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2014 DIGILAW 4554 (MAD)

Alamelu v. Lakshmi

2014-12-09

R.MAHADEVAN

body2014
JUDGMENT Aggrieved against the concurrent findings of the courts below in dismissing the suit filed by them for partition, separate possession and for damages, the plaintiffs have preferred this second appeal. 2. The case of the plaintiffs before the Trial Court was that the suit properties were originally belonged to Hindu Joint Family consisting of Thotti, grand father of the plaintiffs and his brother Pachamuthu. Pachamuthu died long back, without any legal heirs. Thotti had one son viz., Pachamuthu and three daughters, viz., Arundavam, Nadupillai and Anjalai. The plaintiffs are the descendants of Arundavam, Nadupillai and Anjalai. First defendant is the wife of Pachamuthu and daughter-in-law of Thotti. Third defendant is the brother of the first defendant. Thotti died 60 years prior to the suit and his wife Sellammal died 65 years prior to the suit. First defendant's husband Pachamuthu died intestate, 53 years prior to the suit, leaving behind the first defendant as his legal heir. After the demise of Pachamuthu, his wife/first defendant executed Bogyam in favour of one Rathina Padayachi, on 30.06.1944. Challenging the same, the daughters of Thotti filed a suit in O.S.No.323 of 1944 before the District Munsif Court, Vridhachalam and in view of the endorsement made by both parties therein, the suit was decreed in favour of the daughters of Thotti. But they died intestate, leaving behind the plaintiffs as their respective legal heirs. The Bogyam executed by the first defendant was settled in the year 1947 itself. The daughters of Thotti are in joint possession of the suit properties and they shared the income derived from the properties along with the first defendant and they paid kist also. Since the plaintiffs are not interested in enjoying the properties along with first defendant, they filed this suit for partition and separate possession and also for damages. 3. The suit was resisted by the first defendant contending that the suit property originally belonged to her father-in-law Thotti. Thotti died in the year 1935 leaving behind his son Pachamuthu and three daughters. After the demise of Thotti, his son Pachamuthu enjoyed the property and he died in the year 1944. Thereafter, the first defendant as legal heir of Pachamuthu, is in peaceful possession and enjoyment of the property continuously and uninterruptedly. Patta for the suit property also stands in the name of the first defendant. Hence, the first defendant is the absolute owner. Thereafter, the first defendant as legal heir of Pachamuthu, is in peaceful possession and enjoyment of the property continuously and uninterruptedly. Patta for the suit property also stands in the name of the first defendant. Hence, the first defendant is the absolute owner. Moreover, this defendant is in adverse possession of the suit property. Fifth item of the suit property was sold by the first and third defendants to the second defendant by way of a sale deed dated 13.11.1995 and the second defendant is in possession and enjoyment of the same, after mutating patta in his favour. With regard to other properties, excluding item-5, the first defendant executed a Will dated 12.12.1991 in favour of his brother/third defendant and the same was registered on 26.12.1991. It is further contended by the first defendant that the income from the properties had not been shared by the plaintiffs or their predecessors at any point of time and the first defendant alone is enjoying the properties as the only legal heir of her husband. The predecessors of the plaintiffs had not claimed any right over the suit properties. Hence, the plaintiffs are barred from claiming right over the suit properties. It is also contended that as Thotti and his son Pachamuthu died prior to the Act 30/1956 came into force, the first defendant alone is the legal heir to the suit property and the plaintiffs cannot claim any right over the property. Hence, she prayed for dismissal of the suit. 4. The Trial Judge framed the following issues and additional issues:- i) Whether the genealogy list given by the plaintiffs is correct? ii) Whether the defendants are in adverse possession of the suit properties? iii) Whether the plaintiffs paid correct Court Fees? iv) To what relief the plaintiffs are entitled? Additional Issues: i) Whether the suit properties are the absolute properties of the first defendant, as per the Hindu Succession Act 1956? ii) Is the first defendant in adverse possession of the suit property, since she enjoyed the same continuously from 1944? iii) To what relief the plaintiffs are entitled? 5. Before the Trial Court, on the side of plaintiffs, two witnesses had been examined as PW.1 and PW.2 and five documents were marked as Exs.A1 to A5 and on the side of defendants, two witnesses had been examined as DW.1 and DW.2 and thirteen documents were marked as Exs.B1 to B13. iii) To what relief the plaintiffs are entitled? 5. Before the Trial Court, on the side of plaintiffs, two witnesses had been examined as PW.1 and PW.2 and five documents were marked as Exs.A1 to A5 and on the side of defendants, two witnesses had been examined as DW.1 and DW.2 and thirteen documents were marked as Exs.B1 to B13. The Trial Court, on analysis of both oral and documentary evidence, dismissed the suit. On appeal, the appellate court, concurred with the finding of the Trial Court and dismissed the appeal. Aggrieved against the concurrent judgment and decree of both the courts below, the present second appeal has been filed. 6. The second appeal has been admitted on the following substantial question of law:- "Are the Courts below correct in law in holding that the plaintiffs are not entitled to any share in the suit property even though their mothers have exercised their right over the same before the implementation of the Hindu Succession Act ?" 7. The arguments advanced by Mr.D.Sivakumaran, learned counsel for the appellants, Mr.V.Raghavachari, learned counsel for the respondents 1 to 3 and Mrs.Mythili Suresh, learned counsel appearing on behalf of fourth respondent are heard in detail. The materials available on record are also perused. 8. The learned counsel for the appellants has submitted that the appellants are none other than the grand-daughters of Thotti and they have been in possession and enjoyment of the suit properties and therefore, they are entitled to 3/4th share in the suit properties and the first defendant is entitled to only 1/4th share. 9. The learned counsel has further submitted that the courts below without considering the factual position in a right perspective had come to the wrong conclusion and thereby dismissed the suit, which is incorrect. 10. The learned counsel for the appellants has vehemently contended that though the Hindu Succession Act came into force in the year 1956, it could not alter the pre-existing right of daughters of Thotti, who was the original owner of the suit properties. 11. 10. The learned counsel for the appellants has vehemently contended that though the Hindu Succession Act came into force in the year 1956, it could not alter the pre-existing right of daughters of Thotti, who was the original owner of the suit properties. 11. Further, the learned counsel for the appellants has contended that in view of the decree passed by the District Munsif Court, Virdhachalam in O.S.No.323 of 1944, the first defendant had only a life interest and therefore, as per sub-Section 2 of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, the first defendant has only life interest in the suit properties. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the appellants has relied upon the decision in Shivdev Kaur (D) by LRs. & others vs. R.S.Grewal ((2013 (2) CTC 587). 12. Countering the submissions of the learned counsel for the appellants, the learned counsel for the respondents 1 to 3 has submitted that originally the suit properties belonged to one Thotti, who has one son and three daughters. While the said Thotti was alive, he conducted the marriages of his three daughters. After his death in the year 1935, his son Pachamuthu was in possession and enjoyment of the suit properties and he died in the year 1944. Thereafter, automatically, the wife of said Pachamuthu, who is the first defendant in the suit, has been in possession and enjoyment of the suit properties. Therefore, the first defendant is the absolute owner of the suit properties and the plaintiffs do not have any right to claim any share in the suit properties. 13. The learned counsel for the respondents 1 to 3 has also contended that by way of inheritance, the first defendant acquired the property of her husband and not by virtue of any of the provisions of the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937 or under any other Act. 14. 13. The learned counsel for the respondents 1 to 3 has also contended that by way of inheritance, the first defendant acquired the property of her husband and not by virtue of any of the provisions of the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937 or under any other Act. 14. The learned counsel for the respondents 1 to 3 has contended that when the suit properties were acquired by the first defendant by way of inheritance and as such, she has been in possession and enjoyment of the suit properties as absolute owner, her absolute right cannot be restricted to life interest by way of a decree, which is null and void and therefore, as per sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, the first defendant is the full owner and not a limited owner. 15. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the respondents 1 to 3 relied on the following decisions: a. Rangaswami Naicker v. Chinnammal and another b. Subhan Rao and others v. Parvathi Bai and others ( 2010 (10) SCC 235 ) 16. The learned counsel for the fourth respondent has submitted that the fourth respondent is the purchaser of some of the items of the suit property, viz., item-2, item-7 and 32 cents in item-3. She had further submitted that after the concurrent dismissal of the suit filed by the appellants, the 4th respondent had purchased the aforesaid properties for valuable consideration. 17. The learned counsel for the fourth respondent has further submitted that after the death of Thotti in the year 1935, his son Pachamuthu was in possession and enjoyment of the suit properties and he died in the year 1944. Thereafter, automatically, the wife of said Pachamuthu, who is the first defendant in the suit, has been in possession and enjoyment of the suit properties continuously without any kind of interruption, as legal heir of Pachamuthu. After coming into force of the Act 30 of 1956, the first defendant became the absolute owner of the suit properties and the plaintiffs do not have any right to claim any share in the suit properties. 18. After coming into force of the Act 30 of 1956, the first defendant became the absolute owner of the suit properties and the plaintiffs do not have any right to claim any share in the suit properties. 18. The learned counsel for the fourth respondent has also contended that by way of inheritance, the first defendant acquired the property of her husband and not by virtue of any of the provisions of the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, 1937 or under any other Act. 19. The learned counsel for the fourth respondent has contended that when the suit properties were acquired by the first defendant by way of inheritance and as such, she has been in possession and enjoyment of the suit properties as absolute owner, her absolute right cannot be restricted to life interest by way of a decree, which is null and void and therefore, as per sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, the first defendant is the full owner and not a limited owner and the fourth defendant had purchased some of the items of the suit properties from the absolute and full owner. 20. After hearing the aforesaid submissions on either side, it is pertinent to see the provisions of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act which deals with, "Property of a female Hindu to be her absolute property" and reads as under: " (1) Any property possessed by a female Hindu, whether acquired before or after the commencement of this Act, shall be held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner. Explanation.- In this sub-section, 'property' includes both moveable and immoveable property acquired by a female Hindu by inheritance or devise, or at a partition, or in lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance, or by gift from any person, whether a relative or not, before, at or after her marriage, or by her own skill or exertion, or by purchase or by prescription, or in any other manner whatsoever and also any such property held by her as stridhana immediately before the commencement of this Act. (2) Nothing contained in sub-section (1) shall apply to any property acquired by way of gift or under a will or any other instrument or under a decree or order of a civil court or under an award where the terms of the gift, will or other instrument or the decree, order or award prescribe a restricted estate in such property." 21. A combined plain reading of sub-section 1 of Section 14 and the explanation connotes that any movable or immovable property acquired by a female Hindu by inheritance, before or after the commencement of the Act, shall be held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner and such property held by her as Stridhana. 22. Sub-Section 2 of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act says that any property acquired by way of gift or under a Will or any other instrument or under a decree or order of a civil court or under an award where the terms of the gift, Will or other instrument or the decree, order or award prescribe a restricted estate in such property, the provisions of sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act will not apply. " 23. The Hindu Succession Act confers upon Hindu females full rights of inheritance and sweeps away the traditional limitations on her powers of disposition which were regarded under the Hindu law as inherent in her estate". Sub-section (1) of section 14, is wide in its scope and ambit and uses language of great amplitude. It says that any property possessed by a female Hindu,. whether acquired before or after the commencement of the Act, shall be held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner. Sub-section (1) of section 14, is wide in its scope and ambit and uses language of great amplitude. It says that any property possessed by a female Hindu,. whether acquired before or after the commencement of the Act, shall be held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner. The words "any property" are, even without any amplification, large enough to cover any and every kind of property, but in order to expand the reach and ambit of the section and make it all-comprehensive, the Legislature has enacted an explanation which says that property would include "both movable and immovable property acquired by a female Hindu by inheritance or devise, or at a partition, or in lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance, or by gift from any person, whether a relative or not, before, at or after her marriage, or by her own skill or exertion, or by purchase or by prescription, or in any other manner whatsoever and also any such property held by her as stridhana immediately before the commencement" of the Act. Whatever be the kind of property, movable or immovable and whichever be the mode of acquisition, it would be covered by subsection (1) of section 14, the object of the Legislature being to wipe out the disabilities from which a Hindu female suffered in regard to ownership of property under the old Sastric law, to abridge the stringent provisions against proprietary rights which were often regarded as evidence of her perpetual tutelage and to recognize her status as an independent and absolute owner of property. 24. In the instant case on hand, the first defendant had not acquired the suit property by way of gift or under a will or any other instrument or under a decree or order of a civil court or under an award where the terms of the gift, Will or other instrument or the decree, order or award prescribe a restricted estate in such property, as stated under sub-section 2 of Section 14 of the said Act, whereas the suit property was acquired by the first defendant after the death of her husband by way of inheritance and therefore, as per sub-section 1 of Section 14, the first defendant is the absolute and full owner and not a limited owner. 25. In the light of the above, the decision in Shivdev Kaur (D) by L.Rs. 25. In the light of the above, the decision in Shivdev Kaur (D) by L.Rs. and others R.S. Grewal(2013 (2) CTC 587) relied on by the learned counsel for the appellants is not made applicable to the case on hand. In the said decision, it has been held as follows:- "Thus, in view of the above, the law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that if a Hindu female has been given only a "life interest", through Will or gift or any other document referred to in Section 14 of the Act 1956, the said rights would not stand crystallised into the absolute ownership as interpreting the provisions to the effect that she would acquire absolute ownership/title into the property by virtue of the provisions of Section 14(1) of the Act 1956, the provisions of Sections 14(2) & 30 of the Act, 1956, would become itios". 26. As afore stated, the suit properties were acquired by the first defendant only by way of inheritance and therefore, the decision relied on by the learned counsel for the appellants cannot be considered. 27. On the other hand, the decision relied on by the learned counsel for the respondents 1 to 3 in ''Subhan Rao and others vs. Parvathi Bai and others ( (2010) 10 SCC 235 )'', the Division Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court has referred to the decision in ''V. Tulasamma v. Sesha Reddy (1977) 3 SCC 99 )'' and "Rangaswami Naicker v. Chinnammal( AIR 1964 Mad 387 ) wherein, a three Judge Bench of the Apex Court has interpreted the provisions of Section 14(1)(2) of the Hindu Succession Act and summarised the legal conclusions which they had reached, after an exhaustive considerations of the authorities mentioned therein, which are as under:- "16..... ......(1) The Hindu female's right to maintenance is not an empty formality or an illusory claim being conceded as a matter of grace and generosity, but is a tangible right against property which flows from the spiritual relationship between the husband and the wife and is recognised and enjoined by pure Shastric Hindu Law and has been strongly stressed even by the earlier Hindu jurists starting from Yajnavalkya to Manu. Such a right may not be a right to property but it is a right against property and the husband has a personal obligation to maintain his wife and if he or the family has property, the female has the legal right to be maintained therefrom. If a charge is created for the maintenance of a female, the said right becomes a legally enforceable one. At any rate, even without a charge the claim for maintenance is doubtless a pre-existing right so that any transfer declaring or recognising such a right does not confer any new title but merely endorses or confirms the pre-existing rights. (2) Section 14(1) and the Explanation thereto have been couched in the widest possible terms and must be liberally construed in favour of the females so as to advance the object of the 1956 Act and promote the socio-economic ends, sought to be achieved by this long needed legislation. (3) Sub-section (2) of s.14 is in the nature of a proviso and has a field of its own without interfering with the operation of s. 14(1) materially. The proviso. should not be construed in a manner so as to destroy the effect of the main provision or the protection granted by s. 14(1) or in a way so as to become totally inconsistent with the main provision. (4) Sub-section (2) of s.14 applies to instruments, decrees, awards, gifts etc. which create independent and new titles in favour of the females for the first time and has no application where the instrument concerned merely seeks to confirm, endorse, declare or recognise pre-existing rights. In such cases a restricted estate in favour of a female is legally permissible and s.14(1) will not operate in this sphere. Where, however, an instrument merely declares or recognises a pre-existing right, such as a claim to maintenance or partition or share to which the female is entitled, the sub-section has absolutely no application and the female's limited interest would automatically be enlarged into an absolute one by force of s.14(1) and the restrictions placed, if any, under the document would have to be ignored. Thus where a property is allotted or transferred to a female in lieu of maintenance or a share at partition, the instrument is taken out of the ambit of sub- s. (2) and would be governed by s.14(1) despite any restrictions placed on the powers of the transferee. (5) The use of express terms like "property acquired by a female Hindu at a partition", "or in lieu of maintenance" "or arrears of maintenance" etc. in the Explanation to s. 14(1) clearly makes sub-s. (2) inapplicable to these categories which have been expressly excepted from the operation of sub-s.(2). (6) The words "possessed by" used by the Legislature in s.14(1) are of the widest possible amplitude and include the state of owning a property even though the owner is not in actual or physical possession of the same: Thus, where a widow gets a share in the property under a preliminary decree before or at the time when the 1956 Act had been passed but had not been given actual possession under a final decree, the property would be deemed to be possessed by her and by force of s.14(1) she would get absolute interest. in the property. It is equally well settled that the possession of the widow, however, must be under some vestige of a claim, right or title, because the section does not contemplate the possession of any rank trespasser without any right or title. (7) That the words "restricted estate" used in s. 4(2) are wider than limited interest as indicated in s.14(1) and they include not only limited interest, but also. any other kind of limitation that may be placed on the transferee." 28. The above principles make it clear that the first defendant would acquire an absolute interest when she was in possession of the properties at the time when the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 came into force and any restrictions placed under the compromise decree would have to be completely ignored. 29. It is well settled that under the Hindu Law the husband has got a personal obligation to maintain his wife and if he is possessed of properties, then his wife is entitled as of right to be maintained out of such properties. 29. It is well settled that under the Hindu Law the husband has got a personal obligation to maintain his wife and if he is possessed of properties, then his wife is entitled as of right to be maintained out of such properties. The claim of a Hindu widow to be maintained is not an empty formality, which is to be exercised as a matter of concession or indulgence, grace or gratis or generosity, but is a valuable, spiritual and moral right which flows from the spiritual and temporal relationship of the husband and wife. As the wife is in a sense a part of the body of her husband, she becomes co-owner of the property of her husband, though in a subordinate sense. 30. In the instant case on hand, it is an admitted fact that the suit properties were acquired by the first defendant only by way of inheritance after the death of her husband and not by any other mode and therefore, it is clear that if the above principles laid down by the Apex Court applies to the case on hand, the inevitable conclusion would be that the first defendant is the absolute owner of the suit properties and the plaintiffs cannot claim any right or interest over the suit properties. 31. Further, the case of the plaintiffs is that they have been in possession and enjoyment of the suit properties along with the first defendant and the first defendant shared the income from the property with the mothers of the plaintiffs. There is absolutely no evidence to prove the same, whereas, it is admitted on the side of the plaintiffs that the first defendant alone has been in possession and enjoyment of the suit properties by paying kist and property tax. There is no evidence to show that the plaintiffs have paid the kist and tax through the first defendant. 32. Above all, the patta, chitta and adangal in respect of the suit properties stand in the name of the first defendant. On the other hand, the plaintiffs have not filed any documentary evidence to prove their possession and enjoyment of the suit properties. 33. Only on the basis of the compromise decree of the District Munsif Court, Virdhachalam, the plaintiffs have filed the suit for partition, which has rightly been dismissed the by the courts below. 34. On the other hand, the plaintiffs have not filed any documentary evidence to prove their possession and enjoyment of the suit properties. 33. Only on the basis of the compromise decree of the District Munsif Court, Virdhachalam, the plaintiffs have filed the suit for partition, which has rightly been dismissed the by the courts below. 34. In the light of the above discussion, the substantial question of law is answered as against the appellants/plaintiffs, but in favour of the respondents/defendants. 35. For the aforesaid reasons, the second appeal fails and the same is dismissed confirming the judgments and decrees of the courts below. However, there will be no order as to costs. Connected Miscellaneous Petition is also dismissed.