JUDGMENT 1. - This appeal under Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter 'the Act of 1894') has been filed against the order dated 06.03.2013, passed by the Civil Judge (Sr. Division), Alwar in case No.38/101/2006, whereby the reference at the instance of the applicant-respondent under Section 18 of the Act of 1894 was allowed and the award dated 10.04.2006, passed by the Land Acquisition Officer (hereinafter 'LAO') for a sum of Rs. 51,26,766/- enhanced to Rs. 1,32,80,000/- plus solatium amount @ 30% thereof in terms of Section 23(2) of the Act of 1894 and an additional amount @ 12% p.a. from the date of the notification i.e. 12.09.2005 till the date of payment in terms of Section 23(1A) of the Act of 1894. 2. The facts of the case are that the State Government issued a notification under Section 4 of the Act of 1894 on 12.09.2005 for acquisition of about 431.82 hectare land for extension of Industrial Area Nimrana, in villages Janksinghpura, Madhosinghpura, Kali Pahadi, Majrakath in Tehsil Behror, District Alwar. Due compliance's having been made with the procedural provisions under the Act of 1894, an award came to be passed by the LAO on 10.04.2006. The award included the land of the respondent as it was recorded as the owner and in possession of 0.83 hectare land in village Majarakath. Thus sum found payable to the respondent as compensation was Rs. 51,26,766/- payable on all count under the Act of 1894. On an application made by the respondent to the LAO expressing dissatisfaction with the amount of compensation and seeking enhanced compensation, a reference under Section 18 of the Act of 1894 was made to the competent civil court. By the impugned order dated 06.03.2013, the compensation has been enhanced as detailed here-in-above. Hence this appeal. 3. Mr. Ajeet Bhandari, appearing for the appellant-RIICO, has made twofold submissions. The first contention is that the impugned order dated 06.03.2013 passed by the Civil Judge (S.D.), Alwar is vitiated on account of the fact that the land acquired by the appellant-RIICO has been considered to be residential in nature and not agricultural as was found by the Land Acquisition Officer. Ajeet Bhandari, appearing for the appellant-RIICO, has made twofold submissions. The first contention is that the impugned order dated 06.03.2013 passed by the Civil Judge (S.D.), Alwar is vitiated on account of the fact that the land acquired by the appellant-RIICO has been considered to be residential in nature and not agricultural as was found by the Land Acquisition Officer. It was submitted that albeit vide order dated 24.01.1996 (Ex-2 ) and order dated 31.01.1996 (Ex-3) as also another order dated 30.01.1996 (Ex-4), the land in the ownership of the respondent was converted from agricultural to residential, yet the conversion was conditional upon the land being put to residential use within a period of two years. He submits that the land was not so used within two years and even till the date of the notification i.e. 12.09.2005 and its ultimate acquisition. Consequently the land in issue should have been deemed to have reverted to its original nature and character of agricultural land. Counsel has invoked Section 90A of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, 1956 (hereinafter 'the Act of 1956') in support of his argument and submitted that breach of condition of the conversion to residential user in fact entailed the respondent rendered a trespasser in his own land and for from enhanced compensation as granted by the lower court, the respondent was entitled to any compensation whatsoever. That argument however overlooks the fact that the respondent was not so treated even by the LAO in his award dated 10.04.2006 and indeed granted a lower compensation and in fact granted compensation of Rs. 51,26,766/-. That aspect aside, as the argument has been made, it would be appropriate to reproduce Sub-sections 2, 3, 4, & 5 of Section 90A of the Act of 1956. 90A- Use of agricultural land for non-agricultural purpose : (1) ............... (2) Any such person desiring to use such land or any part thereof for any purpose other than that of agricultural shall apply for the requisite permission in the prescribed manner and to the prescribed officer or authority and every such application shall contain the prescribed particulars. (3) The State Government shall, after making or causing to be made due enquiry in the prescribed manner, either refuse the permission applied for or grant the same subject to the prescribed terms and conditions. (3) The State Government shall, after making or causing to be made due enquiry in the prescribed manner, either refuse the permission applied for or grant the same subject to the prescribed terms and conditions. (4) When any such land or part thereof is permitted to be used for any purpose other that than of agriculture, the person to whom such permission is granted shall be liable to pay to the State Government in respect thereof - (a) an urban assessment levied at such rate and in accordance with such manner is may be laid down in rules to be made in this behalf by the State Government; or (b) such amount by way of premium as may be prescribed by the State Government; or (c) both. (5) If any such land is so used- (a) without the written permission of the State Government being first obtained, or (b) otherwise than in accordance with the terms and conditions of such permission, or (c) after such permission having been refused under sub-section (3), or (d) without making any of the payments referred to sub-section (4), the person originally, holding the land as aforesaid for the purpose of agriculture as well as all subsequent transferees, if any, shall be deemed to be a trespasser or trespassers, as the case may be, and shall be liable to ejectment from such land in accordance with Section 91 as if he or they had occupied or continued to occupy such land without lawful authority and to every such proceeding the provisions of Section 212 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act, 1955 (Rajasthan Act 3 of 1955) shall apply as if such land were in danger being wasted, damaged or alienated : Provided that State Government may, in lieu of having such person and the subsequent transferees so ejected from the land in question, allow him or them, as the case may be, to retain such land, use the same for any purpose other than that of agriculture on payment to the State Government, in addition to the urban assessment and premium payable under sub-section (4) of such fine by way penalty as may be prescribed. 4. Reference has also been made to the Rajasthan Land Revenue (Conversion of Agricultural Land for Non-Agricultural Purposes in Rural Areas) Rules 1992 (hereinafter 'the Rules of 1992'), more particularly to Rule 13 thereof which reads as under : 13. 4. Reference has also been made to the Rajasthan Land Revenue (Conversion of Agricultural Land for Non-Agricultural Purposes in Rural Areas) Rules 1992 (hereinafter 'the Rules of 1992'), more particularly to Rule 13 thereof which reads as under : 13. Use of land after conversion-Any agricultural land, converted for a non agricultural purpose, shall be used for such converted purpose within a period of two years from the date of issue of the conversion order failing which the conversion order shall be withdrawn and the amount of premium deposited shall be forfeited to the State Government : Provided that the said period of two years may be extended by one year by the next higher authority, if such higher authority is satisfied. Provided further that an opportunity of being heard shall be given before passing an order of forfeiture of the premium. Provided also that if such land could not be used for non-agricultural proposes within the period as prescribed above, the State Government may extend the period further as deemed proper. In such cases the applicant shall move application through the Divisional Commissioner who after examination of the case, forward the same to be State Government with his comments. 5. The submission of Mr. Bhandari is that the non-user or delay in user of the converted land as per time period set out in the conversion order falls under clause (b) of Section 91A(5) of the Act of 1956 consequent to which in terms of clause (d) thereof, the respondent was rendered a trespasser even over his/own land. He submits that even though Rule 13 of the Rules of 1992, promulgated by the State Government in the exercise of its power conferred by clause (xi-A) of Sub-section (2) of Section 261 read with Section 90A of the Act of 1956, provides that the period of two years for user of land for the purposes it was converted for could be extended by one year by the next higher authority and beyond that by the State Government and no forfeiture could follow without an opportunity of being heard to the beneficial of the conversion, the said Rule is of little avail to the respondent as it stand in derogation of the substantive provisions of Section 90A of the Act of 1956. He submits that consequently the respondent ought to have been deemed as a trespasser and so treated with no rights over the land acquired. He reiterated that what of enhanced compensation, even the award of Rs. 51,26,766/- to the respondent was unwarranted and contrary to law in respect whereof RIICO will take proceedings for recovery of amount as wrongly paid. 6. I find no force whatsoever in the submission made which is without any basis. For one, clause (b) of Section 90A(5) of the Act of 1956 on which reliance has been placed by Mr. Bhandari would apply, in my considered opinion, only to situations of a misuser of the land converted (for purposes other than converted) and would not attract to a cause of delay in the user for the purpose for which the land was converted.In fact Rule 13 of the Rules of 1992 necessitates such an interpretation, for otherwise Rule 13 shall be rendered completely otiose. In my considered opinion, there is an apparent difference between a misuser of a land converted contrary to the purpose for which it was so converted and mere delay in the user of the land converted. While in the first situation of misuser, Section 90A(5) of the Act of 1894 could conceivably be attracted, in cases of delay in the user of the land for the purpose of which it was concerted, Rule 13 of the Rules of 1992 alone would be operational. The said Rule deals with situation of delay in putting the land converted to the user as intended within a period of two years and even thereafter. Further on the principle of harmonising the rules promulgated under an act with its substantive provisions such an interpretation would also be warranted. The submission made by Mr. Bhandari on this court therefore deserves to be rejected. It is no-body's case that any order of forfeiture in respect of the land converted was ever passed by the State Government by resort to Rule 13 of the Rules of 1992. No notice admittedly was ever issued to the respondent for the delay in the user of the land converted for residential purpose. It is no-body's case that any order of forfeiture in respect of the land converted was ever passed by the State Government by resort to Rule 13 of the Rules of 1992. No notice admittedly was ever issued to the respondent for the delay in the user of the land converted for residential purpose. No opportunity of hearing was given and so therefore it cannot be countenanced that the land converted stood forfeited to the State Government under Rule 13 of the Rules of 1992 or the respondent's status over the land was only as a trespasser. That being the position, in my considered opinion, the nature of the land acquired continued to remain residential in terms of the conversion orders passed by the State Government from time to time as referred to here-in-above and mutation made accordingly. 7. The second contention of Mr. Bhandari is that the enhancement of the compensation by the court below has been made on the ipse dixit of the court below and contrary to the principles laid down for determination of real market value of the land under Section 23 of the Act of 1894. Counsel has drawn the attention of this Court to a complete absence of evidence with regard to the market price of the land acquired on the date of the issue of the notification under Section 4 of the Act of 1894 i.e. 12.09.2005. He submits that a bare reading of the impugned order dated 06.03.2013 indicates that the market value of Rs. 1,600/- per square meter has been arrived at completely arbitrarily on the basis of impermissible backward extrapolation from the subsequent rates prevailing in the area upto three to five years after the date of the notification dated 12.09.2005, such as auction notices of 15.07.2008 and 07.01.2009. It has been submitted that the court below illegally also took into consideration the subsequent rates prevailing in the area as on 09.02.2011 which as per the say of the witness of the respondent one, M.P. Goyal was Rs. 3,000/-. He submits that there was no evidence whatsoever with regard to the market value of the property acquired as of 12.09.2005 and consequently in terms of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ramanlal Deochand Shah v. State of Maharashtra & Anr. 3,000/-. He submits that there was no evidence whatsoever with regard to the market value of the property acquired as of 12.09.2005 and consequently in terms of the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ramanlal Deochand Shah v. State of Maharashtra & Anr. [ AIR 2013 SC 3452 ] , the burden being on the applicant seeking enhancement of compensation and the applicant having filed to discharge the said burden, the reference ought to have been dismissed. He submits that contrarily the compensation without any justification has been enhanced to Rs. 1,32,80,000/- plus solatium amount @ 30% thereof in terms of Section 23(2) of the Act of 1894 and an additional amount @ 12% p.a. under Section 23(1A) of the Act of 1894 as also future interest in terms of Section 34 of the Act of 1894. This counsel submitted warranting the setting aside of the impugned order dated 06.03.2013. 8. Mr. Mahendra Singh, appearing for the respondent-applicant, would however submit that the principle for determination of compensation for land acquired under the Act of 1894 is that some evidence at the instance of the applicant and material to show the rates in the area at the time of Section 4 Land Acquisition Act 1894 notification suffices. He submits that the market rate of the land acquired has not to be proved to a mathematical exactitude and probabilities of the case on the true market rate where warranted are enough for determination of compensation. Hence some amount of guesswork is permissible. He further submits that the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that where the land acquired is converted and sold, the compensation in respect thereof can be determined by going backwards from the price at which allotment had been made by the acquiring authority excluding the cost of development. He submits that in the context of the aforesaid principle, the determination of compensation Rs. 1,600/- per square meter in respect of the land acquired with reference to the rates at the auction of 15.07.2008 and 07.01.2009 as also the rates as of 09.02.2011 is wholly legal, valid and just. 9. Heard. Considered. 10. He submits that in the context of the aforesaid principle, the determination of compensation Rs. 1,600/- per square meter in respect of the land acquired with reference to the rates at the auction of 15.07.2008 and 07.01.2009 as also the rates as of 09.02.2011 is wholly legal, valid and just. 9. Heard. Considered. 10. As held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ramanlal Deochand Shah (Supra), proceedings under Section 18 of the Act of 1894 are in the nature of an original suit and as in a original suit the burden lies on the plaintiff to prove the case set up before the court for enhancement of compensation by adducing positive and concrete evidence in support of the compensation claimed. Oddly in the instant case, a bare look at issue No.1 framed by the court below indicates that the burden with regard to market value for the land acquired was placed not on the respondent-applicant, but on the appellant-RIICO, the non-applicant before the lower court. The erroneous approach by the court below was further exacerbated by the lower court having failed to insist upon any evidence of probative worth from the respondent-applicant's side in regard to the market price of the land acquired as on the date of notification under Section 4 of the Act of 1894 i.e. 12.09.2005. In my considered view, compensation cannot be determined on the basis of mere surmises, conjecture and even extrapolation / approximation with reference to the sale price of the land several years subsequent to the date of notification under Section 4 of the Act of 1894. A bare look at the impugned order evidences the fact that the compensation has been enhanced on the mere ipse dixit of the respondent-applicant as stated in its witness's affidavit in evidence before the court below without any documentary support as to the extant market value of the land acquired on the date of the Section 4 notification under the Act of 1894. To my mind that is a completely unsatisfactory state of affairs and public monies cannot be so causally expanded by the enhancement of award contrary to law. On this count, the compensation having been enhanced without any evidence of probative worth for the purpose, the appellant-RIICO is entitled to succeed. It is held that the determination of enhanced compensation for the land acquired Rs. On this count, the compensation having been enhanced without any evidence of probative worth for the purpose, the appellant-RIICO is entitled to succeed. It is held that the determination of enhanced compensation for the land acquired Rs. 1,600/- per square meter plus further amount under Sections 23(1A) and 23(2) and Section 34 of the Act of 1894 is wholly illegal, perverse and based on no evidence. Therefore, to that extent, the order dated 06.03.2013, passed by the lower court is liable to be quashed and set aside. 11. There would have been substance in the submission of Mr. Bhandari appearing for the appellant-RIICO that the respondent-applicant having failed to adduce requisite evidence before the court below justifying the enhancement of compensation with reference to the market rate of the land acquired as of 12.09.2005 i.e. the date of notification under Section 4 of the Act of 1894, the entire reference was deserving of dismissal, if it had not been for the fact that the LAO in passing the award under Section 11 of the Act of 1894 on 10.04.2006 committed an apparent illegality holding that in spite of the land being recorded after formal conversion by the competent authority for residential user, the respondent-applicant was only entitled to compensation treating the land acquired as agricultural. Consequently, this fundamental error in determining the nature of the land acquired by the LAO while passing the award renders it necessary that the matter be remanded to the lower court for determination afresh of the market price of the land acquired on the basis of evidence at the instance of the respondent-applicant as to the market price of the land acquired prevailing as of 12.09.2005 i.e. the date of notification under Section 4 of the Act of 1894. 12. Consequently, the order dated 06.03.2013 is quashed and set aside and the matter is remanded to the lower court for decision on the matter afresh based on evidence with regard to the market price of the land acquired as of 12.09.2005 treating the land to be residential in nature. 13. The civil misc. appeal stands disposed of accordingly. Stay application needs no address in view of the appeal itself being disposed of.Appeal Disposed of. *******