Anil Kumar, J. – Matter is taken in revised cause list. None appears on behalf of the respondent. Heard Shri Mohd. Arif Khan, senior advocate and perused record. Controversy in the present case relates to a premises situated in Mall building No. 4, Ashok Marg, Lucknow which is bounded as under: - East - Other property West - Lane North - Raja Ram Kumar Marg South - Other Property of S. Dwivedi M/s. Chandra Agro Pvt. Ltd. is landlord of the said premises which has been let out to the Bank of India. The tenancy of the defendant/bank was month to month starting on 1st day of English calendar. 2. As the said building is not covered by the provisions of U.P. Act 13 of 1972 so the plaintiff sent a notice under section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act to the Bank at its registered Head Office at Mumbai as well as Lucknow office that the tenancy of the defendant in respect to the premises in question would come to end on the expiry of 30 days from the date of receipt of the said notice by defendant. The Bank was further asked to vacate the premises in question after expiry of the period as given in the notice. In the notice, it is clearly mentioned that if the Bank does not vacate the possession of the premises in question then the plaintiff will charge damages for such illegal use and occupation at the rate as mentioned in the said notice per month till the plaintiff gets the possession of the said premises. 3. The said notice was served upon the Bank, in spite of the service of the notice and the termination of the tenancy as per the terms of the notice Bank had not delivered the possession and remain in occupation of the premises, so the M/S. Chandra Agro respondent-plaintiff filed as suit for arrears of rent, ejectment and damages registered as SCC Suit No. 26 of 1996 in the Court of District Judge Lucknow, subsequently transferred to the Additional District Judge Court No. 7, Lucknow. After exchange of the pleadings as well as evidence the Court below in order to decide the controversy involved in the case framed the following points: (1) Relationship of the landlord and tenant, as the same is not disputed; (2) Rate of monthly rent, as the same is not disputed, (3) Legality of the notice dated 30.4.1996 sent by the plaintiff to the defendant, 4. The points, which would be relevant to be decided as framed by the Court below, are follows: (1) Whether the plaintiff is entitled to get the amount, as prayed for by him, in the plaint? (2) To what relief the plaintiff is entitled? 5. The Court below after hearing the learned Counsel for parties on merit and taking into consideration the fact and material/evidence on record by judgment and decree dated 29.5.2003 allowed the suit. The operative portion quoted as under: “The suit of the plaintiff for ejectment and damages is decreed with costs against the defendant. The plaintiff is also entitled to recover damages from the defendant for illegal use and occupation of the suit premises for 31.5.1996, i.e., one day being Rs. 1,894. The plaintiff shall also be entitled to recover pendenti lite and future damages from the defendant at the rate of Rs. 20 per sq. ft. of the covered area in possession of the defendant for illegal use and occupation of the suit property, till the plaintiff gets the possession of the said premises, subject to payment of requisite Court fees. The plaintiff shall also be entitled to receive interest on the amount of damages at the rate of 12% per annum.” 6. Sri Mohd. Arif Khan, Counsel for the revisionist while challenging the impugned order submits that the action on the part of the Court below thereby awarding as damages @ Rs. 20 per sq.ft. for use and occupation of the building in question per day till the premises in question is retained by the Bank is wholly illegal and arbitrary and based on same evidence, so the same is laible to be set aside in view of the law as laid down by this Court in the case of Rakesh Kumar v. Satish Kumar, 2010 (28) LCD 239. 7. He further submits that neither certified Copy of two lease deeds which are basis of awarding as damages @ Rs. 20 per sq.ft. 7. He further submits that neither certified Copy of two lease deeds which are basis of awarding as damages @ Rs. 20 per sq.ft. nor the parties to the said lease deeds have been examined in order to proof the contents of the same. So, the said materials cannot be taken as evidence by the Court below in awarding as damages @ Rs. 20 per sq. ft. In support of his argument, he has placed reliance on the judgment given by the Apex Court in the case of Balraj Taneja and another v. Sunil Madan and another, 1999 (8) SCC 396 =2000 (40) ALR 494 (SC), wherein paras 42 to 45 held as under: “Judgment” as defined in section 2 (9) of the Code of Civil Procedure means the statement given by the Judge of the grounds for a decree or order. What a judgment should contain is indicated in Order XX, Rule 4 (2) which says that a judgment: “shall contain a concise statement of the case, the points for determination, the decision thereon and the reasons for such decision.” It should be a self-contained document from which it should appear as to what were the facts of the case and what was the controversy which was tried to be settled by the Court and in what manner. The process of reasoning by which the Court came to the ultimate conclusion and decreed the suit should be reflected clearly in the judgment. In an old case, namely, Nanhe v. Saiyad Tasadduq Husain, 1912 (15) Oudh Cases 78, it was held that passing of a mere decree was material irregularity within the meaning of section 115 of the Code and that even if the judgment was passed on the basis of the admission made by the defendant, other requirements which go to constitute “judgment” should be complied with. In Thippaiah and others v. Kurt Obaiah, ILR 1980 (2) Kar 1028, it was laid down that the Court must state the grounds for its conclusion in the judgment and the judgment should be in confirmity with the provisions of section 2 (9) of the Code of Civil Procedure. In Dineshwar Prasad Bakshi v. Parmeshwar Prasad Sinha, AIR 1989 Pat. 139 , it was held that the judgment pronounced under Order VIII, Rule 10 must satisfy the requirements of “judgment” as defined in section 2 (9) of the Code. In Dineshwar Prasad Bakshi v. Parmeshwar Prasad Sinha, AIR 1989 Pat. 139 , it was held that the judgment pronounced under Order VIII, Rule 10 must satisfy the requirements of “judgment” as defined in section 2 (9) of the Code. Learned Counsel for respondent No. 1 contended that the provisions of Order XX, Rule 1 (2) would apply only to contested cases as it is only in those cases that “the points for determination” as mentioned in this Rule will have to be indicated, and not in a case in which the written statement has not been filed by the defendants and the facts set out in the plaint are deemed to have been admitted. We do not agree. Whether it is a case which is contested by the defendants by filing a written statement, or a case which proceeds ex parte and is ultimately decided as an ex parte case, or is a case in which the written statement is not filed and the case is decided under Order VIII, Rule 10, the Court has to write a judgment which must be in conformity with the provisions of the Code or at least set out the reasoning by which the controversy is resolved.” 8. Next argument advanced by Shri Mohd. Arif Khan, learned Counsel for the revisionist is that the Court below has not given any finding or reasons thereby awarding 12% pendent lite interest against the Bank to the plaintiff, only reasoning given is that the same is in accordance with the Reserve Bank of India. So the said action on the part of the Court below is contrary to law as laid down in the case of Deputy Commissioner, Kheri Manager, Court of Wards, Mahewa Estate v. Dr. Ram Kumar Saxena, AIR 1941 Oudh 254, wherein paragraph No. 6 has held as under : “The remaining question is one of interest. The learned Civil Judge has relied on Parshadi Lal v. Brij Mohan Lal, (‘36) 23 AIR 1936 Oudh 52 = 159 IC 117 = 11 Luck 550 L = OWN 1217. The law in regard to interest has subsequently been laid down in Madan Theatres Ltd. v. Narayan Das, (40) 27 MANU/OU/0022/1940=AIR 1940 Oudh 257 = 187 IC 849 = 15 Luck 550 = 1940 OWN 395. The law in regard to interest has subsequently been laid down in Madan Theatres Ltd. v. Narayan Das, (40) 27 MANU/OU/0022/1940=AIR 1940 Oudh 257 = 187 IC 849 = 15 Luck 550 = 1940 OWN 395. A creditor can claim interest (1) on the ground of agreement, (2) on the basis of a statute and (3) on the ground of usage. The plaintiff did not base his case on contract or usage. He says that under the practice of his shop, he charges interest at 1 per cent. His practice does not amount to usage. The mere writing on the bills that interest at 1 per cent, will be charged cannot amount to a contract. The interest Act is applicable only when a notice is given that interest will be claimed from the date of demand until the time of payment. No such notice was given in this case. The plaintiff can therefore claim interest only under section 61, Sale of Goods Act for the price of medicines is Rs. 2313-8-0. We allow interest on this amount from 6th October, 1933, till the date of the application at 6 per cent, per annum. The result is that we modify the decree of the Lower Court to this extent only that the respondent will get interest on Rs. 2313-8-0 only at 6 per cent, per annum and not on Rs. 3263-8-0. The claim is allowed for rupees 3263-8-0 with interest on Rs. 2313-8-0 at the rate of 6 per cent, per annum from 6th October 1933, till the date of application that is 3rd January 1936, and thereafter at the rate of Rs. 3-8 per cent, per annum till realization. Parties will receive and pay costs according to their success and failure in both Courts.” 9. Shri Mohd. Arif Khan, learned Counsel for the revisionist also submits that Bank has already handed over the possession of the premises in question to the landlord. 10. I have heard learned Counsel for the revisionist and gone through the record. 11. As per the undisputed facts of the case while awarding Rs. 20 per sq. ft. Shri Mohd. Arif Khan, learned Counsel for the revisionist also submits that Bank has already handed over the possession of the premises in question to the landlord. 10. I have heard learned Counsel for the revisionist and gone through the record. 11. As per the undisputed facts of the case while awarding Rs. 20 per sq. ft. as damages against the Bank for use and occupation of the premises, till the same is in possession of the Bank, the Court below has placed reliance on the xerox/notrized copy of the two lease deeds in respect of the property situated in the same building let out by their owner to the respondents @ Rs. 30 and 35 per sq.ft. respectively and examined himself as P.W. 1 to establish his claim. However, neither certified Copy of the said documents nor the parties to the said two lease deeds were examined/produced as a witness in order to prove the contents of the said documents. So, as per the settled proposition of law, the Court below has erred in placing reliance on the said documents while awarding Rs. 20 per sq.ft. as damages. 12. In the case of H. Siddiqui (Dead) By L.Rs. v. A. Ramalingam, 2011 (4) SCC 240 , Hon’ble Apex Court held as under: “Para No. 12 - Provisions of section 65 of the Act 1872 provide for permitting the parties to adduce secondary evidence. However, such a course is subject to a large number of limitations. In a case where original documents are not produced at any time, nor, any factual foundation has been led for giving secondary evidence, it is not permissible for the Court to allow a party to adduce secondary evidence. Thus, secondary evidence relating to the contents of a documents is inadmissible, until the non production of the original is accounted for, so as to bring it within one or other of the cases provided for in the section. The secondary evidence must be authenticated by foundational evidence that the alleged Copy is in fact a true Copy of the original. Mere admission of a document in evidence does not amount to its proof. Therefore, the documentary evidence is required to be proved in accordance with law. The Court has an obligation to decide the question of admissibility of a document in secondary evidence before making endorsement thereon. Mere admission of a document in evidence does not amount to its proof. Therefore, the documentary evidence is required to be proved in accordance with law. The Court has an obligation to decide the question of admissibility of a document in secondary evidence before making endorsement thereon. (Vide: The Roman Catholic Mission and another v. State of Madras and another, AIR 1966 SC 1457 ; State of Rajasthan and others v. Khemraj and others, AIR 2000 SC 1759 ; Life Insurance Corporation of India and another v. Ram Pal Singh Bisen, (2010) 4 SCC 491 ; and M. Chandra v. M. Thangamuthu and another, 2010 (9) SCC 712 ). Para No. 14 - In our humble opinion, the Trial Court cold not proceed in such an an-warranted manner for the reason that the respondent had merely admitted his signature on the photocopy of the power of attorney out did not admit the contents thereof. More so, the Court should have borne in mind that admissibility of a document or contents thereof may not necessary lead to drawing any interference unless the contents thereof have some probative value.” (See. Ram Suresh Singh v. Prabhat Singh alias Chhote Singh and another, 2009 (6) SCC 681 and Subhash Harnaranji Laddha v. State of Maharastra, 2006 (12) SCC 545 ). 13. Further, the parties to the said lease deeds were not produced as witness in order to prove the contents of the said documents (lease deeds), hence, no reliance can be placed on the said document merely on the evidence given by the plaintiff/P.W. 1 in view of the law as laid down by Hon’ble Apex Court in the case of Ramji Dayawala and Sons (P.) Ltd. Invest Import, AIR 1981 SC 2085 , held as under (relevant paragraph at page 2092): “The question in that case was whether the testatrix was so seriously ill as would result in impairment of her testamentary capacity. To substantiate the degree of illness, a letter and two telegrams written by a nurse were tendered in evidence. The question was whether in the absence of any independent evidence about the testamentary capacity of the testatrix the contents of the letter could be utilised to prove want of testamentary capacity. To substantiate the degree of illness, a letter and two telegrams written by a nurse were tendered in evidence. The question was whether in the absence of any independent evidence about the testamentary capacity of the testatrix the contents of the letter could be utilised to prove want of testamentary capacity. Obviously, in these circumstances the Privy Council observed that the fact that a letter and two telegrams were sent by itself would not prove the truth of the contents of the letter and, therefore, the contents of the letter bearing on the question of lack of testamentary capacity would not be substantive evidence. Undoubtedly, mere proof of the handwriting of a document would not tantamount to proof of all the contents or the facts stated in the document. If the truth of the facts stated in a document is in issue mere proof of the handwriting and execution of the document would not furnish evidence of the truth of the facts or contents of the document. The truth or otherwise of the facts or contents of the document. The truth or otherwise of the facts or contents so stated would have to be proved by admissible evidence, i.e., by the evidence of those persons who can vouch safe for the truth of the facts in issue.” 14. In the case of Subash Maruti Avasare v. State of Maharastra, 2006 (10) SCC 631 , Hon’ble the Apex Court held that “be mere filing of a document, its contents are not proved. A certificate issued by an expert should be brought on record by examining him.” Further, the Court below while awarding Rs. 20 per square feet as damages to the plaintiff-respondent has not given any finding or reasons. So, keeping in view the above said facts, the said action on the part of the Court below is liable to be set aside. 15. 20 per square feet as damages to the plaintiff-respondent has not given any finding or reasons. So, keeping in view the above said facts, the said action on the part of the Court below is liable to be set aside. 15. Next argument advanced by the learned Counsel in respect to the award of interest @ 12% per annum the position which emerges out is that the plaintiff-respondent has demanded interest @ 18% interest as damages from the bank/ revisionist whereas the Court below has awarded @ 12% on the ground that the same is as per Reserve Bank of India but no finding has been given that under what circumstances, the same is in accordance with the Reserve Bank of India, so the said action on the part of the Court below is unsustainable as per section 34 of Code of Civil Procedure which reads as under: - “34. Interest. (1) Where and in so far as a decree is for the payment of money, the Court may, in the decree, order interest at such rate as the Court deems reasonable to be paid on the principal sum adjudged, from the date of the suit to the date of the decree, in additin to any interest adjudged on such principal sum for any period prior to the institution of the suit, with further interest at such rate not exceeding six per cent per annum, as the Court deems reasonable on such principal sum, from the date of the decree to the date of payment, or to such earlier date as the Court thinks fit: Provided that where the liability in relation to the sum so adjudged had arised out of a commercial transaction, the rate of such further interest may exceed six per cent per annum, but shall not exceed the contractual rate of interest or where there is no contractual rate, the rate at which moneys are lent or advanced by nationalized banks in relation to commercial transactions. Explanation I. In this sub-section, “nationalized bank” means a corresponding new bank as defined in the Banking companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act, 1970 (5 of 1970). Explanation II. For the purposes of this section, a transaction is a commercial transaction, if it is connected with the industry, trade or business of the party incurring the liability. Explanation I. In this sub-section, “nationalized bank” means a corresponding new bank as defined in the Banking companies (Acquisition and Transfer of Undertakings) Act, 1970 (5 of 1970). Explanation II. For the purposes of this section, a transaction is a commercial transaction, if it is connected with the industry, trade or business of the party incurring the liability. (2) Where such a decree is silent with respect to the payment of further interest on such principal sum from the date of the decree to the date of payment or other earlier date, the Court shall be deemed to have refused such interest, and a separate suit therefor shall no lie.” 16. Further, it is well settled that payment of interest on the principal sum adjudged, whether pendente lite or future is admittedly on the discretion of the Court. It is also a settled position of law that if interest has not been awarded by the Trial Court, the Appellate Court should not interfere with the same provided good reasons are assigned for awarding of such interest. In a five Judges Bench decision, the Supreme Court in the case of Central Bank of India v. Ravindra and others, 2001 (45) ALR 695 (SC) while dealing with award of interest under section 34 of the Code of Civil Procedure in a suit filed by the Bank for recovery of the loan dues categorically laid down that section 34, C.P.C. is a general in its application and whether it would apply or not and if it would apply to what extent, would obviously depend on the facts and situation of each case. 17. Further, the award of interest pendente lite and post decree is discretionary with the Court as it is essentially governed by section 34, C.P.C. de-hors the contract between the parties. In a given case, if the Court finds that in the principal sum adjudged on the date of the suit the component of interest is disproportionate with the component of the principal sum actually advanced the Court may exercise its discretion in awarding interest pendente lite and post decree interest at a lower rate or may even decline awarding such interest. The discretion shall be exercised fairly, judiciously and for reasons and not in an arbitrary or fanciful manner. 18. The discretion shall be exercised fairly, judiciously and for reasons and not in an arbitrary or fanciful manner. 18. Thus, it would be appropriate to hold that the discretion of the Court under section 34 of the C.P.C. is also available with regard to the period for which pendent lite interest can be awarded. In the facts situation of the present case, where the Trial Court has not assigned any specific reason as why the interest has been awarded @ 12% only on the ground that the same is in accordance with Reserve Bank of India and no other finding has been given is also liable to be set-aside. 19. For the foregoing reasons, the impugned judgment and decree dated 29.5.2003 passed in suit by Addl. District Judge, Court No. 7, Lucknow in SCC No. 26 of 1996 is set-aside to the extent it awards Rs. 20 per sq.ft. So far it is award pendente-lite and future damages to the plaintiff M/S. Chandra Agro against the defendant Bank of India @ Rs. 20 per sq. ft. in respect to the covered area in possession of the defendants for use in occupation of the suit property, also so far it awards that the plaintiff/ M/S. Chandra Agro Pvt. Ltd. is entitled to receive interest on the amount of damages @ 12% per annum and the matter is remanded by the Court below to decide afresh in accordance with law after giving an opportunity of hearing to the parties concerned. The said exercise shall be done expeditiously. 20. With the above observation revision is partly allowed. Revision Partly Allowed. ____________