JUDGMENT An employee, who was made to retire 12 years ago, now a septuagenarian, is made to wage a long drawn legal battle of multiple rounds concerning the terminal benefits paid or to be paid in recognition of the services he has rendered to his employer. The petitioner joined the 2nd respondent Corporation in 1973 as Lower Division Clerk (L.D.C) and later got promoted as Senior Assistant in 1990. In 2001, the 2nd respondent Corporation, governed by the provisions of A.P. Cooperative Societies Act, 1964, brought out a policy of voluntary retirement scheme to its employees. Those employees, including the petitioner, who are eligible under the scheme (V.R.S), have applied to be retired from service. In fact, having accepted the petitioner’s application through Proceedings dated 04.06.2001, the respondent Corporation communicated to the petitioner on 27.06.2001 that the petitioner would be retired on the last day of the said month i.e., 30th June, 2001. Accordingly, on the said date, the petitioner was relieved of his responsibilities and ceased to be an employee of the respondent Corporation. Retired though the petitioner had been, yet despite the lapse of considerable time, the respondent Corporation did not choose to pay the terminal benefits to the petitioner. Aggrieved thereby, he filed W.P.No.13039 of 2002 before this Court. On 17.09.2002, this Court gave an interim direction directing the respondent Corporation to pay the retirement benefits to the petitioner. When there was no compliance with the said Order, the petitioner invoked the contempt jurisdiction of this Court and filed C.C.No.429 of 2003. Eventually, under the pain of contempt, on 17.04.2003, the respondent Corporation paid certain amounts towards the retirement benefits. Though the Writ Petition came to be closed on the payment of the said amount, the Proceedings issued on 17.04.2003 settling the benefits revealed that the petitioner was entitled to Rs.4,50,787/-but was paid Rs.1,25,203.17 ps, thus with a deduction of an amount of Rs.3,25,583.83 ps. The reason supplied by the respondent Corporation was that the said amount was the deficit caused by the petitioner while he was in service for the years from 1994 to 20012002. Questioning the said Proceedings dated 17.04.2003 deducting substantial amounts from his service benefits, the petitioner once again approached this Court by filing W.P.No.7990 of 2003. The reason supplied by the respondent Corporation was that the said amount was the deficit caused by the petitioner while he was in service for the years from 1994 to 20012002. Questioning the said Proceedings dated 17.04.2003 deducting substantial amounts from his service benefits, the petitioner once again approached this Court by filing W.P.No.7990 of 2003. Incidentally certain other employees, who met the same fate, also filed Writ Petitions, illustratively W.P.Nos.5292 of 2002 and 17720 of 2003 being two of those writ petitions. On 14.07.2005, W.P.No.7990 of 2003 filed by the petitioner was allowed by this Court, holding that the action of the respondent Corporation in deducting certain amounts from the service benefits on the retirement of the petitioner is totally illegal. Aggrieved by the judgment of the learned Single Judge, the respondent Corporation took the matter in appeal by filing W.A.No.2630 of 2005. While admitting the said appeal, a Division Bench of this Court suspended the operation of the Judgment dated 14.07.2005 passed by the learned Single Judge. Ostensibly, taking advantage of the suspension of the judgment, the 2nd respondent Corporation approached the first respondent i.e., the Deputy Registrar of Cooperative Societies, Adilabad District, and initiated Surcharge Proceedings. Resultantly, on 03.01.2006, pending disposal of the Writ Appeal, the first respondent issued Notice, purportedly under Section 60 of the A.P. State Cooperative Societies Act, 1964 (‘the Act’ for brevity), directing the petitioner to attend the inquiry to be held on 19.01.2006. Having appeared on the said date, the petitioner sought further time and soon thereafter approached this Court by filing the Writ Petition. Thus, the petitioner questioned the Surcharge Proceedings initiated by the first respondent at the behest of the 2nd respondent Corporation by taking recourse to Section 60 of the Act, as being totally illegal and arbitrary, apart from being void as well as being without any jurisdiction. Incidentally, pending disposal of the present Writ Petition, the Writ Appeal filed by the respondent Corporation was dismissed through a Common Judgment dated 14.02.2006. It is gathered from the submissions of the learned counsel that soon thereafter the balance amount was also paid to the petitioner. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has strenuously contended that the Notice issued by the first respondent on 03.01.2006 in R.C.No.1717/2005/c is ex facie illegal and arbitrary and without jurisdiction. It is gathered from the submissions of the learned counsel that soon thereafter the balance amount was also paid to the petitioner. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has strenuously contended that the Notice issued by the first respondent on 03.01.2006 in R.C.No.1717/2005/c is ex facie illegal and arbitrary and without jurisdiction. Drawing the attention of this Court to the Judgment dated 14.07.2005 rendered by the learned Single Judge in W.P.No.7999 of 2003 and also that of the Division Bench dated 14.02.2006 in W.A.No.2630 of 2005, the learned counsel has submitted that at both levels this Court has specifically observed that once an employee is made to retire without any disciplinary Proceedings pending, after his retirement, no fresh proceedings can be initiated. It is the specific contention of the learned counsel that the whole issue was covered by the earlier proceedings and in view of concurrent findings rendered by the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench, the Notice dated 03.01.2006 is hit by principles of constructive res judicata. Elaborating on the power and jurisdiction of the first respondent, the learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the Proceedings under Section 60 of the Act can be initiated where, in course of audit under Section 50, or enquiry under Section 51, or inspection under Section 52 or 53 of the Act, or on winding up of the society, if any person connected with the affairs of the society has misappropriated or fraudulently retained any money. Expatiating further, the learned counsel has further strenuously contended that, in the present instance, there is no such inspection or enquiry, but the authorities have chosen to straight away issue Proceedings under Section 60 of the Act, merely based on a letter addressed by the respondent Corporation, especially after a long lapse of time from the date of the petitioner’s retirement. The learned Counsel has also stated that the alleged misappropriation is said to have pertained to the period beginning from 1994, and if it were to be true, nothing prevented the respondent Corporation to initiate appropriate proceedings at the earliest point of time. According to the learned counsel, the effort of the respondent Corporation, especially in the face of finality attached to the issue regarding recovery of amounts by way of concurrent decisions of this Court, is nothing but an abuse of process. According to the learned counsel, the effort of the respondent Corporation, especially in the face of finality attached to the issue regarding recovery of amounts by way of concurrent decisions of this Court, is nothing but an abuse of process. Imparting a semblance of statutory sanctity to the proceedings by posting them under Section 60 of the Act cannot be countenanced. Summing up his submissions, the learned counsel has urged this Court to allow the Writ Petition and give a quietus to the litigation so as to allow a senior citizen to lead his post retirement life with some peace. Per contra, initially the learned Standing Counsel for the respondent Corporation has raised a preliminary objection that the Writ Petition was filed against the show-cause notice dated 03.01.2006, issued by the first respondent invoking Section 60 of the Act. In other words, the learned Standing Counsel has contended that since the first respondent has the necessary jurisdiction to issue the said show cause notice, no challenge could have been laid against it. The learned Standing Counsel has strenuously opposed the claims and contentions of the petitioner. Having admitted the previous judicial proceedings and the eventual payment of the retirement benefits, save the deductions, the learned Standing Counsel has submitted that the Surcharge Proceedings were initiated through a show cause notice dated 03.01.2006, based on the audit reports given by the auditors of the respondent Corporation. The learned counsel has further submitted that in the earlier round of litigation, the issue that fell for consideration was whether any deduction would be made from the retirement benefits without following due process of law. In other words, whether recovery proceedings can be initiated without taking recourse to any departmental inquiry or without a clear finding in any Disciplinary Proceedings. The learned Standing Counsel has also submitted that the Surcharge Proceedings were issued only after paying the entire retirement benefits to the petitioner. As such, the grievance of the petitioner in W.P.No.7999 of 2003 stood answered on payment of those benefits. Thus, the recovery proceedings which were initiated subsequently have nothing to do with the previous litigation and they were based on fresh cause of action available to the respondent Corporation under the provisions of the Act. As such, the grievance of the petitioner in W.P.No.7999 of 2003 stood answered on payment of those benefits. Thus, the recovery proceedings which were initiated subsequently have nothing to do with the previous litigation and they were based on fresh cause of action available to the respondent Corporation under the provisions of the Act. Elaborating the said submission, the learned counsel has stated that Surcharge Proceedings under Section 60 of the Act are not disciplinary proceedings, as has been held by this Court in Balasa Rama Rao Vs. General Manager, District Co-operative Central Bank Limited, Srikakulam and another ( 1995 (3) ALT 556 ). On the said premise, the learned Standing Counsel has countered the contentions of the petitioner and submitted that either expressly or constructively the principle of res judicata has no application to the present proceedings. The learned Standing Counsel has submitted that the Notice dated 03.01.2006 is to show cause, and it is required to be answered by the petitioner. All the grounds the petitioner wanted to canvas could have been raised by the petitioner before the 1st respondent, which is a quasi-judicial authority with the necessary jurisdiction to entertain all the pleas that are available to either party to the proceedings. Accordingly, the learned Standing Counsel has urged this Court to dismiss the Writ Petition, thereby permitting the petitioner to raise all his objections before the first respondent, who alone is competent to decide the matter in question. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Standing Counsel for the respondent Corporation, apart from perusing the record. From the respective pleadings of the parties and rival submissions, the following issues fall for consideration: i) Whether the Writ Petition is maintainable against a show cause notice? Whether the present surcharge proceedings are hit by the principles of res judicata? iii) Whether the Surcharge Proceedings, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, are sustainable? In re. Issue No.1: There is no universal proposition of law that no writ lies against a show-cause notice; on the contrary, the courts have held that a writ petition does lie, but under specific circumstances. iii) Whether the Surcharge Proceedings, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, are sustainable? In re. Issue No.1: There is no universal proposition of law that no writ lies against a show-cause notice; on the contrary, the courts have held that a writ petition does lie, but under specific circumstances. As a matter of settled legal principle, the Courts have held that a Writ Petition against a show-cause notice is maintainable (1) if the notice is issued by an authority without any jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction; (2) when the notice manifestly reveals the premeditated attitude of the authority; (3) when the whole issue is fait accompli; (4) or when it is manifestly illegal or tainted with the vice of abuse – to name a few instances. A caveat may have to be served here that want of jurisdiction is entirely different from the errors that may creep in while exercising the said jurisdiction. In the former case the proceedings are coram non judice, but not in the latter. The Courts have discouraged litigation based on the show-cause notices on the premise that such proceedings are premature. In other words, the Courts do not, in the first place, have much material before them to know the mind of the authorities. On the other hand, show cause notice is not a definite indication to hold that the authority has made up his mind to take action against the Noticee. In other words, a right accrues to a person to sue on violation of any of his civil or constitutional rights, but not on an apprehended or anticipated violation thereof. A fortiori, a mere show-cause notice or charge-sheet does not infringe the right of anyone. It is only when a final order imposing some punishment adversely affecting a party is passed, then the said party can be said to have any grievance. In any event, if the show-cause notice is ex facie illegal, more particularly when the Court has all the material before it, for instance owing to the previous rounds of litigation between the same parties before the same forum, the vigour of the principle of non-interference gets greatly diluted. In any event, if the show-cause notice is ex facie illegal, more particularly when the Court has all the material before it, for instance owing to the previous rounds of litigation between the same parties before the same forum, the vigour of the principle of non-interference gets greatly diluted. In the present case, it being the third round of litigation, there is sufficient material on record to appreciate the rival contentions of the parties and thereby further appreciate the legality or the lack of it concerning the show cause notice. Evidently, the respondent Corporation made efforts to recover the amounts from and out of the sum due to the petitioner on the premise that he caused loss to the Corporation. The series of instances of misappropriation is said to have taken place way back in 1994 and continued up to 2001. No explanation has been forth coming from the respondent Corporation as to why it could not initiate any action against the petitioner at the earliest, assuming that the audit findings have established the culpability or complexity of the petitioner. If one is mindful of the fact that auditing under Section 50 of the Act is an annual affair and is required to be completed or complied with under a strict time frame, the attempted justification of the respondent Corporation as to its belated efforts looks facetious, to put it mildly. It is only when the Corporation suffered a judicial order in the Writ Petition, pending the Writ Appeal preferred by it, it chose to approach the first respondent, taking recourse to Section 60 of the Act. Even the said show cause notice is blissfully laconic as to the method and manner of misappropriation said to have been committed by the petitioner. As such, in the light of the material that has come to be placed before this Court in the previous rounds of litigation as well as the present one, apart from the comprehensive pleas taken by the authorities concerned at all levels of litigation, this Court, in its considered opinion, is justified, in examining the legality of the show cause notice. Thus, the issue is answered in favour of the petitioner, holding that the Writ Petition is maintainable. In re. Issue No.2: There is no gainsaying the fact that res judicata is a common law principle with universal application, i.e., applicable to all branches of law. Thus, the issue is answered in favour of the petitioner, holding that the Writ Petition is maintainable. In re. Issue No.2: There is no gainsaying the fact that res judicata is a common law principle with universal application, i.e., applicable to all branches of law. It is res judicata when applied to the Civil Law, and vis-a-vis the Criminal Law, it is recognised as acquafa acquit. It is no longer res integra that the Writ Proceedings are amenable to the application of the principles of res judicata. Though Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure enunciates the contours of res judicata, in the first place, it is not exhaustive. In the second place, application of principle of res judicata being the inherent aspect of the Courts, Section 11 only gives a statutory acknowledgment to the said principle. In the present case, the learned counsel for the petitioner has contended that the same issue of recovery of amount from the petitioner has fallen for consideration in the earlier two writ petitions, especially in the 2nd Writ Petition. After W.P.No.7990 of 2003, the mater was taken in appeal in W.A.No. 260 of 2005 and the judgment of the learned Division Bench declaring the illegality of the approach adopted by the respondent Corporation has attained finality. Indisputably, all the three proceedings concern themselves with the issue of the efforts of the respondent Corporation to recover the amounts from the petitioner on the ground that he has committed misappropriation of funds, or in the alternative, he has caused huge loss to the Corporation during the course of his employment. Keeping aside the aspect of limitation, if we consider the issue in its true perspective, what emerges is this: What was considered by this Court on earlier occasions is not a question whether the respondent Corporation is entitled to recover the amounts from the petitioner, but whether the process adopted by the respondent Corporation in that regard passes the muster of legality? Admittedly, when the petitioner was made to retire under V.R.S, albeit under a judicial compulsion, the respondent Corporation paid the terminal benefits to the petitioner. When the amount was paid, certain deductions had been effected. Admittedly, when the petitioner was made to retire under V.R.S, albeit under a judicial compulsion, the respondent Corporation paid the terminal benefits to the petitioner. When the amount was paid, certain deductions had been effected. It is further not in dispute that before effecting such deductions, the respondent Corporation had not followed any procedure, leave alone putting the petitioner on notice calling for an explanation as to why the amounts should not be deducted. Thus, what has fallen for consideration and what has been interdicted by this Court in the earlier Writ proceedings is the procedural safe guards that have not been put in place by the respondent Corporation while making an attempt to recover the amounts allegedly due to it. Thus, the principles of res judicate either expressly or constructively may not have any application to the facts of the present case. At the same time, it is further relevant to appreciate that there was no occasion for this Court to consider, even before the Division Bench, whether the surcharge proceedings amounted to disciplinary proceedings and whether, once they are not equated with disciplinary proceedings, they could be initiated even after retirement of the petitioner. To hold that surcharge proceedings do not amount to disciplinary proceedings, there is a binding authority in Balusa Ramaiah (1 supra), decided by a learned Single Judge. Once the present surcharge proceedings do not amount to disciplinary proceedings, it may be seen that the entire discussion in the earlier Writ Petitions proceeded on the assumption that the amounts were sought to be recovered without due process, more particularly subsequent to the retirement of the petitioner. It can thus be safely held that the issue in the previous writ petitions and the present Writ Petition is entirely different. Accordingly, the 2nd issue is required to be held in favour of the 2nd respondent. In re: Issue No.3: To appreciate the claim on the part of the respondent Corporation, it is imperative to examine the statutory scheme of A.P. Co-operative Societies Act, 1964 (‘the Act’ for brevity). Chapter VII of the Act deals with audit, inquiry, inspection and surcharge proceedings. In re: Issue No.3: To appreciate the claim on the part of the respondent Corporation, it is imperative to examine the statutory scheme of A.P. Co-operative Societies Act, 1964 (‘the Act’ for brevity). Chapter VII of the Act deals with audit, inquiry, inspection and surcharge proceedings. To begin with, we may examine Section 50 of the Act, which speaks of audit and which is as follows: "Audit:- (1) There shall be a separate wing for audit in the Co-operative Department headed by the Chief Auditor who will work under the general superintendence and control of the Registrar of Cooperative Societies. The Chief Auditor shall audit or cause to be audited by a person authorised by him by a general or special order in this behalf, the accounts of a society atleast once in every year and shall issue or cause to be issued an audit certificate with such particulars as may be prescribed, before the end of the succeeding Co-operative year. Such audit shall primarily cover an examination of the debts, overdue, if any, verification of the cash balance and securities and valuations of the assets and the liabilities of the society (including prudent management of the affairs of the society in accordance with the Act, rules and byelaws). (2) Every person who is, or has at any time been, an officer or employee of the society and every member including a past member shall furnish such information in regard to, any transaction, working and affairs of the society as the Chief Auditor or such person authorised by him may require. (3) The committee shall prepare and submit or cause to be prepared and submitted within such period not exceeding six months as may be prescribed for different classes of societies after the end of the co-operative year, to the Chief Auditor or the person authorised by him as the case may be, such statements and reports as may be prescribed for the purpose of the audit of accounts of the Society for the Co-operative year. (4) The audit shall be completed within a period of six months from the close of the Co-operative year of the registered society concerned and such other further period not exceeding six months as the Chief Auditor may permit for reasons to be recorded in writing." Section 51 of the Act concerns itself with inquiry; section 52, with inspection; and section 53, with inspection of books by financing bank or federal society. Insofar as section 59 of the Act is concerned, it deals with placing an officer or servant of the society under suspension consequent to initiation of any proceedings in the light of what emanates in audit or inspection under sections 50 to 53 of the Act. Insofar as section 59 of the Act is concerned, it deals with placing an officer or servant of the society under suspension consequent to initiation of any proceedings in the light of what emanates in audit or inspection under sections 50 to 53 of the Act. Section 60 of the Act deals with surcharge proceedings, which is as follows: "Surcharge:- (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, where in the course of an audit under Section 50 or any inquiry under Section 51 or an inspection under Section 52 or Section 53 or the winding up of a society it appears that any person who is or was entrusted with the organisation affairs or management of the society or any past or present officer or servant of the society has misappropriated or fraudulently retained any money or other property or has been guilty of breach of trust in relation to the society or has caused any deficiency in the assets of the society by breach of trust or wilful negligence or has made any payment contrary to the provisions of this Act, the rules or the bye-laws, the Registrar himself, or any person specially authorised by him in this behalf, of his own motion or on the application of the committee, liquidator or any creditor or contributory, may inquire into the conduct of such person or officer or servant and make an order requiring him to repay or restore the money or property or any part thereof with interest at such rate as the Registrar or the person authorised as aforesaid thinks just or to contribute such sum to the assets of the society by way of compensation in respect of the misappropriation, misappropriation of funds, fraudulent retention breach of trust, or wilful negligence as the Registrar or the person authorised as aforesaid thinks just: Provided that no order shall be passed against any person referred to in this sub-section unless the person concerned has been given an opportunity of making his representation. (2) Any sum ordered under this Section to be repaid to a society or recovered as a contribution to its assets may be recovered on a requisition being made in this behalf by the Registrar to the Collector in the same manner as arrears of land revenue. (2) Any sum ordered under this Section to be repaid to a society or recovered as a contribution to its assets may be recovered on a requisition being made in this behalf by the Registrar to the Collector in the same manner as arrears of land revenue. (3) This Section shall apply notwithstanding that such person or officer or servant may have incurred criminal liability by this Act." Since the respondent Corporation has claimed that it has proposed to initiate action against the petitioner owing to the findings in the statutory audit, a close scrutiny of the said provision indicates firstly that audit is an annual affair. The accounts of the society are required to be audited at least once in every year and there shall be an audit certificate issued in this regard. The scope of audit covers the examination of the debts overdue, if any, verification of the cash balance, and securities and valuations of the assets and the liabilities of the society. In fact, the auditing is required to be conducted under a strict time frame. It may illustratively be stated that the audit shall be completed within a period of six months from the close of the co-operative year of the registered society concerned. Indisputably, the surcharge proceedings can be initiated against any person who is or was entrusted with the organisation of assets or management of the society or any past or present officer or servant of the society who has misappropriated or fraudulently retained any money or other property or has been guilty of breach of trust in relation to the society or he has caused any deficiency of the assets of the society by breach of trust or by wilful payment or has made any payment contrary to the provisions, the rules or the bye-laws. The Registrar or any other officer authorised in this behalf of his own motion or on the application of the committee, creditor, contributory, etc., may inquire into the conduct of such person or officer or servant. In terms of the statutory proposition and in the light of Balasa Rama Rao (1 supra), it cannot be said that the proceedings partake the character of disciplinary proceedings or that they cannot be initiated after an employee has retired. To the said extent, the action of the respondent Corporation cannot be interdicted. In terms of the statutory proposition and in the light of Balasa Rama Rao (1 supra), it cannot be said that the proceedings partake the character of disciplinary proceedings or that they cannot be initiated after an employee has retired. To the said extent, the action of the respondent Corporation cannot be interdicted. We have to examine how far the case of the petitioner fits into section 50 of the Act, so as to fall within the ambit of the surcharge proceedings under section 60 of the Act. It is appropriate to examine the impugned notice in Rc.No.1717/2005-E, dated 03.01.2006 issued by the 1st respondent, which is, to the extent relevant as follows: "Where as it is observed that Sri Md.Abdul Ali has worked as Senior Assistant Soap Base Unit, Nirmal Divisional Office, Utnoor from 1994 and retired from Service under V.R.S. on 30.06.2001 and Whereas in the reference 1st cited, the vice Chairman and Managing Director, Girijan Cooperative Corporation Limited, Vishakhapatnam has informed that, Sri Md.Abdul Ali, during his tenure as Senior Assistant of the Soap Base Unit Nirmal has caused huge MFP/other deficits, Due/Advances to a tune of Rs.2,08,545-28 ps, during the year 1994-1995 to 2001-2002 and fixed responsibility on him for recovery of above said amount. The year wise details of the deficits noticed admissible deficits written off, in admissible deficits to be recovered for the period from 1994-1995 to 2001-2002 and the other dues as pointed out in the final audit reports of the unit are mentioned below. Sl. No. Year Deficits noticed Admissible deficits written off Inadmissible deficits ordered for Recovery Pregs No. & date of VC & MD 1. 1994 - 95 87923-20 53679-50 37226-95 1245/02 IA-2 Dt.15.4.2003 2. 1995 – 96 114362-83 101262-00 13100-83 1244/02 IA-2 Dt. 15.4.2003 3. 1996 – 97 45006-00 0-00 50775-00 1243/02 IA-2 Dt. 28.4.2003 1200/02 IA-2 4. 1999 – 2000 68100-00 68100-00 0-00 Dt. 15.4.2003 5. 2000-01 54845-60 33915-00 23265-50 1201/02 IA-2 Dt. 15.4.2003 6. 2001 – 02 51980-00 0-00 51980-00 1199/02 IA-2 Dt 28.3.2003 Total 422217-63 296956-50 176348-28 II. Other Dues/Advances:- Statutory Advances 1. Due to IR Advance 4631-00 2. Due to VRS Advance Adhoc Payment (Pending Settlement of Terminal benefits) 20000-00 3. 1999 – 2000 68100-00 68100-00 0-00 Dt. 15.4.2003 5. 2000-01 54845-60 33915-00 23265-50 1201/02 IA-2 Dt. 15.4.2003 6. 2001 – 02 51980-00 0-00 51980-00 1199/02 IA-2 Dt 28.3.2003 Total 422217-63 296956-50 176348-28 II. Other Dues/Advances:- Statutory Advances 1. Due to IR Advance 4631-00 2. Due to VRS Advance Adhoc Payment (Pending Settlement of Terminal benefits) 20000-00 3. Other deficits 7566-00 Total 32,197-00 Total I – II 2,08,545-28 Therefore, I, the Deputy Registrar of Cooperative Societies, Adilabad Division, in Exercise of powers vested on me under Section 60 of the A.P.C.S. Act 7 of 1964 hereby direct Sri Md. Abdul Ali, Ex-Senior Asst of Soap Base Unit Nirmal to show cause as to why the entire amount of Rs.2,08,545-28 ps. should not be recovered from him and as an opportunity shall appear in person before the undersigned on 19-01-2006 at 11-00 a.m. in the Office of the District Cooperative Officer, Adilabad and to adduce and cross-examine the witnesses of Girijan Cooperative Corporation and his evidence in rebuttal in this case and he can produce evidences of documentary and witnesses of personal." It is axiomatic that whenever the application of an employee is processed for retirement under VRS, it cannot be processed unless the record of the said employee is clean. In the event of any allegations against the employee, the request of the employee can be either deferred or declined to be accepted. The above extracted Notice indicates that the alleged deficits seem to have had their origin in 1994-95 and continued till 2001-02. Acknowledging that the auditing is an annual affair, I am of the opinion that, had there been any deficit or irregularity found in the audit of 1994-95, nothing would have prevented the respondent Corporation to initiate appropriate action soon thereafter. The above table further reveals that the inadmissible deficits ordered for recovery got repeated in 1995-96, 1996-97, 1999-2000, 2000-01 and 2001-02. Incidentally, the fourth column of the table shows that the VC & MD issued all the proceedings in 2003 i.e., much after the retirement of the petitioner. In the earlier two rounds of litigation, the respondent Corporation has not been specific about the nature of the allegations faced by the petitioner. On the contrary, the authorities chose to effect unilateral deductions in the petitioner’s retirement benefits. In the earlier two rounds of litigation, the respondent Corporation has not been specific about the nature of the allegations faced by the petitioner. On the contrary, the authorities chose to effect unilateral deductions in the petitioner’s retirement benefits. The proceedings having not been exempted from the application of the laws governing limitation, most of the amounts shown in the table, assuming for the purpose of discussion that they are outstanding against the petitioner, are barred by limitation. Indisputably, the respondent Corporation processed the application of the petitioner and allowed him to retire in 2001. Even thereafter, it is not the Corporation which initiated the action either of recovery or of surcharge on its own. It is the petitioner who was compelled to approach this Court complaining of non-payment of retirement benefits. At last they were paid on the pain of contempt proceedings pending the writ petition. Even there afterwards, the respondent Corporation did not initiate any action as soon as they paid the terminal benefits. After laying a challenge against the judgment of the learned single Judge, when the proceedings are pending before the Division Bench, as a matter of post-factum justification, the authorities approached the 1st respondent, who in turn, issued notice dated 03.01.2006, purportedly under section 60 of the Act. Despite the factum of initiation of surcharge proceedings having been brought to the notice of the Division Bench, eventually, through a common judgment dated 14.02.2006, the Division Bench dismissed the Writ Appeals, which included the one filed against the petitioner. A perusal of the judgment would indicate, strangely though, the respondent Corporation has never taken the defence of the surcharge proceedings and has never contended that they do not amount to disciplinary proceedings and that they can be continued against the petitioner. Without much hesitation, it can be stated that in terms of the provisions of the Limitation Act, for the alleged deficiencies as reflected in the audit reports pertaining to the years from 1994-95 to 2001, the respondent Society cannot initiate recovery proceedings in the year 2006. In State of Kerala v. V.R. Kalliyanikutty (1999) 3 SCC 657 ), the Hon’ble Supreme Court, dealing with the issue of recovery of dues, has held: “14. In State of Kerala v. V.R. Kalliyanikutty (1999) 3 SCC 657 ), the Hon’ble Supreme Court, dealing with the issue of recovery of dues, has held: “14. In our view if such a wide interpretation is put on the words “amount due” under the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act, there is every likelihood of the provisions of Article 14 being attracted. This Court in the case Director of Industries, U.P. v. Deep Chand Agarwal [ (1980) 2 SCC 332 : AIR 1980 SC 801 ] justified the special procedure for recovery of certain debts under the U.P. Public Moneys (Recovery of Dues) Act, 1965 on the ground that the amounts which were advanced by the State or by the financial institutions were for the economic betterment of the people of that State. Speedy recovery of these amounts was necessary so that these amounts could be reutilized for the same public purpose. It is doubtful if this public purpose would extend to granting exemption to these claims from the statute of limitation. The law of limitation itself rests on the foundations of public interest. The courts have expressed at least three reasons for supporting the existence of statutes of limitation: (1) that long dormant claims have more of cruelty than justice in them; (2) that a defendant might have lost the evidence to disprove a stale claim; and (3) that persons with good causes of action should pursue them with reasonable diligence. (See Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th Edn., Vol. 28, para 605.) In Nav Rattanmal v. State of Rajasthan [ AIR 1961 SC 1704 ] the statutes of limitation have been considered as statutes of repose and statutes of peace. The generally accepted basis for such statutes is that they are designed to effectuate a beneficent public purpose. Whether public purpose of speedy recovery would outweigh public purpose behind a statute of limitation is a moot point. But we need not examine this aspect any further in view of our interpretation of the words “amounts due” in Section 71. ... The rights of the parties are not thereby enlarged. The process of recovery is different. An Act must expressly provide for such enlargement of claims which are legally recoverable, before it can be interpreted as extending to the recovery of those amounts which have ceased to be legally recoverable on the date when recovery proceedings are undertaken. ... The rights of the parties are not thereby enlarged. The process of recovery is different. An Act must expressly provide for such enlargement of claims which are legally recoverable, before it can be interpreted as extending to the recovery of those amounts which have ceased to be legally recoverable on the date when recovery proceedings are undertaken. Under the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act such a process of recovery would start with a written requisition issued in the prescribed form by the creditor to the Collector of the district as prescribed under Section 69(2) of the said Act. Therefore, all claims which are legally recoverable and are not time-barred on that date can be recovered under the Kerala Revenue Recovery Act.” Having allowed the common judgment dated 14.02.2006 in W.A.No.2236 of 2003 and batch to attain finality, the respondent Corporation cannot subject the petitioner to litigious process ad infinitum, if not ad nauseam, by calling the proceedings with a different name so as to overcome the binding judgments of this Court in earlier proceedings. Accordingly, I am of the considered opinion that the last issue shall be held in favour of the petitioner and against the respondent Corporation. For the aforesaid reasons, the writ petition is allowed and the impugned notice dated 03.01.2006 in Proceedings Rc.No.1717/2005-E is set aside and quashed. There shall be no order as to costs. Miscellaneous petitions, if any pending in this writ petition, shall stand closed.