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2014 DIGILAW 484 (HP)

Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. v. Birma Devi

2014-04-28

RAJIV SHARMA

body2014
Judgment : Justice Rajiv Sharma, Judge. The applicant/appellant has instituted an appeal against the award dated 17.1.2012 rendered by the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Kinnaur at Rampur Bushahr in M.A.C. Petition No. 85 of 2009. The appeal is barred by one year, two months and twelve days. Hence, the present application. 2. According to the averments contained in the application, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the insurance company applied for the certified copy of award on 18.1.2012. It was received by him on 4.2.2012. He sent the same to the Divisional Office, Shimla in the month of February, 2012. However, the records sent by the counsel got misplaced in the connected appeals. When the learned counsel, who had conducted the case before the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, asked for the release of legal fee in the month of June, 2013, it transpired that certified copy of the award was not on the record. In these circumstances, learned counsel advised the Divisional Office, Shimla to obtain fresh copy of the award. Thereafter, certified copy was applied on 24.6.2013. It was supplied on 25.6.2013. Thereafter, it was sent to the office of the applicant at Shimla on 27.6.2013. 3. The application has been contested by the claimants. The version put forth by the applicant cannot be believed. It is not believable that certified copy of the award dated 17.1.2012 was misplaced in the office. In case, it has been misplaced definitely action would have been taken against the officer/official, who was responsible for this. There is no averment contained in the application that any action has been taken against the officer/official of the insurance company for misplacing the certified copy of the award dated 17.1.2012. In fact, certified copy, as per averment made in the application, was obtained on 4.2.2012 itself. In the application, name of the learned counsel, who had appeared on behalf of the applicant has not even been disclosed. The copy of the bill raised by the learned counsel has also not been placed on record. The entire story has been concocted by the applicant to over come delay of one year two months and twelve days. 4. The applicant has not explained satisfactorily an inordinate delay in filing the appeal. The copy of the bill raised by the learned counsel has also not been placed on record. The entire story has been concocted by the applicant to over come delay of one year two months and twelve days. 4. The applicant has not explained satisfactorily an inordinate delay in filing the appeal. It is settled law that Courts ought to be liberal while considering application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, but at the same time, the rights which have accrued to the opposite party cannot be overlooked. 5. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Oriental Aroma Chemical Industries Limited vs Gujarat Industrial Development Corporation and another, (2010) 5 SCC 459 have held that there should be liberal approach in condoning delay of short duration and strict approach in cases of inordinate delay and the same yardstick is to be applied for deciding applications of private individuals and the State. However, certain amount of latitude is not impermissible with regard to State. Their Lordships have held as under: “14. We have considered the respective submissions. The law of limitation is founded on public policy. The legislature does not prescribe limitation with the object of destroying the rights of the parties but to ensure that they do not resort to dilatory tactics and seek remedy without delay. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a period fixed by the legislature. To put it differently, the law of limitation prescribes a period within which legal remedy can be availed for redress of the legal injury. At the same time, the courts are bestowed with the power to condone the delay, if sufficient cause is shown for not availing the remedy within the stipulated time. 15. The expression "sufficient cause" employed in Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963 and similar other statutes is elastic enough to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which sub serves the ends of justice. Although, no hard and fast rule can be laid down in dealing with the applications for condonation of delay, this Court has justifiably advocated adoption of a liberal approach in condoning the delay of short duration and a stricter approach where the delay is inordinate -Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Although, no hard and fast rule can be laid down in dealing with the applications for condonation of delay, this Court has justifiably advocated adoption of a liberal approach in condoning the delay of short duration and a stricter approach where the delay is inordinate -Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag v. Mst. Katiji (1987) 2 SCC 107 , N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy (1998) 7 SCC 123 and Vedabai v. Shantaram Baburao Patil (2001) 9 SCC 106 . 16. In dealing with the applications for condonation of delay filed on behalf of the State and its agencies/instrumentalities this Court has, while emphasizing that same yardstick should be applied for deciding the applications for condonation of delay filed by private individuals and the State, observed that certain amount of latitude is not impermissible in the latter case because the State represents collective cause of the community and the decisions are taken by the officers/agencies at a slow pace and encumbered process of pushing the files from table to table consumes considerable time causing delay - G. Ramegowda v. Spl. Land Acquisition Officer (1988) 2 SCC 142 , State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani (1996) 3 SCC 132 , State of U.P. v. Harish Chandra (1996) 9 SCC 309 , State of Bihar v. Ratan Lal Sahu (1996) 10 SCC 635 , State of Nagaland v. Lipok Ao (2005) 3 SCC 752 , and State (NCT of Delhi) v. Ahmed Jaan (2008) 14 SCC 582 . 18. A reading of the impugned order makes it clear that the High Court did make a bald reference to the application for condonation of delay filed by the respondents but allowed the same without adverting to the averments contained therein and the reply filed on behalf of the appellant. Not only this, the High Court erroneously assumed that the delay was of 1067 days, though, as a matter of fact, the appeal was filed after more than four years. Another erroneous assumption made by the High Court was that the appellant had not filed reply to controvert the averments contained in the application for condonation of delay. 24. During the course of hearing, learned counsel for the respondents fairly conceded that in the second suit filed by the appellant there was a specific mention of decree dated 30.10.2004 passed in Special Civil Suit No. 32/2001. 24. During the course of hearing, learned counsel for the respondents fairly conceded that in the second suit filed by the appellant there was a specific mention of decree dated 30.10.2004 passed in Special Civil Suit No. 32/2001. He also conceded that even though the first suit remained pending before the trial Court for three years and five months and the second suit remained pending for more than two years, none of the officers of the Law Department or the Engineering Department of respondent No.1 appeared before the Court. 29. As a corollary, the appeal filed by the respondents against judgment and decree dated 30.10.2004 shall stand dismissed as barred by time. However, it is made clear that the disposal of this appeal shall not absolve the higher functionaries of respondent No.1 from the responsibility of conducting a thorough probe into the matter so that accountability of the defaulting officers/officials may be fixed and the loss, if any, suffered by respondent No.1 recovered from them after complying with the rules of natural justice.” 6. Their Lordship of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Lanka Venkateswarlu (Dead) by LRs. vs. State of Andhra Pradesh and Others, (2011) 4 SCC 363 have held that discretionary power to condon delay must be exercised reasonably. Their Lordships have held as under: “19. We have considered the submissions made by the learned counsel. At the outset, it needs to be stated that generally speaking, the courts in this country, including this Court, adopt a liberal approach in considering the application for condonation of delay on the ground of sufficient cause under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. This principle is well settled and has been set out succinctly in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag & Ors. Vs. Katiji & Ors. ( (1987) 2 SCC 107 ). 23. The concepts of liberal approach and reasonableness in exercise of the discretion by the Courts in condoning delay, have been again stated by this Court in the case of Balwant Singh (supra), as follows:- "25. We may state that even if the term "sufficient cause" has to receive liberal construction, it must squarely fall within the concept of reasonable time and proper conduct of the party concerned. The purpose of introducing liberal construction normally is to introduce the concept of "reasonableness" as it is understood in its general connotation." "26. We may state that even if the term "sufficient cause" has to receive liberal construction, it must squarely fall within the concept of reasonable time and proper conduct of the party concerned. The purpose of introducing liberal construction normally is to introduce the concept of "reasonableness" as it is understood in its general connotation." "26. The law of limitation is a substantive law and has definite consequences on the right and obligation of party to arise. These principles should be adhered to and applied appropriately depending on the facts and circumstances of a given case. Once a valuable right has accrued in favour of one party as a result of the failure of the other party to explain the delay by showing sufficient cause and its own conduct, it will be unreasonable to take away that right on the mere asking of the applicant, particularly when the delay is directly a result of negligence, default or inaction of that party. Justice must be done to both parties equally. Then alone the ends of justice can be achieved. If a party has been thoroughly negligent in implementing its rights and remedies, it will be equally unfair to deprive the other party of a valuable right that has accrued to it in law as a result of his acting vigilantly." 28. We are at a loss to fathom any logic or rationale, which could have impelled the High Court to condone the delay after holding the same to be unjustifiable. The concepts such as "liberal approach", "justice oriented approach", "substantial justice" can not be employed to jettison the substantial law of limitation. Especially, in cases where the Court concludes that there is no justification for the delay. In our opinion, the approach adopted by the High Court tends to show the absence of judicial balance and restraint, which a Judge is required to maintain whilst adjudicating any lis between the parties. We are rather pained to notice that in this case, not being satisfied with the use of mere intemperate language, the High Court resorted to blatant sarcasms. 29. The use of unduly strong intemperate or extravagant language in a judgment has been repeatedly disapproved by this Court in a number of cases. Whilst considering applications for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the Courts do not enjoy unlimited and unbridled discretionary powers. 29. The use of unduly strong intemperate or extravagant language in a judgment has been repeatedly disapproved by this Court in a number of cases. Whilst considering applications for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the Courts do not enjoy unlimited and unbridled discretionary powers. All discretionary powers, especially judicial powers, have to be exercised within reasonable bounds, known to the law. The discretion has to be exercised in a systematic manner informed by reason. Whims or fancies; prejudices or predilections can not and should not form the basis of exercising discretionary powers.” 7. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Maniben Devraj Shah vs. Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai, (2012) 5 SCC 157 have held that distinction must be made between delay of few days and inordinate delay causing prejudice to the other side and no premium can be given for total lethargy or utter negligence of State officers/machinery/agency/instrumentality and condonation of delay caused by such officers cannot be allowed as a matter of course by accepting plea that dismissal on ground of limitation will cause injury to public interest. Their Lordships have held as under: “12. Shri A.S. Bhasme, learned counsel for the appellants argued that the reasons assigned by the learned Single Judge for condoning more than 7 years and 3 months delay in filing the appeals are legally unsustainable and the impugned order is liable to be set aside because the explanation given by the Corporation lacked bonafides and was wholly unsatisfactory. Learned counsel emphasized that in the absence of any denial by the Corporation that it has a battery of advocates to deal with the litigation, the transfer of Shri Ranindra Y. Sirsikar in January, 2004 to Miscellaneous Court and, thereafter, to other Courts has no bearing on the issue of delay because the suits filed by the appellants had been decided in May, 2003 and no explanation has been given as to why applications for certified copies could not be filed for 7 years and 5 months. Shri Bhasme submitted that even if one advocate / law officer was transferred from one department / division to another, nothing prevented the Corporation from taking steps to apply for certified copies of the judgment. Shri Bhasme submitted that even if one advocate / law officer was transferred from one department / division to another, nothing prevented the Corporation from taking steps to apply for certified copies of the judgment. Shri Bhasme further submitted that the story of misplacement of papers was concocted by the Corporation and the same ought to have been rejected by the High Court because the assertion made in that regard was vague to the core and no indication was given as to when the papers were traced and by whom. In support of his argument, Shri Bhasme relied upon the judgments of this Court in Oriental Aroma Chemical Industries Limited v. Gujarat Industrial Development Corporation (2010) 5 SCC 459 . 14. We have considered the respective arguments / submissions and carefully scrutinized the record. The law of limitation is founded on public policy. The Limitation Act, 1963 has not been enacted with the object of destroying the rights of the parties but to ensure that they approach the Court for vindication of their rights without unreasonable delay. The idea underlying the concept of limitation is that every remedy should remain alive only till the expiry of the period fixed by the Legislature. At the same time, the Courts are empowered to condone the delay provided that sufficient cause is shown by the applicant for not availing the remedy within the prescribed period of limitation. 15. The expression sufficient cause used in Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and other statutes is elastic enough to enable the Courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which serve the ends of justice. No hard and fast rule has been or can be laid down for deciding the applications for condonation of delay but over the years this Court has advocated that a liberal approach should be adopted in such matters so that substantive rights of the parties are not defeated merely because of delay. 23. No hard and fast rule has been or can be laid down for deciding the applications for condonation of delay but over the years this Court has advocated that a liberal approach should be adopted in such matters so that substantive rights of the parties are not defeated merely because of delay. 23. What needs to be emphasised is that even though a liberal and justice oriented approach is required to be adopted in the exercise of power under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and other similar statutes, the Courts can neither become oblivious of the fact that the successful litigant has acquired certain rights on the basis of the judgment under challenge and a lot of time is consumed at various stages of litigation apart from the cost. 24. What colour the expression sufficient cause would get in the factual matrix of a given case would largely depend on bona fide nature of the explanation. If the Court finds that there has been no negligence on the part of the applicant and the cause shown for the delay does not lack bona fides, then it may condone the delay. If, on the other hand, the explanation given by the applicant is found to be concocted or he is thoroughly negligent in prosecuting his cause, then it would be a legitimate exercise of discretion not to condone the delay. 25. In cases involving the State and its agencies/instrumentalities, the Court can take note of the fact that sufficient time is taken in the decision making process but no premium can be given for total lethargy or utter negligence on the part of the officers of the State and / or its agencies / instrumentalities and the applications filed by them for condonation of delay cannot be allowed as a matter of course by accepting the plea that dismissal of the matter on the ground of bar of limitation will cause injury to the public interest. 28. The applications filed for condonation of delay and the affidavits of Shri Sirsikar are conspicuously silent on the following important points: (a) The name of the person who was having custody of the record has not been disclosed. (b) The date, month and year when the papers required for filing the first appeals are said to have been misplaced have not been disclosed. (b) The date, month and year when the papers required for filing the first appeals are said to have been misplaced have not been disclosed. (c) The date on which the papers were traced out or recovered and name of the person who found the same have not been disclosed. (d) No explanation whatsoever has been given as to why the applications for certified copies of the judgments of the trial Court were not filed till 23.8.2010 despite the fact that Shri Sirsikar had given intimation on 12.5.2003 about the judgments of the trial Court. (e) Even though the Corporation has engaged battery of lawyers to conduct cases on its behalf, nothing has been said as to how the transfer of Shri Ranindra Y. Sirsikar operated as an impediment in the making of applications for certified copies of the judgments sought to be appealed against.” 8. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Amalendu Kumar Bra and others vs. Sate of West Bengal, (2013) 4 SCC 52 have held that courts should not take liberal approach in matter of condonation of delay when State’s action in preferring appeal is marred by serious laches and negligence in absence of “sufficient cause”. Their Lordships have held as under: “10. In the instant case as noticed above, admittedly earlier objection filed by the Respondent-State under Section 47 of the Code was dismissed on 17.8.2010. Instead of challenging the said order the Respondent-State after about one year filed another objection on 15.9.2011 under Section 47 of the Code which was finally rejected by the executing court. It was only after a writ of attachment was issued by the executing court the respondent preferred civil revision against the first order dated 17.8.2010 along with a petition for condonation of delay. Curiously enough in the application for condonation of delay no sufficient cause has been shown which entitle the respondent to get a favourable order for condonation of delay. True it is, that courts should always take liberal approach in the matter of condonation of delay, particularly when the appellant is the State but in a case where there is serious laches and negligence on the part of the State in challenging the decree passed in the suit and affirmed in appeal, the State cannot be allowed to wait to file objection under Section 47 till the decree holder puts the decree in execution. As noticed above, the decree passed in the year 1967 was in respect of declaration of title and permanent injunction restraining the Respondent-State from interfering with the possession of the suit property of the plaintiff-appellant. It is evident that when the State tried to interfere with possession the decree holder had no alternative but to levy the execution case for execution of the decree with regard to interference with possession. In our opinion their delay in filing the execution case cannot be a ground to condone the delay in filing the revision against the order refusing to entertain objection under Section 47 CPC. This aspect of the matter has not been considered by the High Court while deciding petition for condoning the delay. Merely because the Respondent is the State, delay in filing the appeal or revision cannot and shall not be mechanically considered and in absence of 'sufficient cause' delay shall not be condoned.” 9. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Esha Bhattacharjee vs. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy and others, (2013) 12 SCC 649 have laid down the following principles applicable to application of condonation of delay as under: “21.1. There should be a liberal, pragmatic, justice -oriented, non- pedantic approach while dealing with an application for condonation of delay, for the courts are not supposed to legalise injustice but are obliged to remove injustice. 21.2. The terms “sufficient cause” should be understood in their proper spirit, philosophy and purpose regard being had to the fact that these terms are basically elastic and are to be applied in proper perspective to the obtaining fact -situation. 21.3. Substantial justice being paramount and pivotal the technical considerations should not be given undue and uncalled for emphasis. 21.4. No presumption can be attached to deliberate causation of delay but, gross negligence on the part of the counsel or litigant is to be taken note of. 21.5. Lack of bona fides imputable to a party seeking condonation of delay is a significant and relevant fact. 21.6. It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict proof should not affect public justice and cause public mischief because the courts are required to be vigilant so that in the ultimate eventuate there is no real failure of justice. 21.7. 21.6. It is to be kept in mind that adherence to strict proof should not affect public justice and cause public mischief because the courts are required to be vigilant so that in the ultimate eventuate there is no real failure of justice. 21.7. The concept of liberal approach has to encapsule the conception of reasonableness and it cannot be allowed a totally unfettered free play. 21.8. There is a distinction between inordinate delay and a delay of short duration or few days, for to the former doctrine of prejudice is attracted whereas to the latter it may not be attracted. That apart, the first one warrants strict approach whereas the second calls for a liberal delineation. 21.9. The conduct, behaviour and attitude of a party relating to its inaction or negligence are relevant factors to be taken into consideration. It is so as the fundamental principle is that the courts are required to weigh the scale of balance of justice in respect of both parties and the said principle cannot be given a total go by in the name of liberal approach. 21.10. If the explanation offered is concocted or the grounds urged in the application are fanciful, the courts should be vigilant not to expose the other side unnecessarily to face such a litigation. 21.11. It is to be borne in mind that no one gets away with fraud, misrepresentation or interpolation by taking recourse to the technicalities of law of limitation. 21.12. The entire gamut of facts are to be carefully scrutinized and the approach should be based on the paradigm of judicial discretion which is founded on objective reasoning and not on individual perception. 21.13 The State or a public body or an entity representing a collective cause should be given some acceptable latitude. 22.1. An application for condonation of delay should be drafted with careful concern and not in a half hazard manner harbouring the notion that the courts are required to condone delay on the bedrock of the principle that adjudication of a lis on merits is seminal to justice dispensation system. 22.2. An application for condonation of delay should not be dealt with in a routine manner on the base of individual philosophy which is basically subjective. 22.3. 22.2. An application for condonation of delay should not be dealt with in a routine manner on the base of individual philosophy which is basically subjective. 22.3. Though no precise formula can be laid down regard being had to the concept of judicial discretion, yet a conscious effort for achieving consistency and collegiality of the adjudicatory system should be made as that is the ultimate institutional motto. 22.4. The increasing tendency to perceive delay as a non- serious matter and, hence, lackadaisical propensity can be exhibited in a non-challant manner requires to be curbed, of course, within legal parameters.” 10. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Basawaraj and another vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer, (2013) 14 SCC 81 have held that “sufficient cause” cannot be liberally interpreted if negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides is attributed to the party. Even though limitation may harshly affect rights of a party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when prescribed by statute. Their Lordships have held as under: “9. Sufficient cause is the cause for which defendant could not be blamed for his absence. The meaning of the word "sufficient" is "a dequate" or "enough", inasmuch as may be necessary to answer the purpose intended. Therefore, the word "sufficient" embraces no more than that which provides a platitude, which when the act done suffices to accomplish the purpose intended in the facts and circumstances existing in a case, duly examined from the view point of a reasonable standard of a cautious man. In this context, "sufficient cause" means that the party should not have acted in a negligent manner or there was a want of bona fide on its part in view of the facts and circumstances of a case or it cannot be alleged that the party has "not acted diligently" or "remained inactive". However, the facts and circumstances of each case must afford sufficient ground to enable the Court concerned to exercise discretion for the reason that whenever the Court exercises discretion, it has to be exercised judiciously. The applicant must satisfy the Court that he was prevented by any “sufficient cause” from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the Court should not allow the application for condonation of delay. The applicant must satisfy the Court that he was prevented by any “sufficient cause” from prosecuting his case, and unless a satisfactory explanation is furnished, the Court should not allow the application for condonation of delay. The court has to examine whether the mistake is bona fide or was merely a device to cover an ulterior purpose. (See: Manindra Land and Building Corporation Ltd. v. Bhootnath Banerjee & Ors., AIR 1964 SC 1336 ; Lala Matadin v. A. Narayanan , AIR 1970 SC 1953 ; Parimal v. Veena @ Bharti AIR 2011 SC 1150 ; and Maniben Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai AIR 2012 SC 1629 .) 10. In Arjun Singh v. Mohindra Kumar, AIR 1964 SC 993 this Court explained the difference between a “good cause” and a “sufficient cause” and observed that every “sufficient cause” is a good cause and vice versa. However, if any difference exists it can only be that the requirement of good cause is complied with on a lesser degree of proof that that of “sufficient cause”. 11. The expression “sufficient cause” should be given a liberal interpretation to ensure that substantial justice is done, but only so long as negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides cannot be imputed to the party concerned, whether or not sufficient cause has been furnished, can be decided on the facts of a particular case and no straitjacket formula is possible. (Vide: Madanlal v. Shyamlal, AIR 2002 SC 100 ; and Ram Nath Sao @ Ram Nath Sahu & Ors. v. Gobardhan Sao & Ors., AIR 2002 SC 1201 .) 12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes. The Court has no power to extend the period of limitation on equitable grounds. “A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A Court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation.” The statutory provision may cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but the Court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect to the same. The legal maxim “dura lex sed lex” which means “the law is hard but it is the law”, stands attracted in such a situation. The legal maxim “dura lex sed lex” which means “the law is hard but it is the law”, stands attracted in such a situation. It has consistently been held that, “inconvenience is not” a decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a statute. "330. Policy of Limitation Acts. The courts have expressed at least three differing reasons supporting the existence of statutes of limitations namely, (1) that long dormant claims have more of cruelty than justice in them, (2) that a defendant might have lost the evidence to disprove a stale claim, and (3) that persons with good causes of actions should pursue them with reasonable diligence". An unlimited limitation would lead to a sense of insecurity and uncertainty, and therefore, limitation prevents disturbance or deprivation of what may have been acquired in equity and justice by long enjoyment or what may have been lost by a party's own inaction, negligence' or laches. (See: Popat and Kotecha Property v. State Bank of India Staff Assn. (2005) 7 SCC 510 ; Rajendar Singh & Ors. v. Santa Singh & Ors., AIR 1973 SC 2537 ; and Pundlik Jalam Patil v. Executive Engineer, Jalgaon Medium Project, (2008) 17 SCC 448 ). 14. In P. Ramachandra Rao v. State of Karnataka, AIR 2002 SC1856 , this Court held that judicially engrafting principles of limitation amounts to legislating and would fly in the face of law laid down by the Constitution Bench in A. R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, AIR 1992 SC 1701 . 15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that where a case has been presented in the court beyond limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to what was the “sufficient cause” which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be negligent, or for want of bonafide on his part in the facts and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this court in regard to the condonation of delay. No court could be justified in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only within the parameters laid down by this court in regard to the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time condoning the delay without any justification, putting any condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to showing utter disregard to the legislature.” 11. There is inaction, lethargy and utter negligence on the part of the company in filing the appeal. The grounds taken in the application for condonation of delay do not constitute “sufficient cause”. 12. Accordingly, in view of the discussions and analysis made hereinabove, there is no merit in the application and the same is dismissed.