JUDGMENT Proverbially speaking, lightening never strikes the same place twice. But, in practical parlance, human calamity does strike a person twice or even more. At least in this case, it did. The petitioner, a widow close to 70 years old, was left destitute by her husband, who once was a workman of the respondent Company (Singareni Calories Company Limited). Later, she was deserted by her only daughter, who disappeared, having gone in search of her husband, whose whereabouts too could not be traced – even to this day. To dilate on the facts ever so briefly, so to speak in a manner of oxymoron, the petitioner’s husband, during his lifetime, was working as Board Mazdoor in exploration department, Bellampalli area under the control of the respondent Company, having joined the service in the year 1962. While he was in service, being issueless, the said workman adopted a girl child on 11.01.1988 as per the Hindu religious rites and customs. In course of time, the said workman married off his adopted daughter and started living with them along with his wife. When age and illness caught up with the said workman, on 14.11.1992 he took voluntary retirement on the ground of medical invalidation. Consequent upon his retirement, the petitioner’s husband made an application to the respondent Company on 08.02.1993 to provide employment to his son-in-law under dependent category. The said representation was followed up with another one on 25.08.1993, but to no avail. Having perhaps married the workman’s daughter on the lure of an employment, since the workman could not prevail over the respondent Company to consider his application positively to provide employment to his son-in-law, the said son-in-law, frustrated as he had been, started harassing the workman’s daughter. Eventually the son-in-law deserted the family and remained untraced. Broken hearted at the plight of his daughter, the workman died on 08.03.2005. The mother and daughter were left alone to fend for themselves. Not too long thereafter, went the daughter in search of her husband with a hope that he could be persuaded, if found, to come back so that the family could have a breadwinner. Unfortunately, though years went by, even the daughter did not come back. Worse still, she has never been heard of. Not too long thereafter, went the daughter in search of her husband with a hope that he could be persuaded, if found, to come back so that the family could have a breadwinner. Unfortunately, though years went by, even the daughter did not come back. Worse still, she has never been heard of. Under those trying circumstances, the petitioner, an old lady, deserted by the near and dear, albeit by the contrivance of the circumstances, petitioned to the respondent Company to provide to her some succour in the form of either monthly monetary compensation or payment of lump sum amount in compensatory terms, she being the dependent of the deceased workman of the respondent Company. Though the petitioner made representations repeatedly, those made on 24.04.2010 and 09.11.2010 being illustrative, the respondent Company has chosen to remain silent. As a last resort, the petitioner approached this Court by filing the present writ petition seeking a direction to the respondent Company for grant of monetary monthly benefit, or in the alternative for a lump sum amount of Rs.3,00,000/- in lieu of dependent employment. In this regard, the learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the service regulations governing the workmen of the respondent Company, specifically regulation 7.2 thereof, provides for employment to the dependent of the deceased/ permanently disabled employee. He has further contended that initially when the petitioner’s husband could not continue in service owing to his ill-health, he sought retirement on the ground of medical invalidation and simultaneously requested the authorities concerned to provide a job to his son-in-law. The learned counsel has also further stated that at the time of the medical invalidation of the petitioner’s husband, the request of the petitioner’s husband was actively considered, and, in fact, his son-in-law had been subjected to the necessary fitness test. The learned counsel for the petitioner has further contended that at no point of time has the respondent Company provided to the petitioner’s husband, during his lifetime, any reasons as to why his request for providing compensatory employment to his son-in-law could not be entertained; even thereafter after his death, the petitioner who pursued the issue was also not informed of the reasons that weighed with the authorities. Now in the changed circumstances, the issue of providing alternative appointment is no longer germane, and as such, who should fit in to the definition of dependent and what should be the regulatory regime in that regard pale into insignificance. Accordingly, the learned counsel has contended that now the very wife of the deceased workman, the petitioner herein, has gone before the authorities and sought relief as the dependent, reeling under abject poverty. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, to this day, the respondent authorities have not felt it desirable to consider the case in any manner. Accordingly, he has urged this Court to give a suitable direction in the form of mandamus to the authorities concerned to provide pecuniary compensation either on monthly basis or in a lump sum to the tune of Rs.3,00,000/- to the petitioner. He has also contended that the respondent Company does have such a policy of providing compensation in lieu of compassionate appointment to the dependents of the deceased workman or those who got permanently disabled in harness. Per contra, the learned Standing Counsel for the respondent Company, in tune with the averments made in the counter affidavit filed by the respondent Company, has submitted that the Company has not violated any statutory rule or regulation or any other administrative direction having statutory force, so as to attract the invocation of Article 226 of the Constitution of India at the behest of the petitioner. The learned Standing Counsel has also submitted that the writ petition suffers from incurable laches, inasmuch as the petitioner’s husband was removed from the rolls of the respondent Company with effect from 14.11.1992, whereas the writ petition came to be filed in 2010, i.e., after nearly 18 years. The learned counsel has also further contended that in terms of the regulations governing the respondent Company, an adopted daughter cannot be treated as a dependent and in support of it, he placed reliance on regulation 7.2, which will be referred to by and by. Supplying the specifics in support of his submissions, the learned Standing Counsel for the respondent Company has also stated that at the earliest point of time, the petitioner’s case was referred to a two-man committee, which was constituted to find out the genuineness of the dependents in the pending dependent employment case as on 31.12.1992. Supplying the specifics in support of his submissions, the learned Standing Counsel for the respondent Company has also stated that at the earliest point of time, the petitioner’s case was referred to a two-man committee, which was constituted to find out the genuineness of the dependents in the pending dependent employment case as on 31.12.1992. Based on the report of the said two-man committee, the case of the dependent employment was not considered and the said so-called dependent’s name was deleted from the overall seniority list. The learned Standing Counsel has strenuously contended that since the petitioner’s husband sought voluntary retirement under health grounds, his wife, the petitioner, would not be entitled to any monthly monetary compensation, much less lump sum amount in lieu thereof. Referring to the case of the dependents, the learned Standing Counsel has stated that neither the adopted daughter nor her husband could be treated as dependents. The learned Standing Counsel passingly admitted that there is a monthly monetary scheme (MMS)/lump sum amount (LSP) in lieu of dependent employment in terms of settlements dated 31.07.1997 and 21.06.2001. He has, however, stated that it should be applied only to the case of death/medical invalidation of the employee while in service. Accordingly, the learned Standing Counsel has urged this Court to dismiss the writ petition as being without any merit. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Standing Counsel for the respondent Company, apart from perusing the record. Upon the perusal of the record, I am of the opinion that presently the issue of who are qualified to be the dependents from among the members of the family, or for that matter in the extended family, assumes no importance and has rather become an issue of no consequence. In any event the respondent Company in its counter affidavit has referred to National Coal Wage Agreement (NCWA) and has stated that an adopted daughter cannot be treated as a dependent daughter under NCWA. In fact, in the affidavit filed by the petitioner in support of the writ petition, the said rule or regulation dealing with the issue of dependency and provision of compassionate appointment is extracted. As the correctness of the said provision has not been contested by traversing the same in the pleadings of the respondent Company, the said provision may be extracted for a proper appreciation. As the correctness of the said provision has not been contested by traversing the same in the pleadings of the respondent Company, the said provision may be extracted for a proper appreciation. The said regulation 7.2 reads as follows: "7.2 The ‘Dependent’ for this purpose means (under clause 9.3 & 9.0 (iii) of NCW-VI), the wife/husband as the case may be, unmarried daughter, son and legally adopted son. If no such direct dependent is available for employment, brother, widowed daughter/widowed daughter-in-law/ or son-in-law residing with the deceased/permanently disabled employee and almost wholly dependant on the earnings of the deceased/permanently disabled employee may be considered to be dependent of the ex-employee." Interestingly under clause 9.3 and 9.0 (iii) of NCW-VI, the wife/husband, as the case may be, unmarried daughter, son and legally adopted son are categorised as dependents. Despite the constitutional mandate in Articles 14, 15 & 16 of the Constitution of India, which strike at the root of discrimination even with regard to sex or gender, the regulation of an instrumentality of state recognises only the adopted son, but not the adopted daughter. Suffice it to say, though no challenge is laid nor any issue arises thereof, such provision falls foul of Articles 15 and 16 of the Constitution of India, as it is a naked gender bias. The Constitutional Courts may in future examine the said provision in properly constituted judicial proceedings as and when the occasion arises. As it is trite that there should be no judicial pronouncement on issues that have rendered themselves academic, I leave at that. From the counter affidavit of the respondent Company, it was evident that at the time of medical invalidation of the petitioner’s husband, the case of his son-in-law was actively considered. Suffice it to quote a portion of the counter affidavit which confirms the said aspect: "It is submitted that Sri Toodi Pulla Reddy, worked as Boring Mazdoor in Bellampalli area. He had opted for Voluntary Retirement on health grounds in favour of his son-in-law Sri M.Mohan Reddy. Accordingly he was declared unfit and his son-in-law was declared fit." The respondent Company also admits that in terms of settlement dated 31.07.1997 and 21.06.2001, in the case of death/medical unfit (medical invalidation?) of an employee in service, monetary monthly compensation (MMC) or lump sum amount (LSP) in lieu of dependent employment could be provided. Accordingly he was declared unfit and his son-in-law was declared fit." The respondent Company also admits that in terms of settlement dated 31.07.1997 and 21.06.2001, in the case of death/medical unfit (medical invalidation?) of an employee in service, monetary monthly compensation (MMC) or lump sum amount (LSP) in lieu of dependent employment could be provided. As the said admission is evident from para-9 of the counter affidavit, what remains to be considered is, whether the petitioner fits into the schemes of the settlement dated 31.07.1997 and 21.06.2001; and if she does, has her belated approached to the Court rendered her remediless on the basis of laches? The first issue is required to be answered by considering whether the petitioner’s husband was declared medically unfit while he was in service or not? Without much cogitation, it could be held that initially the petitioner’s husband was subjected to medical examination by the Medical Board, Area Hospital, Bellampalli through its proceedings dated 13.11.1992. Based on the said findings, through proceedings dated 18.11.1992, the Deputy Chief Geologist communicated to the petitioner’s husband that he was medically declared unfit and that his name was removed from the rolls of Exploration Division, Bellampalli with effect from 14.11.1992. It is apposite to extract the said communication in its entirety: "Medical Board, Area Hospital, Bellampalli vide Lr. No. AHB 7/VR/92/5488 Dated 13.11.92, you have been declared medially unfit under voluntary retirement for further service. Hence, your name is removed from the rolls of Exploration Division, Bellampalli w.e.f. 14.11.92. You may approach the office of the Exploration Division, Bellampalli for terminal benefits etc., as per the prevailing rules of the Company." A perusal of the above communication addressed by an official of the respondent Company amply indicates that the voluntary retirement allowed to be taken by the petitioner’s husband was under the compelling circumstances of his having been declared medically unfit. As such, going by the averments of the respondent Company in its counter affidavit, the petitioner’s husband is deemed to have been, nay actually, declared medically unfit while he was in service. As such, the petitioner, being the wife and dependant of the deceased workman in terms of regulation 7.2 and also the settlements dated 31.07.1997 and 21.06.2001, is entitled to either monthly monetary compensation (MMC) or lump sum amount (LSP), as the case may be. As such, the petitioner, being the wife and dependant of the deceased workman in terms of regulation 7.2 and also the settlements dated 31.07.1997 and 21.06.2001, is entitled to either monthly monetary compensation (MMC) or lump sum amount (LSP), as the case may be. The second issue that is required to be decided is whether the belated approach of the petitioner to this Court would be an insurmountable hurdle in terms of incurable laches. It is axiomatic that the makers of the Constitution have advisedly never deemed it appropriate to crib and cringe the public law remedy provided by way of prerogative writs in terms of Articles 226 and 227 with statutorily available forms of limitation. In any event, by way of subsequent judicial interpretation, the Constitutional Courts have felt it desirable not to allow the litigants to knock the doors of the Courts with antiquated matters, decades later with the cause having been practically dead. Under those circumstances, as an equitable measure, the Constitutional Courts have devised the policy of laches to ward off stale claims sought to be kept alive by the litigants in perpetuity. It is not the length of time that determines the factum of laches, but the staleness of the issue that is to be reckoned. In other words, though the petitioner has approached the Court years later, if the cause is alive and the relief sought for is appropriate even at that belated hour – and no vested rights of any third party are defeated thereby – the issue brought before the Court even after considerable length of time could not be stated to be suffering from laches. In this case, the hapless woman had fought with the conspiring circumstances for many years and in the twilight of her life, sapped of strength and hope, approached this Court in view of persistent refusal of the respondent Company to consider her case for pecuniary relief in view of the employment. It may be stated that initially the woman fought for employment to her son-in-law; later she had to cope with the death of her husband and disappearance of her dear daughter, as well as son-in-law. Only under those circumstances, left destitute, the petitioner prayed for the financial assistance, only in terms of the regulation of the respondent Company, but was denied. Only under those circumstances, left destitute, the petitioner prayed for the financial assistance, only in terms of the regulation of the respondent Company, but was denied. Under those circumstances, the petitioner’s approaching this Court could not be said to be suffering from any laches. Before parting with the matter, I remind myself of the fact that no judicial dispensation can be resorted to simply swayed by the factors of sympathy. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Omprakash vs. Radhacharan, (2009) 15 SCC 66 , has held that it is nowa well-settled principle of law that sentiment or sympathy alone would not be a guiding factor in determining the rights of the parties which are otherwise clear and unambiguous. Having said that, in the same breadth, I refer to another decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in S.K. Mastan Bee vs. GM, South Central Rly. (2003) 1 SCC 184 , has held on the issue of laches in the following words: “5. In this appeal, the appellant questions this restriction on her right to claim family pension w.e.f. 21-11-1969, the date on which her husband died. It is submitted on behalf of the appellant that the Division Bench having agreed with the learned Single Judge on the legal right of the appellant to receive family pension ought not to have confined the said right to a date much subsequent to the death of her husband, merely because a demand for payment of family pension was made only in the year 1992. Learned counsel for the appellant pointed out from the judgment of the Division Bench itself that it had held that the denial of family pension to the appellant amounted to violation of her fundamental right to life guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution and that the Division Bench had also held that in the circumstances of this case the delay in approaching the railway authorities cannot be considered to be fatal for the maintainability of the writ petition. The learned counsel submitted, based on these findings, that the Division Bench could not have restricted the appellant's claim to a date much subsequent to the date of death of her husband. The learned counsel submitted, based on these findings, that the Division Bench could not have restricted the appellant's claim to a date much subsequent to the date of death of her husband. Per contra, the learned counsel for the Railways contended that the delay in approaching the court was so large that it was not a fit case for the exercise of the discretionary remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution and that the High Court was in fact very generous to the appellant in granting the relief from the year 1992. 6. We notice that the appellant's husband was working as a Gangman who died while in service. It is on record that the appellant is an illiterate who at that time did not know of her legal right and had no access to any information as to her right to family pension and to enforce her such right. On the death of the husband of the appellant, it was obligatory for her husband's employer viz. the Railways, in this case to have computed the family pension payable to the appellant and offered the same to her without her having to make a claim or without driving her to a litigation. The very denial of her right to family pension as held by the learned Single Judge as well as the Division Bench is an erroneous decision on the part of the Railways and in fact amounting to a violation of the guarantee assured to the appellant under Article 21 of the Constitution. The factum of the appellant's lack of resources to approach the legal forum timely is not disputed by the Railways. The question then arises on facts and circumstances of this case, was the Appellate Bench justified in restricting the past arrears of pension to a period much subsequent to the death of the appellant's husband on which date she had legally become entitled to the grant of pension? In this case as noticed by us hereinabove, the learned Single Judge had rejected the contention of delay put forth by the Railways and taking note of the appellant's right to pension and the denial of the same by the Railways illegally considered it appropriate to grant the pension with retrospective effect from the date on which it became due to her. The Division Bench also while agreeing with the learned Single Judge observed that the delay in approaching the Railways by the appellant for the grant of family pension was not fatal, in spite of the same it restricted the payment of family pension from a date on which the appellant issued a legal notice to the Railways i.e. on 1-4-1992. We think on the facts of this case inasmuch as it was an obligation of the Railways to have computed the family pension and offered the same to the widow of its employee as soon as it became due to her and also in view of the fact that her husband was only a Gangman in the Railways who might not have left behind sufficient resources for the appellant to agitate her rights and also in view of the fact that the appellant is an illiterate, the learned Single Judge, in our opinion, was justified in granting the relief to the appellant from the date from which it became due to her, that is the date of the death of her husband. Consequently, we are of the considered opinion that the Division Bench fell in error in restricting that period to a date subsequent to 1-4-1992.” In the above case, a widowed woman approached the Court after 23 years. Under the facts and circumstances of the case, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has directed the authorities to provide her the succour after 23 years. For the foregoing reasons, the writ petition is allowed directing the respondent authorities to pay either monthly monetary compensation (MMC) or lump sum amount (LSP) to the petitioner in terms of the regulations governing the said issue, inasmuch as this Court holds that the petitioner’s husband was medically invalidated when he was in service. There shall be no order as to the costs. As a sequel to disposal of the writ petition, miscellaneous petitions, if any pending in this writ petition, shall stand closed.