A.M.Sapre, CJ. This is a writ petition filed by writ petitioners (15 in numbers) under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India seeking to invoke our extra ordinary jurisdiction in the field of Public Interest Litigation (PIL). 2. According to the writ petitioners, they are the residents of Lakhipur District. Their main grievance in this writ petition is about the place for construction of one “Recreation Centre Hall” in the area. They say that the site selected by the authorities is neither suitable nor proper for construction of the Recreation Centre Hall and hence it should not be allowed to be constructed at the place chosen by the authorities but it should be at some other place which is of their liking. In other words, the question raised by them for our decision is which is the proper place for construction of Recreation Centre Hall – whether at “A“ place chosen by the state authorities or at “B“ place which writ petitioner say to be more proper and suitable. 3. We are afraid; we can entertain the writ petition (PIL) for deciding this question in our PIL jurisdiction. It is not permissible in the light of law laid down by the Supreme Court in a case reported in (2002) 10 SCC 226 (Union of India vs Kannadapara). 4. This is what the Supreme Court laid down in the aforesaid decision while dealing with the same type of issue. “5. We do not find any basis for the High Court coming to the conclusion that the decision of the Union Cabinet was vitiated on account of legal mala fides. Merely because an administrative decision has been taken to locate the headquarters at Bangalore, which decision is subsequently altered by the same authority, namely, the Union Cabinet, cannot lead one to the conclusion that there has been legal mala fides. Why the headquarters should be at Hubli and not at Bangalore, is not for the court to decide. There are various factors which have to be taken into consideration when a decision like this has to be arrived at. Assuming that the decision so taken is a political one, it cannot possibly give rise to a challenge on the ground of legal mala fides. A political decision, if taken by a competent authority in accordance with law, cannot per se be regarded as mala fide. Assuming that the decision so taken is a political one, it cannot possibly give rise to a challenge on the ground of legal mala fides. A political decision, if taken by a competent authority in accordance with law, cannot per se be regarded as mala fide. In any case, there is nothing on the record to show that the present decision was motivated by political consideration. The observation of the High Court that there has been a change in the decision because there was a change of the Governments and a different political party had come into power, is not supported by any basis. That the court will not interfere in questions of policy decision is clearly brought out by the following passage from a decision of this Court in Delhi Science Forum v. Union of India (1996) 2 SCC 405 ) when at p. 413, it was observed as follows: (SCC p. 413, para 7) “7. What has been said in respect of legislations is applicable even in respect of policies which have been adopted by Parliament. They cannot be tested in court of law. The courts cannot express their opinion as to whether at a particular juncture or under a particular situation prevailing in the country any such national policy should have been adopted or not. There may be views and views, opinions and opinions which may be shared and believed by citizens of the country including the representatives of the people in Parliament. But that has to be sorted out in Parliament which has to approve such policies. Privatisation is a fundamental concept underlying the questions about the power to make economic decisions. What should be the role of the State in the economic development of the nation? How the resources of the country shall be used? How the goals fixed shall be attained? What are to be the safeguards to prevent the abuse of the economic power? What is the mechanism of accountability to ensure that the decision regarding privatisation is in public interest? All these questions have to be answered by a vigilant Parliament. Courts have their limitations — because these issues rest with the policy-makers for the nation. No direction can be given or is expected from the courts unless while implementing such policies, there is violation or infringement of any of the constitutional or statutory provision. All these questions have to be answered by a vigilant Parliament. Courts have their limitations — because these issues rest with the policy-makers for the nation. No direction can be given or is expected from the courts unless while implementing such policies, there is violation or infringement of any of the constitutional or statutory provision. The new Telecom policy was placed before Parliament and it shall be deemed that Parliament has approved the same. This Court cannot review and examine as to whether the said policy should have been adopted. Of course, whether there is any legal or constitutional bar in adopting such policy can certainly be examined by the Court.” 6. We further find that the High Court has issued a direction to the appellants herein to locate the zonal office of the Railways at Bangalore. Apart from the fact that in matters of policy the court will not interfere, such a direction could under no circumstances have been issued. If a case had been made out, and in this case no such case had been made out, that a decision to locate at Hubli was not in accordance with law, then the only direction which could have been issued by the court was to consider as to where the headquarters should be located. It is not the function of the court to decide the location or the sites of the headquarters, it is the function of the Government. On this ground also, the decision of the High Court is incorrect. 7. For the aforesaid reasons, these appeals are allowed and the impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside, the result of which would be that the writ petition filed by the respondents would stand dismissed.” 5. In the light of authoritative pronouncement of the Supreme Court, we find absolutely no merit in this writ petition because it is not for the court to decide as to where one should construct a building in the city. It is essentially for the State to decide whether it should at “A” place or “B” place. Once they choose the venue, such decision cannot stand for judicial scrutiny in our extra ordinary jurisdiction under article 226/227 of the Constitution unless it has prima facie case based on peculiar undisputed facts. Such is not the case here. 6. It is essentially for the State to decide whether it should at “A” place or “B” place. Once they choose the venue, such decision cannot stand for judicial scrutiny in our extra ordinary jurisdiction under article 226/227 of the Constitution unless it has prima facie case based on peculiar undisputed facts. Such is not the case here. 6. The petitioners should feel fortunate that they are getting one “Recreation Centre Hall” in the area. What is more important for the citizens is to have an activity of this nature or of any kind to come up in their area but not the place where it is coming. Whether it comes up at a place “A” or “B”, it is of no consequence. A citizen or group of citizen can neither demand and nor dictate to the State/authorities, that particular activity should come and that too at a particular place of his liking. Such legal right does not flow in their favour. It is neither their property right nor contractual right and nor personal right available against the State. 7. We have perused the petition and find that it has no subsisting cause of action. 8. As a consequence, the petition fails and is accordingly dismissed in limine. No cost.