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2014 DIGILAW 4584 (MAD)

Kasiammal v. Lakshmi

2014-12-12

P.R.SHIVAKUMAR

body2014
JUDGMENT : The plaintiff in O.S.No.136/2001 on the file of the Principal District Munsif, Karaikal is the deceased first appellant in the present second appeal. She filed the above said suit against the respondent herein/defendant for the following reliefs: a) directing the respondent to vacate and hand over possession of the suit property after removing the thatched hut put up by her in the suit property; b) directing the respondent to pay mesne profits at the rate of Rs.50/- per month from the date of suit till the date of actual delivery of possession of the suit property to the appellant; and c) for costs 2. The above said prayer was made based on the following plaint averments: i) The deceased first appellant was the owner of a larger extent of property which includes the suit property, namely a small portion out of the above said larger extent, having purchased the same under the sale deed dated 19.09.1975. Sometimes after the purchase, the deceased first appellant put up a hut and accommodated her daughter Parvathi, who had been given in marriage to one Vivekanandan. A few years prior to the filing of the suit, the said Parvathy died leaving her only child in the custody of the deceased first appellant. Thereafter, the son-in-law of the deceased first appellant started to have a wayward life and he started to live with one lakshmi, the present respondent. However the nature of arrangement between them was not known to the deceased first appellant. ii) After the death of Parvathy, by virtue of the permission granted by the deceased first appellant, Vivekanandan occupied the hut as a permissive occupant. On the death of Vivekanandan, the licence granted in his favour got terminated. However, Lakshmi, the respondent herein continued to occupy the same defying the demand made by the deceased first appellant to vacate and hand over the suit property. Though the hut had been erected by the deceased first appellant, of late, it came to her knowledge that the hut was assessed for tax in the name of deceased Vivekanandan, the son in law of the deceased first appellant and the respondent staked a claim that the assessment for the hut should be changed in her name. Though the hut had been erected by the deceased first appellant, of late, it came to her knowledge that the hut was assessed for tax in the name of deceased Vivekanandan, the son in law of the deceased first appellant and the respondent staked a claim that the assessment for the hut should be changed in her name. Since she could not produce any proof to show that she was the wife of deceased Vivekanandan or in any other manner entitled to such change of tax assessment, her request for mutation was refused, pursuant to which she filed a suit on the file of District Munsif Court, Karaikal in O.S.No.324/1984 for a direction to change the tax assessment to her name. The suit was dismissed and an appeal filed by her in A.S.No.29/1996 was also dismissed by the Additional District Judge, Puducherry at Karaikal. iii) In addition, the respondent was also not living in the suit property and the suit property remained vacant and unoccupied on the date of filing of the present suit. However, in order to avoid problems, the deceased first appellant chose to file the suit for the relief of eviction based on her title and revocation of the licence granted by her in favour of her son-in-law Vivekanandan and also for mesne profits at the rate of Rs.50/- per month. 3. The suit was resisted by the respondent herein by filing a written statement containing averments, which are in brief, as follows: i) The plaint allegation as if the respondent/defendant was in occupation of 200 sq.ft. alone was wrong and mischievous. She had been in possession and enjoyment of the house site measuring about 180 Kuzhis, in which she had put up her house with brick walls and thatched roof occupying 4 Kuzhis, equivalent to 576 sq.ft. The rest of the extent is being used by her as kitchen-garden for raising seasonal vegetables. She, along with her late husband, used to store the haystack obtained from the cultivation of some other lands in Subramaniapuram in the vacant space abutting the thatched house. They also used a portion of the said property as cattle shed for keeping the cattles owned by them. ii) The house was assessed for tax in the name of her husband Vivekanandan. They also used a portion of the said property as cattle shed for keeping the cattles owned by them. ii) The house was assessed for tax in the name of her husband Vivekanandan. A larger extent of 180 Kuzhis is in possession of the respondent, whereas the suit has been filed for recovery of a smaller portion, more or less like an island. There is a distance of 15 feet between the road and the house. Hence the suit in respect of an island like portion out of the larger extent cannot be maintained. The value of the property per Are is Rs.20,000/- and the value of the portion said to be in illegal possession of the respondent shall be more than Rs.1,50,000/-. Hence the question regarding valuation of the relief and the sufficiency of the court fee paid should be tried as a preliminary issue. Since the house is located at a distance of 15 feet from the road, the pathway connecting the road and the house should have also been included in the description of property and the failure to do so would affect the maintainability of the suit. Moreover Vivekanandan was holding the suit property against the appellants or the real owners and his possession had excluded others from the suit property. iii) The respondent married Vivekanandan during the year 1986 and she gave birth to a child named Muthu, who was 17 years old at the time of filing of the written statement. Before the filing of the suit, at no point of time, the first appellant interfered with the respondent's possession of the suit property and such a situation prevailed for more than 17 years. Even during the life time of Vivekanandan, his possession of the suit property was open, hostile and adverse to the right, if any of the appellants. iv) The appellants have also suppressed the fact that another suit in between the deceased first appellant and another party in respect of the very same land ended against the deceased first appellant. The respondent along with her son Muthu is occupying the suit property. Though the said fact was known to the deceased first appellant, the respondent's son Muthu had not been added as a party and hence the suit is liable to be dismissed as bad for non-joinder of necessary party. The respondent along with her son Muthu is occupying the suit property. Though the said fact was known to the deceased first appellant, the respondent's son Muthu had not been added as a party and hence the suit is liable to be dismissed as bad for non-joinder of necessary party. The survey numbers and boundaries have been wrongly mentioned and the description of the property furnished in the plaint is not correct. The deceased first appellant never exercised any act of ownership over the suit property. The deceased first appellant chose to produce only a copy of the sale deed dated 19.09.1975 and no reason has been assigned in the plaint for the non-production of the original sale deed. In any event, the suit filed by the deceased first appellant herein is barred by limitation. The deceased first appellant was not entitled to the relief of recovery of possession and also the relief of mesne profits. The suit filed for the recovery of possession without declaration of title is not maintainable. Based on the above said averments made in the written statement she had pleaded for dismissal of the suit. 4. Based on the pleadings of the parties, the trial court framed seven issues, which are as follows: 1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for the recovery of possession as prayed for or not? 2. Whether the plaintiff is entitled for mesne profits as prayed for? 3. Whether the Coourt fee paid by the plaintiff is correct or not? 4. Whether this court has jurisdiction to try the suit or not? 5. Whether the suit is barred by limitation? 6. Whether the defendant and his son acquired prescribed title to the property or not? 7. Whether the suit is bade for non joinder of necessary parties? 5. After framing of the issues, the parties went for trial and in the trial, the deceased first appellant was examined as PW1 and five documents were marked as Exs.A1 to A5 on her side. On the side of the respondent herein/defendant, three witnesses were examined as DWs 1 to 3 and 11 documents were marked as Exs.B1 to B11. One M.Duraisamy, VAO was examined as court witness and through him, four documents were marked as Exs.X1 to X4. 6. On the side of the respondent herein/defendant, three witnesses were examined as DWs 1 to 3 and 11 documents were marked as Exs.B1 to B11. One M.Duraisamy, VAO was examined as court witness and through him, four documents were marked as Exs.X1 to X4. 6. At the conclusion of trial, the learned trial Judge, considered the evidence adduced on both sides in the light of the arguments advanced by the counsel appearing on both sides, and upon such consideration, sustained the contention of the deceased first appellant that her son- in-law Vivekanandan was in possession of the suit property only as a permissive occupant and that after the death of Vivekanandan well within the period of limitation, the deceased first appellant had filed the suit for recovery of possession and that hence the suit was not barred by limitation as provided under Article 65 of the Limitation Act. Based on the said findings, the learned trial judge, by judgment and decree dated 20.12.2004, decreed the suit as prayed for. 7. As against the decree of the trial court dated 20.12.2004, the respondent herein/defendant preferred an appeal in A.S.No.7/2005 on the file of the lower appellate court. The said appeal was heard by the learned Additional District Judge, Puducherry at Karaikal. The learned lower appellate judge framed the following two points for determination: 1. Is the judgment and decree passed by the trial court in O.S.136/2001 is erroneous and liable to be set aside? 2. What relief the appellant is entitled for? 8. The learned lower appellate judge, after hearing the arguments advanced on both sides, on a re-appreciation of evidence, held that the deceased first appellant suppressed previous litigations between the appellant/plaintiff and Gnanambal, Periya Thambi Pillai and Malaiperumal Pillai against whom she had filed a suit in O.S.No.114/79 on the file of the District Munsif, Karaikal for declaration and also the fact that the said suit ultimately came to be dismissed by the High Court in S.A.No.1497/1984 and that, on the other hand, the respondent/defendant would trace her title to the Settlement Deed dated 12.03.1999 executed in favour of one Senthilkumar and Arulpragash marked as Ex.B11 and the encumbrance certificate marked as Ex.B1. Relying on the kist receipts produced by the respondent marked as Ex.B2 and Ex.B7 (series), the learned lower appellate judge held that the respondent was in possession of the suit property from 1983 onwards; that the deceased first appellant had lost her title in respect of the suit property through the judgment made in S.A.No.1497/1984 arising from O.S.No.114/1979 and that the present suit filed by the deceased first appellant was beyond the period of limitation and hence the same was liable to be dismissed as barred by limitation. Accordingly, the learned lower appellate judge allowed the appeal, set aside the judgment and decree of the learned trial judge dated 20.12.2004 made in O.S.No.136/2011 and dismissed the said suit. 9. As against the reversing judgment of the lower appellate court, the deceased first appellant/plaintiff brought forth the present second appeal on various grounds set out in the memorandum of grounds of second appeal. During the pendency of the second appeal, the sole appellant in the second appeal died and one Suriya Deepan, who is none other than the son of her Pre-deceased daughter, has been brought on record as her Legal Representative vide order dated 20.12.2013 made in M.P.Nos.1 to 3 of 2009 in S.A.No.1487 of 2008. 10. At the time of admission, three questions were formulated as substantial questions of law involved in the second appeal. They are: a) Whether the Courts below did not err in dismissing the suit on the ground that the appellant did not file any document to show that the license was cancelled, when the legal position is that the revocation of the license may be expressed or implied, thus by word or act indicating clearly and unequivocally the licensor's intention are sufficient to constitute, express or implied revocation to withdraw the license? b) Whether the Court below did not err in nor holding that a license is a matter personal between the grantor and the grantee of the license and such a license must be held to have lapse with the death of the licensor or the licensee? c) Whether the learned District Judge is right in dismissing the suit as barred by limitation when the defendant's possession was never proved to be adverse to the plaintiff? 11. c) Whether the learned District Judge is right in dismissing the suit as barred by limitation when the defendant's possession was never proved to be adverse to the plaintiff? 11. In order to eliminate the mistakes and ambiguities found in the substantial questions of law framed at the time of admission and for fine tuning the substantial questions of law, they are re-cast as follows: 1. Whether the lower appellate court committed an error in allowing the appeal and dismissing the suit filed by the deceased first appellant herein/plaintiff on the premise that no document to prove the plea of the cancellation of licence was produced by the first appellant herein/plaintiff? 2. Whether the lower appellate court committed an error in not holding that the licence being personal between the grantor and the grantee of the licence shall have lapsed on the death of the licensor or the licensee? 3. Whether the lower appellate court is right in holding that the suit filed by the appellant was barred by limitation ignoring the contention of the appellant/plaintiff that the possession of the respondent/defendant was not proved to be adverse to the appellant herein/plaintiff? 12. The arguments advanced by Mr.R.Sunil Kumar, learned counsel for the appellant and by Mr.R.Karthikeyan, learned counsel for the respondent were heard. The materials available on record were also perused. 13. Learned counsel for the appellant, pointing out the pleadings made in the plaint, advanced an argument that the lower appellate judge committed an error in holding that there was suppression of earlier proceedings and the same would affect the maintainability of the suit filed by the deceased first appellant for eviction and recovery of possession. It is the further contention of the learned counsel for the appellant that the earlier proceedings between the deceased first appellant/plaintiff and third parties did have no relevance to the suit against the respondent herein, since the reliefs sought for in the present suit are based on an averment that Vivekanandan had been permitted to occupy the suit property; that on his death, the licence granted to him stood revoked and that thereafter, the respondent herein/defendant did have no right to continue in possession, that too denying the title of the appellant/plaintiff. The clear case of the appellant/plaintiff is that she purchased a larger extent of property, which consists of the suit property, under a sale deed dated 19.09.1975 marked as Ex.A1. The clear case of the appellant/plaintiff is that she purchased a larger extent of property, which consists of the suit property, under a sale deed dated 19.09.1975 marked as Ex.A1. Under Ex.A1, the appellant/plaintiff had purchased an extent of 2 Mah and 31 Kuzhis comprised in S.Nos.32/11 and 91/11 of Serumavilangai hamlet, Surakudi village from another Kasiammal wife of Meenakshi Sundaram of Kumbakonam. The genuineness and validity of the said document relied on by the deceased first appellant/plaintiff has not been specifically challenged by the respondent herein/defendant. 14. On the other hand, the contention of the respondent herein/defendant is that she had been in possession and occupation of not only the thatched house, but also a larger extent of house site measuring about 180 Kuzhis out of which the thatched house occupies only an area of 4 Kuzhis equivalent to 576 sq.ft. and that the said house being situated at a distance of 15 feet from the road, the prayer for recovery of possession of the area over which the house stands disregarding even the path leading to the road from the house site would not be maintainable. In addition, she has also taken a stand that the property has not been properly valued, since according to her, the value of the property would be more than Rs.1,50,000/-. The further contention made in the written statement is that she, as the widow of Vivekanandan, who was the son in law of the appellant herein/plaintiff, was in possession and enjoyment of the suit property for more than the statutory period and that the possession by Vivekanandan followed by the possession of the respondent/defendant has resulted in perfection of title in her by adverse possession. Though she has stated in her written statement that the revenue records relating to the suit property stand in the name of Md.Hussain and three others and no adjudication could be made in the absence of pattadhars, she has not taken any plea that either she or Vivekanandan through whom she claims right derived title from the said pattadars. As against the said persons also, she is claiming adverse possession. Except the general denial, there is no specific denial of the plaint allegation that Vivekanandan was permitted by the deceased first appellant/plaintiff to reside in the house situated in the property purchased by her and on his death, the licence granted to him got terminated. 15. As against the said persons also, she is claiming adverse possession. Except the general denial, there is no specific denial of the plaint allegation that Vivekanandan was permitted by the deceased first appellant/plaintiff to reside in the house situated in the property purchased by her and on his death, the licence granted to him got terminated. 15. As against the clear plea made by the deceased first appellant/plaintiff that by virtue of sale deed dated 19.09.1975, she became the absolute owner of the property purchased therein and in a small portion of the said property, she put up a hut and accommodated her daughter Parvathi, who had been given in marriage to Vivekanandan, the respondent/defendant has not made a clear plea as to who is the owner of the said property. Though she would have made a claim that Vivekanandan and after his death she continued to be in possession of the entire extent now claimed to be that of the deceased first appellant/plaintiff, she has not stated under what right they were in possession. There is also absence of clear plea as to when and how did they get the possession of the said property, as against the clear averment made in the plaint. 16. Though the respondent/defendant in paragraph 4 of her written statement would admit that Vivekanandan was the son-in-law of the deceased first appellant/plaintiff, during the course of evidence, she took a tantalising stand. At one place she would state that she did not know the relationship between the deceased first appellant/plaintiff and Vivekanandan and also pleaded ignorance as to whether Vivekanandan had married Parvathi, the daughter of the first appellant/plaintiff. At another place, she ventured to deny the said fact. In yet another place of her evidence as DW1, she has stated that Vivekanandan was not the son-in-law of the first appellant/plaintiff and he did not marry Parvathi, the daughter of deceased first appellant/plaintiff. 17. At another place, she ventured to deny the said fact. In yet another place of her evidence as DW1, she has stated that Vivekanandan was not the son-in-law of the first appellant/plaintiff and he did not marry Parvathi, the daughter of deceased first appellant/plaintiff. 17. The deceased first appellant/plaintiff had taken a clear stand in her plaint and she adduced oral and documentary evidence in consonance with and in confirmation of her plea that she was the owner of larger extent by virtue of her purchase made under the original of Ex.A1 and that in a small portion out of it she put up a hut and allowed her daughter and son-in-law to occupy the same; that even after the death of her daughter Parvathi, her son-in-law Vivekanandan continued to occupy the same and that after the death of Vivekanandan, the deemed permission/licence stood automatically revoked. It is also her clear stand and evidence that the respondent/defendant was not married to Vivekanandan, but occasionally he brought her to the suit property. 18. The claim of the respondent/defendant is not based on her own derivative title. On the other hand, it is her case that Vivekanandan was her husband and he himself perfected title to the suit property by adverse possession. As such she should have stated in clear terms, "who was the real owner of the property? "Against whom Vivekanandan set up adverse possession? and "when did such adverse possession start?". In this regard, the evidence of DW1 and DW3 are not helpful to the respondent/defendant to substantiate her case. DW1, the respondent herself, has admitted that she did not know on what arrangement Vivekanandan was residing in the suit property. The relevant portion of her evidence in vernacular is reproduced below: "tpntfhde;jd; jhth ,lj;jpy; ve;j Vw;ghl;od;go FoapUe;jhh; vd;w tptuk; vdf;F bjhpahJ/" It is also her admission that she did not know with whose funds the thatched house in the suit property was put up. According to her own version, she married Vivekanandan in 1985, but the thatched house in the suit property was put up in 1980. It is also her admission that before 1985 she did not have any connection with the village in which the suit property situates. According to her own version, she married Vivekanandan in 1985, but the thatched house in the suit property was put up in 1980. It is also her admission that before 1985 she did not have any connection with the village in which the suit property situates. She relies on Exs.B2, B6 and B7 series in support of her contention that Vivekanandan put up the thatched house found in the suit property and he himself had perfected title to the same by adverse possession. Ex.B2 is a house tax receipt dated 10.06.1983 for 4 faslis under which a sum of Rs.1.20 was paid by Vivekanandan. But he paid the said amount for the deceased first appellant/plaintiff. As on the date of Ex.B2, possession of Vivekanandan cannot be said to be adverse to that of the right of the deceased first appellant/plaintiff. The payment of tax in the name of deceased first appellant/plaintiff will probablise her case that Vivekanandan was there as a permissive occupant. Ex.B6 is the house tax assessment order dated 18.03.1994. It seems the deceased first appellant/plaintiff Kasiammal was assessed for tax and the respondent/defendant is shown to be the person in occupation of the thatched house. The said document also will not lend any support to the respondent/defendant to prove her case that her possession was adverse to the deceased first appellant/plaintiff. In Ex.B2, the tax was paid by Vivekanandan on behalf of Kasiammal in 1983. However in 1986, Vivekanandan seemed to have paid the house tax in his name. In 1991, his father Ramasamy Pillai seems to have paid the house tax on behalf of Vivekananandan, after the death of his son. How and under what circumstances, the house tax assessment made in the name of Kasiammal came to be changed in the name of Vivekanandan has not been explained. Out of four tax receipts filed as Ex.B7 series, one evidences that Vivekanandan paid the house tax for Kasiammal and two evidence payment in the name of Vivekanandan himself and one evidences payment by the father of Vivekanandan on his behalf after the death of his son. The said documents are not enough to show that the possession of Vivekanandan was hostile to the deceased first appellant/plaintiff or that his permissive possession. 19. Further more, the respondent/defendant stakes claim to the suit property not in her own right, but as the legal representative of deceased Vivekanandan. The said documents are not enough to show that the possession of Vivekanandan was hostile to the deceased first appellant/plaintiff or that his permissive possession. 19. Further more, the respondent/defendant stakes claim to the suit property not in her own right, but as the legal representative of deceased Vivekanandan. According to her evidence, Vivekanandan died in the year 1991. Ex.B4, the card for the 16th day ceremony evidences that he died on 16.05.1991. The respondent/defendant claims to be the widow of Vivekanandan and on that basis alone she claims right to the suit property. But she is not in a position to produce any document to show that she was the legally wedded wife of Vivekanandan. However, she has produced Ex.B5-Birth Certificate of one Muthu, Ex.B6-demand notice, Ex.B10-xerox copies of voter's identity card for getting widow's pension. In those documents, she has been shown to be the wife of Vivekanandan. Except Ex.B5, all other documents came into existence after the dispute arose. In B5-birth certificate, the child's name is shown as Muthu, place of birth is shown as Thirunallar, father's name is noted as Vivekanandan, whereas mother's name is noted as Mahalakshmi. Hence as rightly contended by the learned counsel for the appellants some other's birth certificate could have been produced in order to substantiate her contention that she was the wife of deceased Vivekanandan. 20. After the death of Vivekanandan, the respondent/defendant made an attempt to have the tax assessment changed to her name, but her attempt proved to be a failure. Pursuant to the refusal of the authorities based on the objection raised by the first appellant/plaintiff to change the tax assessment to her name, the respondent/defendant filed a suit in O.S.No.324/1984 on the file of the Principal District Munsif, Karaikal against Tirunallar Commune Panchayat and the deceased first appellant/plaintiff Kasiammal for a mandatory injunction for mutation in her name and for other reliefs. The trial judge, after full trial, dismissed the suit accepting the contention of Kasiamal that Vivekanandan was a permissive occupant and also on the basis of the finding that Lakshmi, the respondent herein (plaintiff in O.S.No.324/1994) was not able to prove to be a legal heir of Vivekanandan. Certified copies of the judgment and decree in the said suit have been produced as Exs.A2 and A3. Certified copies of the judgment and decree in the said suit have been produced as Exs.A2 and A3. As against the dismissal of the said suit, the respondent herein/defendant preferred an appeal on the file of the Additional District Judge, Pondicherry @ Karaikal in A.S.No.29/1996. The said appeal was dismissed confirming the judgment and decree of the trial court. Certified copies of the judgment and decree in the said appeal have been produced as Exs.A4 and A5. Thereafter, she did not prefer any second appeal and the said judgment became final. The defendant, while deposing as DW1 has also admitted that the suit filed by her in O.S.No.324/1994 was dismissed and the appeal filed by her in A.S.No.29/1996 was also dismissed by the Additional District Judge. 21. A perusal of the entire evidence of DW1 will make it clear that she was taking conflicting and contradicting stands. DW2 and DW4 simply speak about the valuation of the property. Their evidence, shall not, in any way, support the case of the respondent/defendant of having perfected title by adverse possession. Though one Kaliyaperumal was examined as DW3 and his proof affidavit was accepted as his evidence in chief examination, during cross examination, he had completely disowned the same by stating that he did not know the contents of the affidavit and he signed the same as requested by the respondent/defendant. In addition, his evidence is quite contrary to the evidence of DW1 making his testimony totally unreliable. According to DW1's evidence, she was married to Vivekanandan only in 1985. However, the testimony of DW3 is to the effect that the respondent/defendant was living with Vivekanandan from 1980. In addition, there is an admission by him that he did not know where, Vivekanandan was living before he married Lakshmi, the respondent herein. The further admission made by him is that he was not aware of the marriage between Vivekanandan and Lakshmi. He also admitted that he did not know the relationship of Vivekanandan and Kasiammal, the deceased first appellant/plaintiff. He also pleaded absence of knowledge as to who was the owner of the property and who paid the tax for the same. Though respondent had taken a stand that they were using the adjacent land for keeping the haystack, DW3 denies it. He also pleaded absence of knowledge as to who was the owner of the property and who paid the tax for the same. Though respondent had taken a stand that they were using the adjacent land for keeping the haystack, DW3 denies it. A consideration of the entire evidence of DW3 will make it clear that his evidence is unreliable and the respondent/defendant cannot rely on his testimony as he has almost destroyed plea of defence of the respondent during his cross examination. 22. So far as the prior litigation between Kasiammal, the deceased first appellant/plaintiff with Periya Thambiah Pillai is concerned, the respondent/defendant has not produced certified copies of the judgment and decree. On the other hand, she has chosen to produce an encumbrance certificate obtained on 18.06.2004 and a certified copy of the Gift Settlement deed dated 12.03.1999. It goes without saying that those two documents came into existence after the dispute between the first appellant and the respondent/defendant arose. The encumbrance certificate has been marked as Ex.B1 and the certified copy of the Settlement Deed has been marked as Ex.B11. Ex.B11 alone has been noted as encumbrance in Ex.B1. A perusal of Ex.B11 will show that one Aruna Devi, daughter-in-law of Periya Thmbiah Pillai, claiming to be the power agent of Periya Thmbiah Pillai, executed the said Settlement Deed in favour of her own sons Senthil Kumar and Arul Prakash. In the said settlement deed, a recital had been made to the effect that the subject matter of the settlement belonged to Periya Thambiah Pillai by virtue of a judgment of the High Court in S.A.No.1497/1984 and also by virtue of a will. The particulars of the will have not been mentioned. Though the judgment of the second appeal has been referred to, neither a copy of the judgment nor a copy of the decree has been produced. Hence the said document being, self-serving document unsupported by other documents, cannot be taken as a proof that the property belonged to Periya Thambiah Pillai and it was settled on Senthil Kumar and Arul Prakash. If at all the respondent/defendant claims to have perfected title by adverse possession against those persons, she could have taken steps to get them impleaded. Hence the said document being, self-serving document unsupported by other documents, cannot be taken as a proof that the property belonged to Periya Thambiah Pillai and it was settled on Senthil Kumar and Arul Prakash. If at all the respondent/defendant claims to have perfected title by adverse possession against those persons, she could have taken steps to get them impleaded. Even if it is assumed that she, being in possession can protect her possession against all except real owners, the respondent/defendant should have led concrete and unassailable evidence to show that the property belongs to those persons and neither she nor Vivekanandan came to be inducted by Kasiammal as a permissive occupant. 23. Marshalling the evidence and taking into account all the aspects, the learned trial judge gave a correct finding that Vivekanandan was in possession as a permissive occupant and on his death, the licence/permission granted to him stood automatically revoked and that the respondent herein/defendant claiming through Vivekanandan could not resist the plea made by the deceased first appellant, namely the grantor. The learned trial Judge also gave a clear finding that the respondent/defendant was not able to prove her marital status with Vivekanandan. Such a clear finding was disturbed by the lower appellate judge, by simply reading in between the lines in the evidence of PW1 and pointing out the fact that PW1 was not cogent in her evidence as to the extent of the property and the boundaries of the property. A close scrutiny of the evidence of PW1 will make it clear that the aberrations found here and there were minor discrepancies due to her illiteracy. The learned lower appellate judge took pains to pick holes in her evidence, totally ignoring the fact that the respondent has not proved her case of adverse possession and perfection of title by adverse possession to trample the judgment of the trial court. A proper analysis of the facts and evidence will make it clear that, while the trial court has decided the case on preponderance of probabilities, the learned lower appellate judge reversed it rendering perverse findings. The 1st and 2nd substantial questions are, accordingly answered in favour of the appellants and against the respondent. 24. A proper analysis of the facts and evidence will make it clear that, while the trial court has decided the case on preponderance of probabilities, the learned lower appellate judge reversed it rendering perverse findings. The 1st and 2nd substantial questions are, accordingly answered in favour of the appellants and against the respondent. 24. So far as the question of limitation is concerned, the respondent/defendant, who has taken the plea of bar of limitation, should have pleaded and proved by adducing sufficient evidence as to from which date the possession became adverse to that of the plaintiff and she should have also proved by reliable and sufficient evidence that such a possession adverse to the right of the owner was continuous and uninterrupted for more than the statutory period of 12 years and thereby she had perfected title by adverse possession. 25. In this case, except the bald averments made in the written statement that even against the third party, who staked claim of title to the suit properties and also against the plaintiff, Vivekanandan had perfected title by adverse possession. When the person setting up plea of adverse possession does not know who is the owner of the property and claims that the property belongs to some other person, he/she cannot be said to have set up a possession adverse to that of the owner. Moreover, the second appellant is admittedly the son of Vivekanandan born through Parvathy, the predeceased daughter of the plaintiff. Even if it is assumed that Vivekanandan had perfected title by adverse possession to the suit property, after his death, second appellant has become entitled to the same as his legal heir. The respondent/defendant is not in a position to prove that she had been legally wedded to Vivekanandan. In the former suit in O.S.No.324/1984, when she made a claim for mutation on the premise that she was the wife of deceased Vivekanandan, she lost her battle. If all these aspects are taken into consideration, one can come to a conclusion that the plea that the suit is barred by limitation has not been substantiated by the respondent/defendant. The finding of the lower appellate court to the contrary is quite perverse and the same has got to be interfered with and reversed. If all these aspects are taken into consideration, one can come to a conclusion that the plea that the suit is barred by limitation has not been substantiated by the respondent/defendant. The finding of the lower appellate court to the contrary is quite perverse and the same has got to be interfered with and reversed. Hence the third substantial question of law is answered in favour of the appellants and against the respondent, holding that the lower appellate court was wrong in holding that the suit filed by the appellant was barred by limitation and such a finding was rendered in ignorance of the contention of the appellant/plaintiff that possession of the respondent/defendant was not proved to be adverse to that of the plaintiff. The 3rd substantial question of law is, accordingly answered in favour of the appellants and against the respondent. 26. So far as the claim of mesne profits is concerned, both the counsel did not advance any argument. The lower appellate court also did not consider the question. In view of the same, the finding of the trial court regarding mesne profits and the consequent incorporation of a direction in the decree for payment of mesne profits has got to be confirmed. 27. In view of the answers to the substantial questions of law 1 to 3 given in favour of the appellants and against the respondent, the second appeal shall succeed, with the result that the judgment and decree of the lower appellate court shall be set aside and the decree passed by the trial court shall be restored and confirmed. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to cost. In the result, the second appeal is allowed. The judgment and decree of the Additional District Judge, Puducherry at Karaikal dated 30.01.2007 made in A.S.No.7 of 2005 reversing the judgment and decree of the Principal District Munsif, Karaikal dated 20.12.2004 made in O.S.No.136 of 2001, is set aside. The decree of the trial court dated 20.12.2004 made in O.S.No.136 of 2001 shall stand restored and confirmed. There shall be no order as to cost. Consequently, the connected miscellaneous petitions are closed.