admitted his signature. Further the panch, Sahidbhai (PW-12) has admitted the signature on the panchnama (Exh.59) for discovery of jute bag, which was used for carrying the dead-body of the deceased and further at the instance of A-3 in the said discovery, incriminating material of jute bag containing blood stains is discovered. Through the evidence of I.O., Shri Bharatsinh (PW-36) (Exh.120) the contents of the aforesaid panchnamas are proved by the prosecution. The FSL - Serological Report (Exh.132) shows that the blood is found from the jute bag, which was discovered at the instance of A-3 containing the blood matching to the blood group of the deceased. The aforesaid are the main evidence produced by the prosecution for the respective role played by A-1, A-2 and A-3. 11. The FSL - Serological Report (Exh.132) shows that the blood is found from the jute bag, which was discovered at the instance of A-3 containing the blood matching to the blood group of the deceased. The aforesaid are the main evidence produced by the prosecution for the respective role played by A-1, A-2 and A-3. 11. In addition to the above, for the additional role played by A-3 through the evidence of I.O., in the investigation, it had transpired that there was meeting of minds between A-3 and A-5 and the conspiracy was hatched to cause death of crippled person-deceased. The panch, Bhavanji (Exh.21) has admitted his signature on the panchnama for discovery of Rs. 30,000/- at the instance of A-3, wherein disclosure was made by A-3 that the amount of Rs. 60,000/- was given to him by A-2, the place at which Rs. 30,000/- kept was identified and the incriminating material of Rs. 30,000/- was also discovered. The another panch Ganapat (PW-23) (Exh.84) has admitted his signature on the panchnama for discovery of the amount of Rs. 23,500/-, whereby disclosure was made by A-3 for the place at which the amount of Rs. 30,000/- was kept, the place was identified and the amount was recovered as incriminating material as of Rs. 23,500/-. All the aforesaid panchas after admission of the signatures turned hostile, but by the testimony of I.O., Bharatsingh (PW-36) (Exh.120), contents of the panchnamas are proved. In the same manner, another panch Jayanti (PW-16) (Exh.71) has admitted his signature on the panchnama for the discovery of knife at the instance of A-5, wherein the disclosure was made for A-5 for the place at which the weapon was kept and the incriminating material of knife having length of 40 cms and width of 6 cms was discovered. Similarly, Babubhai (PW-18) (Exh.) the panch for discovery of mobile of the deceased at the instance of A-5 has admitted his signature on the panchnama prepared for the disclosure statement made by A-5 for the place at which the mobile was kept and the incriminating material of mobile was discovered. Through the testimony of I.O. (PW- 36) the contents of the panchnamas are proved. 12. The evidence of Dr. Deepak (PW-31) (Exh. 99) supports the case of the prosecution for the death caused of the deceased by various injuries on the vital parts of the body. Through the testimony of I.O. (PW- 36) the contents of the panchnamas are proved. 12. The evidence of Dr. Deepak (PW-31) (Exh. 99) supports the case of the prosecution for the death caused of the deceased by various injuries on the vital parts of the body. As per the testimony of the said doctor, the neck was cut with the sharp weapon and the size of the injury was 10 cm x 6 cm and 4 cm deep on medial side, x 3 cm deep lateral side, x 8 cm deep in central. The injury was also found of 8 cm x 6 cm. There are other injuries. The main blood veins of the neck were cut. The respiratory track was also cut. There were other 12 additional injuries, in all 13 injuries and as per the doctor, injury No.1 was sufficient to cause death in natural course. He opined that the said injuries could be caused with sharp-cutting weapon like knife. The case property (Article 18 - Chhari) - knife was shown to him and he opined that such injury could be caused with the same. As per the said doctor, the death must have occurred prior to 12 hours from the time at which postmortem was performed and as per the said evidence, postmortem was performed at 2 O'clock in the afternoon on 8.8.2007. The defence in the cross-examination of the said witness has not been able to bring about any material contradiction on the aspect of injuries on the body of the deceased or the other opinion expressed by the doctor, except that in the postmortem note, such opinion was not recorded for the time of death prior to 12 hours from the time of postmortem and in the cross-examination of the said doctor when the question was put to him that such injuries could be caused with the knife having sharpness on both the sides, the doctor answered that then there would be difference in the stabbed wounds. In our view, the aforesaid aspect of non-recording of the time of death in the postmortem report could not be said to be fatal to the case of the prosecution for proving the time of the death of the deceased. In our view, the aforesaid aspect of non-recording of the time of death in the postmortem report could not be said to be fatal to the case of the prosecution for proving the time of the death of the deceased. Further, the answer given in the cross-examination for the injuries caused reconfirms that the injuries could be caused with the knife shown to the doctor, which was discovered at the instance of A-5. The aforesaid could be said as important evidence led by the prosecution for proving the case in addition to the other evidence for showing the place of the incident, the recovery of vehicle used for disposal of dead-body and others. 13. We may now consider the contention raised by the learned Counsel appearing for the respective accused. 14. Mr. Lakhani, learned Counsel appearing for A-1 and A-2 raised the first contention that as per the evidence of the prosecution, the blood sample of the deceased was taken and the same was forwarded to the Forensic Science Laboratory as per the document at Exh. 101. The endorsement below the said document at Exh. 101 shows that one police constable having Buckle No.1192 had received four bottles, but thereafter what has happened to the said samples of the blood and other parts of the body is not explained by the prosecution. He submitted that under these circumstances, the chances of implanting of the blood in various incriminating material discovered could not be ruled out. In the submission of the learned Counsel, such would be fatal to the case of the prosecution and hence, the accused would be entitled to the benefits. 15. The contention made prima facie appears to be with substance, but upon close scrutiny, it appears that such defence of implanting of the blood or chances of implanting of the blood is coming out for the first time, inasmuch as no question whatsoever has been put to any witness by way of suggestion or otherwise to any of the witnesses that the blood bottles, which were prepared in the hospital and forwarded to the Director, Forensic Science Laboratory could have been misused or that the blood could be implanted. Further, when the panchnamas were prepared in presence of panchas, the blood on the concerned incriminating material whenever was found has been recorded. Further, when the panchnamas were prepared in presence of panchas, the blood on the concerned incriminating material whenever was found has been recorded. The signature of the panchnama as well as the contents of the panchnama as referred to herein above have been proved by the prosecution. Under these circumstances, the contention raised can only be said on hypothesis, without there being any foundation for defence raised during the trial. Apart from the above, the burden lies upon the prosecution to prove the case and it is for the prosecution to put forward relevant evidence to support its case. The prosecution, while proving the case based on circumstances evidence, has not relied upon the samples of blood taken or the report of the FSL pertaining thereto. On the aspect of grouping of the blood of the deceased, the clothes were recovered and the blood is found on the clothes of the deceased of 'O' Group. As against the sample, it is neither put in by the defence, nor any question is put by way of suggestion to any witness, including doctor that the blood group of the deceased was not 'O'. Under these circumstances, we do not find that merely because subsequent FSL Report is not produced for the four bottles, which were forwarded to Forensic Science Laboratory, such would be fatal to the case of the prosecution. 16. The learned Counsel for A-1 and A-2 next contended that Kantibhai (PW-3) is an interested witness and, therefore, may not be relied upon by the Court for considering the case of the prosecution. It was also submitted that even for Ghemar (PW-7), another panch witness, the position is the same, inasmuch as he could be said as interested witness. Further, both the said witnesses were from different villages altogether and the prosecution has not explained the specific reason for calling Kantibhai (PW-3) and Ghemar (PW-7) as panchas at the time of preparation of panchnama. He submitted that if the evidence of Kantibhai (PW-3) and Gamer (PW-7) is discarded or is excluded from the case of the prosecution, the whole case of the prosecution would fall, inasmuch as the other panchas having not supported the case of the prosecution for recovery and/or discovery and, therefore, the benefits be extended to the accused. 17. He submitted that if the evidence of Kantibhai (PW-3) and Gamer (PW-7) is discarded or is excluded from the case of the prosecution, the whole case of the prosecution would fall, inasmuch as the other panchas having not supported the case of the prosecution for recovery and/or discovery and, therefore, the benefits be extended to the accused. 17. In this regard, in the testimony of I.O., (PW-36) (Exh.120) in the cross-examination when question was put to I.O., about the relationship of Kantibhai with Laxmanbhai, he had no knowledge about the same. Further, he has denied that it was not agreed that one panch was to be taken from Badal and another panch was to be taken from Badampura. No evidence is brought about by the defence for showing a particular interest of both the witnesses, Kantibhai and Ghemarbhai for any animosity against any of the accused. Under these circumstances, merely because panch is a resident of a different village, we do not find that on such ground the testimony of both the witnesses deserve to be discarded, if otherwise are found to be believable. Further at the time when trustworthiness of the witness is to be considered the overall deposition and the answers given in the cross-examination and the tendency of the witness to state truth are to be considered. We do not find that the testimony of both the witnesses of the examination-in-chief or in cross-examination could be said as wholly untrustworthy, so as to disbelieve them or to discard their evidence from the case of the prosecution. Under these circumstances, the contention cannot be accepted. 18. The learned Counsel for A-1 and A-2 raised the contention that in the scooter, which was recovered from A-1, no blood is found or no blood spots are found, in spite of the fact that as per the case of the prosecution the said scooter was used for carrying dead-body of the deceased in gunny bag. It was submitted that when the deceased had sustained so many injuries the blood spots are bound to be there on the jute bag and it may also be on the scooter, but when the scooter is recovered, no blood spots are found. Such would show that the story of the prosecution of carrying dead-body on the scooter is improbable and unbelievable. It was, therefore, submitted that the evidence in this regard deserves to be discarded. Such would show that the story of the prosecution of carrying dead-body on the scooter is improbable and unbelievable. It was, therefore, submitted that the evidence in this regard deserves to be discarded. 19. The date of the incident is 7.8.2007 at about 11 O'clock to 12 O'clock. Further, in the evidence of I.O., Bharatsinh (PW-36) (Exh.120), it has come on record that the statement of Tinaji was recorded by him and Tinaji in his statement when narrated the incident had stated before him that at about 11.30 p.m., during night time, it was raining and hence, the chances of no blood found on the scooter could not be ruled out. Further, when the postmortem was performed it has come in the evidence of Dr. Deepak (PW-31) (Exh.99) that the clothes of the deceased were with blood and wet. In this manner, there is corroboration to the statement of Tinaji made before the I.O., that it was raining and further when the dead-body was carried, at that time also it was raining. In any case, the scooter was discovered, by panchnama (Exh.83) on August 20, 2007, after about 13 days from the date of incident. Further in the panchnama, there is reference to the spots found like that of the blood. Under these circumstances, it is not a matter where no sufficient explanation comes on record. Therefore, we cannot accept the contention that the story put forwarded by the prosecution could be said as non-believable or improbable. 20. The learned Counsel for A-3 raised the contention that the only evidence proved by the prosecution against A-3 is for destroying of evidence. So far as discovery made at the instance of A-3, the panchas are hostile and, therefore, such evidence may not be considered by the Court as supporting the case of the prosecution. Similarly contention was raised by the learned Counsel for A-5 that none of the discoveries is proved by the prosecution so far as it relates to the material discovered at the instance of A-5, since panchas have not supported the case of the prosecution and the evidence of I.O., could not be said as sufficient to prove the case of the prosecution. It was submitted that if the discovery is not believed so far as they relate to A-3 and A-5, no evidence in law for involvement of A-3 and A-5 would be available and, therefore, in any case, the conviction cannot be maintained against A-3 and A-5. 21. The learned Counsel for A-3 and A-5 further raised the contention that the discovery of currencies at the instance of A-3 is highly improbable and unbelievable inasmuch as the currencies cannot be identified and more particularly no specific reasons has come on record for the amount to be kept by A-3 at a different village instead of his own residence. It was submitted on behalf of A-5 that even if discovery of knife and mobile is considered for the sake of argument, in the weapon no blood is found and the FSL Report is not supporting the case of the prosecution for showing any blood found on the knife. Under these circumstances, it cannot be said that the very weapon was used for commission of crime. The learned Counsel also submitted that as per the statement of Tinaji when the blows were being given the person had covered his face with veil and when the identification parade was held, the persons in similar position or of the similar age were not kept in the panel and, therefore, the identification parade can be said as an eye-wash and unbelievable for supporting the case of the prosecution. The learned Counsel for A-3 and A-5 submitted that even if reasonable doubt is created in the case of the prosecution, the accused concerned would be entitled to the benefits and such benefits be extended in the present case. 22. At this stage, we may make useful reference to the observations made by he Apex Court in its decision in the case of Jagroop Singh v. State of Punjab, reported in AIR 2012 SC 2600 , which was also a case based on circumstantial evidence. In the said decision at paragraphs 28, 29 and 30, the Apex Court observed, thus:- "28. In the case at hand, the accused persons were arrested after 18 days and recovery was made at that time. The blood stain found on the weapon has been found in the serological report as human blood. In the said decision at paragraphs 28, 29 and 30, the Apex Court observed, thus:- "28. In the case at hand, the accused persons were arrested after 18 days and recovery was made at that time. The blood stain found on the weapon has been found in the serological report as human blood. In the case of Sattatiya (supra), the recovery was doubted and additionally, non-matching of blood group was treated to be a lacuna. It is worth noting that the clothes and the weapon were sent immediately for chemical examination. Here the weapon was sent after 18 days as the recovery was made after that period. The accused have not given explanation how human blood could be found on the spade used for agriculture which was recovered at their instance. In this context, we may profitably reproduce a passage from John Pandian v. State Represented by Inspector of Police, Tamil Nadu : "The discovery appears to be credible. It has been accepted by both the courts below and we find no reason to discard it. This is apart from the fact that this weapon was sent to the forensic science laboratory (FSL) and it has been found stained with human blood. Though the blood group could not be ascertained, as the results were inconclusive, the accused had to give some explanation as to how the human blood came on this weapon. He gave none. This discovery would very positively further the prosecution case." 29. Thus viewed, we do not find any substantial reason to disbelieve the disclosure statement and the recovery of the weapon used. It is apt to mention here that the doctor, who has conducted the post mortem, has clearly opined that the injuries on the person of the deceased could be caused by the weapon (blade of such spade) and the said opinion has gone unrebutted. 30. Another aspect is to be taken note of. Though the incriminating circumstances which point to the guilt of the accused had been put to the accused, yet he could not give any explanation under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure except choosing the mode of denial. 30. Another aspect is to be taken note of. Though the incriminating circumstances which point to the guilt of the accused had been put to the accused, yet he could not give any explanation under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure except choosing the mode of denial. In State of Maharashtra v. Suresh, it has been held that when the attention of the accused is drawn to such circumstances that inculpated him in the crime and he fails to offer appropriate explanation or gives a false answer, the same can be counted as providing a missing link for completing the chain of circumstances. We may hasten to add that we have referred to the said decision only to highlight that the accused has not given any explanation whatsoever as regards the circumstances put to him under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure." 23. We may also make useful reference to the decision of the Apex Court in the case of State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu alias Afsan Guru, reported in (2005) 11 SCC 600 on the aspect of scope and ambit of Section 27 of the Evidence Act. In the said decision, the Apex Court after considering its earlier decisions observed at paragraphs 142, 143, and 144 as under:- "142. There is one more point which we would like to discuss i.e. whether pointing out a material object by the accused furnishing the information is a necessary concomitant of Section 27. We think that the answer should be in the negative. Though in most of the cases the person who makes the disclosure himself leads the Police Officer to the place where an object is concealed and points out the same to him, however, it is not essential that there should be such pointing out in order to make the information admissible under Section 27. It could very well be that on the basis of information furnished by the accused, the Investigating Officer may go to the spot in the company of other witnesses and recover the material object. By doing so, the Investigating Officer will be discovering a fact viz., the concealment of an incriminating article and the knowledge of the accused furnishing the information about it. By doing so, the Investigating Officer will be discovering a fact viz., the concealment of an incriminating article and the knowledge of the accused furnishing the information about it. In other words, where the information furnished by the person in custody is verified by the Police Officer by going to the spot mentioned by the informant and finds it to be correct, that amounts to discovery of fact within the meaning of Section 27. of course, it is subject to the rider that the information so furnished was the immediate and proximate cause of discovery. If the Police Officer chooses not to take the informant-accused to the spot, it will have no bearing on the point of admissibility under Section 27, though it may be one of the aspects that goes into evaluation of that particular piece of evidence. 143. How the clause "as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered" has to be understood is the next point that deserves consideration. The interpretation of this clause is not in doubt. Apart from Kotayya's case, various decisions of this Court have elucidated and clarified the scope and meaning of the said portion of Section 27. The law has been succinctly stated in Inayatullah's case (supra). Sarkaria, J. analysed the ingredients of the Section and explained the ambit and nuances of this particular clause in the following words: (SCC p.832, para 12) "The last but the most important condition is that only "so much of the information" as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered is admissible. The rest of the information has to be excluded. The word 'distinctly' means 'directly', 'indubitably', 'strictly', 'unmistakably'. The word has been advisedly used to limit and define the scope of the provable information. The phrase 'distinctly relates to the fact thereby discovered' is the linchpin of the provision. This phrase refers to that part of the information supplied by the accused which is the direct and immediate cause of the discovery. The reason behind this partial lifting of the ban against confessions and statements made to the police, is that if a fact is actually discovered in consequence of information given by the accused, it affords some guarantee of truth of that part, and that part only, of the information which was the clear, immediate and proximate cause of the discovery. The reason behind this partial lifting of the ban against confessions and statements made to the police, is that if a fact is actually discovered in consequence of information given by the accused, it affords some guarantee of truth of that part, and that part only, of the information which was the clear, immediate and proximate cause of the discovery. No such guarantee or assurance attaches to the rest of the statement which may be indirectly or remotely related to the fact discovered." (emphasis in original) In the light of the legal position thus clarified, this Court excluded a part of the disclosure statement to which we have already adverted. 144. In Bodhraj v. State of J & K [ (2002) 8 SCC 45 ] this Court after referring to the decisions on the subject observed thus: (SCC p. 58, para 18) "The words "so much of such information", as relates distinctly to the fact thereby discovered are very important and the whole force of the section concentrates on them. Clearly the extent of the information admissible must depend on the exact nature of the fact discovered to which such information is required to relate" 24. We may further make useful reference to the decision of this Court in the case of Vinugiri Motigiri v. State of Gujarat, reported in 2002(1) GLR, 702, wherein this Court had an occasion to consider the question that if the panchas have turned hostile, whether the fact disclosed and the incriminating material could be considered with the aid of the testimony of the police officer or not. This Court, at paragraph 24.2, observed thus:- "24.2 It was submitted that since the panch witnesses have turned hostile, the Court cannot rely on the evidence of discovery. This submission is erroneous, because, as held by the Supreme Court in Modan Singh v. State of Rajasthan, reported in AIR 1978 SC 1511 , if the evidence of the investigating officer who recovered the material objects is convincing, the evidence as to recovery need not be rejected on the ground that seizure witnesses do not support the prosecution version. This submission is erroneous, because, as held by the Supreme Court in Modan Singh v. State of Rajasthan, reported in AIR 1978 SC 1511 , if the evidence of the investigating officer who recovered the material objects is convincing, the evidence as to recovery need not be rejected on the ground that seizure witnesses do not support the prosecution version. In a recent decision of the Supreme Court in State, Government of NCT of Delhi v. Sunil, reported in (2001) 1 SCC 652 , while considering the provisions of section 27 of the Evidence Act, and section 114 III.(e) thereof, the Supreme Court has held that there is no requirement either under section 27 of the Evidence Act or under section 161 of the Criminal Procedure Code to obtain signature of independent witnesses on the record in which statement of an accused is written. The obligation to call independent and respectable inhabitants of the locality to attend and witness the exercise made by the police is cast on the police officer when searches are made under Chapter VII of the Code. The legislative idea in insisting on such searches to be made in the presence of two independent inhabitants of the locality is to ensure the safety of all such articles meddled with and to protect the rights of the persons entitled thereto. But recovery of an object pursuant to the information supplied by an accused in custody is different from the searching endeavour envisaged in Chapter VII of the Code. It was held that it is a fallacious impression that when recovery is effected pursuant to any statement made by the accused, the document prepared by the investigating officer contemporaneous with such recovery must necessarily be arrested by the independent witnesses. It was held that if no witness was present or if no person had agreed to affix his signature on the document, it is difficult to lay down, as a proposition of law, that the document so prepared by the police officer must be treated as tainted and the recovery evidence unreliable. The Court has to consider the evidence of the investigating officer who deposed to the fact of recovery based on the statement elicited from the accused on its own worth. The Court has to consider the evidence of the investigating officer who deposed to the fact of recovery based on the statement elicited from the accused on its own worth. The Court observed that, it is an archaic notion that actions of the police officer should be approached with initial distrust and that it is not a legally approvable procedure to presume the police action as unreliable to start with, and to jettison such action merely for the reason that police did not collect signatures of independent persons in the documents made contemporaneous with such actions. It was held that when a police officer gives evidence in court that a certain article was recovered by him on the strength of the statement made by the accused, it is open to the court to believe the version to be correct if it is not otherwise shown to be unreliable. In the present case also, we find that the version given by the police officer about the discovery of the weapons at the instance of the accused persons is reliable and reassures the evidence of the prosecution witnesses who have deposed as to the participation of the accused persons in the crime. Even without these discovery panchnamas, as noted by us herein above, there is reliable evidence to connect all these accused with the crime, and, their evidence is sufficient to hold that these accused persons had formed an unlawful assembly and with a view to achieve their common object of intentionally causing death of deceased Hareshbhai they had on 15.9.1992 around 9.30 in the morning, attacked him with knives and a gupti and caused eighteen incised wounds which resulted in his death." 25. The aforesaid shows that the recovery of an object pursuant to the information supplied by an accused in custody is different from the searching endeavour envisaged in Chapter VII of the Code. Further, the Court has to consider the evidence of the Investigating Officer, who deposed to the fact of recovery based on the statement elicited from the accused on its own worth. Further, the Court has to consider the evidence of the Investigating Officer, who deposed to the fact of recovery based on the statement elicited from the accused on its own worth. It is an archaic notion that actions of the police officer should be approached with initial distrust and that it is not a legally approvable procedure to presume the police action is unreliable to start with, and to jettison such action merely for the reason that police did not collect signatures of independent persons in the documents made contemporaneous with such actions. The aforesaid further shows that if a police officer gives evidence in the Court that certain articles were recovered by him on the strength of the statement made, it is upon the Court to believe the information to be correct, if it is otherwise shown not to be unreliable. 26. It is in this light of the aforesaid legal position we cannot accept the contention of the learned Counsel for the appellant that since the panchas have only admitted their signature in the panchnama prepared for disclosure of certain facts and thereafter incriminating material is also discovered, such should be discarded. In our view, as per the above referred legal position, the Court while considering the aspect that the panchas after admitting signatures have not further supported the case of the prosecution, would also consider as to whether the contents of the panchnama are proved by the prosecution through the evidence of concerned police officers in whose presence the panchas had signed and who subsequently had recovered or discovered the incriminating material. Further, after the discovery or recovery of the incriminating material is proved, the Court may also be required to examine as to whether any possible explanation has been given to such fact of discovery of incriminating material by the accused in the statement under Section 313 of Cr. P.C., or by way of substantial defence. In the present case, as recorded by us herein above, in the statement under Section 313 of Cr.P.C., there is mere denial. In the further statement as recorded by us herein above, A-3 as not stated anything except the false case filed against him. P.C., or by way of substantial defence. In the present case, as recorded by us herein above, in the statement under Section 313 of Cr.P.C., there is mere denial. In the further statement as recorded by us herein above, A-3 as not stated anything except the false case filed against him. So far as A-1 and A-2 are concerned, except denial of stating that no discovery is made, nor any facts were disclosed or that no panchnama was prepared in their presence, no other specific explanation has been given. Similar is the further statement of A-5. There is no denial by A-5 that he was not knowing A-3. Apart from the testimony of the police officer in whose presence the incriminating materials were discovered and also recovered, the document at Exh.121 further shows that the recovery of the clay/earth and the particles of burnt jute pieces of the coat was in presence of scientific officer, who is a public servant. 27. In view of the above, we cannot accept the contention raised by the learned Counsel for the appellants-accused that the discovery of incriminating material is not proved or the fact disclosed by the concerned accused for the place at which the object/items (incriminating material) were kept and thereafter discovery of the incriminating materials should not be considered even if they supported the case of the prosecution. 28. If the facts of the present case is examined the panchnama exh. 72 for disclosure of the fact stated by A-5 for the place at which the knife was kept shows that the knife is discovered from the green grass nearby drainage line and the same is discovered on 18.8.2007 after about 11 days from the date of the incident. Under these circumstance, it is possible that the blood stains may not have been found by the FSL, but such could not be said to be fatal to the case of the prosecution. There is one additional aspect by way of corroboration to the case of the prosecution, inasmuch as the width of the knife as stated in the panchnama Exh.72 was having 6 cm. If the said aspect is considered with the medical evidence of Dr. There is one additional aspect by way of corroboration to the case of the prosecution, inasmuch as the width of the knife as stated in the panchnama Exh.72 was having 6 cm. If the said aspect is considered with the medical evidence of Dr. Deepak (PW-31 (Exh.99) and the injuries described in item No.1 on the neck and different sides of the neck, the width of injury is 6 cm and the said injuries, as per the opinion of the doctor, was sufficient to cause death of an human being in normal course. The doctor further deposes that such injuries could be caused with the knife, which was shown to him (the same knife which was discovered at the instance of A-5). 29. Under these circumstances, we do not find that merely because blood is not detected by FSL on the knife discovered at the instance of A-5, the same could be said as fatal to the case of the prosecution for considering the involvement of A-5 in the alleged crime. 30. We may once again make useful reference to the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Jagroop Singh v. State of Punjab, reported in AIR 2012 SC 2600 (supra) for the conditions to be satisfied of a case of the prosecution based on circumstantial evidence. At paragraphs 15 to 19, it was observed, thus:- "15. In Balwinder Singh v. State of Punjab, 1995 Supp. (4) SCC 259, it has been laid down that the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully proved and those circumstances must be conclusive in nature to connect the accused with the crime. All the links in the chain of events must be established beyond reasonable doubt and the established circumstances should be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused and totally inconsistent with his innocence. In a case based on circumstantial evidence, the Court has to be on its guard to avoid the danger of allowing suspicion to take the place of legal proof and has to be watchful to avoid the danger of being swayed by emotional considerations, however strong they may be, to take the place of proof. 16. In a case based on circumstantial evidence, the Court has to be on its guard to avoid the danger of allowing suspicion to take the place of legal proof and has to be watchful to avoid the danger of being swayed by emotional considerations, however strong they may be, to take the place of proof. 16. In Harishchandra Ladaku Thange v. State of Maharashtra 2007 (13) SCC 436, while dealing with the validity of inferences to be drawn from circumstantial evidence, it has been emphasised that where a case rests squarely on circumstantial evidence, the inference of guilt can be justified only when all the incriminating facts and circumstances are found to be incompatible with the innocence of the accused or the guilt of any other person and further the circumstances from which an inference as to the guilt of the accused is drawn have to be proved beyond reasonable doubt and have to be shown to be closely connected with the principal fact sought to be inferred from those circumstances. 17. In State of U.P. v. Ashok Kumar Srivastava 1992 (2) SCC 86 , emphasis has been laid that it is the duty of the Court to take care while evaluating circumstantial evidence. If the evidence adduced by the prosecution is reasonably capable of two inferences, the one in favour of the accused must be accepted. That apart, the circumstances relied upon must be established and the cumulative effect of the established facts must lead to a singular hypothesis that the accused is guilty. 18. In Ram Singh v. Sonia and Ors. 2007 (3) SCC 1 , while referring to the settled proof pertaining to circumstantial evidence, this Court reiterated the principles about the caution to be kept in mind by Court. It has been stated therein that in a case depending largely upon circumstantial evidence, there is always a danger that conjecture or suspicion may take the place of legal proof. The Court must satisfy itself that various circumstances in the chain of events have been established clearly and such completed chain of events must be such as to rule out a reasonable likelihood of the innocence of the accused. It has also been indicated that when the important link goes, the chain of circumstances gets snapped and the other circumstances cannot in any manner, establish the guilt of the accused beyond all reasonable doubts. 19. It has also been indicated that when the important link goes, the chain of circumstances gets snapped and the other circumstances cannot in any manner, establish the guilt of the accused beyond all reasonable doubts. 19. In Ujagar Singh v. State of Punjab 2007 (13) SCC 90 , after referring to the aforesaid principles pertaining to the evaluation of circumstantial evidence, this Court stated that it must nonetheless be emphasised that whether a chain is complete or not would depend on the facts of each case emanating from the evidence and no universal yardstick should ever be attempted." 31. If the aforesaid broad principles are considered and the facts of the present case once again examined, we find that the prosecution has been able to prove the case on the following aspects:- (1) The strong motive coupled with the history of dispute and beating to the deceased, involving A-1, A-2 and A-3; (2) The deceased was staying with A-1 and A-2; (3) The incident had happened during the late night of about 11.30 p.m.; (4) The fact of disclosure by A-1 for the place at which his scooter and motor cycles were kept and the disclosure of the fact by A-2 for the place at which burnt particles of jute threads used for tying coat and the side supports as well as legs of the coat and the disclosure made by A- 3 for the place at which jute bag, which was used for carrying the dead-body of the deceased, in normal circumstances, would not be a fact known to the police officer and, therefore, such disclosure of fact shows the involvement of A-1, A-2 and A-3 in causing death of the deceased; (5) The disclosure of the fact by A-3 for the amount paid of Rs. 60,000/- to him and the place at which the amount was kept of Rs. 30,000/- and another Rs. 30,000/- at different places and the disclosure of the fact by A-5 for the place at which knife and the mobile of the deceased were kept would also not be, in normal circumstances, within the knowledge of the police officer and, therefore, such disclosure of facts can be considered under Section 27 of the Evidence Act. (6) The consideration of the aforesaid facts gets the support of subsequent discovery made of the respective incriminating material. (6) The consideration of the aforesaid facts gets the support of subsequent discovery made of the respective incriminating material. (7) The aforesaid evidence, if considered in light of the provisions of Section 10 of Indian Evidence Act, for the things said or done by the conspirator in connection with the agreement for conspiracy and further if considered in light of the provisions of Section 120B of IPC it can be said that the prosecution has proved the case for conspiracy hatched, the active role by conspirator with reference to the common object, which was agreed upon for causing death of the deceased. (8) If the aforesaid aspects are considered with the testimony of I.O. (PW-36) that Tinaji had stated before him about mode and the manner in which the death was caused by one person, who had veil on his face and thereafter he had left on the motor cycle of A-1 and further that thereafter A-1 and A-3 kept the dead-body of the deceased in the jute/gunny bag and took it and carried in the scooter and further destroying of evidence by A-1, A-2 and A-3, shows role played by A-1, A-2 and A-3 for commission of crime and further in T.I. Parade, A-5 is identified. The evidence of T.I. Parade gives corroboration to the statement made by Tinaji before I.O. The evidence of doctor for the size of the injury corroborates the use of knife discovered at the instance of A-5. (9) Further, the disclosure of the fact by A-3 and the discovery of currency of Rs. 30,000/- and Rs. 23,000/- at different places shows the role of A-2, A-3 and A-5. 32. If the aforesaid proved facts are considered, we find that the chain for involvement of A-1, A-2, A-3 and A-5 from motive, conspiracy hatched for causing death, reaching the object of causing death, and thereafter destroying of evidence by A-1, A-2 and A-3 could be said as proved by the prosecution and the chain for involvement of the respective accused is also complete. Under these circumstances, we find that it cannot be said that the learned Sessions Judge has committed error in convicting A-1, A-2, A-3 and A-5 for the offence under Section 302 read with Section 120B of IPC, nor can it be said that the learned Sessions Judge has committed error in convicting A-1, A-2, and A-3 under Section 201 read with Section 120B of IPC. We do not find that the sentences imposed deserve to be interfered with. 33. In view of the observations and discussions, all the appeals are meritless. Hence, dismissed and the conviction made and the sentences imposed by the learned Sessions Judge are confirmed. 34. At this stage, Mr. Gondaliya, learned Counsel appearing for Accused No. 2, Mrs. Manguben, Wife of Mr. Chehrabhai Jesungbhai Gol, states that pending the appeal, she was released on bail. Hence, some reasonable time may be given to her to surrender. 35. Considering the facts and circumstances, time to surrender by Accused No. 2, Mrs. Manguben, Wife of Mr. Chehrabhai Jesungbhai Gol, is granted for six weeks from today. Appeals dismissed.