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2014 DIGILAW 452 (RAJ)

Ayal Das v. State of Rajasthan

2014-02-11

AMITAVA ROY, VIJAY BISHNOI

body2014
JUDGMENT : BISHNOI, J. : ” Since all these appeals are directed against the common order dated 07.11.2006 passed by the learned single Judge in the batch of writ petitions preferred by the appellants challenging the notification issued by the State Government dated 03.08.1996 (published on 28.08.1996), while exercising the powers under sub-section (3) of section 2 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 (for short ' the Act of 1950 ” hereinafter), whereby the State Government has granted exemption to the respondent-trust from the application of the provisions of the Act of 1950, therefore, these appeals have been heard together and are being decided by this common judgment. 2. Brief facts of the case are that the appellants are tenants in the premises owned by the respondent-trust. In the year 2003, the respondent-trust had filed eviction suits against the appellants on various ground including personal necessity, nuisance and default etc. in the Court of District Judge, Bhilwara. In the plaint, the respondent-trust has mentioned that the State Government, vide notification dated 03.08.1996, has exempted it from the applicability of all the provisions of the Act of 1950 and as such, the respondent-trust is not bound to proceed in accordance with the provisions of the Act of 1950. The said notification dated 03.08.1996 was subject to challenge by the appellants by way of writ petitions and those writ petitions were decided by the learned single Judge by common order dated 07.11.2006, which is under challenge in these appeals. The main ground, on which the notification was challenged by the appellants in the writ petitions, was that the State Government, before issuing the impugned notification, did not apply its mind to the question whether the conditions for granting exemption to the premises owned by the respondent-trust were fulfilled and the trust is entitled to exemption. 3. The learned single Judge, after taking into consideration the submissions of the rival parties and perusing the pleadings and documents, has observed as under: ' I have considered the rival submissions of the parties, have given my thoughtful consideration and have perused the pleadings and the documents. 3. The learned single Judge, after taking into consideration the submissions of the rival parties and perusing the pleadings and documents, has observed as under: ' I have considered the rival submissions of the parties, have given my thoughtful consideration and have perused the pleadings and the documents. From the documents placed on record by the respondent-Trust, it appears that the State Government sought various information from the respondent-Trust before issuing the exemption notification and after taking into consideration the information supplied by the respondent-Trust with regard to utilization of the income arising from the properties of the trust for public and charitable purpose, that the exemption notification under sub-section (3) of Section 2 of Act of 1950 was issued by the State Government. The contention of the petitioner therefore, that the exemption notification has been issued without due application of mind, is wholly misconceived. On the contrary, the documents placed on record by the respondent-Trust clearly establish that the State Government before issuing the impugned notification made a thorough inquiry from the respondent-Trust and after satisfying itself about the fact that the income arising from the premises owned by the respondent Trust is being used for the public and charitable purpose, that the notification has been issued. Reliance placed by the petitioner on the judgment rendered in the case of M/s. Shah Theaters (supra), is not applicable to the facts of the present case, whereas, the judgment relied upon by the respondent squarely apply to the facts and circumstances of the present case. In view of the above discussion, the writ petitions have no merit and the same are hereby dismissed.' 4. The learned counsel for the appellants has assailed the order dated 07.11.2006 and argued that the learned single Judge has not taken into consideration the fact that before issuance of the notification dated 03.08.1996, the State Government has not recorded its satisfaction, firstly that the income of the trust derived from the rented premises is utilized for the purpose of the institution and secondly, the State Government is satisfied that in the public interest, it is necessary and expedient to exempt the respondent-trust from applicability of all of the provisions of this Act. The learned counsel for the appellants has also argued that though the State Government as well as the private respondents have utterly failed to prove that the State Government has applied its mind before the issuance of the notification, the learned single Judge has erred in holding that the contention of the appellants that the exemption notification has been issued without due application of mind is wholly misconceived. 5. The learned counsel for the appellants has placed reliance on decisions of Hon ” ble Supreme Court in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Kanhaiyalal & Ors., 1969 (2) UJ 428 and P.J. Irani v. State of Madras & Anr., AIR 1961 SC 1731 and argued that it is settled by the above decisions of the Hon ” ble Supreme Court that where the State Government does not apply its mind, which is required under the Act, notification of granting exemption is not valid. The learned counsel for the appellants has also argued that though this Court has ordered for production of the record of the proceedings, whereby the exemption was granted to the respondent-trust but the State Government has failed to produce the said record and therefore, adverse inference may be drawn against the State Government, the notification dated 03-08-1996 may be quashed and set aside, the impugned order may also be set aside and the writ petitions preferred by the appellants may be allowed. 6. Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondent have argued that the challenge to the notification dated 03.08.1996 is suffering from delay as the appellants have challenged it only in the year 2006. It is also contended that though the appellants were in knowledge of the notification in question since the year 1998 when they filed objections in the proceedings initiated against them under Rajasthan Unauthorized Occupants Act, 1964, however, in the writ petition, they have contended that they came to know about the notification in question only when they received the summons of the eviction suit. It is further contended that in view of the above facts, it is clear that the appellants have made a false statement before the learned single Judge and, therefore, the writ petitions filed by the appellants are liable to be dismissed on this ground alone. 7. It is further contended that in view of the above facts, it is clear that the appellants have made a false statement before the learned single Judge and, therefore, the writ petitions filed by the appellants are liable to be dismissed on this ground alone. 7. The learned counsel for the respondent-trust have further argued that the learned single Judge has taken into consideration the documents produced on behalf of the respondent-trust along with reply to the writ petitions and satisfied that the State Government had conducted a thorough enquiry and after being satisfied that the respondent-trust is entitled for exemption from the provisions of the Act of 1950, issued a notification dated 03.08.1996. The learned counsel for the respondents has also argued that the findings arrived at by the learned single Judge are based on unrebutted documents and, therefore, the same are not liable to be interfered with. 8. The learned counsel for the respondents has placed reliance on the decisions of Hon ” ble Supreme Court in S. Kandaswamy Chettiar v. State of Tamil Nadu & Anr., AIR 1985 SC 257 ; M/s. S.M. Mahendru & etc. v. State of Tamil Nadu & Anr., AIR 1985 SC 270 ; Christ the King Cathedral v. John Ancheril & Anr., 2001 AIR SCW 2656 : ( AIR 2001 SC 2543 ); the decisions of this Court in Mohd. Yamin v. State of Rajasthan & Anr., AIR 1989 Raj. 30 ; Madan Lal & Ors. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors., 2007 (2) DNJ (Raj) 960. 9. The learned counsel for the respondent-trust have also informed this Court that the State Government issued a notification dated 01.04.2010, which was published on 15.04.2010, and granted exemption to the respondent-trust from the application of Chapters 2 and 3 of the Rajasthan Rent Control Act, 2001 and from this also, it can be inferred that the State Government has not committed any illegality in granting exemption to the respondent-trust from the application of the provisions of the Act of 1950 vide notification dated 03.08.1996. 10. We have heard learned counsel for the rival parties and perused the record. 11. 10. We have heard learned counsel for the rival parties and perused the record. 11. As per sub-section (3) of section 2 of the Act of 1950, for the purpose of granting exemption from the application of all or any of the provisions of the Act of 1950, the State Government was required to consider that the income of the educational, religious or a charitable institution, derived from its premises, is utilized for the purpose of the institution and whether it is necessary or expedient in public interest to exempt from all or any of the provisions of this Act any premises owned by such institution. 12. We have carefully examined the averments made in the writ petitions as well as the memo of appeals. The appellants have nowhere averred that the respondent-trust is not a charitable institution and its income derived from the rented premises is not utilized for the purpose of the institution. It is noticed that during the pendency of the writ petitions, no reply to the writ petitions was preferred on behalf of the State Government but during the pendency of these appeals, the reply to the writ petition (SBCWP No. 5336/2006) has been filed on behalf of the respondent Nos.1 and 2 Secretary and Deputy Secretary, Department of Urban Development, Government of Rajasthan, Jaipur. Para 9 of the reply reads as under: ' That the averments made in para No.9 of the writ petition are denied in toto being misleading and misconceived. It is respectfully submitted that the allegations made by the petitioner in this para are wholly misconceived and deserve to be seriously deprecated by this Hon ” ble Court, inasmuch as, pursuant to the provisions of sub-section (3) of Section 2 of the Act of 1950, respondent No. 3 had submitted an application before the State Government through the Devasthan Commissioner on 10-1-1994 and along with the said application, all necessary documents including the list of tenants, registration certificate and balance-sheet of the trust etc. were also annexed for the purpose of issuance of the notification under the provisions of the Act of 1950. Thereafter, the Assistant Commissioner, Devasthan Department sent his recommendations on 11-1-1994 to the Commissioner, Devasthan Department to the effect that if the premises in question are exempted from the application of the Rent Control Act, the trust will be able to take devotional activity with expedition. Thereafter, the Assistant Commissioner, Devasthan Department sent his recommendations on 11-1-1994 to the Commissioner, Devasthan Department to the effect that if the premises in question are exempted from the application of the Rent Control Act, the trust will be able to take devotional activity with expedition. The matter was thereafter also further pursued at length and the State Government, after examining all relevant documents and after making thorough enquiry about the fact that the income arising to the trust was wholly utilised for the public purposes and for religious and charitable purposes, granted exemption in favour of respondent No. 3 vide notification dated 26-8-1996. That being the position, allegations made by the petitioner are in this para are wholly misleading and misconceived and the writ petition preferred by the petitioner deserves dismissal on this count alone.' 13. It is also noticed that no counter/rejoinder to the above averments has been filed on behalf of the appellants. 14. It is not in dispute that the State Government had sought various informations from the respondent-trust during the pendency of their application seeking exemption from the applicability of the provisions of the Act of 1950 and every such information was furnished by the respondent-trust. In the absence of any material otherwise it is very difficult to infer that the State Government, despite seeking various informations from the respondent-trust, could not have applied its mind before issuance of the notification dated 03.08.1996. If the State Government would have granted exemption without seeking any information from the respondent-trust, it could have been a case of non-application of mind. It is true that despite directions of this Court, the record of the case was not made available on the ground that the same is missing and an FIR has been lodged in this regard, as observed by a Co-ordinate Bench of this Court in a connected appeal ' D.B.Civil Special Appeal No.20/2007 in its order-sheet dated 28.11.2007, but this fact itself is not sufficient to hold that the notification in question has been issued by the State Government without due application of mind. 15. 15. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellants regarding the delay in challenging the notification dated 03.08.1996 on the ground that there was no occasion to challenge the validity of the notification till the respondent-trust has filed the suit for eviction in the Court of District Judge, Bhilwara is having substance but the fact remains that the averment of the appellants in the writ petition to the effect that they came to know about the issuance of the notification only when the summons of the eviction suit were received by them, is false. 16. The appellants have also not alleged any mala fide in the action of the State Government in granting exemption. 17. The factum of granting exemption to the respondent-trust from the applicability of provisions of Chapters 2 and 3 of the Rajasthan Rent Control Act, 2001 is not in dispute and it can be inferred that the State Government, after satisfying the conditions has further granted exemption to the respondent-trust from the application of Chapters 2 and 3 of the Rajasthan Rent Control Act, 2001. 18. In the overall circumstances of the case, we are not persuaded to take a different view from the learned single Judge, therefore, no interference is called for. 19. Hence, all these appeals are hereby dismissed. Appeals dismissed.