Sudhir Agarwal, J.:- Heard Sri Atul Dayal, Advocate, for petitioners and Sri Rajesh Gupta, learned counsel appearing for respondent. 2. This is tenant's writ petition, who has lost in both the Courts below. S.C.C. Suit No. 5 of 1999 has been decreed vide judgment dated 18.9.1995 on the ground that tenant failed to deposit the entire amount, as required under Section 20 (4) of U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as "Act, 1972") on the first date of hearing so as to claim benefit thereunder and, admittedly, he was in default of payment of rent for more than four months, therefore, was liable for ejectment. The aforesaid judgment has been confirmed by Revisional Court dismissing S.C.C. Revision No. 233 of 1994. 3. Sri Atul Dayal, learned counsel for petitioners, contended that he deposited entire amount on 5.8.1994 when he was allowed permission to file written statement, and, therefore, it cannot be said that any date prior thereto would be the "first date of hearing". 4. However, I find no force in the submission. From the order sheet, it is evident that after service of notice by publication as well as other modes, the date for hearing was fixed on 4.7.1994 when none appeared on behalf of tenant, hence the Court passed an order to proceed ex parte and fixed 2.8.1994 for ex-parte hearing. Petitioner put in appearance on 2.8.1994. An application for recall of ex-parte order dated 4.7.1994 was filed whereupon Court permitted plaintiff to file objection if any and fixed 19.8.1994 for disposal. Admittedly, on 2.8.1994, which was the date fixed for hearing, on that date also, the petitioner had not deposited the amount of rent etc. as contemplated under Section 20 (4) of Act, 1972. In my view, by no stretch of imagination, it can be said that it was not the "first date of hearing". Reliance placed on Ashok Kumar and others Vs. Rishi Ram and others 2002 (2) ARC 160 is misplaced inasmuch the facts of that case are totally different and do not help petitioner in any manner. 5. In my view, by no stretch of imagination, it can be said that it was not the "first date of hearing". Reliance placed on Ashok Kumar and others Vs. Rishi Ram and others 2002 (2) ARC 160 is misplaced inasmuch the facts of that case are totally different and do not help petitioner in any manner. 5. The expression "first hearing" has been explained in Section 20(4) Explanation (a) and reads as under: "the expression "first hearing" means the first date for any step or proceeding mentioned in the summons served on the defendant." This expression has been considered by Apex Court in Ved Prakash Wadhwa Vs. Vishwa Mohan, AIR 1982 SC 816 . It was held that the date of first hearing would not be before a date fixed for preliminary examination of parties and framing of issues. Similar was the view taken in an earlier judgment also in Advaita Nand Vs. Judge, Small Causes Court, Meerut & Ors., 1995(1) ARC 563. 6. A three-Judge Bench of Apex Court also considered this issue in Siraj Ahmad Siddiqui Vs. Prem Nath Kapoor, 1993 (4) SCC 406 and said as under "The date of first hearing of a suit under the Code is ordinarily understood to be the date on which the court proposes to apply its mind to the contentions in the pleadings of the parties to the suit and in the documents filed by them for the purpose of framing the issues to be decided in the suit. Does the definition of the expression 'first hearing' for the purposes of Section 20(4) mean something different? The "step or proceedings mentioned in the summons" referred to in the definition should we think, be construed to be a step or proceeding to be taken by the court for it is, after all, a "hearing" that is the subject matter of the definition, unless there be something compelling in the said Act to indicate otherwise; and we do not find in the said Act any such compelling provision. Further, it is not possible to construe the expression "first date for any step or proceeding" to mean the step of filing the written statement, though the date for that purpose may be mentioned in the summons, for the reason that, as set out earlier, it is permissible under the Code for the defendant to file a written statement even thereafter but prior to the first hearing when the court takes up the case, since there is nothing in the said Act which conflicts with the provisions of the Code in this behalf. We are of the view, therefore, that the date of first hearing as defined in the said Act is the date on which the court proposes to apply its mind to determine the points in controversy between the parties to the suit and to frame issues, if necessary." (emphasis added) Again it was considered in Sudershan Devi & Anr. Vs. Sushila Devi & Anr., (1999) 8 SCC 31 and held that the date fixed for hearing of the matter is the date of first hearing and not the date fixed for filing of written statement. The Court observed that emphasis in the relevant provision is on the word "hearing". The Court also relied on its earlier decision in Ved Prakash Wadhwa (supra). 7. The matter again came to be considered in Mam Chand Pal Vs. Shanti Agarwal (Smt.), 2002 (3) SCC 49 . Therein the suit was filed on 5.12.1988 and summons were issued fixing 19th January, 1989 for filing of written statement and 27th January, 1989 for hearing. The defendant was not served. The order was passed for service of notice on the defendant by publication fixing 3.7.1989 for hearing. By mistake in the publication, the date of hearing was shown as 26.4.1989 instead of 3.7.1989. On 26.4.1989, Presiding Officer was not available having proceeded for training. The case was thereafter adjourned to 11.5.1989 and further gone on adjournment for one or the other reasons on several dates. The Court held that in the present case 26th April, 1989 would not be regarded as "first date of hearing" since on that date the Presiding Officer was not available. In para 7 the court said, "where the Court itself is not available it could not be treated as the date of first hearing". 8. In Ashok Kumar & Ors. Vs. In para 7 the court said, "where the Court itself is not available it could not be treated as the date of first hearing". 8. In Ashok Kumar & Ors. Vs. Rishi Ram and others, AIR 2002 SC 2520 , the Court noticed distinction between the phraseology in Order XV, Rule 5 C.P.C. and Explanation (a) to sub-section (4) of Section 20 of Act, 1972 and in para 8, said: "Rule 1 of Order V speaks of issue of summons. When a suit has been duly instituted a summons may be issued to the defendant to appear and answer the claim on a day specified therein. Rule 2 thereof enjoins that the summons shall be accompanied by a copy of the plaint or, if so permitted, by a concise statement. Rule 5 of Order V says that the Court shall determine, at the time of issuing the summons, whether it shall be for the settlement of issues only, or for the final disposal of the suit which shall be noted in the summons. However, in every suit heard by a Court of Small Causes, the summons shall be for the final disposal of the suit. It may be apt to notice here that Sub-section (3) of Section 20 of the Act was deleted in U.P. Civil Laws Amendment Act, 1972 with effect from September 20, 1972 and Rule 5 was inserted in Order XV of the Civil Procedure Code which deals with disposal of the suit at the first hearing. Explanation 1 to Rule 5 of Order XV defines the expression "first hearing" to mean the date for filing written statement or for hearing mentioned in the summons or where more than one of such dates are mentioned, the last of the dates mentioned. But the said expression, as noticed above, is defined in Clause (1) of Explanation to Sub-section (4) of Section 20. But the said expression, as noticed above, is defined in Clause (1) of Explanation to Sub-section (4) of Section 20. Section 38 of the U.P. Act says that the provisions of the said Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in the Transfer of Property Act or in Code of Civil Procedure, therefore, the definition contained in Clause (a) of Explanation to Sub-section (4) of Section 20 of the Act will prevail over the definition contained in Rule 5 of Order XV of the Code of Civil Procedure as applicable to the State of U.P. It is too evident to miss that in contra-distinction to the "filing of written statement" mentioned in the definition of the said expression contained in Rule 5 of Order XV, the language employed in Clause (a) of the Explanation to Section 20(4) of the U.P. Act, refers to 'the first date for any step or proceeding mentioned in the summons served on the defendant'. In our view those words mean the first date when the court proposes to apply its mind to identify the controversy in the suit and that stage arises after the defendant is afforded an opportunity to file his written statement." (emphasis added) In para 12 of the judgment in Ashok Kumar (supra), considering the above observation and also relying on its earlier decisions in Sudershan Devi (supra), Advaita Nand (supra) and Siraj Ahmad Siddiqui (supra), the Court said: "Now adverting to the facts of the case on hand it has been noticed above that the suit was posted on May 20, 1980 for final disposal but that date cannot be treated as the first hearing of the suit as the Court granted time till July 25, 1980 to the tenant for filing written statement. On July 25, 1980 time was extended for filing written statement and the suit was again adjourned for final disposal to October 10, 1980. Inasmuch as after giving due opportunity to file written statement the suit was posted for final disposal on October 10, 1980 it was that date which ought to be considered as the date fixed by the Court for application of its mind to the facts of this case to identify the controversy between the parties and as such the date of first hearing of the suit." 9. It also held that once the date of "first hearing" is determined and thereafter the case is adjourned, the date of first hearing of the suit would not change on every adjournment of the suit for final hearing. 10. Thus the effective date of first hearing of the suit should be, when the Court proposed to apply its mind. Therefore it would be the date fixed earliest for final disposal/hearing and not adjourned for reasons attributable to the defendant-tenant. There are certain decisions of this Court also and I need not to burden this judgment giving in detail all such judgments except of making reference of some of those hereto i.e Mohd. Salim alias Salim Uddin Vs. 4th Addl. District Judge, Allahabad & Ors. 2001(2) AWC 1468 , Har Prasad Vs. Ist A.D.J., Etah 2004 (56) ALR 460, Jai Ram Dass Vs. Iind Addl. District Judge, Jhansi & Ors. 2004(57) ALR 233, Chaturbhuj Pandey Vs. VI A.D.J., Kanpur & Ors. 2005 (60) ALR 697, Hira Lal & Ors. Vs. Ram Das 2006 (3) ARC 657 and Saadat Ali Vs. J.S.C.C., Moradabad & ors. 2006 (2) ARC 208. 11. Looking into the entirety and the facts of the case in hand in the light of law discussed above, it cannot be doubted, when the Court directed to proceed ex-parte on 4.7.1994 and fixed 2.8.1994 for ex-parte hearing, it was the date on which Court proposed to apply its mind and by all means, it was the latest date which can be said to be "first date of hearing" on which date, admittedly, petitioner has not complied with the requirement of Section 20 (4) of Act, 1972. Hence, benefit thereunder has rightly been denied to him by Courts below. It is true that Courts below have taken "first date of hearing" a little bit earlier and to that extent, the view taken by them may not be correct, but even then the ultimate conclusion drawn by Courts below that tenant has failed to comply with the requirement of Section 20 (4) of Act, 1972 at the first date of hearing, in the light of discussion made above, cannot be faulted. I, therefore, do not find it a fit case justifying interference under Article 226/227 of the Constitution. 12. The writ petition lacks merit. Dismissed. ___________