A.M. Sapre; CJ.:- 1. Heard Mr. A.R. Bhuyan, learned counsel for the appellants and Mr. D. Saikia, learned Additional Advocate General, Assam assisted by Mr. P.N. Goswami, learned Standing Counsel, Education Department appearing for the respondents. 2. This is an intra-court appeal under rule 2(3) of Chapter VA of the Gauhati High Court Rules filed by the writ petitioners of WP(C) No. 1569 of 2014 against the interim order dated 4.4.2014 passed by the learned Single Judge. 3. By the impugned order, learned Single Judge declined to grant ad interim writ prayed by the petitioners by passing the following order: “Heard Mr. A.R. Bhuyan, learned counsel for the petitioners. Mr. D. Saikia, learned Additional Advocate General, Assam, for respondent Nos. l to 3 and Mr. P.N. Goswami, learned Standing Counsel, ASIDC, for the respondent No. 4. Issue rule. Call for the records. Rule is returnable on 16.5.2014. The writ petitioners are Presidents of some School Managing Committees in the District of Cachar. They have challenged legality and validity of notification issued by the respondent No. 2, the Mission Director of SSA, Assam, directing all the District Mission Coordinators to procure school uniforms through Assam Small Industries Development Corporation Ltd. (‘ASIDC’) under the provision of Assam Preferential Stores Purchase Act, 1989. The challenge is based on the ground that under the Right to Education Act, children between the age group of 6 to 14 years are to be provided with certain benefits like uniforms. The guidelines issued by the Human Resource Ministry of the Union of India provides that procurement of uniforms would be done in decentralised way at school level and there would be no centralised procurement at the District, State or Block level. It is also laid down in the guidelines that no preference for procurement can be given to Public Sector Undertakings, Co-operative Societies or any other agencies of the State or Central Government. But in the case in hand, by the impugned communication the process of procurement of school uniforms has been sought to be done through ASIDC in a centralised way. This according to the writ petitioners is contrary to the guideline of the Central Government and as such it needs to be stayed. Mr. D. Saikia, learned Additional Advocate General, appearing for the Axom Sarba Siksha Abhiyan Mission, submits that there is no change on the policy of decentralisation at all. This according to the writ petitioners is contrary to the guideline of the Central Government and as such it needs to be stayed. Mr. D. Saikia, learned Additional Advocate General, appearing for the Axom Sarba Siksha Abhiyan Mission, submits that there is no change on the policy of decentralisation at all. As done before, the fund is lying with the school managing committee. The school managing committee shall choose the colour, quality and design of the school uniforms and they shall make payment to the suppliers. The State Government has only applied the provision of Assam Preferential Stores Purchase Act, 1989, for the benefit of local SSI units and also to ensure adequate and proper implementation of the scheme. According to the learned Additional Advocate General, Assam, complaints were received as to mismanagement by the SMCs. Mr. P.N. Goswami, learned Standing Counsel for the ASIDC, submits that about 3,000 schools out of 4,500 in the State have already accepted the system and made payment to the ASIDC after placing their indents for supply of school uniforms. He submits that process of selection of the suppliers is over and allotment orders have already been issued in the meantime. According to Mr. P.N. Goswami, ASIDC has all along been used by the SSA for procurement of various items including school uniforms and there was no objection in any point of time. He submits that the SMC if not satisfied with the uniform supplied, are at liberty not to accept the same and/or not to make payment. In that event the ASIDC shall be bound to replace die uniforms by the proper set. Under such circumstances, none of the right of the SMCs have been violated. Once the petitioners fail to establish that they have a right to make procurement and that their legally enforceable vested right is violated then only question of interference under article 226 of the Constitution of India arise. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, I am prima facie satisfied that there is no change in the policy of decentralised procurement. Even now the respective SMCs have liberty to make selection of quality, colour and design of the school uniforms as per earlier system. It is the SMCs who have the right to refuse the item if its quality, colour or design is not at par with requirement. Even now the respective SMCs have liberty to make selection of quality, colour and design of the school uniforms as per earlier system. It is the SMCs who have the right to refuse the item if its quality, colour or design is not at par with requirement. The payment is also lying in the hand of SMCs only. That being the position, I do not feel that the petitioners have any prima facie case for getting ad interim order in this case. Moreover, the process of procurement having been already gone a long way, the balance of convenience also does not appear to tilt in favour of the petitioners. Accordingly, prayer for interim order is refused.” 4. Learned counsel for the respondents, at the outset, submitted that the writ petition out of which this appeal arises is now fixed for final hearing on 16th of May, 2014. If that be so, then, we are afraid we can entertain this appeal to examine the legality and correctness of the interim order passed by the learned Single Judge. 5. Even otherwise, mere perusal of the impugned order would go to show that it does not call for any interference for more than one reasons. In the first place, the interim order does not decide the rights of parties. In this case, we also find that no right as such is decided. Secondly, it is subject to the final verdict in the main writ petition. Thirdly, the parties are always at liberty to approach the writ court for obtaining any interim relief during pendency of writ petition even after passing of the impugned order. Fourthly, we find that the writ court has jurisdiction to pass interim order taking into consideration the ingredients necessary for passing the interim order and in this case it has been rightly done and lastly, merely because interim relief is declined would not mean that the writ petition too is liable to be dismissed. However, by this observation we do not wish to suggest that the petitioners have a case on merits or otherwise. All that we wish to observe is that consideration for admitting the writ petition are different than those required for grant of ad interim writ. 6. However, by this observation we do not wish to suggest that the petitioners have a case on merits or otherwise. All that we wish to observe is that consideration for admitting the writ petition are different than those required for grant of ad interim writ. 6. It is now for the writ court to decide on merits whether any case is made out on the merits and the same shall be gone into while hearing the writ petition on merits uninfluenced by any observations made by us and by writ court while declining to grant ad interim relief. 7. With all these observations, we find no merit in this appeal and is hereby dismissed in limine.