ORDER R.S. Ramanathan, J. 1. This Petition is filed, seeking to transfer the case in Spl. C.C. No. 1 of 2008 from the file of the learned Special Judge (under the Prevention of Corruption Act), Puducherry, to any other appropriate Court. Mr. N.R. Elango, the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner has submitted that, after the examination of D.W. 1, it was realised that 9 more witnesses have to be examined. Hence, the Petition, viz., Crl. M.P. No. 996 of 2014 was filed on 04.08.2014, for examination of nine witnesses. The said Petition was dismissed by the learned Special Judge, by order, dated 13.08.2014, and the same is challenged in Crl. R.C. No. 856 of 2014. Even after Crl. R.C. No. 856 of 2014 was listed by this Court, and the same was brought to the knowledge of the learned Special Judge, the learned Special Judge was insisting upon the petitioner to proceed with the arguments. Therefore, the petitioner has apprehension that the learned Special Judge has pre-determined the issue. 2. The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner also submitted that, Crl. O.P. No. 22500 of 2014, was filed by the petitioner's son, challenging the jurisdiction of CBI to conduct the investigation, Crl. O.P. No. 24323 of 2014 was filed by the petitioner for altering the charge by reason of death of his wife/third accused. The said two Petitions are pending before this Court. Eventhough the same was brought to the knowledge of the learned Special Judge, he did not wait for disposal of those Petitions by this Court and insisted upon the petitioner to argue the case. Therefore, the petitioner is apprehending that he may be jeopardised. Hence, the present Petition was filed to transfer the case to some other court. 3. Eventhough the same was brought to the knowledge of the learned Special Judge, he did not wait for disposal of those Petitions by this Court and insisted upon the petitioner to argue the case. Therefore, the petitioner is apprehending that he may be jeopardised. Hence, the present Petition was filed to transfer the case to some other court. 3. The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner also submitted that, as per Section 3 of Prevention of Corruption Act (P.C. Act), the Central Government or the State Government, by notification in the Official Gazette, appoint as many Special Judges, as may be necessary for such area or areas or for such case or group of cases as may be specified in the notification to try the offences, viz., a) Any offence punishable under this Act; b) Any conspiracy to commit or any attempt to commit or any abetment of any of the offences specified in clause (a) of P.C. Act and the person shall not be qualified for appointment as a Special Judge under this Act, unless, he is or has been a Sessions Judge or an Additional Sessions Judge or an Assistant Sessions Judge under the Code of Criminal Procedure. 4. Therefore, the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner submitted that, as per Section 3 of Prevention of Corruption Act, eventhough the Presiding Officer is a Sessions Judge, or Additional Sessions Judge, or Assistant Sessions Judge, unless, he is authorised by the notification given in the Official Gazette, appointing him as Special Judge, he cannot try the case pending under Prevention of Corruption Act. Admittedly, in this case, the Presiding Officer was not appointed as Special Judge and he passed orders dismissing the Petition filed by the petitioner under Section 243(1) Cr.P.C.. and by virtue of the notification, dated 31.10.2014, passed in G.O.Ms. No. 2, the Presiding Officer was appointed as Special Judge. In that notification, it is stated that the notification shall be deemed to have come into force with effect from 24.06.2014 and retrospective effect cannot be given regarding appointment and therefore, the order passed by the learned Special Judge in Crl. M.P. No. 996 of 2014, on 13.08.2014, is without jurisdiction and not valid and in the absence of notification, the Presiding Officer usurped the power of Special Judge and directed the petitioner to submit his arguments. M.P. No. 996 of 2014, on 13.08.2014, is without jurisdiction and not valid and in the absence of notification, the Presiding Officer usurped the power of Special Judge and directed the petitioner to submit his arguments. Therefore, the apprehension of the petitioner is reasonable, and hence, the case is liable to be transferred to some other Court. 5. The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner also relied upon the judgments reported in Bakul Cashew Co. and Another v. Salex Tax Officer, Quilon and Another (1986) 2 SCC 365 : LNIND 1986 SC 72 and Income Tax Officer, Alleppy v. M.C. Ponnoose and Others AIR 1970 SC 385 : (1969) 2 SCC 351 : LNIND 1969 SC 226 in support of his contention. 6. The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner further submitted that the liberty of the accused is more important and the accused cannot be prosecuted by an Officer, who is not qualified, or, who has no jurisdiction to try the case and the jurisdiction cannot be conferred retrospectively. Therefore, the order passed by the learned Special Judge in dismissing Crl. M.P. No. 996 of 2014 is without jurisdiction and that would also prove the biased nature on the part of the Presiding Officer, and therefore, the case has to be tried by some other judge. The learned Senior Counsel also submitted that if this Court allows Crl. R.C. No. 856 of 2014 on merits, by setting the order, dated 13.08.2014, passed by the learned Special Judge, the petitioner cannot be directed to approach the same Special Judge for further examination of defence witness, and he may not get justice and on that ground also the case is liable to be transferred to some other appropriate Court. 7. On the other hand, the learned Special Public Prosecutor for respondent-CBI submitted that, eventhough while assuming the post of Special Judge, Puducherry, the Presiding Officer was not conferred with power by issuing the notification, subsequently, notification was issued on 31.10.2014 and the notification was also given retrospective effect. Hence, the order passed by the learned Special Judge is valid and no prejudice would be caused to the petitioner, if the case in Spl. C.C. No. 1 of 2008 is tried by the same Judge. 8. The learned Special Public Prosecutor further submitted that eventhough the Presiding Officer, who passed the order, dated 13.08.2014, in Crl. Hence, the order passed by the learned Special Judge is valid and no prejudice would be caused to the petitioner, if the case in Spl. C.C. No. 1 of 2008 is tried by the same Judge. 8. The learned Special Public Prosecutor further submitted that eventhough the Presiding Officer, who passed the order, dated 13.08.2014, in Crl. M.P. No. 996 of 2014, has no jurisdiction till notification dated 31.10.2014 was issued, when he was holding the post de facto , he exercised the powers and by applying the doctrine of de facto, the order, dated 13.08.2014 was passed and the same is valid and cannot be set aside. Therefore, the contention of the petitioner that the Presiding Officer was not appointed as Special Judge and subsequently, he was appointed as such, and during the interregnum period, he passed orders against the petitioner, cannot be a ground for transferring the case to some other Court. 9. The learned Special Public Prosecutor also submitted that records would prove that sufficient opportunity was given to the petitioner for examination of his witnesses and after the defence witness was over, he requested the petitioner to submit his arguments and as per the order passed by this Court in Crl. O.P. No. 6239 of 2014, the learned Special Judge was directed to dispose of the case as expeditiously as possible and in obedience of the order passed in Crl. O.P. No. 6239 of 2014, he has requested the defence to submit their arguments and therefore, it cannot be stated that the Presiding Officer is acting in a biased manner or creating apprehension in the mind of the petitioner that he may not get justice. 10. The learned Special Public Prosecutor, in support of his contentions, relied upon the following reported judgments: "i) Beopar Sahayak (P) Ltd. v. Viswa Nath and Others AIR 1987 SC 2111 : (1987) 3 SCC 693 :LNIND 1987 SC 488 ii) Gokaraju Rangaraju Etc. v. State of Andhra Pradesh AIR 1981 SC 1473 : (1981) 3 SCC 132 : LNIND 1981 SC 236 : (1981) 1 MLJ (Crl) 528 and iii) Pulin Behary Das v. Emperor 16 Cal WN 1105 : 16 IC 257 : LNIND 1912 CAL 136" 11. On the basis of the arguments advanced by both sides, it is to be seen whether the Transfer Petition filed by the petitioner has to be allowed or not? 12. On the basis of the arguments advanced by both sides, it is to be seen whether the Transfer Petition filed by the petitioner has to be allowed or not? 12. The learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner has given list of dates till 29.01.2014, and also orally gave dates, on which, the case was adjourned and the proceedings taken during those adjournments. It is seen from the list of dates that the present Presiding Officer took charge on 06.06.2014. Earlier to that, on 27.02.2014, the accused were questioned under Section 313 Cr.P.C., and on 17.03.2014, list of defence witness was filed by citing one defence witness and after assuming charge, he allowed the defence to examine D.W. 1. On 27.06.2014, D.W. 1 was examined in chief, documents were marked and the case was adjourned to 11.07.2014 for further cross-examination. On 11.07.2014, D.W. 1 was examined in part and on 18.07.2014, cross-examination of D.W. 1 was completed. Thereafter, on 31.07.2014, the Petition to recall of D.W. 1 was filed, and that was allowed and on 04.08.2014, D.W. 1 was recalled and examination was also over. Thereafter, on the same date itself, i.e., on 04.08.2014, Petition under Section 243(1) Cr.P.C., was filed by the petitioner to examine nine more defence witnesses and that was dismissed by the learned Special Judge on 13.08.2014, after giving opportunities to the parties. Challenging the order dated 13.08.2014, the petitioner/first accused filed Crl. R.C. No. 856 of 2014. 13. It is also an admitted fact that, Crl. O.P. No. 6239 of 2014 was filed by the petitioner for directing the learned Special Judge to expedite the trial. This Court by order, dated 25.03.2014, disposed of the said Criminal Original Petition by directing the learned Special Judge to dispose of the case in Spl. C.C. No. 1 of 2008 as well as Cr. M.P. No. 399 of 2013, as expeditiously as possible, preferably, within a period of two months and the Trial Court was directed not grant any adjournments, unless warranted, due to emergency. The parties were also directed to render their fullest co-operation for the expeditious disposal of the case within the time stipulated, as stated above. Thereafter, Crl. O.P. No. 22500 of 2014 was filed challenging the jurisdiction of CBI to investigate the case, and Crl. M.P. No. 996 of 2014 was filed to examine defence witnesses. The parties were also directed to render their fullest co-operation for the expeditious disposal of the case within the time stipulated, as stated above. Thereafter, Crl. O.P. No. 22500 of 2014 was filed challenging the jurisdiction of CBI to investigate the case, and Crl. M.P. No. 996 of 2014 was filed to examine defence witnesses. The learned Special Judge, by considering the direction given by this Court in Crl. O.P. No. 6239 of 2014, and the scope of Petition filed before him, and having regard to the fact that no stay was granted by this Court in Crl. O.P. No. 22500 of 2014 and Crl. R.C. No. 856 of 2014, insisted upon the petitioner to proceed with by submitting arguments and in my opinion, by reason of the direction given by the learned Special Judge to the petitioner to submit his arguments, it cannot be stated that the Judge has pre-determined the issue against the petitioner. 14. The bone of contention of the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner is that the learned Special Judge has no jurisdiction to pass orders in Crl. M.P. No. 996 of 2014, as he was not properly appointed in charge and knowing fully well, he proceeded with the completion of trial. Therefore, the learned Special Judge has pre-determined the issue and the petitioner is having apprehension about the Judge. No doubt, it is held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the judgment reported in Income Tax Officer, Alleppy v. M.C. Ponnoose and Others (supra) that, where any rule or regulation is made by any person, or authority, to whom such powers have been delegated by the legislature, it may, or may not be possible to make the same so as to give retrospective operation. It will depend on the language employed in the statutory provision, which may in express terms or by necessary implication, empower the authority concerned to make a rule or regulation with retrospective effect. But, where no such language is to be found, no authority, exercising subordinate legislative functions make a rule, regulation or bye-law, which can operate with retrospective effect. The same principle is also reiterated in the judgment Bakul Cashew Co. and Another v. Salex Tax Officer, Quilon and Another (supra). But, where no such language is to be found, no authority, exercising subordinate legislative functions make a rule, regulation or bye-law, which can operate with retrospective effect. The same principle is also reiterated in the judgment Bakul Cashew Co. and Another v. Salex Tax Officer, Quilon and Another (supra). It is also a settled law that in respect of procedural law, retrospective effect can be given, and, in respect of substantial law, no such retrospective operation can be given. The Prevention of Corruption Act, being a substantial law, no retrospective effect operation can be given. 15. However, having regard to the judgments cited by the learned Special Public Prosecutor Gokaraju Rangaraju etc. v. State of Andhra Pradesh (supra) and Beopar Sahayak (P) Ltd. v. Viswa Nath and Others (supra), the contention of the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner cannot be accepted. 16. In the judgment reported in Gokaraju Rangaraju etc. v. State of Andhra Pradesh (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court applied the de facto doctrine and held as follows: "A judge, de facto, therefore, is one who is not a mere intruder or usurper but one who holds office, under colour of lawful authority, though his appointment is defective and may later be found to be defective. Whatever be the defect of his title to the office, judgments pronounced by him and acts done by him when he was clothed with the powers and functions of the office, albeit unlawfully, have the same efficacy as judgments pronounced and acts done by a judge de jure. Such is the de facto doctrine, born of necessity and public policy to prevent needless confusion and endless mischief. There is yet another rule also based on public policy. The defective appointment of a de facto judge may be questioned directly in a proceedings to which he be a party but it cannot be permitted to be questioned in a litigation between two private litigants, a litigation which is of no concern or consequence to the judge except as a judge. Two litigants litigating their private titles cannot be permitted to bring in issue and litigate upon the title of a judge to his office. Otherwise so soon a judge pronounces a judgment a litigation may be commenced for a declaration that the judgment is void because the judge is no judge. Two litigants litigating their private titles cannot be permitted to bring in issue and litigate upon the title of a judge to his office. Otherwise so soon a judge pronounces a judgment a litigation may be commenced for a declaration that the judgment is void because the judge is no judge. A judge's title to his office cannot be brought into jeopardy in that fashion. Hence, the rule against the collateral attack on validity of judicial appointments to question a judge's appointment in an appeal against his judgment is of course, such a collateral attack." 17. In the above referred judgment, the Hon'ble Supreme Court relied upon the judgment of the Calcutta High Court reported in Pulin Behari Das v. King Emperor (supra) and in the said Calcutta judgment, it is held as follows: "The substance of the matter is that the de facto doctrine was introduced into the law as a matter of policy and necessity, to protect the interest of the public and the individual where these interests were involved in the official acts of persons exercising the duties of an office without being lawful officers. The doctrine in fact is necessary to maintain the supremacy of the law and to preserve peace and order in the community at large. Indeed, if any individual or body of individuals were permitted, at his or their pleasure, to collaterally challenge the authority of and to refuse obedience to the government of the State and the numerous functionaries through whom it exercised its various powers on the ground of irregular existence for defective title, insubordination and disorder of the worst kind would be encouraged. For the good order and peace of society, their authority must be upheld until in some regular mode their title is directly investigated and determined." 18. In the judgment reported in Re James (An Insolvent) (1977) 2 W.L.R. 1 : (1977) 1 All ER 364, the Hon'ble Supreme Court with regard to the de facto doctrine has referred to the opinion given by Lord Denning M.R. which reads as follows: "He sits in the seat of a Judge. He wears the robes of a judge. He holds the office of a Judge. May be he was not validly appointed. But, still, he holds the office. It is the office that matters, not the incumbent.. He wears the robes of a judge. He holds the office of a Judge. May be he was not validly appointed. But, still, he holds the office. It is the office that matters, not the incumbent.. So long as the man holds the office, and exercise it duly and in accordance with law, his orders are not a nullity. If they are erroneous, they may be upset on appeal. But, if not, erroneous they should be upheld." 19. The de facto doctrine has been accepted and applied by the Constitution, by passing 20th amendment, by which, Article 233 A was introduced for validating the appointments and the judgments delivered by certain District judges. That was also considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Gokaraju Ran-garaju etc. v. State of Andhra Pradesh (supra) and the same principle was followed in the judgment reported in Beopar Sahayak (P) Ltd. v. Viswa Nath and Others (supra). 20. It is submitted by the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner that the de facto doctrine can be applied, where the appointment of person was legal, and subsequently his appointment was terminated on the ground that he was not having requisite qualification, and, it cannot be applied to the case like the present one, where the person has no authority to function as Special Judge at the time of his posting and he was given the power retrospectively later, by G.O.Ms. 2, dated 31.10.2014 and therefore, the de facto doctrine cannot be applied to the facts of the case on hand. 21. I am not able to accept the arguments of the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner, and the answer is given in the judgment reported in Gokaraju Rangaraju etc. v. State of Andhra Pradesh (supra) itself. As stated supra, Lord Denning M.R., has held that even though a person was not validly appointed, when he holds the Office and was discharging duties of the Judge, his orders are not nullity. They also followed the principles held by various foreign courts which are incorporated in their order as follows: "Where an office exists under the law, it matters not how the appointment of the incumbent is made, so far as the validity of his acts are concerned. It is enough that he is clothed with the insignia of the office and exercises its powers and functions.... It is enough that he is clothed with the insignia of the office and exercises its powers and functions.... The official acts of such persons are recognized as valid on grounds of public policy, and for the protection of those having official business to transact" 22. In this case, the Presiding Officer is the Sessions Judge and the only contention of the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner is that, he was not appointed by the notification as a Special Judge. It is one thing to say that he was not the Sessions Judge and was not appointed by the notification as Special Judge, and Another thing to say is that he had the qualification of being appointed as Special Judge, but, there was no notification conferring such power. 23. According to me, by applying the de facto doctrine, when the person has got the qualification, but, he was not validly appointed by reason of the absence of notification, his orders cannot be stated to be nullity and it cannot be stated that he was acting without jurisdiction. Further, whether the person, who acted as Special Judge, was competent to act or not, cannot be the subject matter of an application to transfer the case to some other Court and when the orders are not nullity, the same cannot be canvassed for transferring the case on the ground that the Presiding Officer has no authority or jurisdiction to function as Special Judge. 24. According to me, having regard to the order passed in Crl. O.P. No. 6239 of 2014, and also the manner, in which, the learned Special Judge conducted himself by granting adjournments to the petitioner in examining, cross-examining and re-calling D.W. 1., it cannot be stated that the Presiding Officer has acted in a prejudicial manner to the petitioner, so as to create apprehension in the mind of the petitioner that the Presiding Officer has pre-judged the issue. As a matter of fact, the petitioner wanted to complete the trial and for that purpose, he filed Crl. As a matter of fact, the petitioner wanted to complete the trial and for that purpose, he filed Crl. O.P. No. 6239 of 2014, but later, he wanted to protract the litigation by filing various Petitions, viz., the Petition to examine further defence witness, Petition questioning the jurisdiction of CBI to investigate the case, and Petition for transfer, and I can only infer that the petitioner is not interested to complete the trial and for that purpose, all these allegations are made against the Presiding Officer and I do not find any basis. 25. The contention of the learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner should not be directed to go before the same Officer, after having challenged his order in Crl. M.P. No. 996 of 2014, and on that ground, the transfer Petition has to be allowed, cannot be considered as a ground for transfer. It is seen from the memorandum of grounds filed in this Petition that, no allegation has been made against the Presiding Officer or his conduct in conducting the proceeding. The petitioner only commented the order passed in Crl. M.P. No. 996 of 2014. Further, it is seen from the records, that the petitioner was interested in completing the trial till the end of February, 2014 and also filed Crl. O.P. No. 6239 of 2014 for completion of trial within two weeks. Thereafter, there was change of Presiding Officer and also change in the attitude of the petitioner and the petitioner was not interested in conducting the case before the present Judge and filed various Petitions, as stated supra. 26. In the judgment reported in in re Sahara India Real Estate Corporation Ltd. and Others v. Securities and Exchange Board of India and Another (2013) 1 SCC 1 : LNIND 2012 SC 517, it is held as follows: "The Rules of natural justice being founded on principles of fairness can be available only to a party which has itself been fair, and therefore, deserves to be treated fairly." 27. In the judgment reported in the matter of State of Punjab v. V.K. Khanna AIR 2001 SC 343 : (2001) 2 SCC 330 it is held as under: "8. In the judgment reported in the matter of State of Punjab v. V.K. Khanna AIR 2001 SC 343 : (2001) 2 SCC 330 it is held as under: "8. The test, therefore, is as to whether there is a mere apprehension of bias or there is a real danger of bias and it is on this score that the surrounding circumstances must and ought to be collated and necessary conclusion drawn therefrom. In the event, however, the conclusion is otherwise that there is existing a real danger of bias administrative action cannot be sustained. If on the other hand allegations pertain to rather fanciful apprehension in administrative action, question of declaring them to be unsustainable on the basis therefore, would not arise." 28. In the judgment reported in the matter of N.K. Bajpai v. Union of Indian and Another AIR 2012 SC 1310 : (2012) 4 SCC 653 : LNIND 2012 SC 1147 : (2012) 3 MLJ 1184, it is held as follows: "48. Bias must be shown to be present. Probability of bias, possibility of bias and reasonable suspicion that bias might have affected the decision are terms of different connotations. They broadly fall under two categories, i.e., suspicion of bias and likelihood of bias. Likelihood of bias would be the possibility of bias and bias which can be shown to be present, while suspicion of bias would be the probability or reasonable suspicion of bias. The former lead to vitiation of action, while the latter could hardly be the foundation for further examination of action, with reference to -the facts and circumstances of a given case. The correct test would be to examine whether there appears to be a real danger of bias or whether there is only a probability or even a preponderance of probability of such bias, in the circumstances of a given case. If it falls in the prior category, the decision would attract judicial chastise but if it falls in the latter, it would hardly effect the decision, much less adversely. 57. The word 'bias' in popular English parlance stands included within the attributes and broader purview of the word 'malice', which in general connotation, means and implies 'spite' or 'ill will'. It is also now a well settled proposition that existence of the element of 'bias' is to be inferred as per the standard and comprehension of a reasonable man. 57. The word 'bias' in popular English parlance stands included within the attributes and broader purview of the word 'malice', which in general connotation, means and implies 'spite' or 'ill will'. It is also now a well settled proposition that existence of the element of 'bias' is to be inferred as per the standard and comprehension of a reasonable man. The bias may also be malicious act having some element of intention without just cause or excuse. In case of malice or ill will, it may be an actual act conveying negativity but the element of bias could be apparent or reasonably seen without -any negative result and could form part of a general public perception." 29. Bearing these principles in mind, and having regard to the findings given above, there is no likelihood of bias and in my opinion, there cannot be any likelihood of bias on the part of the Judicial Officer and there is no basis for reasonable suspicion of bias, as the petitioner himself did not attribute any allegation against the Judicial Officer. Therefore, I do not find any bona fide or merit in this Petition. In the result, this Criminal Original Petition is dismissed. Consequently, connected M.P. is closed. Petition dismissed