Judgment Subhro Kamal Mukherjee, J. This is an appeal against judgment and order dated September 5, 2012 passed by the Hon’ble Single Judge in A.P. No. 245 of 2012, inter alia, rejecting an application under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, holding, inter alia, that this appellant was not entitled to interim injunction in the aid of the claim for specific performance of the selling agreement. Orrisa Manganese and Minerals Limited (the respondent in short hereinafter) obtained a mining lease to extract iron ore from an area in Ghatkuri now in the district of Singhbhum (West) in the State of Jharkhand. On February 27, 2005 the respondent and Synergy Ispat Private Limited (the appellant in short hereinafter) entered into a selling agreement agreeing to sell to the appellant the entire iron ore excavated from the leasehold area of the respondent as per the terms and conditions mentioned in the said agreement. On February 27, 2005 a raising agreement was entered into between the respondent and Metsil Exports Private Limited (Metsil in short hereinafter). It was alleged by the respondent that sometime in November, 2006 the respondent came to learn that the aforementioned agreements entered into between the respondent and the appellant and the said Metsil are in violation of rule 37 of the Mineral Concession Rules, 1960. Sometime in 2007, there has been a change of management in the respondent. On or about June 22, 2007 allegedly the respondent disowned the aforementioned agreement. The said alleged letter dated June 22, 2007 was, allegedly, posted on June 23, 2007 in the afternoon. The appellant contended that they came to know about the said letter when it received a letter dated June 11, 2010. The respondent, however, had taken inconsistent stands regarding the receipt of the said letter by the appellant. The respondent alleged that there has been a meeting between the two directors of the respondent and representative of the appellant in New Delhi when the aforementioned letter dated June 22, 2007 was referred and it was allegedly agreed that the selling agreement was a void agreement. The respondent alleged that it issued a letter dated August 1, 2008 purportedly enclosing a cheque for Rs.1,67,50,000/- (Rupees one crore sixty seven lakh fifty thousand) only towards the purported return of the advance. The respondent alleged that it issued a letter dated August 1, 2008 purportedly enclosing a cheque for Rs.1,67,50,000/- (Rupees one crore sixty seven lakh fifty thousand) only towards the purported return of the advance. The said letter was allegedly posted on August 11, 2008 and was allegedly delivered to the appellant on August 12, 2008. The appellant, however, contended that it came to know about the said letter dated August 1, 2008 when it received another letter dated January 11, 2010. Sometime in October, 2008 the respondent obtained working permission in Ghatkuri Mines. When the appellant came to learn that the respondent was proposing to commence mining operation in the disputed mines in violation of the selling agreement, some correspondences were exchanged between the parties, which, ultimately, resulted in a request for referring the dispute between the appellant and the respondent to arbitral tribunal. The appellant on September 26, 2011 filed an application under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, which was registered as A.P. No. 922 of 2011. The Hon’ble Single Judge on November 14, 2011 passed an ad interim order in connection with A.P. No. 922 of 2011. On March 14, 2012 A.P. No. 922 of 2011 was listed before this Hon’ble Judge. The respondent submitted before the Court that the respondent was not operating the disputed mines or undertaking any mining activity in view of the restricted orders of the appropriate authority being in operation. The Hon’ble Single Judge, therefore, by order dated March 14, 2012, disposed of A.P. No. 922 of 2011, by directing that, without prejudice to the contentions of the respondent the claim of the appellant was barred, the respondent would issue a notice to the appellant at least seven days in advance addressed to the learned advocate-on-record for the appellant before the commencement of the mining operations by the respondent. However, His Lordship held that the question as to whether the claim of the petitioner was barred by limitation and as to whether the agreement between the parties might be in derogation of the Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation Act), 1957, could not be gone into at that stage. It was observed that such issues could be gone by the arbitrator in the reference for which the appellant had, already, initiated steps. It was observed that such issues could be gone by the arbitrator in the reference for which the appellant had, already, initiated steps. On March 19, 2012 Jharkhand State Pollution Control Board issued an order permitting the respondent to operate the disputed mines for 2 (two) million tonnes per annum on March 21, 2012. A Division Bench of this Court in connection with A.P.O.T. No. 184 of 2012 passed an order on April 17, 2012 appointing Mr. Pradip Kumar Ghosh, learned senior advocate of this Court, as the sole arbitrator. Therefore, all disputes between the parties were referred to the sole arbitration of the said Mr. Pradip Kumar Ghosh. By judgment and order dated May 9, 2012, A.P.O.T. No. 184 of 2012 was disposed of, inter alia, by modifying the order passed by the Hon’ble Single Judge. The respondent was permitted to sell mining extract to the appellant in the event the appellant opted for purchase of any quantity of mining extract at the price that would be prevailing in the market at the time of purchase and in that case the amount that was lying with the respondent would be adjusted against such price and the balance price must be paid by the appellant. However, such arrangement was suggested without prejudice to the rights and contentions of the parties. In the event, the appellant was not willing to purchase the extract of the mines, the amount that was lying with the respondent would be returned to the appellant, who would take back the sum without prejudice to its rights and contentions before the arbitral tribunal. The order of the Hon’ble Single Judge was, therefore, substantially modified and it was clarified that the findings and the observations of the Hon’ble Single Judge and that of the Division Bench would be regarded as tentative and it would not have any binding effect either at the time of hearing arbitration agreement or at the time of final hearing of the interlocutory application before the Hon’ble Single Judge. On July 10, 2012 the respondent forwarded a cheque for Rs.1,67,50,000/- (Rupees one crore sixty seven lakh fifty thousand) only to the appellant and the appellant on July 27, 2012 returned the said cheque to the respondent. On July 10, 2012 the respondent forwarded a cheque for Rs.1,67,50,000/- (Rupees one crore sixty seven lakh fifty thousand) only to the appellant and the appellant on July 27, 2012 returned the said cheque to the respondent. There was a petition for Special Leave (Civil) No. 20425 of 2012 before the Supreme Court of India challenging the said judgment and order dated May 9, 2012 passed in A.P.O.T. No. 184 of 2012. The Supreme Court of India disposed of the said special leave petition on July 27, 2012, inter alia, by directing expeditious hearing of A.P. No. 245 of 2012 by the Hon’ble Single Judge. On March 21, 2012, that is, within the seven days from the date of disposal of A.P. No. 922 of 2011, the learned advocate-on-record for the respondent informed the appellant that the respondent would be commencing mining operations in the disputed mines on and from March 28, 2012. The appellant was compelled to move yet another application under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, which was registered as A.P. No. 245 of 2012, as the appellant asserted that they had the exclusive right to buy the iron ore excavated from the disputed mines in terms of the aforementioned agreement dated February 27, 2005. The Hon’ble Single Judge, by order dated March 29, 2012, passed an interim order restraining the respondent by itself or its servants or agents or assigns or otherwise, howsoever, from selling any part of the extract from the disputed mines in any manner whatsoever without offering the entire extract to the appellant in terms of the agreement dated February 27, 2005. The Hon’ble Single Judge, by impugned judgment and order dated September 5, 2012, rejected the application under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act with the finding that the appellant was not entitled to any interlocutory injunction in the aid of the claim for specific performance of the aforementioned selling agreement. The Hon’ble Single Judge, inter alia, held that the selling agreement was subservient or dependent on the raising agreement with the Metsil and the meaningful reading of the selling agreement would reveal that it was incapable of being performed dehors the raising agreement. The Hon’ble Single Judge, inter alia, held that the selling agreement was subservient or dependent on the raising agreement with the Metsil and the meaningful reading of the selling agreement would reveal that it was incapable of being performed dehors the raising agreement. The Hon’ble Single Judge found that there were common directors in the Boards of the appellant and the Metsil and, therefore, it might not be conclusive, but such fact went a long way to sustain the contention of the respondent that two agreements were part of a composite agreement. The pricing mechanism in the agreements gave credence to the contention of the respondent that two agreements were part of a composite agreement. The annulment of the raising agreement would, effectively, imply the annulment of the selling agreement. In any event, a relevant clause recognising the exclusive right of the appellant to receive the produce extracted from the disputed mine was no longer in the fray and that there was no positive pleading in support of the negative covenant. However, the Hon’ble Single Judge recorded concession of the respondent that the question as to whether the selling agreement was in violation of rule 37 of the Minerals Concession Rules, 1960, has to be adjudicated in course of arbitral reference. Before we deal with the findings of the Hon’ble Single Judge, in the order impugned, we record that the conduct of the respondent is not praiseworthy. It seems that the respondent obtained the mining licence only to trade in the said mining lease. The respondent entered into an agreement on May 14, 2003 with Adhunik Steels Limited for raising in relation to the disputed mines. The term of the afore-mentioned agreement was for 10 (ten) years with effect from May 18, 2003. It conferred Adhunik Steels Limited an option to seek a renewal for further terms. Although Adhunik Steels Limited, pursuant to such agreement, purportedly, mobilised huge resources for carrying out the excavation and extraction of the minerals, the respondent terminated the said agreement on the allegation that it had realised that the agreement with Adhunik Steels Limited was one in violation of rule 37 of the Mineral Concession Rules, 1960. The dispute between respondent on the one hand and Adhunik Steels Limited in the other reached the Supreme Court of India. The dispute between respondent on the one hand and Adhunik Steels Limited in the other reached the Supreme Court of India. It is a reported decision in Adhunik Steels Limited -versus- Orissa Manganese and Minerals Private Limited reported in (2007) 7 SCC 125 . The learned advocate for the respondent, submits that the conduct of the respondent is not that relevant in an injunction matter as that of the petitioner. We are of the opinion that equity is not one way street so as to entitle one of the parties to get any relief in equity. The Court has to do equity and in doing so it has to consider a fact situation and only, thereafter, that it can pass certain orders thereof. In dispensing justice to the litigating parties, the Courts not only go into the merits of the respective cases, but the Courts, also, try to balance the equities so as to do complete justice between them. Since it has been conceded by the respondent before the Hon’ble Single Judge that the question as to whether the selling agreement is in violation of rule 37 of the Mineral Concession Rules, 1960 had to be adjudicated in the arbitral reference, we feel that we should not express our views on the subject and the matter is left to the arbitral tribunal. The Hon’ble Single Judge was grossly impressed by the facts that since those two agreements dated February 27, 2005 were executed on the same day and there were common directors both in the appellant and the Metsil, they were composite agreements and not a standalone contract. The Hon’ble Single Judge, further, held that unless there is raising by Metsil, there could not be any sale of iron ores to the appellant. We have, carefully, considered the materials on records and it appears, prima facie, to us that the appellant and the Metsil are two independent companies and are separate and distinct legal entities. The shareholders of the two companies are entirely different. The existence of even common shareholders and directors would not lead to inference that one company would be bound by the acts of the other. In this connection, we can profitably refer to the decision of the Supreme Court of India in Indowind Energy Limited -versus- Wescare (India) Limited and another reported in (2010) 5 SCC 306 . The existence of even common shareholders and directors would not lead to inference that one company would be bound by the acts of the other. In this connection, we can profitably refer to the decision of the Supreme Court of India in Indowind Energy Limited -versus- Wescare (India) Limited and another reported in (2010) 5 SCC 306 . The parties had, with their eyes wide open, agreed to enter into two separate agreements and agreed to the pricing mechanism, which was arrived at considering the prevalent market price. It provides for increase and decrease thereof at the rate of 21 per centum per annum of the price difference and the parties, further, agreed to review the average market price on yearly basis. We are of the considered opinion, of course, prima facie, that the parties consciously on the same day had entered into two separate agreements and not a tripartite agreement as perceived by the Hon’ble Single Judge in the order impugned. The Hon’ble Single Judge was critical that there was no positive pleading in support of the negative covenant in the petition. The relief for mandatory injunction and perpetual injunction is based on the exclusivity of clause no. 14.1 in the agreement dated February 27, 2005. The clause itself contains negative covenant. In the clause 14.1 there was no reference to either raising contract or Metsil. The mere reference to raising contractor in the agreement will not convert a standalone agreement into a composite agreement. Moreover, the agreement was never terminated on the ground similar to that on which the agreement with Metsil was terminated, but on the pretext of violation of rule 37 of the Mineral Concession Rules, 1960. Therefore, the finding of the Hon’ble Single Judge that there was no positive pleading in support of the negative covenant of the petition is contrary to the materials on records inasmuch as the appellant did make out a clear case for mandatory and perpetual injunction based on the exclusivity of clause no. 14.1 in the agreement. The learned senior counsel for the respondent submits that since the Hon’ble Single Judge declined to pass an interim order in connection with an application under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, the appeal Court should not interfere with such exercise of discretion. 14.1 in the agreement. The learned senior counsel for the respondent submits that since the Hon’ble Single Judge declined to pass an interim order in connection with an application under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, the appeal Court should not interfere with such exercise of discretion. In Adhunik Steels Limited (supra) the Supreme Court of India observed that when the grant of relief by way of injunction has been, in general governed by the Specific Relief Act, and Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act provided for an approach to the Court for an interim injunction, the relevant provisions of the Specific Relief Act could not be kept out of consideration. The grant of interim injunction has necessarily to be based on the pleas governing its grant of relevant provision of the Specific Relief Act and a law bearing on the subject. The respondent has been adopting contradictory stands regarding delivery of the alleged letter dated June 22, 2007 on the appellant. It took the plea that the said letter was received by the appellant on June 28, 2007. Subsequently, the respondent took the plea that the letter dated June 22, 2007 was posted from Bhubaneswar and it was received by the appellant in Delhi on June 25, 2007 and the acknowledgement due card was returned to the respondent on June 28, 2007. In view of the contradictory stands of the respondent regarding the alleged delivery of the purported letter of repudiation of the contract, it raises doubt, prima facie, in our mind, as to whether the agreement was actually terminated or it is a dishonest attempt to avoid the agreement. We express no further opinion as the matter is pending before the arbitral tribunal and the issue as to whether the agreement was repudiated by issuing a letter of termination or not is a subject-matter of the arbitral tribunal. It was contended that the appellant did not comply with covenant of the agreement inasmuch as it did not set up the iron plant. It appears from the recital of the agreement that the production of the proposed plant was to commence within 2 (two) years from the effective date of commencement of the mining operation. It was contended that the appellant did not comply with covenant of the agreement inasmuch as it did not set up the iron plant. It appears from the recital of the agreement that the production of the proposed plant was to commence within 2 (two) years from the effective date of commencement of the mining operation. The appellant was never informed about the mining operation and, in fact, the respondent alleged that the contract was terminated in 2007 on the alleged violation of rule 37 of the Mineral Concession Rules, 1960, that is, much prior to commencement of the mining operation. The Hon’ble Single Judge held, proceeding on the basis, that in substance, the agreement between the appellant and the respondent was not a standalone contract, but it was tripartite agreement. Prima facie, it appears to be doubtful and possibly based on erroneous appreciation of the facts and circumstances of this case. From the pleadings of the parties it is doubtful, prima facie, as to whether the agreement was actually terminated by the respondent or not. The respondent has been trying to make out a case, which is contrary to the contract itself while the appellant was trying to enforce the negative covenant based on the contract. Therefore, the order impugned stands set aside. The application filed by the appellant under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act is allowed in part. The respondent is restrained by an order of injunction to sell the iron ores excavated from the disputed mines to any third party without first offering to the appellant and is, further, directed to maintain accounts of the iron ores raised from the said mines since the commencement of the mining operation subject, however, to the result of the arbitral proceeding. We make it clear that the findings arrived at by the Hon’ble Single Judge and, also, by us are limited for the purpose of disposal of the application under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act and are without prejudice to the rights and contentions of the parties before the learned arbitrator. Before we part with we have noticed a footnote in the order impugned, which runs as under: - “Three decades or so ago, a few great Indians in whose reflected glory the judiciary basks even today, firmly founded the great epistolary jurisdiction. Before we part with we have noticed a footnote in the order impugned, which runs as under: - “Three decades or so ago, a few great Indians in whose reflected glory the judiciary basks even today, firmly founded the great epistolary jurisdiction. This momentous judicial device came as a beacon of light and hope to millions of voiceless citizens who had been seared in the flames of withering injustice. Over the years it ushered in an air of reform from pavements to jails, from the greens of the forests to what we breathe in the cities. More rewardingly for the ordinary citizens, it shone the arclights into the seemingly black holes of intrigue as it sought to install accountability ahead of the mumbo-jumbo of political and commercial expedience; it discovered a missing dimension to give more meaning to constitutional democracy. In some measure it may have assuaged the misgivings of the countrymen for an earlier perceived institutional failure when they stood denuded of their basic rights. “If the constitutional command to the judiciary is to bring about a social revolution and act in the larger public good, one would be missing the wood for the trees if one fails to recognise the symptom of the social malaise that screams from behind the scenes of this inane skirmish that the parties have presented in this matter. For sure, courts of law in this country decide disputes; but that is only a part – albeit, a major facet – of the role of courts, individually and collectively as an institution. In the constitutional scheme of things, courts are the protectors of citizens’ rights. “The purpose of this digression is to highlight what cries for attention beyond the immediate facts that the parties have harped on. The respondent appears to have been adept at obtaining mining licences to only to trade in them. The notes to the respondent’s balance-sheets appended to its latest affidavit abound in the reference to the respondent’s unerring modus operandi. In the respondent obtaining one mining licence after another, spread over a basket of minerals, and thereafter not operating the mines and outsourcing the work for a cut, there is a story to catch. The notes to the respondent’s balance-sheets appended to its latest affidavit abound in the reference to the respondent’s unerring modus operandi. In the respondent obtaining one mining licence after another, spread over a basket of minerals, and thereafter not operating the mines and outsourcing the work for a cut, there is a story to catch. And, it is such story that appears to be worthy of pursuit to arrest it s repetition and ensure that what belongs to all Indians – never mind the immediate traditional rights of the tribal fold and the locals – are not dealt with for the illegitimate benefit of a few. It appears that the respondent in its old avatar, prior to its management being taken over by Adhunik Steels limited early in 2007, specialised only in procuring mining licences, not in mining operations. The respondent could not have been the only specialist at this typically Indian game, akin to the mythical rope-trick. That may be worth inquiring into for the larger good. At a time when screaming newspaper frong-page headlines and photographs over the recent months fuel a perception in some cases, needlessly – of the servility of servants of the Constitution to other masters, it may be a commendable duty to undertake, if only to instill confidence in the institution and wean away the disbelievers from the other disagreeable for a of dispute resolution. “This matter had reached the highest level at the ad interim stage and will, doubtless, be carried there again. This foot is only an expression of hope for then.” We hold that such footnote was not necessary for deciding this matter. We, therefore, set aside the unnecessary footnote inserted by the learned Judge in the impugned judgment and order. A sum of Rs. 1,67,50,000/- (One crore sixty seven lakh fifty thousand) only, with interest accrued thereon, is lying with the learned Registrar, Original Side of this Court and it is invested in short-term interest bearing fixed deposit with a nationalised bank. The deposit shall, however, abide by the result of the arbitral proceeding. The learned Registrar, Original Side, is requested to keep the fixed deposit renewed from time to time. The appeal is, thus, allowed. The parties are directed to bear their respective costs in this appeal. I agree.