Judgment Soumen Sen, J. This second appeal is preferred against the order of affirmation passed by the learned Civil Judge, Senior Division, Diamond Harbour, South 24 Pgs. In Title Appeal no. 9 of 2000. Against the concurrent finding of facts as to the validity of the agreement on which specific performance has been sought for, this second appeal has been preferred. At the time of admission of the second appeal, it appears that the said appeal was admitted on the limited question of law as to whether the courts below erred in law by decreeing the suit for specific performance of contract without any finding that the plaintiff was all along ready and willing to perform his part of the contract which is a mandatory requirement under the provisions of the Specific Relief Act. On this limited issue the said second appeal was admitted. The said issue appears to have been framed in view of the clear mandate of section 16 (c) of the Specific Relief Act which requires that the plaintiff would not get a decree of specific performance unless he avers and proves that he has performed or has always been ready and willing to perform the essential terms of the contract which are to be performed by him. The appeal however is not sought to be argued on this point. Mr. Shamit Sanyal, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the appellant however does not argue on this aspect of the matter since the principal ground of challenge appears to be that both the courts below have completely misconstrued the agreement of which specific performance has been sought for by the plaintiff. This ground however has not been one of the grounds on which the said appeal was admitted. The argument as to the lack of readiness and willingness on the part of the plaintiff possibly was not pressed in view of clear evidence of the plaintiff wherefrom it appears that the plaintiff has been able to prove readiness and willingness which is sine qua non for getting a decree for specific performance. Mr. Sanyal has candidly submitted that in view of the pleading and evidence on record it cannot be said that the plaintiff has not been able to establish readiness and willingness of the said agreement. Mr. Sanyal has candidly submitted that in view of the pleading and evidence on record it cannot be said that the plaintiff has not been able to establish readiness and willingness of the said agreement. However the learned counsel contended that the said appellant is in fact an agreement to secure loan and essentially a loan agreement. The learned counsel for the appellant in all fairness has submitted that the substantial question of law on which the appeal has been admitted is not pressed by him in view of the fact that the record of the proceedings before the trial court would show that the plaintiff had deposited a sum of Rs. 2550/-in the pending suit before the decree was passed. The principal argument appears to be that the said agreement is essentially a security for loan and not a sale agreement. In construing an agreement primary intention of the parties are to be gathered from the instrument itself. The agreement in unequivocal terms shows that the defendant was in need of money and in order to realise the money the defendant wanted to sell the property. The agreement records that the defendant had agreed to sell the property at a consideration of Rs.8000/-. By way of an earnest money a sum of Rs.5500/-was taken as advance at the time of execution of the said agreement and the balance amount was payable at the time of execution of the conveyance. Even after the execution of the said agreement for sale if the defendant had retained possession of the property and there were other evidence to show that the defendant has exercised his rights as owner of the property notwithstanding what have been stated in the said agreement for sale, the consequence would have been different. The possession of the property was delivered simultaneously with the execution of the agreement for sale. The true nature of the transaction is not that of a security for sale but a sale transaction. Thus the plaintiff has been able to establish at the trial that it is an agreement for sale. The onus is on the defendant to establish that the said sale was in fact an agreement for security of loan and not an agreement for sale which the defendant has failed to discharge at the trial. Thus the plaintiff has been able to establish at the trial that it is an agreement for sale. The onus is on the defendant to establish that the said sale was in fact an agreement for security of loan and not an agreement for sale which the defendant has failed to discharge at the trial. However of the various grounds taken the Hon’ble Division Bench did not admit the appeal on the above ground. In view of aforesaid the second appeal fails. However there shall be no order as to costs.