(ORAL) By filing this second appeal defendant has challenged the concurrent findings of the learned court below whereby plaintiff’s suit was partly decreed to the extent of 1 Bigha 4½ Lechas under PP No. 63 and Dag No. 127 of Batadrawa Mouza in the district of Nagaon. This 1 Bigha 4½ Lechas of land constituted one-fourth of the suit land measuring 4 Bighas 17 Lechas of the aforesaid Dag and Patta. 2. Tihadoi Lalungoni, as plaintiff, instituted Title Suit No. 83/1998 in the court of learned Civil Judge (Jr. Divn.) No.2, Nagaon stating that land measuring 4 Bighas 17 Lechas covered by Dag No. 127 of PP No. 63 under Batadrawa Mouza in the district of Nagaon was originally owned by one Badak Lalung, her grandfather. The land was covered by K.P. No. 56 and Dag No. 208 at that time but during settlement operation in the year 1968-69 the land was resurveyed into K.P. No. 14 and Dag No. 204. In the mean time Badak Lalung had died and his only son Kalia Lalung had inherited the whole plot of 4 Bighas 17 Lechas of land. This land was thereafter resurveyed in P.P. No. 63 and Dag No. 127. Kalia Lalung died in the year 1998 leaving behind his widow Ferferi Lalungoni and four daughters, namely, Dilmai Lalungoni, Silmai Lalungoni, Sonmai Lalungoni and Tihadoi Lalungoni. After death of Kalia Lalung, the land was amicably partitioned among all his legal heirs and the plaintiff claimed to have got a separate share measuring 1 Bigha 4½ Lechas as their mother Ferferi had also died in the mean time. It is the further case of the plaintiff that after her marriage she went to live with her husband in the district of Karbi Anglong in the year 1993 but when she came in 1997 she found that the defendant Sarukan Deka Raja was in possession of the land and he refused to part with it when he was so requested by the plaintiff on 15.07.1997. Moreover, he got his name mutated in the records of right in the mean time. Situated thus, plaintiff instituted the suit praying for declaration of her right, title and interest over 4 Bighas 17 Lechas of land and also for eviction of the principal defendant. 3. Moreover, he got his name mutated in the records of right in the mean time. Situated thus, plaintiff instituted the suit praying for declaration of her right, title and interest over 4 Bighas 17 Lechas of land and also for eviction of the principal defendant. 3. Appearing in the case the defendant Sarukan Deka Raja submitted written statement and in paragraph 6 of the said written statement he took a specific stand that the suit of the plaintiff is barred by res judicata. In the said paragraph the defendant stated that earlier, plaintiff’s mother and one sister had instituted title suit being No. 84/1992 praying for declaration of their right, title and interest with respect to the same land measuring 4 Bighas 17 Lechas and the suit was decreed. The defendant claimed to have preferred an appeal being T.A. 21/1994 in the court of learned Civil Judge (Sr. Divn.) and thereupon the appeal was allowed and the decree passed by the learned Trial court was set aside. No appeal was preferred by the plaintiffs of the suit against the aforesaid appellate judgment and decree passed in T.A. 21/1994 and under such circumstances the second suit i.e. T.S. No. 83/1998 was described to be barred by the principle of res judicata. Apart from the aforesaid preliminary objection, the defendant denied the averments made in the plaint and claimed that he has been occupying the land from the time prior to 1976. He further stated that the suit land was originally covered by annual Patta in the name of Badak Lalung who handed over the possession to the defendant 42 (43) years ago having received due consideration. As the land was covered by annual patta, no document was executed by the parties. Subsequently the land was converted into Periodic Patta after death of Badak Lalung for which Kalia Lalung, in discharge of his pious obligation, executed a registered relinquishment deed on 09.10.1975 with respect to entire 4 Bighas 17 Lechas of land in favour of the defendant. It was further pleaded that the defendant had been enjoying the land without any let or hindrance from any quarter. 4. Upon such rival pleadings of the parties, the learned Trial court framed as many as 9 (nine) issues. These issues are given below: i. Whether there is cause of action for the suit? ii. Whether the suit is maintainable in its present form? iii. 4. Upon such rival pleadings of the parties, the learned Trial court framed as many as 9 (nine) issues. These issues are given below: i. Whether there is cause of action for the suit? ii. Whether the suit is maintainable in its present form? iii. Whether the suit is barred by law of limitation as under Article 64 and 65? iv. Whether the suit is hit by multifariousness causes of action? v. Whether the suit is hit by waiver, estoppels and acquiescence? vi. Whether the suit is hit by principles of res judicata under Section 11 of C.P.C.? vii. Whether the suit land is owned and possessed by defendant as his purchased land? viii. Whether the suit land is inherited as share of plaintiff as alleged and has got right, title and interest and entitled to Khas possession by evicting the defendant? ix. To what relief and reliefs the parties are entitled? It would appear from the above that issue No. 6 was in regard to bar of res judicata under Section 11 of C.P.C. and issue No. 8 was in regard to claim of right, title and interest of plaintiff over the suit land. The learned Trial court held that the suit of the plaintiff was not barred by the principle of res judicata. In so doing, the learned Trial court held that by appellate judgment in T.A. 21/1994 which was exhibited as Ext.4, the learned court had merely set aside the judgment and decree of the Trial court holding that the Trial court judgment was not passed on law and facts in respect of defendant No.1. while judgment in T.S. 83/1998 was finally decided. The appellate judgment in T.A. 21/1998 nowhere discloses that any of the issues involved in T.S. 84/1992 was finally decided. According to the learned Trial court the appellate judgment in Ext. 4 did not arrive at any decision at all. With these observations and on the facts stated above, particularly relying on Ext. 1 and 2, the learned Trial court partly decreed the suit of the plaintiff in regard to one-fourth of the suit land being share of Tihadoi. This trial court judgment and decree was passed on 23.08.2002. 5. The defendant challenged the trial court decree before the first Appellate court by T.A. 19/2002. 1 and 2, the learned Trial court partly decreed the suit of the plaintiff in regard to one-fourth of the suit land being share of Tihadoi. This trial court judgment and decree was passed on 23.08.2002. 5. The defendant challenged the trial court decree before the first Appellate court by T.A. 19/2002. The learned first Appellate court upheld the finding of the learned Trial court by its judgment and decree dated 05.07.2004 and dismissed the appeal. It is against these judgments, the present second appeal has been preferred by the defendant. 6. This court while admitting the second appeal on 12.01.2005 framed as many as 3 (three) substantial questions of law and the same are quoted below: i. Whether the plaintiff’s shit is barred by res judicata? ii. Whether the plaintiff’s suit is barred by limitation? iii. Whether the Court below acted beyond jurisdiction in deciding the suit by splitting the suit land? 7. I have heard Mr. P Mahanta, learned counsel for the appellant and Mr. SK Barkataki, learned counsel for the respondent. To appreciate and decide the first substantial question of law in regard to the bar of res judicata, I have gone through the exhibits 3 and 4 which are the judgments passed by the learned Trial court and Appellate court on the earlier occasion in T.S. 84/1992 and T.A. 21/1994 respectively. In paragraph 14 of the appellate judgment the learned Appellate court in T.A. 21/1994 observed as follows: “Even then the appellant/defendant No.1 has succeeded in proving his stand on this score also thereby defeating the plaintiff’s claim against him as found above.” In paragraph 13 of Ext. 4 the learned Appellate court took note of registered relinquishment deed dated 24.10.1975 executed by Kalia Lalung in favour of the present defendant and the said deed was described as Ext. Gha. This appellate judgment also keeps on record that Kalia Lalung had discharged his pious obligation by executing the deed of relinquishment. The learned court below also held that the land revenue payment receipts justify defendant No.1’s claim. Relying on Ext. Ka of the said suit which was the Jamabandi of 1968-69 it was recorded in Ext. 4 that defendant No. 1’s name was mutated in place of Kalia Lalung in respect of the suit land covered by P.P. No. 63. Thus a perusal of Ext. Relying on Ext. Ka of the said suit which was the Jamabandi of 1968-69 it was recorded in Ext. 4 that defendant No. 1’s name was mutated in place of Kalia Lalung in respect of the suit land covered by P.P. No. 63. Thus a perusal of Ext. 4 shows that the learned first Appellate court in T.A. 21/1994 discussed about devolution of title with regard to 4 Bighas 17 Lechas covered by P.P. No. 63 on the defendant No.1 of the said suit. The defendant No. 1 of the earlier suit is none other than the defendant in the present suit. The plaintiffs in the former suit were the own mother and a sister of the present plaintiff. The identity of the title claimed by the plaintiffs in the earlier suit and the present suit, therefore, is also the same. Even in the earlier suit the plaintiffs had claimed that the land originally belonged to Badak Lalung which devolved on Kalia Lalung after the death of Badak Lalung and thereafter when Kalia Lalung died, it devolved equally on his widow and 4 (four) daughters. His widow Ferferi and Sonmai had filed suit for the whole plot of land measuring 4 Bighas 17 Lechas describing the present defendant as a trespasser. Defendant had also taken the same stand as taken in the present case and claimed that he had purchased the land from Badak Lalung and Kalia Lalung when the suit land was covered by annual patta. Subsequently when the land was converted into periodic patta land, Kalia Lalung had executed relinquishment deed in his favour on receipt of Rs. 6,000/- (Rupees six thousand) only. The defence of the defendant as well as the claim of title of the plaintiff in both the suits are identical as stated above in Ext. 4. The learned first Appellate court in T.A. 21/1994 arrived at a positive finding that defendant’s stand was proved and that plaintiff’s claim was not maintainable. This being the position, there is finality as to adjudication of title. Although the present plaintiff was not the plaintiff there but was impleaded as pro-forma defendant. In the case of Raj Lakshmi Dasi Vs. Banamali Sen ( AIR 1953 SC 33 ), the entitlement of the parties for compensation under Land Acquisition Act, 1894 in respect to an acquired property was determined in a reference case. Although the present plaintiff was not the plaintiff there but was impleaded as pro-forma defendant. In the case of Raj Lakshmi Dasi Vs. Banamali Sen ( AIR 1953 SC 33 ), the entitlement of the parties for compensation under Land Acquisition Act, 1894 in respect to an acquired property was determined in a reference case. The decision depended in determination of title to the property. So, when in a subsequent regular suit on claim title the parties entered into litigation, it was held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that there being identity of property involved, the bar of res judicata applies. Here in this case same land measuring 4 Bighas 17 Lechas under same dag and patta with same boundary came up for consideration before the court and since the identity of the actual property as same in both the suits and there was finality in earlier round of litigation the suit of the plaintiff in T.S. 83/1998 is barred by res judicata. The first substantial question of law is, accordingly, decided in favour of the appellant/defendant. 8. Having found that the suit of the plaintiff is barred by res judicata the other two substantial questions of law do not require any further adjudication. The learned counsel has not argued the substantial questions of law No. (i) and (ii) and the same are not adjudicated. In the result, the second appeal is allowed. Judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial court is upheld and hereby set aside. 9. No order as to costs.