ORDER 1. The petitioner in both the criminal original petitions is the sole Accused in S.C. No. 130 of 2011 on the file of the learned Sessions Judge, Mahila Court, Chennai. Originally, including the petitioner, there were four accused in the said case. The Accused Nos. 2 & 3 are the parents and the 4th Accused is the uncle of the 1st Accused/the petitioner herein. As against the petitioner the trial court framed a single charge under Section 376 of IPC. As against the other Accused, the trial court framed charges under Section 417, 471 r/w 109 and 506(ii) of IPC. The Accused Nos. 1 to 4 filed an original petition in Criminal O.P. No. 9823 of 2011 seeking to quash the said case. This court, by order dated 20.06.2012, quashed the charges framed as against the Accused Nos. 2 to 4 and accordingly they stand discharged. Thus, the petitioner is the sole accused, as of now, facing the trial. 2. The petitioner was residing at No. 192A/49A, Ramanujar Street, Washermenpet, Chennai. The 2nd respondent was residing along with her parents at No. 289, Solaiyappan Street, Old Washermenpet, Chennai. It is the further case of the prosecution that when the petitioner and the 2nd respondent were studying X Standard, they had acquaintance with each other. When they reached XII Standard, they started loving each other. It is the further case of the prosecution that 5-6 months prior to 26.03.2010, the petitioner had sexual intercourse on few occasions with the 2nd respondent by giving a false promise of marriage. Thereafter, when the said relationship came to light, the family members of both the families sat together and discussed to celebrate the marriage between the petitioner and the 2nd respondent. But, later on, the Accused Nos. 2 to 4 (since discharged) declined to arrange for the said marriage and thus, they cheated the 2nd respondent. It is further set out in the charges that on 15.02.2010, when the parents of the 2nd respondent approached the Accused Nos. 2 to 4 (since discharged) with a view to persuade them to arrange for the marriage between the petitioner and the 2nd respondent, the Accused Nos. 2 to 4 (since discharged), criminally intimidated them by using abusive language. Thus, the 1st Accused/petitioner herein stands charged for an offence u/s. 376 of IPC, Accused Nos. 2 to 4 (since discharged) with a view to persuade them to arrange for the marriage between the petitioner and the 2nd respondent, the Accused Nos. 2 to 4 (since discharged), criminally intimidated them by using abusive language. Thus, the 1st Accused/petitioner herein stands charged for an offence u/s. 376 of IPC, Accused Nos. 2 and 3 stood charged for offences under Sections 417 of IPC and 506(ii) of IPC and the 4th Accused stands charged for offences under Sections 471 r/w 109 and 506(ii) of IPC. 3. During the course of trial, on 18.09.2012, the 2nd respondent was examined as P.W.1. Two more witnesses were also examined as P.W.2 and P.W.3 on the same day. The 2nd respondent/P.W.1 was cross examined in part by the counsel for accused. During the course of cross-examination, for a specific question put by the defence counsel, the 2nd respondent/P.W.1 answered that the last act of sexual intercourse between her and the petitioner herein happened in the month of August, 2009. Thus, according to her evidence, the offence of rape was committed lastly in the month of August 2009. 4. Thereafter, the petitioner filed a petition in Criminal M.P. No. 10872 of 2012 before the trial court under Section 7A of the JJ Act, 2000 claiming that as on the date of commission of offence, he was a juvenile and, therefore, he should be referred to the Juvenile Justice Board for inquiry as per the JJ Act, 2000 and he should not be tried by the learned Sessions Judge. According to the petitioner, his date of birth is 19.10.1991 and thus, in the month of August, 2009, he had not completed eighteen years of age. That petition was opposed by the prosecution as well as the 2nd respondent herein by filing counter. But, the learned Sessions Judge did not decide the issue of juvenility forthwith. 5. When the said petition was pending, the prosecution filed a petition in Criminal M.P. No. 12146 of 2012 under Section 216 of Cr. P.C. seeking to alter the charges. That petition was dismissed by the trial court by order dated 10.12.2012. As against the same, the 2nd respondent filed a criminal revision petition before this court and the same was dismissed. As against the same, the 2nd respondent herein went up to the Supreme Court by way of Special Leave Petition. P.C. seeking to alter the charges. That petition was dismissed by the trial court by order dated 10.12.2012. As against the same, the 2nd respondent filed a criminal revision petition before this court and the same was dismissed. As against the same, the 2nd respondent herein went up to the Supreme Court by way of Special Leave Petition. The Special Leave Petition was also dismissed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. 6. Thereafter, the trial court took up Criminal M.P. No. 10872 of 2012 for hearing. The trial court finally held that the claim of juvenility under Section 7A of the JJ Act, 2000 cannot be raised by the petitioner at this stage. Thus, the trial court did not render a decision on the question as to whether the petitioner is a juvenile or not. The trial court has, in fact, simply postponed the decision awaiting the rest of the evidence to be let in by the prosecution. This order is now under challenge in Criminal O.P. No. 29861 of 2014. 7. The petitioner has filed Criminal O.P. No. 29714 of 2014 seeking transfer of the case in S.C. No. 130 of 2011 pending on the file of the learned Sessions Judge, Mahila Court, Chennai to any other Sessions Court presided over by a woman Judge within the Sessions Division of Chennai. That is how, these two petitions are before me for disposal. 8. I have heard the learned senior counsel for the petitioner and the counsel for the 2nd respondent and also the learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the 1st respondent in both the original petitions. I have also perused the records carefully. 9. The learned senior counsel for the petitioner would submit that the question of juvenility by an accused can be raised at any stage even after the disposal of the entire case. It is his further contention that as and when juvenility is claimed by the accused, it is incumbent upon the court to decide the said issue, at the first, before proceeding with the case further. For any reason, if the court comes to the conclusion that the accused is a juvenile, thereafter, the trial court shall refer the case to the Juvenile Justice Board as per the JJ Act, 2000 and no court of session has jurisdiction to try a juvenile. 10. For any reason, if the court comes to the conclusion that the accused is a juvenile, thereafter, the trial court shall refer the case to the Juvenile Justice Board as per the JJ Act, 2000 and no court of session has jurisdiction to try a juvenile. 10. The learned senior counsel would nextly contend that as per Rule 8B of the Tamil Nadu Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2001, when juvenility is claimed by the accused, the said petition should be disposed of within 30 days from the date of making of such petition. In this regard, the learned senior counsel submitted that the petition filed by the petitioner claiming juvenility was not only kept pending for such a long time, but also, the trial court has postponed the decision thereby dismissing the petition holding that at this stage the claim of juvenility cannot be raised by the petitioner. The learned senior counsel would further add that so far as the age of the petitioner, as on the date of commission of the offence is concerned, it is to be decided based on the matriculation or equivalent certificates and only in the absence of the same, medical opinion may be obtained as per Rule 8B(3)(b) of the Tamil Nadu Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2001. In the instant case, according to the learned senior counsel, the school certificate showing the date of birth of the petitioner is not disputed. Therefore, according to him, the trial court ought to have taken the date of birth of the petitioner as 19.10.1991. The learned senior counsel would also add that the trial court was not right in postponing the decision by simply dismissing the petition impliedly leaving it open for the petitioner to raise such a claim of juvenility at a later stage. Thus, according to the learned senior counsel, the order of the trial court requires interference at the hands of this court. 11. A detailed counter has been filed by the 2nd respondent wherein the maintainability of the petition in Criminal O.P. No. 19861 of 2014 under Section 482 of Cr. P.C. is disputed. According to the counter, the impugned order is revisable under Sections 397 and 401 of Cr. P.C. and, therefore, the petition under Section 482 of Cr. P.C. is not at all maintainable. P.C. is disputed. According to the counter, the impugned order is revisable under Sections 397 and 401 of Cr. P.C. and, therefore, the petition under Section 482 of Cr. P.C. is not at all maintainable. The learned counsel for the 2nd respondent would further submit that the impugned order is a final order and, therefore, filing of this petition before this court would amount to forum shopping on the part of the petitioner. 12. It is further contended in the counter that the evidence of the 2nd respondent/P.W.1 in respect of the last act of rape was a stage managed one. In paragraphs 11, 12 and 13, the 2nd respondent has stated as follows:- “11. I submit that with reference to the averments and allegations in the Course of Investigation and Course of Trial in Para Nos. 7 and 8, except those that are matter of record in between parties the averments to the contrary is denied as false. I particularly deny that I had made any conscious deposition on 06.10.2012 that the last sexual intercourse with the petitioner took place prior to August 2009, in the above regard it is most respectfully submitted that such deposition was tactically stage managed by the petitioner by putting questions which would demean the femininity of any civilized person having done so, the petitioner is trying to gain from his own wrongs. If such procedure adopted by the unscrupulous elements such as the petitioner is left unchecked with iron hands, the same would result in disastrous circumstances, transgression of justice and no female would come forth to seek justice after putting her life and the family prestige at stake. I further submit that the questions which were put forth to me by the learned Senior Counsel appearing for the petitioner before the Hon'ble Trial Court is bound to imbalance even our most shrewd legal practitioner, which has been rightly observed by the Hon'ble Trial Judge. Admittedly, the said questions which were put forth to me before extracting the purported deposition would by itself go to prove that the petitioner would go to any extent to escape from the clutches of law after dooming the life for all times to come, the deposition given by me on 06.10.2012 should be viewed in the above context. Admittedly, the said questions which were put forth to me before extracting the purported deposition would by itself go to prove that the petitioner would go to any extent to escape from the clutches of law after dooming the life for all times to come, the deposition given by me on 06.10.2012 should be viewed in the above context. However, the petitioner who has already wrecked my life is trying to inflict further wounds in order to escape from the consequences of his acts. I further submit that with reference to the deposition about the age of the petitioner I submit that the same is of no consequence whatsoever to declare the petitioner as juvenile as admittedly, the petitioner could never by classified as juvenile as admittedly, the petitioner could never be classified as juvenile on the date of occurrence. The above fact should be viewed in the context that the petitioner himself has admitted before the Hon'ble Courts that he is aged about 19 years when the crime was committed by him. 12. I submit that the deposition made by me on 06.10.2012 cannot be read in isolation and the same should be read in conjecture with the complaint filed by me before the respondent police, in which I have stated in clear terms that the petitioner had 5 to 6 months before the date of complaint approached me, when I was alone in my house and tried to misbehave with me at this juncture I brought to the notice of the petitioner that it would not be proper for them to have sexual intercourse with me prior to marriage. On saying so the petitioner said that since he and his family members considered her as wife and daughter-in-law there is no question of the petitioner in any manner cheating me, further it has been specifically brought out by me in the complaint that after saying so, the petitioner had sex with me 5 to 6 times from the contents of the complaint it is clear that the petitioner had sex with me much after August 2009, only in view of the above fact, the petitioner sought to create a mental imbalance in me by putting inappropriate questions so that I would lose my mental balance and depose in a manner which would suit his purpose. A bare perusal of the complaint filed by me before the respondent police would reveal the true facts and circumstances. A copy of the complaint dated 03.03.2010 filed by me before the respondent police is herewith annexed and marked as Annexure “B” to this counter affidavit. 13. I further submit that after tactically managing the deposition on the lines needed by the petitioner, the petitioner without completing his cross examination has sought 15 to invoke the provisions of the Juvenile Justice Act. The above conduct of the petitioner would by itself go to prove that the entire episode was stage-managed by the petitioner by putting me under stress and using such piquant situation to his advantage.” Thus, according to the counsel for the 2nd respondent, the evidence elicited from the 2nd respondent/P.W.1 during the course of cross-examination about the last act of rape cannot be given any weightage as according to him, the answer was a stage managed answer elicited from the 2nd respondent. 13. The learned counsel would further contend that the evidence given by the 2nd respondent on 06.10.2012 cannot be read in isolation and the same should be read in conjunction with the complaint. He would further contend that it is always open for the petitioner to raise the claim of juvenility at any stage hereafter once the evidence is concluded by the prosecution. Thus, according to him, this petition is liable only to be dismissed. 14. I have considered the above submissions carefully. 15. Since, the maintainability of this petition under Section 482 of Cr. P.C. is disputed by the 2nd respondent, I should consider the same at the first instance. According to him, the impugned order is a final order and the same is therefore revisable. But, I am not persuaded by the said argument. As has been held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Madhu Limayee vs. State of Maharashtra, (1977) 4 SCC 551 , not only a final order, but an intermediate order could also be revised. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that an order, which decides the rights and liabilities, though may not be a final order, still, is revisable inasmuch as it is not an interlocutory order as it lies somewhere between a final order and an interlocutory order. 16. The Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that an order, which decides the rights and liabilities, though may not be a final order, still, is revisable inasmuch as it is not an interlocutory order as it lies somewhere between a final order and an interlocutory order. 16. The learned counsel for the 2nd respondent would rely upon a judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Mohit alias Sonu and Another vs. State of U.P. and Another, 2013 (7) SCC 789 . That was case where a petition under Section 319 of Cr. P.C. was filed seeking to summon a person as an additional accused. That petition was dismissed. As against the same a petition under Section 482 of Cr. P.C. challenging the order was filed before the High Court. When the maintainability of that petition came up for consideration, the Hon'ble Supreme Court, after referring to Madhu Limayee vs. State of Maharashtra, (1977) 4 SCC 551 case and various other judgments held that such an order is revisable under Section 397 of Cr. P.C. In para 20, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as follows:- “20. In the light of the ratio laid down by this court referred to hereinabove, we are of the considered opinion that the order passed by the trial court refusing to issue summons on the application filed by the complainant under Section 319 of Criminal Procedure Code cannot be held to be an interlocutory order within the meaning of sub-section (2) of Section 397 of Criminal Procedure Code. Admittedly, in the instant case, before the trial court the complainant's application under Section 319 of Criminal Procedure Code was rejected for the second time holding that there was no sufficient evidence against the appellants to proceed against them by issuing summons. The said order passed by the trial court decides the rights and liabilities of the appellants in respect of their involvement in the case. As held by this court in Amar Nath's case (supra), an order which substantially affects the rights of the accused or decides certain rights of the parties cannot be said to be an interlocutory order so as to bar a revision to the High Court against that order as contemplated under Section 397(2) of Cr. P.C.” 17. As held by this court in Amar Nath's case (supra), an order which substantially affects the rights of the accused or decides certain rights of the parties cannot be said to be an interlocutory order so as to bar a revision to the High Court against that order as contemplated under Section 397(2) of Cr. P.C.” 17. In the case on hand, applying the principles stated in the above said judgments, if we look into the facts, it is crystal clear that the rights and liabilities of the petitioner flowing from the JJ Act, 2000 has not been decided by the trial court. If the trial court has held that the petitioner is not a juvenile, certainly, such an order could be said to be a final order as the rights of the petitioner under the JJ Act, 2000 have been determined. The said order could have been challenged only by way of revision and in such event, the power of this court under Section 482 of Cr. P.C. cannot be invoked at all. Similarly, if the trial court had decided that the petitioner was a juvenile as on the date of commission of the offence, then, the 2nd respondent or the prosecuting agency could have been aggrieved by the said order inasmuch as the liabilities of the petitioner for punishment would stand finally decided in the said petition. In such event also, the order passed by the trial court could only be challenged by way of revision under Section 397(2) of Cr. P.C. and in such an event a petition under Section 482 of Cr. P.C. is not maintainable. But, in the instant case, the trial court has neither held that the petitioner was a juvenile nor he was not a juvenile as on the date of commission of offence. Instead, the trial court has simply postponed the decision. Thus, this order has neither decided the rights of the petitioner nor his liabilities. Therefore, I hold that the said order is certainly not a revisable order under Section 397(2) of Cr. P.C. In such view of the matter, I hold that Criminal O.P. No. 29861 of 2014 is maintainable. 18. Instead, the trial court has simply postponed the decision. Thus, this order has neither decided the rights of the petitioner nor his liabilities. Therefore, I hold that the said order is certainly not a revisable order under Section 397(2) of Cr. P.C. In such view of the matter, I hold that Criminal O.P. No. 29861 of 2014 is maintainable. 18. Now, turning to the manner in which the trial court has dealt with the petition, I should say that as per Section 7A of the JJ Act, 2000 as and when a claim of juvenility is made, it is mandatory that such claim should be decided at the first instance without any delay, that too, within 30 days from the date of such claim as provided in Rule 8B of the Tamil Nadu Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2001. It is not known as to why the decision on such petition was postponed by the trial court without deciding the claim of juvenility made by the petitioner on time. 19. The reason stated by the prosecution is that after the filing of the petition claiming juvenility, a petition for alteration of charges came to be filed by the prosecution and that matter went up to the Hon'ble Supreme Court and that was the reason why, during the pendency of such proceeding, the trial court did not pass any order in the petition filed by the petitioner claiming juvenility. In my considered opinion, the trial court ought to have disposed of the said petition within 30 days as mandated in Rule 8B of the Tamil Nadu Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2001. But, on that score, I am not inclined to set aside the impugned order. 20. Now, turning to the facts of the case, as has been rightly pointed out by the learned senior counsel, during cross examination, the 2nd respondent (P.W.1) has stated that the last act of rape was committed by the petitioner in the month of August, 2009. If this evidence of the 2nd respondent/P.W.1 is taken into consideration and if the date of birth of the petitioner is accepted as 19.10.1991, as on the date of commission of the crime, the petitioner was only a juvenile. In such an event, the petitioner would be entitled for the benefits of the JJ Act, 2000. If this evidence of the 2nd respondent/P.W.1 is taken into consideration and if the date of birth of the petitioner is accepted as 19.10.1991, as on the date of commission of the crime, the petitioner was only a juvenile. In such an event, the petitioner would be entitled for the benefits of the JJ Act, 2000. Though it is contended by the learned counsel for the 2nd respondent that this answer from the 2nd respondent/P.W.1 was elicited by the defence counsel by putting her under pressure, I find it very difficult to accept the said contention. He would further submit that such evidence was stage managed. If this contention is accepted, then, the sanctity for the deposition of any evidence in its entirety will be lost. Under Section 165 of the Evidence Act it is the duty of the trial court to put questions and to make the witness to understand the questions and then to answer the questions freely. Under Section 138 of the Evidence Act, during cross-examination, all the questions relating to the relevant facts could be asked by the counsel. If any question, which is irrelevant, is asked, it is the duty of the court to disallow the same. Here, in the instant case, the question relating to the last act of rape cannot be stated to be irrelevant. As per S.138 of the Evidence Act, such question asked by the learned counsel for defence is lawful. Whether any weightage could be given to the answer elicited from the witness or not is within the wisdom of the trial court to appreciate. This court cannot express any opinion in this regard. But at the same time, I find it very difficult to accept the contention of the learned counsel for the 2nd respondent that such answer was stage managed. I am sure that during trial of a case, before the court of law, there can be no stage-management by any counsel to elicit any answer. Therefore, this argument of the learned counsel for the 2nd respondent is also liable to be rejected. 21. As I have already pointed out, in paragraph 11 of the impugned order, the trial court has held as follows:- “11. Therefore, this argument of the learned counsel for the 2nd respondent is also liable to be rejected. 21. As I have already pointed out, in paragraph 11 of the impugned order, the trial court has held as follows:- “11. Further when the counsel for the petitioner/accused was cross examining P.W.1 with regard to the manner in which they had sexual intercourse and also about the menstrual periods after the occurrence, she started crying in the open court. At that mood she has given such an answer. Hence, the single line of evidence alone cannot be taken advantage by the petitioner/accused. The court has to consolidately consider the entire evidence for fixing the date of occurrence which is on various dates as per the evidence of P.W.1. Further this court can add or alter the charges framed against the petitioner/accused at any time before the completion of evidence on the side of prosecution or even after the completion of evidence of P.W.1 victim girl. Hence, on the above said materials and the precedent judgments placed before this court and on the reading of the provisions of J.J. Act, particularly Section 7(A) of the Act this court is of the view that the petitioner/ accused cannot claim the juvenility u/s. 7(A) at this juncture. Hence this court feels that the petition is liable to be dismissed.” 22. In my considered opinion, the conclusion arrived at by the trial court cannot be allowed to sustain. In this regard, I may usefully refer to a judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Shaw Nawaz vs. State of U.P. and Another, 2011 (13) SCC 751 wherein, after having a thorough survey of the previous judgments, before and after the introduction of 7A of the JJ Act, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that as and when a question of juvenility is raised, the same should be decided first. In my considered opinion, if the juvenility is not decided at once within 30 days as mandated by the Tamil Nadu Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2001, at a later point of time, if it is found that the person, who claimed juvenility, was a juvenile as on the date of commission of offence, then, the whole exercise by way of trial would be waste besides the fact that allowing the juvenile to appear before the regular court along with the adult accused will defeat the very object of the JJ Act, 2000. That is the reason why the law mandates that the claim of juvenility should be decided without any delay. But, in this case, unfortunately, the trial court has dismissed the claim without taking any decision on the same. Thus, in my considered opinion, the order of the trial court deserves interference at the hands of this court. Thus, I hold that the impugned order is liable to be set aside and the claim of juvenility raised by the petitioner is required to be reconsidered by the court below. 23. This original petition has been filed by the petitioner/Accused seeking to transfer the above said case (S.C. No. 130 of 2011) from the file of the learned Sessions Judge, Mahila Court, Chennai, to any other competent court in Chennai City. 24. In the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the petitioner has stated that the trial court had recorded in its earlier order under Section 7-A of the JJ Act that the de facto complainant broke-down when she was asked certain questions in respect of her menstrual period, but no such question was ever asked and all the questions put to her were asked, with modesty, in open court. The trial court has also stated that because the answer regarding the last act of intercourse was spoken to when P.W.1 had broken down, it carries no weightage. The learned senior counsel would submit that this shows the predetermination of the learned judge. The trial court has also made certain observations in its earlier order which, according to the learned senior counsel, would show the predetermination of the learned Judge. Therefore, according to him it would be in the interest of justice that the case should be transferred to some other competent court in the Chennai City. 25. The trial court has also made certain observations in its earlier order which, according to the learned senior counsel, would show the predetermination of the learned Judge. Therefore, according to him it would be in the interest of justice that the case should be transferred to some other competent court in the Chennai City. 25. Per contra, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the 1st respondent and the learned counsel for the 2nd respondent would vehemently oppose this petition. According to them, there are no sufficient grounds raised in the petition justifying the transfer of the case to some other court. 26. I have considered the above submissions carefully. 27. The observations made by the learned Sessions Judge, as I have already dealt with in Criminal O.P. No. 29861 of 2014, would go to show that the learned Judge has, to some extent, decided the disputed facts. For instance, the trial court has made the following observations in its order:- “11. But the date of occurrence cannot be fixed on the incomplete evidence of P.W.1. Further there are averments and evidence to show that the petitioner/accused has promised to marry her and had sexual intercourse with her. But on 14.02.2010 the petitioner/accused has assertively stated that she should not call him any more asking for him for marriage and thereby the complaint was lodged after many talks between the parents of both the petitioner/accused and the victim girl. Hence, this court is having ample opportunity and power to frame charge u/s. 417 IPC at any stage even after the completion of P.W.1's evidence since there is no particular date for the last sexual occurrence is fixed either by the victim P.W.1 or by the petitioner/accused and also the evidence of P.W.1 is to be continued and other witness like medical evidence for the sexual act also for fixing of the age is to be produced before this court on the side of prosecution, this court cannot fix the date of occurrence and thereby ascertain that the petitioner/accused has not completed the age of 18 years on the alleged date of occurrence, i.e. August 2009 and this court cannot declare him as juvenile in conflict with law. The medical evidence to fix the age of the petitioner/accused is also produced before this court, in which the age of the petitioner /accused is fixed as above 18 but below 20 years. The medical evidence to fix the age of the petitioner/accused is also produced before this court, in which the age of the petitioner /accused is fixed as above 18 but below 20 years. As per the argument placed by the learned counsel for the petitioner/accused, only after considering the school certificate in which date of birth was entered, school certificate and birth certificate issued by the corporation and in the absence of all these, the medical evidence is to be considered, this court also admits the date of birth of the petitioner/accused as 19.10.1991, the date of occurrence of last sexual activity could not be fixed by this court on the very reading of the incomplete evidence of P.W.1. We cannot also expect the victim P.W.1 in a critical situation and in a sensational mood has given evidence that after August 2009 they did not have any sexual intercourse. Further, when the counsel for the petitioner/accused was cross examining P.W.1 with regard to the manner in which they had sexual intercourse and also about the menstrual periods after the occurrence, she started crying in the open court. At that mood, she has given such an answer. Hence the single line of evidence alone cannot be taken advantage by the petitioner/accused.” 28. In view of above observations of the trial court, in my considered opinion, in order to afford fair trial, it would be appropriate for this court to transfer the above said case to some other court in the City of Chennai, which is presided over by a woman Judge. 29. It is brought to my notice that there are number of woman Judges presiding over the Courts of Sessions in Chennai City. The III Additional Sessions Court, is also presided over by a woman Judge and therefore, in my considered opinion it would be in the interest of justice to transfer the said sessions case to the said court. Accordingly, this petition needs to be allowed. 30. In the result:- (i) Criminal O.P. No. 29714 of 2014. This criminal original petition is allowed and the case in S.C. No. 130 of 2011 pending on the file of the learned Sessions Judge, Mahila Court, Chennai, is hereby withdrawn and the same is transferred to the file of the learned III Additional Sessions Judge, Chennai. 30. In the result:- (i) Criminal O.P. No. 29714 of 2014. This criminal original petition is allowed and the case in S.C. No. 130 of 2011 pending on the file of the learned Sessions Judge, Mahila Court, Chennai, is hereby withdrawn and the same is transferred to the file of the learned III Additional Sessions Judge, Chennai. The trial court shall transmit the entire case records within a period of one week from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. On receipt of the records, the transferee court shall proceed with further in accordance with law. (ii) Criminal O.P. No. 29861 of 2014 This criminal original petition is allowed. The impugned order dated 27.10.2014 made in Criminal M.P. No. 10872 of 2012 in S.C. No. 130 of 2011 by the learned Sessions Judge, Mahila Court, Chennai, is hereby set aside and the matter is remanded back to the learned III Additional Sessions Judge, City Civil Court Campus, Chennai, for fresh consideration of Criminal M.P. No. 10872 of 2012. The learned III Additional Sessions Judge shall first decide the claim of juvenility raised by the petitioner herein and then to proceed with further in accordance with law. At any rate, appropriate decision on the claim of juvenility shall be made within a period of 30 days as provided in Rule 8B of the Tamil Nadu Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Rules, 2001 from the date of receipt of receipt of the records from the trial court. The petitioner herein as well as the respondents are at liberty to make their submissions on the question of juvenility before the trial court and the said court shall not get influenced by the observations made in this order and decide the question of juvenility independently.